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Abstract 
 
The study begins by investigating Thailand‘s administration of its mineral 
resources and those of some other leading mineral-exporting countries for comparison.  
The notion of ‗resource curse‘, which affects many resource-rich countries, and an 
analysis how Thailand fought and won the ‗curse‘ is critically explored.  The principle 
of sustainable development and its implication to Thailand are presented, together with 
various computed indicators of sustainable development for Thailand. The role of 
mineral resources and Hotelling‘s model in the context of sustainable development are 
discussed. 
The essence of this study is the development of economic models to determine 
the optimal extraction paths of Thailand‘s gypsum resources based on Hotelling's 
concept of maximizing Net Present Value (NPV) of benefits accrued to the country.  
This study finds that under all assumptions and all scenarios, at a certain point in time, 
Thailand should stop exporting its gypsum and devote the remainder of its gypsum 
resources to domestic consumption only. In addition, Thailand should push gypsum 
price up to a certain level.  The model determining gypsum consumption in Thailand 
and some countries imported gypsum from Thailand, which are the basis to determine 
the optimal extraction paths of gypsum in Thailand, is also developed.  It shows that the 
price of gypsum had no effect on its consumption.  In other words, the demand for 
gypsum might be highly inelastic.  Finally, the long-term policies for Thailand to 
manage its gypsum resource are recommended. 
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Chapter 1    An Introduction to the Construction Mineral 
Industries in Thailand 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 What are the Construction Mineral Industries?  
To construct most structures: buildings, concrete bridges, and roads, Portland 
cement and aggregates
1
 are required.  For decorating a building, dimension stones
2
 are 
among consumers‘ choices.  Therefore, construction minerals can be divided into three 
groups: Portland cement group, aggregate group, and dimension stone group.  
Important chemical compositions of Portland cement consist of calcium oxide 
(CaO), silicon dioxide (SiO2), aluminium oxide (Al2O3) and iron oxide (Fe2O3). 
Therefore, minerals used in the production of Portland cement are low-magnesium 
limestone, shale, and iron ore.  In addition to the three aforementioned minerals, 
gypsum is normally added to the product as the retarder to prolong the setting time of 
the Portland cement. 
The aggregate group comprises sand, pebbles, and crushed stones.  In Thailand, 
the production of pebbles is negligible, while the production of sand for construction is 
huge and widespread.  However, their industries, which are not overseen by the 
Department of Primary Industries and Mines, DPIM, will not be studied in this research 
because their problems are not prominent and their statistics are scant and difficult to 
compile. The resources of crushed stones are limestone, granite, basalt, and hard 
sandstone. In Thailand, to produce crushed stones, limestone rock is the first choice. 
                                                 
1
 Aggregates comprise sand, gravel, and crushed stone that are mixed with Portland cement to make concrete or 
with asphalt to make road pavement. 
2
 Dimension stones are solid rocks that, after cut and polished, are used as floor or wall tiles, tables, etc. 
2 
 
Granite, basalt, and hard sandstone are crushed locally where limestone outcrops
3
 are 
absent. 
Dimension stone group is composed of marble, granite, limestone, and some 
other calcium carbonate minerals. Minerals in this group need to be solid and have an 
attractive colour suitable to make floor and wall tiles. 
1.1.2 An Overview of the Construction Mineral Industries in Thailand 
From geological points of view, Thailand is rather well endowed with a variety 
of mineral resources.  At present, Thailand produces about 40 kinds of minerals mainly 
for domestic consumption.  In the past, mining industry as a whole used to play a 
significant role in the economic development of the country.  For a long period of time, 
until a couple of decades ago, export of minerals was a major source of Thailand‘s 
foreign exchange earnings, and income from mineral royalties was an important source 
of the government revenue.  However, the rapid economic growth over the last two 
decades has made the country increasingly less dependent on the exploitation of its 
mineral resources.  From 1993 to 2005, the average contribution of the mining and 
quarrying
4
 sector (excluding petroleum) to the GDP of Thailand was only about 2.0 per 
cent (Bank of Thailand, 2006). Figure 1.1 shows the share of the mining and quarrying 
sector to the nation‘s GDP.  Because of its small contribution to the national economy 
together with its past mistake of not taking environmental concerns seriously, the 
mining industry, as a whole, is not well supported by the public and is treated as an 
annoying sunset industry.  
 
                                                 
3 Outcrop is a large mass of rock that stands above the surface of the ground. 
4
 A quarry is a place where large amounts of stone are extracted using explosives or dug out of the 
ground. 
3 
 
However, because the marginal extraction costs of almost all construction 
minerals are low, transportation costs per ton take big portions in the prices paid by 
customers.  For example, in U.S.A., the average annual free on board plant price, which 
included all costs of mining, processing, in-plant transportation, overhead costs, and 
profit of crushed stones in 2006 was $8.19 per metric ton (Willett, 2009).  But, freight 
and logistics costs can be 50% to 70% of delivered cost of mineral to customer (Barker, 
2007).  This means that, in 2006, users in U.S.A. had to pay for crushed stones at prices 
up to $16.3 – 27.3 per metric ton, or between two to three times the free on board plant 
price.  It can be deducted from such importance of the transportation costs that price 
disparities between imported and domestic construction minerals could be very large, if 
the sources of the minerals are far from the border.  In the case of Thailand, if there was 
no domestic production of crushed stones, people who live in Bangkok might have to 
pay for the crushed stones from Myanmar about triple the prices they pay now simply 
because of the high costs of transportation by trucks of about 0.07 – 0.10 
US$/ton/kilometre.  If Thailand was not producing gypsum, users in Thailand would be 
expected to pay for imported gypsum from Australia about the same price paid by 
Japanese, which is almost double the domestic gypsum price now.  Prices of gypsum 
will be discussed in some details later in Chapter 5.  This is the reason why countries, 
even rich ones, normally do not attempt to suppress mining for construction materials, 
except for small countries that have very limited land.  Hence, the industry is really a 
necessary one.  In this category of minerals, Thailand has ample resources of limestone, 
granite and other dimension stones, sand and glass sand, shale, clays, and gypsum.   
In 2005, Thailand had a gross national product per capita of about $2,660, 
which was classified by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income developing 
country.  Its average GDP growth rate in the last five year was about five per cent.  At 
4 
 
this fairly good level of economic prosperity, together with the size of its population of 
about sixty-five million, we can certainly see a huge demand for construction materials 
in the region of several million tons annually.  Undoubtedly, mining for construction 
materials is a big and growing industry in Thailand which means that mining and 
quarrying still play an important role to upstream industries in supporting downstream 
industries. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The Share of the Mining and Quarrying Sector to the GDP of Thailand from 
1993 to 2005 
Source: Bank of Thailand (2006) 
1.2 Current Situation of the Construction Mineral Industries in 
Thailand 
The time period to be studied started from 1995, the year the Thai Government 
transferred the quarrying and rock crushing industry to be under the supervision of the 
Department of Mineral Resources (now the DPIM), when Thailand began to 
systematically compile data and information about the construction mineral industries.  
Because of the very strong and traumatic impacts of the Far East Asian financial and 
5 
 
economic crisis of 1997, the study will divide the time period to be studied from 1995 
to 2005 into three sub-periods: first, the period before the economic crisis; second, the 
period immediately after the economic crisis; and third, the period of full recovery. 
1.2.1 The Mining and Quarrying Sector and the Construction Sector, in 
General 
As shown in Figure 1.2, before the economic crisis, from 1995 to 1996, the 
values, at 1988 Prices, of the mining and quarrying sector and the construction sector 
grew at the annual rate of 9.6% and 7.1%, respectively.  Immediately after the 
economic crisis, the values of the mining and quarrying sector decreased for two years, 
from 1997 to 1998, at the average annual rate of 20.8%.  But the construction sector 
endured the lash of the economic crisis two years longer, since its values showed 
negative growth from 1997 to 2000, at the average annual rate of - 20.0%.  The average 
growth rate, during the period of full recovery, of the values of the mining and 
quarrying sector was 6.6%, from 1999 to 2005, and that of the construction sector were 
and 5.1%, from 2001 to 2005 (Bank of Thailand, 2006). 
As for the prospect in the near future, these two industries are expected to 
remain bright because of the big government construction projects and the flourishing 
of house markets as the result of the good economic growth. 
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Figure 1.2 GNP by Industry from 1995 to 2005 at 1988 Prices  
Source: Bank of Thailand (2006) 
1.2.2 Portland Cement 
As shown in Figure 1.3, after the economic crisis, the production statistics for 
Portland cement showed two distinctive patterns: one during the period from 1999 to 
2002, another during the period from 2002 to 2005.  Although it was affected by and 
barely survived after the economic crisis, the production of Portland cement for the 
former period increased at the average rate of 7.0% per annum, a better figure than the 
construction sector as a whole, because of the increasing export as a result of the 
depreciation of the Thai currency.  During the latter period, the production of cement 
increased at the average rate of 3.8% per annum. Its production rose owing, in larger 
part, to the growth construction sector in the Thai economy, while the export declined 
significantly.  In fact, during the latter period, the domestic consumption of cement 
grew at the average rate of 8.0% per annum.  In 2005, the domestic consumption 
accounted for 67% of the country‘s total production, at 43.5 million metric tons, which 
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reached 89% of the country‘s production capacity (Office of Industrial Economics, 
2006). 
As shown in Figure 1.4, the production of limestone and shale as raw materials 
for cement production, after the economic crisis, from 1999 to 2005, also grew in a 
similar pattern to that of the cement.  As for gypsum, another raw material in producing 
Portland cement, the situation was less correlative with that of the cement.  The unique 
situation of gypsum was due to the exportation of gypsum and its other significant 
domestic uses.  Figure 1.5 shows the production, consumption, and export of gypsum 
from 1995 to 2005 (Department of Primary Industries and Mines, 2006). Details of the 
gypsum resources in Thailand will be presented in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 1.3 Total Cement Statistics from 1995 to 2005 
Source: Office of Industrial Economics (2006) 
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Figure 1.4 Production of Limestone for Cement and Shale from 1995 to 2005 
Source: Department of Primary Industries and Mines (2006) 
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Figure 1.5 Production, Consumption, and Export of Gypsum from 1995 to 2005 
Source: Department of Primary Industries and Mines (2006) 
1.2.3 Crushed Stones 
In Figure 1.6, after the economic crisis, the production of crushed stones, 
consisting of limestone, granite, basalt, and hard sandstone, as aggregates for the 
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domestic construction industry, can be divided into two patterns: one during the period 
from 1997 to 1998, and another during the period from 1998 to 2005.  The production 
during the former period decreased at the average rate of 36.1% per annum, while 
during the latter period it grew at the average rate of 26.4% per annum.  In 2005, the 
domestic consumption accounted for 97% of the country‘s total production, at 97.4 
million metric tons (Department of Primary Industries and Mines, 2006). 
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Figure 1.6 Production of Crushed Stones from 1995 to 2005 
Source: Department of Primary Industries and Mines (2006) 
1.2.4 Dimension Stones 
The dimension stone industry in Thailand faced a bleak future even before 
Thailand encountered the economic crisis.  In Figure 1.7, from 1995 to 1996, the total 
production of dimension stones decreased at an annual rate of 6.8%.  After the 
economic crisis, the patterns of production of dimension stones can be divided into two 
periods; one from 1997 to 1999, and another from 1999 to 2005.  Affected by the 
severe economic crisis, the total production during the former period declined sharply 
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at the average rate of 50.7% per annum.  The production during the latter period 
improved with an annual increasing rate of 12.1% due to the growth of the construction 
sector.  However, the production numbers were below 40,000 cubic metres 
(Department of Primary Industries and Mines, 2006). 
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Figure 1.7 Production of Dimension Stones from 1995 to 2005 
Source: Department of Primary Industries and Mines (2006) 
1.3 The Construction Mineral Availability of Thailand 
The availabilities of minerals for future exploitation are quoted as reserves and 
resources of the minerals.  A general classification of reserves and resources of 
minerals is depicted by the McKelvey box of Figure 1.8.  The total amount of material 
on earth is the ‗Base resource‘ as represented by the outer box (= total resource).  The 
undiscovered part of the base resource is the ‗Hypothetical resource‘.  The discovered 
base resource is divided into two parts: the part that cannot be economically or 
technically extracted is called ‗Conditional resources‘, while the part that is 
economically and technically extractable is ‗Reserves‘.  Theoretically, the size of a 
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reserve relative to the base resource can increase because of exploration, price rises, 
lifted restrictions, improved technology, etc. and decrease because of price falls or 
imposed restrictions (Gray, 2004). To reflect varying degrees of both geological and 
economic certainty, reserves can be subdivided into proven, probable and possible 
categories; frequently used synonyms are: measured, indicated, and inferred.  Proven or 
measured reserves are stocks with reasonable certainty that can be recoverable under 
current prices and costs.  Probable or indicated reserves are stocks partly explored with 
some certainty and representing the best approximation of extra stocks that can be 
recoverable under current prices and costs.  Possible or inferred reserves are stocks 
whose approximations are based on broad geological character.  Generally, reserves are 
not fixed.  The more prices rise, the more stocks can be economically extracted 
(Perman et al., 2003).  
 
 
Figure 1.8 The McKelvey Box Showing the Relationship between Resources and 
Reserves  
Source: Bennett and Doyle (1997) 
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However, as demonstrated in Figure 1.9, gypsum and other cheap sedimentary 
minerals--including limestone and shale--have very high geological continuity and high 
grades by nature.  Therefore, their reserves can be identified and estimated without 
much effort.  In fact, they are cheap simply because they are abundant and easy to be 
found, explored, excavated and processed.  As a country having a fairly complete 
geological map, it is more likely that all major economic deposits of construction 
minerals in Thailand are known.  Hence, the chance that price rises will spur 
discoveries of new significant deposits is slim.  Furthermore, their stratified orebodies 
are physically clear-cut and massive.  Therefore, the sizes and quantities of the already 
known reserves will not alter by changes in prices either.  But a conditional resource 
can switch over to economic reserves by a sufficient increase in prices paying to 
producers.  In fact, because of the relatively high transportation costs, distances from a 
deposit to the mineral users decide whether the deposit is an economic reserve or a 
conditional resource.  An uninteresting hard-rock hill can become an economic reserve 
for crushed stone once a large town springs up or a big construction project is planned 
to be developed near by.   
All the reserve figures for the construction minerals shown in topics 1.3.1 and 
1.3.2, apart from those of gypsum, were the total proven reserves of each mineral in 
the areas of the present-day mining licenses as updated in 2006. The figures for 
gypsum were the total proven plus probable reserves in the areas of the present-day 
mining licenses, of the applications for mining licenses, and in a forest that primarily 
explored by the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR).  Indeed, with the exception 
of gypsum, there are at least hundreds of million metric tons of reserves of each 
mineral that are located outside the areas of the present-day mining licenses.  In other 
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words, most construction mineral resources are physically sustainable since there are a 
lot of hard rock mountains all over the country providing vast reserves of rocks.   
 
 
 
Figure 1.9 Diagrammatic Representation of the Continuity of Different Orebody Types 
and Approximate Grades.  
Source: King et al. (1982) 
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1.3.1 Portland Cement Group 
a) Limestone Suitable for Portland Cement Production 
Limestone is very widespread and can be found throughout most parts of the 
country, except for the north-eastern Korat Plateau.  However, the reserves of limestone 
that are suitable for Portland cement production are located in some areas in the central, 
northern, and southern parts of the country.  The deposits of such limestone in the 
central part of country, especially in Saraburi, Nakhon Ratchasima, Ratchaburi, 
Phetchaburi, and Nakhon Sawan provinces, are the major sources of raw material of 
many cement plants supplying Portland cement to the city of Bangkok and its vicinity, 
the most important domestic market for construction materials.  
In the northern part, the deposits in Lampang, Phrae, Chiang Rai, and Nan 
provinces support a cement plant in Chae Hom district, Lampang province. In the 
southern part, there are deposits in Nakhon Sithammarat province, in which a cement 
plant is located.  Just the total proven reserves in the areas of the present-day mining 
licenses as updated in 2006 were 7,520 million metric tons. 
b) Shale 
The reserves of shale are abundantly found all over the country.  Just the total 
proven reserves in the areas of the present-day mining license as updated in 2006 
were 487.13 million metric tons, all of which are in Saraburi, Lampang, and Nakhon 
Sithammarat provinces, where cement plants are located. 
c) Iron ore 
Iron ore is a minor raw material in the production of Portland cement.  There 
are six deposits of iron ore reserves in three provinces.  In Loei Province, there are four 
15 
 
deposits, namely, Phu Yang, Phu Ang, Phu Lek, and Phu Hia, and their total proven 
reserves in the areas of the present-day mining licenses as updated in 2006 were 27.2 
million metric tons of 52 per cent Fe.  The Khao Uem Kreum deposit in Kanchanaburi 
province had the total proven reserves in the areas of the present-day mining licenses 
as updated in 2006 of 4.8 million metric tons of 40 per cent Fe. Finally, in Lop Buri 
province, Khao Thab Kwai deposit had the total proven reserves in the areas of the 
present-day mining licenses as updated in 2006 of 7.6 million metric tons of 44.4 per 
cent Fe.   
d) Gypsum 
Gypsum constitutes a very small part in Portland cement, but it is a crucial raw 
material. The reserves of gypsum are in Suratthani and Nakhon Sithammarat provinces 
in the southern part, Phichit and Nakhon Sawan provinces in the central part, and Loei 
province in the north-eastern part. Its total proven plus probable reserves in the areas of 
the present-day mining licenses, of the applications for mining licenses, and in a forest 
primarily explored by the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR), as updated in 
2006, were 270.73 million metric tons.  The locations of Thailand and its gypsum 
deposits are shown in Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11, respectively. 
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Figure 1.10 Location of Thailand in South-East Asia 
Source: National Statistical Office of Thailand (2000)  
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Figure 1.11 Location of Gypsum Deposits in Thailand 
Source: Utha-aroon and Rattanajaruraks (1996) 
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1.3.2 Aggregate Group 
a) Limestone 
More than 80% of the total consumption of crushed stones comes from 
limestone because its outcrops are located all over the country and its quality is quite 
consistent.  Just the total proven reserves in the areas of the present-day mining 
licenses as updated in 2006 were 2,355 million metric tons. 
The suppliers of crushed stones to the city of Bangkok and its vicinity are from 
62 limestone quarry areas in 9 provinces: Saraburi, Lopburi, Pargeneburi, Sakweaw, 
Kanganaburi, Supanburi, Ratchaburi, Petchaburi, and Prajuabkerekan.  
b) Granite 
Granite is the second most important source for the production of crushed 
stones for construction after limestone, especially in the areas lacking limestone such as 
in Chonburi and Naratiwat provinces. Besides substituting for limestone, crushed 
granite is used as aggregate in concrete where high strength is a requirement. Granite 
mountains are located all over the country except for Korat plateau in the north-eastern 
part of Thailand.  Just the total proven reserves in the areas of the present-day mining 
licenses as updated in 2006 were 296 million metric tons. 
c) Basalt 
Basalt is the third important source for the production of crushed stones for 
construction, constituting about 10% of total consumption of crushed stones. Crushed 
basalt is produced only in the north-eastern part of the country, where basalt is 
widespread.  Just the total proven reserves in the areas of the present-day mining 
licenses as updated in 2006 were 156 million metric tons.  
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d) Hard Sandstone 
Hard sandstone is located in many areas all over the country especially in the 
north-eastern part.  Just the total proven reserves in the areas of the present-day 
mining licenses as updated in 2006 were 31 million metric tons. 
1.4 Government Policies on the Construction Mineral Industries of 
Thailand 
At present the government policies on the construction mineral industries are 
not fully cohesive.  The administration of the resources of construction minerals—
namely, crushed stones for aggregate, dimension stones, sand, shale, and gypsum—in 
Thailand is under the direct jurisdiction of at least three departments in three ministries.  
While the Department of Mineral Resources, Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment, has a control over the declared lands of high mineral potential, the 
Department of Primary Industries and Mines, Ministry of Industry, is authorized to 
administer the mining industry which includes the producers of crushed stones for 
aggregate, limestone and shale for Portland cement, and the mineral gypsum.  
Excavation of construction sand is under the provincial authorities, which are 
supervised by the Ministry of Interior.  In addition, before permission to mine is 
granted, a mining project has to submit its Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
report to the Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning for 
approval. It is a system of checks and balances, but a result is red tape in the 
administration of the mineral resource industries.  
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1.4.1 Specific Policies on Gypsum 
Thailand‘s gypsum is unique.  The total proved ore reserves of gypsum in 
Thailand at present is large, at the level of hundreds million metric tons.  Unlike in 
North America and in Europe, where gypsum production is dominated by a small 
number of big corporations, Thailand has more than twenty small producers. Thailand‘s 
production of natural gypsum in 2004 was about 8 million metric tons, ranking as the 
5
th
 largest natural gypsum producer in the world behind U.S.A, Iran, Canada and Spain 
(Founie, 2006). But, in terms of export, Thailand is the world‘s second largest supplier 
of natural gypsum behind only Canada.  Thailand has become the dominant 
international supplier of gypsum in the Asia-Pacific region because it has almost no 
rivals in the region.  As gypsum is a cheap and bulky commodity, transportation costs 
play a crucial role in competition. Note that, in U.S.A., freight and logistics costs can 
be 50% to 70% of delivered cost of the mineral to customer (Barker, 2007) and, as to 
be mentioned in some details in Chapter 5, from 1988 to 2004, the average Cost, 
Freight and Insurance (CIF) price of gypsum at Japan‘s ports, in constant dollars (year 
2005=100), was 30.5 US$/metric ton.  Such a price, which included transportation 
costs, was almost double the average Free on Board (FOB) price of gypsum at 
Thailand‘s ports, in constant dollars (year 2005=100), of 15.5 US$/metric ton, during 
the same period.  The closest competitor of Thailand in the region is Australia, besides 
far away Mexico and Morocco.  But the transportation costs from Australia to major 
gypsum consuming countries, such as Japan and South Korea, are higher than that from 
Thailand, because of the longer distances.  But facing big powerful foreign gypsum 
users, Thai gypsum producers have almost never realized this advantage.  Competition 
by price-cutting among Thai gypsum producers was intense from time to time.  Once in 
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a while, when the gypsum price had been so low, small gypsum miners would ask the 
Government to intervene.  At present, the following measures are enforced by DPIM: 
i) No new mining license to mine gypsum will be granted.  This measure 
is not effective in reducing the supply of gypsum, because it does not affect the present 
capacities of the existing mines.  But the measure eliminates new entrants to the 
industry. 
ii) Export of gypsum is under government control, and non-marketable 
quotas for export were allocated to all gypsum mines depending on three factors: each 
mine production capacity, remaining gypsum reserve in each mine, and a share of each 
mine in the total export of the country in the previous year.  However, facing strong 
opposition from miners, the Government was unable to cut down the export of each 
mine much.  As a result, the country‘s total export quota has always exceeded the total 
demand from abroad.  Therefore, this measure alone has not totally eliminated price-
cutting competition.  
iii) In conjunction to the export control measure mentioned above, the 
government allows the Mining Council of Thailand to divide the export markets into 
six zones, and only the mining company who used to export to a particular zone will be 
granted permission to export to that zone.  After introduction of these measures five 
years ago, the gypsum price has improved, but not very much.  
1.4.2 Problems with Present Policies on Gypsum 
As mentioned above, the present government policy has not been very effective 
in its attempt at increasing the export price of gypsum.  Another drawback of the 
present policy is that it does not address the future problems when the country‘s 
resources of natural gypsum are depleted in the near future.  
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1.5 Narrowing the Scope of the Construction Mineral Industries to be 
Studied 
Of all the construction minerals and their industries, only gypsum will be 
focused on in this study.  The reason is that the amounts of reserves of other 
construction minerals can be deemed as physically sustainable to a reasonable future.  
On the other hand, gypsum is only one mineral in this group having limited reserves of 
270.73 million metric tons, as updated in 2006, which is not very big in comparison 
with its annual production.  Even though there are some chances that reserves may 
increase from exploration, technological progresses, price rises, etc., the expected 
increasing stock is unlikely to meet future domestic consumption and export demands.  
Besides being a raw material for producing domestic Portland cement, gypsum is one 
of the important mineral resources raising the country‘s revenues from exportation.  
The upward trend of gypsum production is opposite to the downward trend of its 
remaining reserves.  Therefore, its critical situation deserves to be focused on in this 
study. 
1.6 Main Questions to be Answered and Corresponding Contents 
To achieve the main objective of developing long-term strategies and plans for 
the government of Thailand to manage its gypsum mineral resources, the thesis will try 
to answer the following questions: 
i) How does Thailand manage its mineral resources in general as opposed to 
gypsum in particular? This is a question about background information that needs to be 
answered before any recommendations to the government of Thailand can be made.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis will brief the essence of the mining law, taxation and policy of 
Thailand together with those of Canada, Australia and Brazil for comparison.   
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ii) What are the implications of exploiting mineral resources for a country, and 
how well did Thailand fare when it encountered the so-called ―resource curse‖?  It is 
important for an individual involving mineral resource management to understand the 
―resource curse‖ phenomenon.  Chapter 3 of this thesis, explaining the notion of natural 
resource curse and analysing the past reactions of Thailand when it faced the curse, is 
aimed to answer this question. 
iii) What is the connection between the concept of sustainable development and 
mineral resources, and is the development of Thailand sustainable?  Since an important 
theme of the concept of sustainable development is a concern over the environmental 
degradation and the depletion of natural resources, this question needs to be answered 
in dealing with mineral resource management.  Chapter 4 of this thesis, covering the 
discussions about the concept of sustainable development, the role of mineral 
resources, together with an analysis about indicators for sustainable development in 
Thailand, will respond to these questions.  
iv) What are the gypsum consumption functions for Thailand and its clients?  
Answer to this question is very important in determining the optimal depletion path of 
the gypsum resource of Thailand, empirically.  Chapter 5 will show a very simple 
model determining gypsum demand in Thailand and some countries that imported 
gypsum from Thailand. 
v) What is the optimal extraction path of Thai gypsum resource?  This question 
needs to be answered because policies and plans for managing the Thai gypsum 
resources should be based on numerical facts.  An economic model determining the 
optimal depletion path of Thailand‘s gypsum resources will be presented in Chapter 6.  
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Empirical solutions of the model will be the bases for the discussion in Chapter 7 and a 
part of the recommendation to be presented in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 2    Mining Laws, Taxation, and Policies of Thailand 
and Some Other Countries 
Mining activities adversely affect the environment while providing benefits to 
the public in the form of employment, export earnings, government revenues, etc. As a 
result, in most countries, mining industries are tightly controlled by special legislation 
and are levied extra taxes--such as mineral royalty, special income tax, etc.--in addition 
to corporate income tax that is levied on all businesses.  This chapter will summarize 
the essence of the mining law, taxation and policy of Thailand.  Also those of Canada, 
Australia and Brazil will be presented to see their similarities and differences.  Canada 
and Australia are chosen as they are rich in minerals and are the leading mineral export 
countries.  The framework of mining management in Brazil is considered as it is one of 
the developing countries, similar to Thailand, that export a lot of minerals.  The 
comparison of Thailand‘s policies with those of Canada, Australia, and Brazil will be 
presented here too. 
2.1 Thailand’s Mining Laws, Taxation and Policies 
Thailand is a single state country.  There are elected local administrations at the 
sub-district level, but they have very limited authority.  With regard to mineral 
resources, a local administration has been authorized to give consent to mining projects 
and to monitor the compliance with environment protection measures of miners in its 
jurisdiction.  Although it is not stated explicitly in laws, mineral resources are treated as 
owned by the State and administrated by a department of the central government.  
Thailand has a long history of mining for metals, especially tin and gold, and the 
Government of Thailand has always committed to developing the mineral industry 
through the private sector.  To govern private mining ventures, a governmental agency 
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has been established for more than a century.  During its long history, this agency has 
evolved, adopted some different names, and come under various ministries.  Its present 
name is the Department of Primary Industry and Mines (DPIM) under the Ministry of 
Industry.  Apart from being the main administrative agency executing mining laws, 
regulations, etc. the DPIM has a duty to promote mining ventures. The DPIM 
encourages private investments from both domestic and foreign sources, by providing 
necessary facilities in terms of legal and regulatory aspects as well as various forms of 
technical assistance.  
2.1.1 Mining Laws 
Thailand had its first modern mining law in 1901, more than a century ago.  The 
law was repealed and replaced twice.  At present the principal law governing the 
mining sector is the Minerals Act of 1967, which was amended in 1973, 1979, 1991, 
and 2002.  The Minerals Act of 1967 and its amendments regulate prospecting, mining, 
mine-out land reclamation, mineral dressing, smelting, and mineral transactions 
including transporting, selling, buying, import and export of minerals.  The Act really 
revolves especially around the tight control on mining for and extraction of tin, which 
was the single most important mineral in Thailand up until about two decades ago, in 
order to collect tin royalty effectively.  The unwritten concept of the law is that 
minerals are vested to the nation; therefore, the owner of the land is not automatically 
entitled to be the ownership of the minerals underneath.  No one shall explore for or 
undertake mining in any place, regardless of the right over the area unless obtaining a 
prospecting license or a mining concession from the DPIM.  According to the Minerals 
Act, doing mineral business in every stage in Thailand must first get permission, in the 
form of licenses, permits, or concessions, from the DPIM.  Some of the licenses and 
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permits under the Minerals Act are as follows (Department of Primary Industries and 
Mines, 2004b): 
a) Licenses for Prospecting 
There are three types of prospecting licenses as follows:  
i) Prospecting License (PL): It is a one-year permit allowing a person to 
conduct general prospecting and exploration for minerals within a specified district or 
province. 
ii) Exclusive Prospecting License (EPL): This type of license grants a person an 
exclusive right to conduct prospecting and exploration for minerals within a specified 
area.  In an area of an EPL, no other persons can apply for another EPL, a Special 
Prospecting License, or a Mining Concession.  An inland EPL is valid for 1 year and 
covers an area not exceeding 4 square kilometres, while an offshore EPL is valid for 2 
years and covers an area not exceeding 800 square kilometres. 
iii) Special Prospecting License (SPL): It is a document granting exclusive right 
to conduct mineral prospecting and exploration within a specified area not exceeding 
16 square kilometres and with a validity period of 5 years.  In an area of an SPL, any 
other persons cannot apply for another SPL, an EPL, or a Mining Concession. 
b) Mining Concessions 
Mining concessions under the present Mineral Act can be categorized into three 
types as follows: 
i) Mining Concession for a surface inland mine: It is a document granted to a 
mining investor for an exclusive right to extract minerals inland by a surface mining 
method within a specified maximum area of 48 hectares and with a valid life of up to 
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25 years.  A concession area is rather small, but one can apply for several mining 
concessions in conjunction.  
ii) Mining Concession for an offshore mine: It is a document granted to a 
mining investor for an exclusive right to extract minerals offshore within a specified 
maximum area of 80 square kilometres and with a valid life of up to 25 years. 
iii) Mining Concession for underground mining: It is a document, with a valid 
life of up to 25 years, granted to a mining investor for an exclusive right to extract 
minerals underground.  The maximum area of this type of Mining Concession is 16 
square kilometres, which can cover lands legally held by others.  If the underground 
mining activities are done deeper than 200 metres, the miner does not need to get 
permission from the surface land owners.  However, to get a Mining Concession for 
underground mining, an investor must past several stringent requirements including one 
or more public hearings. 
c) Licenses for Mineral Processing, Metallurgical Processing, Mineral 
Transactions, and other Licenses 
i) Mineral Processing License: It is a license allowing a person to set up a 
mineral processing plant.  It has a valid life of up to 3 years, which may be extended 
and re-extended for up to 3 years each time. 
ii) Metallurgical Processing License: It is a license allowing a person to set up a 
smelter or metallurgical processing plant.  It has a valid life of up to 25 years, which 
may be extended for up to 25 years. 
iii) Mineral transaction licenses comprise Mineral Purchase License, Mineral 
Storage License, Mineral Possession License, Mineral Transport License, Mineral 
Import License, and Mineral Export License. 
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iv) Other licenses exist such as License for a Joint Mining Operation, License 
for Temporary Suspension of Mining Operation, License for Diverting Water, Artisan 
Mining License, and Ore Panning License. 
According to the Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental 
Quality Act of 1992, an applicant for mining must submit an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) report to the Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy 
and Planning (ONEP) for reviewing.  A Mining Concession will not be granted by the 
DPIM before the EIA report is approved by ONEP. 
Besides the requirement to submit an EIA report, the Enhancement and 
Conservation of the National Environmental Quality Act of 1992 stipulates a number of 
issues affecting mining activities as follows (United Nations, 2001): 
 Establishing environmental standards enforcing on all mining activities, 
 Designating any pieces of lands as environmentally protected areas to 
control land uses, and 
 Establishing an environmental fund.  This fund can be loaned by miners for 
spending on pollution control activities and reclamation of mined-out areas. 
According to the Minerals Act of 1967, for mined-out areas, a holder of a 
Mining Concession must either backfill the pits, sumps or shafts, or reclaim the area to 
the original form. Reclamation of mined-out areas must be done in accordance with the 
conditions proposed in the mining plan submitted to the DPIM.  Before mine closure, 
all mine structures and facilities must be completely removed.  Furthermore, any mine 
reclamation and rehabilitation must comply with the conditions set out in the approved 
EIA report.  
Foreign investors must get a Business License to run a mining business from the 
Minister of Commerce, with the approval of the Cabinet, as stipulated by the Foreign 
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Business Act of 1999.  In addition, under the Foreign Business Act, a foreign 
company—defined as a company whose majority shareholders are foreigners—may run 
mining businesses in Thailand only if Thai nationals or Thai juristic persons hold the 
shares of not less than 40 percent of the capital of that company.  The minimum amount 
of shares needed to be held by Thai nationals may be reduced to the level of not less 
than 25 percent with the approval of the Cabinet, but two-fifths of the total number of 
the company‘s directors must be Thai nationals.  An application for a Business License 
to run a mining business can be submitted at the Department of Business Development, 
Ministry of Commerce, in Bangkok, or at a Local Business Development Office 
located in every province. The Cabinet will approve the application within sixty days of 
the application submitting date (Department of Primary Industries and Mines, 2004c).  
2.1.2 Mining Taxation 
According to the Revenue Code, a company doing any business in Thailand has 
to pay corporate income tax at a rate of 30% of its net profit and Value Added Tax 
(VAT) at a rate of 7%.  In the case that the company‘s products are exported, all the 
VAT will be refunded.  In addition to the aforementioned taxes, a mining company is 
also required to pay Mineral Royalties as stipulated in the Mineral Royalty Rates Act of 
1966 amended in 1977 and 1979.  The Mineral Royalty is a kind of ad valorem tax, 
paid to the DPIM in percentages of the revenues from minerals.  In relation to 
construction minerals, the Mineral Royalty rates of limestone and shale for cement 
industry, iron ore, gypsum, and rocks for crushed stones are 7, 4.5, 4, and 4 percent, 
respectively. Besides specifying mineral royalty rates, the Mineral Royalty Rates Act of 
1966 also spell out how to determine the revenues from minerals that will be the basis 
for Mineral Royalty payments (Department of Primary Industries and Mines, 2004a).  
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Besides taxes and mineral royalties, a mining company must also pay some 
operational fees to the DPIM in accordance with the Minerals Act of 1967 as follows:   
i) Application fees: 100 bahts
5
 for a PL, 500 bahts for an EPL, 1,000 bahts for 
an SPL, and 1,000 bahts for a ML. 
ii) Annual land use fees: 3,750 bahts per square kilometre for prospecting and 
exploration, and 12,500 bahts per square kilometre for mining. 
iii) Special Benefits to the State: An applicant for a ML for all kinds of minerals 
except for industrial rocks
6
 must offer a special benefit to the State for the amount of 
0.1% of total value of mineral reserves over 50 million bahts.  To receive a ML for an 
industrial rock, an applicant must offer a special benefit to the State at the rates as 
shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Special Benefit to the State for a ML for Industrial Rocks 
Value of Rock Reserves in the Ranges of (million bahts) Rates (%) 
< 50 - 
50-2,500 0.1 
2,500-7,500 0.2 
7,500-20,000 0.5 
20,000-50,000 1.0 
> 50,000 2.0 
Source: Department of Primary Industries and Mines (2004) 
iv) Special Subscriptions: As stated in the Minerals Act, a ML holder must pay 
a Special Subscription at a rate not exceeding ten percent of the royalty paid for 
minerals produced.  This Special Subscription will be kept by the DPIM as an expense 
budget for the reclamation of mined-out areas, for the prevention and suppression of 
illegal mining activities, and for local development.  At present only tin mines are 
required to pay these Special Subscriptions at the rate of 2.5 percent of the royalty paid. 
                                                 
5
 In 2005, 40.22 Bahts = 1 US$ 
6
 Industrial rocks are solid rocks in Portland cement group (limestone for cement and shale) and crushed 
stone group (limestone for crushed stone, granite, basalt, and sandstone).  
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v) Reclamation Guarantee Deposits: Before a ML is granted a miner must 
deposit a sum of money at the DPIM as a guarantee that he/she will reclaim the mined-
out areas.  If the ML holder fulfils his/her obligation, this deposit will be returned to 
him/her in full (Department of Primary Industries and Mines, 2004b). 
2.1.3 Mining Promotion Policies 
a) Investment Promotion by the Board of Investment 
Businesses in all stages of the mineral industry, including mining, are also 
eligible to apply for Investment Promotion Privileges (IPP) prescribed under the 
Investment Promotion Act of 1977 amended in 1991 and 2001.  The investment 
promotion privileges, which can be granted by the Board of Investment (BOI) 
established by the Investment Promotion Act, include tax incentives and non-tax 
incentives.  Some of the non-tax incentives include permission to bring in foreign 
workers, to own land, and to take out foreign currencies.  The really important 
incentives are the tax incentives, the details of which are as follows (Department of 
Primary Industries and Mines, 2004d). 
i) Exemption or reduction of import duty on imported machinery and 
equipment;  
ii) Exemption of corporate income tax for 3, 5 or 8 years for a project with 
capital investment exceeding 10 million bahts (excluding costs of land and working 
capital) and obtaining ISO 9000 or similar international standard certification within 2 
years, otherwise the exemption of corporate income tax will be reduced by 1 year; 
iii) Reduction of corporate income tax by 50% for 5 years after the end of 
corporate income tax holiday; 
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iv) Double deduction from taxable income for transportation, electricity and 
water costs for 10 years from the date of first revenue derived from promoted activities; 
and 
v) Deduction can be made from net profit of 25 per cent of the project's 
infrastructure installation or construction costs for 10 years from the date of the first 
sales, and net profit for one or more years of any year can be chosen for such 
deduction.  The deduction is in addition to normal depreciation. 
b) Providing Geological Data 
Besides offering fiscal and other incentives, Thailand has invested a lot in 
developing good geological information available for potential mining investors.  A 
geological survey unit has been established in the Department of Mineral Resources 
since 1933.  In Thailand, systematic prospecting and exploration for economic minerals 
done by the government has been guided by the consecutive National Economic and 
Social Development Plans (NESDPs) with the aim of supporting domestic downstream 
industries and strengthening the national economy.  During 1962-1976 (NESDP Nos. 
1-3), exploration focused on tin, iron ore, manganese, ceramic minerals, fluorspar, glass 
sand, and marl which were commodities produced mainly for export.  During 1977-
1981 (NESDP No. 4), there was continual exploration from the earlier NESDPs and 
new projects focused on potash/rock salt and energy minerals such as solid fuels and 
radioactive minerals.  Since the early 1980s, the production of mineral commodities has 
shifted orientation from export towards domestic uses because of the domestic 
economic growth and the collapse of the world tin market in 1986.  During 1982-1986 
(NESDP No. 5), exploration focused on industrial minerals, solid fuels, hydrothermal 
energy and radioactive minerals.   
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During 1987-2006 (NESDP Nos. 6-9), large budgets were allocated to two 
consecutive mineral exploration projects: the Mineral Resources Development Project 
(MRDP), and the Accelerated Mineral Resources Exploration and Evaluation Project 
(AMREEP), with the aim firstly to accelerate the exploration for minerals of economic 
importance such as gold, potash, and raw materials for Portland cement and secondly, 
to promote mineral exploration investment by the private sector.  The MRDP‘s 
objectives were to define mineral potential areas on a regional scale and to acquire 
geological data for resource management.  As a result of the MRDP, 345 high mineral 
potential areas were located, and one-third of these potential areas showed good 
prospects for finding gold and base metals.  Under the AMREEP, 60 high mineral 
potential areas, the results of the MRDP, covering 36,400 square kilometres, were 
selected for detailed investigation by farming out exploration contracts to private 
companies.  It was expected that the mineral deposits thus discovered as a result of 
AMREEP would be released by bidding to the private mining investors.  However, at 
present this policy has been unintentionally changed due to the bureaucratic reform of 
2002.  Before October 2002, the Department of Mineral Resources, Ministry of 
Industry, was the sole governmental authority responsible for gathering geological data, 
managing the country‘s mineral resources, and governing the mineral industries.  Since 
the bureaucratic reform, the Department of Mineral Resources, has been come under 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, and is authorized to oversee only 
geological works and to manage the high mineral potential areas.  At the same time, the 
DPIM has been established in the Ministry of Industry and authorized to administer the 
country‘s mineral industries.  These two departments have not yet worked in tandem; 
therefore, the plan to release the discovered mineral deposits to private investors by 
bidding has not yet materialized (United Nations, 2001). 
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c) Inducing the Support of Local Communities  
To reduce the conflicts between miners and local communities, DPIM has 
worked with other relevant government agencies and local authorities to minimize 
social and environmental problems from mining operations.  Local authorities are 
delegated to be involved in decision-making about the exploitation of mineral resources 
in their responsible areas. Furthermore, 60 per cent of mineral royalties collected by 
DPIM will be allocated to local and provincial administrations for the well-being of the 
local people. 
d) Promoting Good Practices 
During 2005-2006, DPIM ran a project to rate the operational performance in 
the areas of engineering and environmental management of all mining, mineral 
processing, milling, and metallurgical entrepreneurs.  Any companies rating highly on 
operational performance in both areas will be awarded certificates of recognition by the 
DPIM.  This project had the key objective of encouraging entrepreneurs in the mineral 
industries to improve their performance for the benefit of neighbouring communities 
and the country as the whole.  
2.1.4 Relevant Environmental Policies 
a) On Pollution from Mining 
In Thailand, at present, the biggest mineral businesses are quarrying and rock 
milling to produce crushed stones for aggregates and hence, affects environment the 
most. These industries are the major sources of dust pollution from the mineral sector.  
Because crushed stone is a bulky low-price commodity, the sources of production, 
which generate dust, are normally situated close to cities and this proximity is the major 
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cause for concern by the public.  The quarrying and rock milling industry is an old and 
important industry because its product—crushed stones—is a necessary material for 
construction of roads, buildings, and other structures.  In Thailand, because of the rapid 
economic growth, the industry has grown very fast.  The environmental problem from 
the quarrying and rock milling industry is exacerbated by the concentration of rock 
quarries and mills in a small area.  In Thailand, metropolitan Bangkok and its 
surrounding cities and towns are the major consumers of aggregate.  Therefore, 
quarries and rock mills are concentrated at limestone outcrops not too far from 
Bangkok, which has no stone resources of its own because of being situated on a flood 
plain.  The largest concentration of quarrying and rock milling industry in Thailand is 
at Tha-pra-lan and adjacent districts in Saraburi Province which is the main crushed 
stone supplier for metropolitan Bangkok and its surrounding cities and towns: the 
major aggregate consumers of the country.  In this area, there were 108 quarries, 50 
rock mills, and 15 limestone-powder mills, with a total crushed stone production of 
about fifty million tons per annum, which was about one half of the total country‘s 
crushed stone production. 
As the country‘s economy grew, dust pollution in the areas of concentrated 
crushed stone production had gotten worse year by year.  In 1995, the Thai government 
took actions by placing the quarrying and rock milling industry under the supervision 
of the Department of Mineral Resources (now the DPIM). At its worst, in 1996, the 
total suspended particles in the air at the centre of the district town was measured at 
1,721 micrograms per cubic metre, more than five times the acceptable air quality 
standard of 330 micrograms per cubic metre.  To solve the problem, strict enforcement 
of the laws was not seen as an option because it would have disrupted the supply of 
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aggregate. The DPIM had to start everything from scratch since all rock mills were 
used to emitting dust freely without penalty. 
The project to mitigate dust pollution in the areas surrounding quarries and rock 
mills at Tha-pra-lan and adjacent districts in Saraburi province was initiated in 1997 
and ran until 2000.  The main objective of this project was to reduce dust pollution in 
the area to the acceptable safe standard by using dust prevention and suppression 
technology and environmental management.  The project was intended as a pilot 
project for solving the dust pollution problem caused by quarries and aggregate mills in 
other concentrated areas of crushed stone production all over the country.  The Faculty 
of Engineering, Chulalongkorn University, was hired as the project consultant.  
Altogether, the total budget was about $5 million. The project could be claimed to be 
moderately successful because the dust pollution gradually reduced.  In 1999, around 
the middle of the project, the Total Suspended Particle (TSP) at the centre of the district 
town was reduced to 230 micrograms per cubic metre and 120 micrograms per cubic 
metre at the end of the project in 2001.  The two figures are well below the acceptable 
standard of 300 micrograms per cubic metre. 
b) On Recycling 
In Thailand, construction and demolition waste has not been processed for reuse 
as aggregates.  In Bangkok, this waste is used entirely as landfill, since Bangkok, 
situated on a flood plain, faces problems with subsidence.  
2.1.5 Sustainable Development Policies 
Thailand has given importance to sustainable development by putting the issue 
on its national agenda.  The concept of sustainable development was first addressed in 
the 9
th
 National Economic and Social Development Plan (2002-2006) and it was 
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defined as a holistic development which involves six dimensions: economics, social, 
environment, politics, technology and knowledge, and mental and spiritual balance.  In 
2003, Thailand established the National Sustainable Development Council chaired by 
the Prime Minister. The council is responsible for formulating operational plans, 
implementing processes, and evaluating outcomes.  The council‘s objective is to reach 
a balance between economics, social, natural resource and environment for the well 
being of people across generations (Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board, 2001).  
The national strategies involving the concept of sustainable development are as 
follows: 
a) The strategy on sustainable natural resource and environmental development: 
This strategy focuses on the conservation, the revival, and the sustainable utilization of 
natural resources.  Projects under this strategy are: 
i)  the conservation and revival of forests and coastal lines, 
 ii)   holistic water basins management, 
 iii)  recovery of degraded natural resources, 
iv)   mitigation and protection of pollution problems, and 
v)    enhancement of the effectiveness of natural resource use and 
environment management by taking into account the opinions of the 
local population and other relevant parties 
b) The strategy on sustainable economic development: This strategy focuses on 
the continuity of economic stability, economic growth benefiting the majority of Thai 
people, production and consumption improving quality of life without jeopardizing the 
environment or creating pollution.  
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c) The strategy on sustainable social development: This strategy focuses on 
reducing poverty and social inequality. 
d) The strategy on the promotion of social participation for sustainable 
development: This strategy aims to allow people and all stakeholders to participate in 
development of natural resources, environment, economy and society in such a way 
that all relevant opinions are heard and balanced. 
The concept of sustainable development is also employed in the mineral policy 
statements of the DPIM.  It is stated in its vision that DPIM will manage, organize, and 
develop mineral deposits and primary industries by using appropriate technology and 
taking into account the environmental impact to ensure the sustainable development of 
the industry.  The DPIM‘s mission is to improve the productivity and competitiveness 
of the mineral and primary industries, and to fulfil the demands for sustainable 
utilization of mineral resources while ensuring a safe and healthy environment.  The 
DPIM‘s policies emphasize (1) physical sustainability of mineral production through 
mineral exploration and development, and (2) sustainability of ecosystems and the 
environment in mining areas through mine site rehabilitation.  
2.2 Canadian Mining Laws, Taxation and Policies 
2.2.1 Mining Laws 
Canada is a federation of ten provinces and three territories. The ten provinces 
are Alberta (AB), British Columbia (BC), Manitoba (MB), New Brunswick (NB), 
Newfoundland and Labrador (NL), Nova Scotia (NS), Ontario (ON), Prince Edward 
Island (PE), Quebec (QC), and Saskatchewan (SK), while the three territories are 
Northwest Territories (NT), Nunavut (NU), and Yukon (YT). The government of each 
province and territory has its own mining legislation to regulate aspects of exploration, 
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mining, and environmental management.  Exceptions have been the Northwest and 
Nunavut Territories whose mineral resource management is under the control of the 
Canadian Federal Government.  Names of laws relevant to mining and their fields of 
enforcement and application of each province and territory are presented in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Provincial/Territorial Mining Laws and Their Applications 
Province/Territory Names of Laws Fields of Enforcement and Application 
Alberta 
 
Mines and Minerals Act -  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
British Columbia 
 
Mines Act  
 
Mineral Tax Act  
-  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, and reclamation 
-  mining taxation 
Manitoba 
 
Mines and Minerals Act  
Mining Tax Act 
-  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, and reclamation 
-  mining taxation 
New Brunswick 
 
Mining Act  
 
 
Metallic Minerals Tax Act 
Quarriable Substances Act  
 
- exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, and reclamation of all mines 
except for quarries 
- mining taxation of all mines except for 
quarries 
- exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
for quarrying 
Newfoundland and Labrador 
 
Mining Act  
 
 
Mining and Mineral 
Rights Tax Act 
Quarry Materials Act 
 
- exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, and reclamation of all mines 
except for quarries 
- mining taxation of all mines except for 
quarries 
- exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
for quarrying 
Nova Scotia 
 
Mineral Resources Act -  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
Ontario 
 
Mining Act  
 
Mining Tax Act 
-  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, and reclamation 
-  mining taxation 
Quebec 
 
Mining Act  
 
Mining Duties Act 
-  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, and reclamation 
-  mining taxation 
Saskatchewan 
 
Energy and Mines Act  
 
Mineral Taxation Act 
-  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, and reclamation 
-  mining taxation 
Northwest Territories 
 
Territorial Lands Act -  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
Nunavut 
 
Territorial Lands Act -  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
Yukon Yukon Quartz Mining Act -  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
of all mines except for coal and gold mines 
Source: Natural Resources Canada (2006) 
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Besides being under the provincial and territorial environmental laws and 
regulations, any significant mining project may need to be reviewed by several relevant 
federal departments under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA).   
2.2.2 Mining Taxation 
Canadian mining taxation can be divided into three levels, the Federal 
Government, the Provincial and Territorial Governments, and the Municipalities.  The 
Federal Government imposes corporate income taxes (corporate income tax and 
withholding tax), a capital tax, the GST (Goods and Services Tax), payroll levies 
(employment insurance and Canada Pension Plan), property taxes, sales taxes, excise 
taxes, and custom duties.  The rates of some taxes are shown in Table 2.3.  At the 
federal level, a special treatment includes the following tax provisions (Natural 
Resources Canada, 2006):  
 Resource Allowance;  
 Provincial/territorial mining taxes and royalties;  
 Canadian Exploration Expenses (CEE);  
 Flow-Through Shares (FTS) and the Investment Tax Credit for Exploration 
in Canada (ITCE);  
 Foreign Resource Expenses (FRE) and Foreign Exploration and 
Development Expenses (FEDE);  
 Canadian Development Expenses (CDE)  
 Special class of Capital Cost Allowance (CCA);  
 Accelerated Capital Cost Allowance (ACCA);  
 Depletion Allowance;  
 Treatment of foreign ores; and  
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 Deduction for mine reclamation trust fund contributions.  
Table 2.3 Federal Tax Rates 
Tax Tax Rate 
Federal Corporate Tax 
Capital Tax 
Goods and Services Tax 
Fuel Excise Tax 
     - Gasoline 
     - Diesel 
21.57% of resource income 
0.125% of assets above $10 million 
7% of purchases 
 
10 cents per litre 
4 cents per litre 
Source: Natural Resources Canada (2006)  
The Provincial and Territorial Governments impose corporate income taxes in 
all provinces and territories. Capital taxes are imposed in SK, MB, ON, QC, NB, and 
NS.  All provinces and territories collect mining and royalty taxes require mining 
companies to pay workers‘ compensation.  Payroll levies--health and/or post-secondary 
education taxes--are applied in MB, ON, QC, NL, NU, and NWT.  Value-added taxes 
are imposed in QC, NB, NS, and NL, and excise taxes (on fuel) and sales taxes are 
applied in PE, ON, MB, SK, and BC.  The municipal taxation is property tax, licenses, 
and fees.  The structures and rates of main taxes are shown in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5.  
Table 2.4 Canadian Corporate Income Tax Rates Applicable to Mining 
Province/Territory Net federal 
tax rate on 
resource 
income (%) 
(1) 
Prov./Terr. 
Statutory 
Income Tax 
Rate (%) 
(2) 
Resource 
Allowance 
Reduction 
(%) 
(3) 
Net Provincial 
Tax Rate on 
Resource 
Income (%) 
(4) = (2) + (3) 
Net Combined 
Fed./Prov./Terr. 
Income Tax 
Rate (%) 
(5) = (1) + (4) 
Alberta 
British Columbia 
Manitoba 
New Brunswick 
Newfoundland and Labrador 
Nova Scotia 
Ontario 
Quebec 
Saskatchewan 
Northwest Territories 
Nunavut 
Yukon 
21.57 
21.57 
21.57 
21.57 
21.57 
21.57 
21.57 
21.57 
21.57 
21.57 
21.57 
21.57 
11.5 
12.0 
14.5 
13.0 
14.0 
16.0 
12.0 
9.9 
17.0 
14.0 
12.0 
15.0 
-2.88 
0 
-1.27 
-1.14 
-1.23 
-1.40 
-3.00 
-2.48 
-4.25 
-1.23 
-1.05 
-1.31 
8.62 
12.00 
13.23 
11.86 
12.77 
14.60 
9.00 
7.42 
12.75 
12.77 
10.95 
13.69 
30.19 
33.57 
34.80 
33.43 
34.34 
36.17 
30.57 
28.99 
34.32 
34.34 
32.52 
35.26 
Source: Natural Resources Canada (2006) 
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Table 2.5 Canadian Provincial/Territorial Mining or Royalty Tax Rates  
Province/Territory Mining or Royalty Tax Rate* 
First Tier Second Tier 
Alberta 1 percent on revenue 12 percent on net profits  
British Columbia 2 percent on net current proceeds 13 percent on net revenue 
Manitoba N/A 18 percent on profits 
New Brunswick 2 percent on net revenue 16 percent on net profits over $100,000 
Newfoundland and Labrador 
 
N/A 15 percent on 80 percent of net profit, plus 
20 percent on the remaining 20 percent of net 
profit 
Nova Scotia 2 percent on net revenue 15 percent on net profits 
Ontario N/A 10 percent on net profits 
Quebec N/A 12 percent on profits 
Saskatchewan N/A 10 percent on net profits. 
Northwest Territories N/A a variable tax rate (5-14%) that, on average, 
cannot exceed 13 percent of net income 
Nunavut N/A a variable tax rate (5-14%) that, on average, 
cannot exceed 13 percent of net income 
Yukon  A progressive tax rate varies according to amount of income. The starting tax rate 
is 3 percent and rises by 1 percentage point for every tranche of $5 million of 
taxable income. But the maximum tax rate shall not be higher than 18 percent. 
Source: Natural Resources Canada (2006)                                                                                                      
Notes: *Some provinces impose a two-tier mining tax system and the greater one will be levied.                    
N/A = not applicable. 
2.2.3 Mining Promotion Policies 
From Gurmendi (2004), Canada is a world leading producer of potash, 
diamond, nickel, selenium, columbium (niobium), and zinc. The Federal, Provincial, 
and Territorial Governments ensure Canada remains a leading mineral producer by 
providing support and encouraging exploration and deposit appraisal activities by 
means of fiscal incentives, resolution of land access issues, and the provision of 
geoscientific data (Canadian Intergovernmental Working Group on the Mineral 
Industry, 2004). Some of the Federal and Provincial Governments‘ policies in 
promoting mining industry are as follows. 
a) Federal Government 
One of the fiscal incentives used to assist investors in mineral exploration is the 
programme of the super Flow-Through Shares (FTS), which grants 15% federal tax 
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credits for mineral exploration. The credit is in addition to the existing 100% deduction 
of eligible exploration expenditures from the Federal portion of investors‘ income tax.  
This is equivalent to a 136.7% exploration expense deduction.  
b) Provincial Governments  
With the aim to encourage investment in mineral exploration, tax credits 
granted for mineral exploration are as follows:  British Columbia offers a non-
refundable tax credit at a rate of 20% from 2005-2008; Manitoba offers a non-
refundable tax credit at a rate of 10% from 2002-2005; Ontario offers a refundable tax 
credit at a rate of 5% from 2000-2007; Yukon offers a refundable tax credit at a rate of 
25% from 2003-2005; and Quebec allows a deduction of up to 150% of the cost of 
certain qualifying exploration expenses from 2002-2007 (Canadian Intergovernmental 
Working Group on the Mineral Industry, 2004).  
To increase mineral supply and avoid land use conflict especially in crushed 
stone for the aggregate sector, the Government of Ontario Province introduced the 
Ontario Provincial Policy Statement and one of the policies in this statement was the 
Mineral Aggregate Resources Policy. This policy had a goal to protect mineral 
aggregate supply for long-term use. Its two main parts consisting of (1) developing 
mineral aggregate resources in deposits which are as close to markets as possible, and 
(2) protecting mineral aggregate operations from land use conflicts by restricting 
migration of people to mineral aggregate supply areas. The mining operation provides 
new infrastructure such as roads, power, and water supply system, with the result that 
people decide to migrate to areas adjacent to quarry. The resulting problem is land use 
conflict because mining companies cannot expand quarrying because there are 
communities around mining area. Therefore, restricting migration of people to mineral 
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aggregate supply areas will provide long-term mineral aggregate supply and reduce 
water and land conflict (Ontario Aggregate Resources Corporation, 2005). 
2.2.4 Relevant Environmental Policies 
Some of the relevant environmental policies of the Canadian Federal and 
Provincial Governments are as follows. 
a) Federal Government 
The Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada (PDAC) was 
established by the Federal Government in 1932 to support mineral exploration and 
develop the mineral industry. The PDAC introduced the Total Landscape Management 
(TLM), a concept to balance between resource development and conservation 
objectives (Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada, 1998), which consists 
of: 
(i) employing the overarching method of biodiversity conservation to manage 
complete landscapes; 
(ii) planning a floating reserve system to successfully protect dynamically 
changed landscapes of mining areas  
(iii) adaptive management of relevant data, ecosystems, and disturbances; and 
(iv) co-management ensuring provision for local community input.  
To conserve mineral resources, recycling is one action that helps.  This is 
especially important in the case of construction mineral resource group. In 2001, the 
Natural Resources Canada, a Federal government agency supervising the natural 
resources sector, launched the five-year (April 2001-March 2006) Enhanced Recycling 
Programme to foster an increased use of recycled minerals and metals by seeking 
46 
 
partners in the automobile, construction, electro-plating and electronics sectors (Natural 
Resources Canada, 2003). 
b) Provincial Governments  
In all provinces and territories, at the end of mining project, mining companies 
are required by law to reclaim, restore, or rehabilitate mined areas.  But, in case that 
reclamation fails, the mining area is abandoned uselessly. To solve this problem, the 
Government of Ontario Province set up the Management of Abandoned Aggregate 
Properties (MAAP) Programme to restore abandoned aggregate quarries within Ontario 
under the Aggregate Resource Act. This programme is funded by money collected by 
deducting 0.5 cent of the annual six-cent per ton license levy. In 2005, MAAP restored 
over 75 hectares of aggregate mining areas at a total cost of C$548,272. These sites 
were rehabilitated to natural areas (40 hectares), agricultural land (28 hectares), and 
recreation areas (7 hectares) with the average cost of C$7,267 per hectare, decreasing 
from that of C$13,411 per hectare in 2004 (Ontario Aggregate Resources Corporation, 
2005).    
2.2.5 Sustainable Development Policies 
In stating their mineral resource and mining policies, the Canadian Federal and 
Provincial Governments also used the popular term of ―sustainable development‖.  The 
differences between the Federal and Provincial policies are the scope of the concept of 
sustainable development.  The mineral resource policies concerning ―sustainable 
development‖ of the Federal government covered three-dimensional areas: economic, 
environmental, and social.  However, those of the provincial governments focused only 
on (1) physical sustainability of mineral production through mineral exploration and 
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development and (2) sustainability of ecosystems and the environment in mining areas 
through mine site rehabilitation.  
a) Federal Government 
In 1996 the Federal Government of Canada issued the Minerals and Metals 
Policy of the Government of Canada: Partnerships for Sustainable Development.  The 
policy, which states the Federal Government‘s role, the objectives and the strategies for 
sustainable mineral and metal resources development, represented the first attempt by 
the Government to incorporate the concept of sustainable development into a 
comprehensive policy document in the natural resources area.  The six-part policy 
stated its principal objectives as follows: 
―- to integrate the concept of sustainable development in 
federal decision-making affecting the minerals and 
metals industry; 
   - to ensure the international competitiveness of 
Canada‘s minerals and metals industry in the context of 
an open and liberal global trade and investment 
framework 
-  to advance the concept of the sustainable development 
of minerals and metals at the international level through 
partnerships with other countries, stakeholders, and 
multilateral institutions and organizations; 
-  to establish Canada as a global leader in promoting the 
safe use of minerals and metals, and their related 
products; 
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-  to promote Aboriginal involvement in minerals and 
metals-related activities; and 
- to provide a framework for the development and 
application of science and technology to enhance the 
industry‘s competitiveness and environmental 
stewardship‖ (Natural Resources Canada, 1996). 
In implementing the sustainable development approach, the Policy emphasized 
the need to integrate, fully and as early as possible, the environmental, economic and 
social considerations in the decision-making process concerning minerals and metals.  
In summation, this federal policy intended to promote minerals and metals industry of 
Canada by taking into account the environmental, economic and social aspects through 
good governance and under the open and liberal concepts of the free-market 
economics.  The Policy also stressed the importance of science and technology (S&T) 
activities related to minerals and metals in supporting the objectives of sustainable 
development.  
b) Provincial Governments  
Alberta 
According to Alberta Mineral Development Strategy 2002, the vision of the 
Albertan Government is to provide full opportunity for industry to explore and develop 
mineral resources for the greatest benefit of all Albertans while ensuring commitment 
to sustainable development.  The goals of Alberta Mineral Development Strategy are as 
follows:  
― - To develop a comprehensive Geoscience Knowledge 
Initiative needed by government, industry and the public 
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for earth resources stewardship and sustainable 
development. Strategic partnerships (such as the 
Cooperative Mapping Strategies) and establishment of 
adequate base level funding will ensure attainment of 
acceptable levels of basic geological mapping, 
geoscience information and expertise; 
-  To establish a regulatory, environmental and fiscal 
framework for exploration and development that is 
effective, efficient and fair by designing policies and 
guidelines for integrated land management, ensuring 
available mineral tenure policies are proper for 
exploration and development, by developing the 
recommendations for improvements of mining 
regulation, environmental protection, and health and 
safety issues, and by ensuring Alberta‘s fiscal regimes are 
equitable, competitive, and stable;  
- To implement innovative communication, consultation 
and community development processes by fostering 
participation of relevant sectors consisting of 
governments, indigenous people and society, educational 
institutes and mining industry; and 
- To ensure that Alberta‘s infrastructure supports and 
facilitates responsible development of the mineral 
industry‖ (Government of Alberta, 2002). 
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British Columbia 
According to the British Columbia Mining Plan 2005, there are four 
cornerstones of the mining industry: focusing on communities and indigenous people, 
protecting employees and environment, increasing competitiveness, and access to land. 
Strategies of each cornerstone are shown as follows: 
―Cornerstone 1: Focus on communities and indigenous 
people 
Strategy 1: encourage greater relationships with 
communities 
Strategy 2: encourage greater relationships with 
indigenous people 
Strategy 3: develop approaches to sustainable mining 
 
Cornerstone 2: Protecting employees and environment 
Strategy 4: lead in standards and practices of health and 
safety 
Strategy 5: lead in standards and practices of 
environment 
Strategy 6: work with other relevant sectors to solve 
environmental problems 
 
Cornerstone 3: Global competitiveness 
Strategy 7: ensure competitive taxation 
Strategy 8: streamline regulation 
Strategy 9: invest in geoscience 
Strategy 10: attract investment 
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Strategy 11: enhance excellent infrastructure 
Strategy 12: invest in people development and 
technology 
 
Cornerstone 4: Access to land 
Strategy 13: define land available for exploration and 
mining 
Strategy 14: cooperate with other land users‖ 
(Government of British Columbia, 2005) 
Manitoba 
The purpose of Manitoba‘s Sustainable Development Act 1997 is to create a 
framework through which sustainable development will be implemented in the 
provincial public sector and promoted in private industry and in society generally.  The 
guidelines of sustainable development in this Act are composed of the followings: 
― (1) Efficient use of resources by means of: encouraging 
and facilitating development and application of systems 
for proper resource pricing, demand management and 
resource allocation together with incentives to encourage 
efficient use of resources; and employing full-cost 
accounting to provide better information for decision 
makers. 
(2) Public participation by means of: establishing forums 
which encourage and provide opportunity for 
consultation and meaningful participation in decision 
making processes by Manitobans; endeavouring to 
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provide due process, prior notification and appropriate 
and timely redress for those adversely affected by 
decisions and actions; and striving to achieve consensus 
amongst citizens with regard to decisions affecting them. 
(3) Access to information by means of: encouraging and 
facilitating the improvement and refinement of economic, 
environmental, human health and social information; and 
promoting the opportunity for equal and timely access to 
information by all Manitobans. 
(4) Integrated decision making and planning by means of 
encouraging and facilitating decision making and 
planning processes that are efficient, timely, accountable 
and cross-sectoral and which incorporate an inter-
generational perspective of future needs and 
consequences. 
(5) Waste minimization and substitution by means of 
encouraging and promoting the development and use of 
substitutes for scarce resources where such substitutes are 
both environmentally sound and economically viable; 
and reducing, reusing, recycling and recovering the 
products of society. 
(6) Research and Innovation by means encouraging and 
assisting the researching, development, application and 
sharing of knowledge and technologies which further our 
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economic, environmental, human health and social well-
being‖ (Government of Manitoba, 1997).  
 
Newfoundland and Labrador 
In 1997 the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador announced its 
intention to enact a Proposed Sustainable Development Act.  At present, the proposed 
act has not been passed into an active law as yet.  However, details of the proposed act 
are still posted on the web-site of the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador.  In 
this proposed act, the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador has committed to 
introduce a Sustainable Development Act that will: 
 
― - Establish sustainable management of the province's 
natural environment as a central policy objective. 
- Recognize the full range of uses and values of natural 
resources, including resource industries, habitat for 
wildlife, parks and wilderness, tourism and recreation. 
- Safeguard the life supporting capacity of air, water, soil  
and ecosystems. 
- Provide for the sustainable development of renewable 
resources in a way that enables people to provide for their  
economic, social and cultural needs, while preserving the 
integrity of ecosystems and meeting the reasonably 
foreseeable needs of future generations. 
-  Ensure nonrenewable resource developments benefit 
future as well as present generations by controlling the 
pace of development, promoting value-added product  
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manufacturing and spending royalties in ways that have 
long-term benefits across generations. 
- Direct resource departments and related agencies to 
harmonize resource policies, which will make them more 
consistent and efficient in their pursuit of a healthy 
economy, environment and society for present and future 
generations. 
- Ensure that workers, environmentalists, industry, 
communities, aboriginal peoples and others have a say in 
how our resources are managed‖ (Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 2006). 
Ontario 
The objectives of the Mineral Development Strategy, introduced in 2006, are to 
help Ontario remain one of the world‘s leading mining jurisdictions while, at the same 
time, supporting responsible and sustainable mineral development that benefit 
communities and all Ontarians. The four key strategies objectives are: 
(1) Promoting long-term sustainability and global competitiveness by applying 
appropriate tax and fiscal regimes, improving geological database, and supporting 
research and development;  
(2) Supporting modern, safe and environmentally sound exploration and mining  
by monitoring environmental performance of the mining industry, developing mining 
technology, and modernizing regulatory processes of mining issues; 
(3) Clarifying and modernizing mineral resource stewardship by encouraging 
participation of indigenous people in mining industry and clarifying access to mineral 
resources; and 
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(4) Promoting community development and opportunities for all by supporting 
jobs for local people, and improving public infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, and 
schools (Government of Ontario, 2006) 
Quebec 
In 2004 the Government of Quebec announced Quebec‘s Sustainable 
Development Plan: Consultation Document, effective from 2004 to 2007.  In the Plan 
fourteen principles were set to guide the Government of Quebec‘s actions with respect 
to sustainable development. The principles, which will serve to define their legal 
obligations and authority, are as follows: 
― (1) Health and quality of life: People, protection of their 
health and improvement of their quality of life are at the 
centre of concerns for sustainable development; people 
are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony 
with nature. 
(2) Social equity: Development must be undertaken in a 
spirit of intra- and inter-generational equity, taking the 
needs of everyone concerned into account. 
(3) Environmental protection: To achieve sustainable 
development, environmental protection must constitute 
an integral part of the development process. 
(4) Economic efficiency: The economy of Québec must 
be effective, geared toward innovation and economic 
prosperity that is conducive to social progress, and 
respectful of the environment. 
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(5) Involvement and commitment: Sustainable 
development is founded on a shared commitment; the 
involvement of citizens and a partnership among all 
groups in society are needed to ensure the social, 
economic and environmental sustainability of 
development. 
(6) Access to knowledge: Educational measures and 
access to information must be encouraged in order to 
stimulate innovation, raise awareness and ensure 
effective public involvement in the implementation of 
sustainable development. 
(7) Protection of cultural heritage: The property, sites and 
landscapes making up a society‘s cultural heritage are a 
source of identity, pride and solidarity. Through its 
cultural heritage, the traditions, customs, values and 
knowledge of a society are passed on from generation to 
generation and the preservation of this heritage fosters 
the economy of resources. Cultural heritage components 
must be identified, protected and enhanced, taking their 
intrinsic rarity and fragility into account. 
(8) Prevention: In the presence of a known risk, 
preventive and corrective actions must be taken, with 
priority given to actions at the source, using the best 
techniques available at an economically acceptable cost. 
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(9) Precaution: Where there is a risk of serious or 
irreversible harm, the lack of absolute scientific certainty 
must not be used as an excuse for postponing the 
adoption of effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation. 
(10) Biodiversity preservation: Biological diversity offers 
incalculable advantages and must be preserved for the 
benefit of present and future generations; the protection 
of species, ecosystems and the natural processes that 
maintain life is essential if quality of human life is to be 
maintained. 
(11) Respect for ecosystem support capacity: Human 
activities must be respectful of the support capacity of 
ecosystems, and must not exceed the threshold beyond 
which the functions and balance of the natural 
environment would be irreversibly altered. 
(12) Responsible production and consumption: 
Production and consumption patterns must change in 
order to reduce their adverse social and environmental 
impact to a minimum and, in particular, avoid waste and 
the depletion of resources. 
(13) Polluter/User-pay: Those who generate waste 
material or other forms of pollution should bear the cost 
of preventive, waste reduction and anti-pollution 
measures; goods and services should be priced so as to 
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reflect all the costs they generate, whether at the 
production or consumption stage. 
(14) Inter-governmental partnership and cooperation: 
Governments must collaborate to ensure that 
development is sustainable from an environmental, social 
and economic standpoint; the external impact of actions 
in a given territory must be taken into consideration 
(Government of Quebec, 2004). 
2.3 Australian Mining Laws, Taxation and Policies 
2.3.1 Mining Laws 
Australia is a Commonwealth of six states and one territory consisting of the 
states of New South Wales (NSW), Queensland (QLD), South Australia (SA), 
Tasmania (TAS), Victoria (VIC), and Western Australia (WA), and Northern Territory 
(NT).  Mineral resources are under state or territorial ownership. The government of 
each state and territory has its own mining legislation to regulate aspects of exploration, 
mining activities, environmental management, reclamation of mining areas, and mining 
taxation. Names of laws relevant to mining and their fields of enforcement and 
application of each state and territory are presented in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6 State/Territorial Mining Laws and Applications 
State/Territory Names of Laws Fields of Enforcement and Application 
New South Wales Mining Act 1992 -  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
Queensland Mineral Resources Act 1989 -  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
South Australia Mining Act 1971 -  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
Tasmania Mineral Resources 
Development Act 1995 
-  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
Victoria Mineral Resources 
Development Act 1990 
-  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
Western Australia Mining Act 1978 -  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, reclamation, and mining taxation 
Northern Territory Mining Act 2005 
 
Mineral Royalty Act 2006 
-  exploration, mining activities, environmental 
management, and reclamation 
-  mining taxation 
2.3.2 Mining Taxation 
Mining companies must pay tax to two levels of government, Commonwealth 
and states. The Commonwealth Government imposes corporate income tax, Goods and 
Services Tax (GST) or VAT, Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT), capital gains tax, and fuel 
excise tax.  The rate of corporate income tax is 30 percent of taxable income.  Goods 
and Services Tax (GST) or VAT is levied at a rate of 10 percent of values added at each 
step in production and distribution of goods and services including importation.  The 
Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) is collected at a rate of 48.5 percent of the taxable values of 
certain fringe benefits they provide to their employees. 
State governments impose land tax in all states except for Northern Territory, 
stamp duty in all states and territory, payroll tax in all states and territory at a rate 
between 4.75% and 6.85%, and mineral royalties are collected in all states and territory.  
The details of mineral royalty rates applied to construction minerals, which are the 
focuses of this study, are shown in Table 2.7. 
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Table 2.7 Royalty Rates for Construction Minerals in Australia  
Commodity WA NSW VIC QLD SA TAS NT 
Aggregate 30c/t 35c/t 84c/t 25c/t 20c/t A$1/t 18% NV
7
 
Gypsum 30c/t 35c/t 24-84c/t 25c/t 20c/t ad v + prof
8
 18% NV 
Limestone 50c/t 35c/t 84c/t 30c/t 20c/t 60c-A$1.2/t 18% NV 
Source: Government of Western Australia (1999)  
2.3.3 Mining Promotion Policies 
In Australia, the Commonwealth and State Governments have introduced their 
own policies in promoting mining industry. Their available mining promotion policies 
are shown as follows. 
a) Commonwealth Government 
From Lyday (2003), Australia is a world leading producer of lead, nickel, sands, 
tantalum, uranium, and zinc. To continue such status, the Commonwealth Government 
has a policy on encouraging investment in mineral exploration and mining activities.  
Under such policy, the Australian Resources Research Centre (ARRC) was established 
in 2001. The ARRC was a joint venture of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organization (CSIRO), Curtin University of Technology, and the 
Government of Western Australia. The ARRC‘s initial research on minerals and 
mining are focused on technologies that enable the discovery of new world-class, high 
quality mineral deposits and extraction method at the lowest possible cost with 
emphasis on safety and the environment (Australian Resources Research Centre, 2001). 
                                                 
7
 NV means net value of mineral commodity sold in a royalty year. 
8
 ad v + prof means ad valorem and profit-based combination. 
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b) State Governments 
New South Wales 
Besides ARRC, Cooperative Research Centre for Landscape Evolution and 
Mineral Exploration (CRCLEME) is another research centre that is a joint venture 
between New South Wales Geological Survey, Australian National University, 
University of Canberra, and CSIRO Division of Exploration and Mining. Its objective 
is to improve the understanding of the Australian landscape in terms of its 
geomorphology, regolith (soil cover), weathering, and alteration processes to aid in the 
search for new mineral resources (Government of New South Wales, 2006). 
South Australia 
The South Australian Government promotes mineral investment through 
various initiatives.  The recent and presently active initiatives are South Australian 
Exploration Initiative (SAEI), Plan for Accelerating Exploration (PACE), Broken Hill 
Exploration Initiative (BHEI), and Targeted Exploration Initiative South Australia 
(TEISA) of 2020.  The SAEI, implemented from 1992 to 1996 at a total state 
government budget of A$23.5 million, was tasked with gathering mineral geoscientific 
data by airborne geophysical surveys, bedrock drilling and compilation of geoscientific 
databases.  The BHEI, started in 1994, is a joint program involving the South 
Australian, New South Wales and Commonwealth Governments with the aim of 
promoting mineral investment in the Broken Hill-Olary region in order to help secure 
the future of a port and a city in the region.  Under the PACE, which was established in 
2004, the State Government will co-fund up to 50% of approved drilling projects to 
enhance the level of mineral exploration in the State.   The TEISA of 2020, a renewal 
exploration programme that targets key areas of South Australia, started in 1992, has 
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been an approach to ensure that high quality pre-competitive geoscientific data 
continues to be supplied to mineral and petroleum explorers wishing to do business in 
South Australia (Government of South Australia, 2004).  
Northern Territory 
The mining promotion plan of the Northern Territory (NT) was stated in the 
Building the Territory‘s Resource Base (BTRB) initiative with the aim of informing 
potential explorers about the rich prospect of the NT.  The presently active component 
in the initiative, launched in 2005, is called the Top End Secret campaign – Strategy for 
increased NT exploration (Government of Northern Territory, 2006) 
Tasmania 
Since the mineral industry has played and continues to play a substantial role in 
the Tasmanian economy, the State of Tasmania also supports the industry. With the 
cooperation of the Commonwealth Government and the mineral industry in Tasmania 
the Western Tasmanian Regional Minerals Programme was implemented in order to, 
amongst other tasks, to set up a regional development plan, for up to 15 years, to 
identify the infrastructure needed to support an expanded industrial base in Tasmania 
(Government of Tasmania, 2006). 
Victoria 
Victoria State devised a plan called ―the Innovation Roadmap‖ with the aim of 
stimulating the innovation and strategic investment necessary for the sustainable 
development of Victoria‘s mineral and energy wealth.  The aim of the roadmap was to 
identify priorities of research and development, and to define obstacles to investment in 
gold, mineral sands, coal, construction stone, natural gas and oil sectors.  
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As for construction minerals, in 1993, the Department of Primary Industries 
issued a Geological Survey of Victoria Technical Record designating Extractive 
Industry Interest Areas (EIIA). This geological survey report, which has been reviewed 
a number of times to include new information and changes in land use and zoning, 
designated lands containing stone resources of sufficient quantity and quality to support 
extractive industry operations. The EIIA is a guideline for both mining companies to 
find new stone deposits and local communities to realize and prepare long-term public 
land use plans at the mines end of life (Government of Victoria, 2006). 
2.3.4 Relevant Environmental Policies 
In Australia, the Commonwealth and State Governments have introduced their 
own policies for the mining industry. The available environmental policies related to 
the mineral industry are as follows. 
a) Commonwealth Government 
To support rehabilitation, the Australian Centre for Minesite Rehabilitation 
Research (ACMRR), a joint venture of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organization (CSIRO), University of Queensland, Curtin University of 
Technology and the Australian Mineral Industries Research Association, was 
established in 1994 with initial funding of A$600,000. The main objective of ACMRR 
was to conduct strategic research into mine-site rehabilitation, which would lead to 
significant improvements in rehabilitation processes for the mutual benefit of Australia 
and its mining industry (Lyday, 1994).  
64 
 
b) State Governments 
Victoria 
To preserve mineral resources, recycling is one method that helps, especially in 
construction mineral resource group.  In 2002, the Government of Victoria State 
released the Towards Zero Waste strategy.  This strategy has three objectives consisting 
of  
(1) to reduce solid waste from three sources: commerce and industry, 
municipalities, and construction and demolition;  
(2) to increase the amount of materials for reusing and recycling; and  
(3) to decrease environmental damage resulting from these solid wastes. 
For the solid waste from construction and demolition, the goal is a recovery rate 
of 80 percent by weight to be reused and recycled by 2014, while an interim goal is a 
recovery rate of 65 percent in years 2008-09.  In years 2002-03, there was 3.75 million 
tons of solid waste from construction and demolition accounting for 40 percent of the 
total solid waste generated in Victoria. Approximately 0.9 million tons of demolished 
concrete was reprocessed into aggregate (Government of Victoria, 2005). 
South Australia 
The South Australian Government introduced ‗Waste Strategy 2005-10‘ to 
ensure a healthy environment for South Australians across generations.  The strategy 
identified three waste types consisting of municipal solid waste, commercial and 
industrial waste, and construction and demolition waste.  For construction and 
demolition waste, the strategy sets targets to increase recovery and reuse of 
construction and demolition materials by 20, 35, and 50 percent within 2006, 2008, 
2010, respectively (Government of South Australia, 2005). 
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New South Wales 
The New South Wales Government has introducing the Waste Avoidance and 
Resource Recovery Strategy 2006 (Waste Strategy 2006), an update of the Waste 
Strategy 2003, with the aim of maximizing the conservation of natural resources and 
minimizing waste and disposal.  Waste Strategy 2006 will provide guidance for actions 
to ensure efficient utilization of natural resources and to reduce the impact on the 
environment throughout the life cycle of goods and materials.  The strategy‘s targets 
are, by 2014, to increase the recovery and use of the three waste types: municipal 
waste, commercial and industrial waste, and construction and demolition waste to 66%, 
63%, and 76%, respectively.  
In New South Wales State, abandoned mining areas where no accountable 
individual, company or organization can be found will be rehabilitated under the New 
South Wales Derelict Mines Programme.  This programme has been administered by a 
joint agency committee (the Derelict Mines Committee) comprising senior 
representatives from the Department of Primary Industries, Department of Lands, 
Department of Environment and Conservation and the NSW Minerals Council.  The 
programme aims to minimize risks, to remove environmental pollution sources, and to 
reduce land degradation for the health and safety of local communities (Government of 
New South Wales, 2006).   
Queensland 
In 2005 the Environmental Protection Agency of Queensland with the 
cooperation of the Queensland Resources Council started the process of setting up a 
policy framework to encourage the progressive rehabilitation of large mines.  The 
proposed framework includes:  
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― - New provisions in the Environmental Protection Act 
1994 (EP Act) for certifying progressive rehabilitation, 
recording details of the areas certified and verifying this 
at final relinquishment of the mining tenement; 
- Changes to the current process for setting and recording 
the rehabilitation objectives for each mining and 
exploration project and how progress towards those 
objectives will be measured; 
- A Guideline on rehabilitation requirements and the 
criteria to assess the suitability of rehabilitation; 
- A mechanism to assess the residual risk of each 
rehabilitated area; and 
- Changes to the FA system in the EP Act and 
Guidelines.‖  (Queensland Resources Council, 2005) 
2.3.5 Sustainable Development Policies 
The concept of ―sustainable development‖ is also employed in the policy 
statements of the Commonwealth and State Governments.  However, the 
Commonwealth and State Governments approach the scope of sustainable development 
differently because the Commonwealth and states have different roles in administrating 
mineral resources.  While the sustainable policies of the Commonwealth Government 
give general guidance, those of the provincial governments focus only on (1) physical 
sustainability of mineral production through mineral exploration and development and 
(2) sustainability of ecosystems and the environment in mining areas through mine site 
rehabilitation.  
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a) Commonwealth Government 
The Commonwealth applies its policies on sustainable mineral development 
through the Ministerial Council for Mineral and Petroleum Resources (MCMPR), 
established in June 2001. The MCMRR consists of the Commonwealth Minister for 
Industry, Tourism and Resources and, State and Territory Ministers with responsibility 
for minerals and petroleum. It has adopted a long-term strategic vision, to be achieved 
in 2025, as ―Australia is recognised as a world-class location for minerals and 
petroleum exploration and development, with a competitive resources industry valued 
for its contribution to the sustainable development of the nation and the world.‖ 
To achieve its vision the MCMPR identifies several key priorities, one of which 
is valuing community and contributing to sustainable development. Under this priority, 
the MCMPR believes that to attain a sustainable future, and thereby maintain its licence 
to operate, the industry must: 
―- Operate to accepted world‘s best environmental 
practices; 
- Demonstrate an overriding commitment to the health 
and safety of its employees and the communities in which 
it operates; 
- Undertake meaningful consultation with stakeholders 
regarding decisions that may affect them; and 
- Create economic benefits for shareholders, employees 
and local communities as well as the community at large 
(as owner of the resource).‖ (Ministerial Council for 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources, 2005) 
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b) State Governments 
Western Australia 
The Western Australian Government took the concept of sustainable 
development seriously.  In September 2003, it released a very comprehensive 
sustainability strategy called ―Hope for the Future: The Western Australian State 
Sustainability Strategy‖.  The strategy explained the conceptual basis of sustainability 
and covered almost, if not, all aspects of sustainability. It seeks to resolve the tensions 
between economic, environmental and social goals through finding mutual benefits. 
The strategy attempts to show how the needs of current and future generations can be 
met through an integration of environmental protection, social advancement and 
economic prosperity. 
Concerning mineral resources, the strategy discussed sustainable mining and 
petroleum production under the topic of Sustainable Natural Resource Management. It 
stated its objective as to ensure that minerals and petroleum production in Western 
Australia remains at world best practice and the industries help to establish the standard 
for sustainability. Besides the present requirement for the industry to conduct 
environmental impact assessments that helps establish environmental bottom lines and 
the State‘s royalty regime that helps ensure an economic return for communities from 
the development of mineral resources, its action plans comprise: 
― - Work towards sustainability assessment of complex or 
strategic mining and petroleum projects using 
sustainability criteria (consistent with the Keating 
Review). 
- With key stakeholders, develop a set of agreed 
sustainability operating principles for the mining and 
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petroleum sectors through a working group or groups 
managed through the Department of Industry and 
Resources and the Sustainability Roundtable. 
- Foster local community involvement (particularly 
Aboriginal communities, pastoralists and local shires) as 
part of the  sustainability assessment process. 
- Establish transparent processes to enable community 
awareness of the day-to-day regulatory system for 
exploration, mining and minerals processing including 
through the web site of the Department of Industry and 
Resources. 
- Work with industry on the development of voluntary 
accreditation for mining and petroleum industry 
sustainability. 
- Implement strategies that support the use of local 
employment in mining ventures, particularly using 
regional centres as employment hubs, and encourage 
mining companies to maximise their purchasing of goods 
and services within regions.‖ (Government of Western 
Australia, 2003) 
New South Wales 
The term sustainable development was mentioned in the Regulatory Impact 
Statement issued in the process of enacting Mining Regulation 2003 of the State of 
New South Wales. In the regulation, the Department of Mineral Resources is assigned 
to advance sustainable mineral development for the benefit of the community by 
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providing custodianship of mineral resources and ensuring sound resources utilization. 
This is achieved by:  
― - Encouraging and facilitating well planned, responsible 
mineral exploration and mining/minerals development; 
- Allocating and managing exploration and mining titles 
in an efficient and timely manner; and 
- Ensuring a fair and equitable royalty return to the 
community from development of its mineral resources. 
- Improving the safety and performance of the mining 
industry by providing an appropriate regulatory 
framework. 
- Ensuring that the exploration and mining industry meets 
outcomes expected by the community and Government 
for environmental management and rehabilitation‖ 
(Government of New South Wales, 2003) 
Victoria 
The Department of Primary Industries, Victoria, stated its purpose as ―the 
sustainable development of primary industries for the benefit of all Victoria‖.  To attain 
its purpose the Department set five key strategies as follows: 
 Allocating natural resources by managing and regulating natural resource 
use in the public interest; 
 Working with industries by facilitating investment in the sustainable use of 
Victoria's natural resources;  
 Using science to drive improvements in the productivity and sustainability 
of Victoria's primary industries; 
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 Securing market opportunities for Victoria by protecting and enhancing 
access to markets; and  
 Assisting with change by strengthening the capacity of rural industries and 
communities to anticipate and respond to change. (Government of Victoria, 
2006) 
Tasmania 
The State of Tasmania‘s policies and planning is administered under the 
Resource Management and Planning System (RMPS). The RMPS has the objective of 
furthering sustainable development by considering environmental, economic, cultural 
and social factors in decisions about planning and development. The RMPS is 
composed of a suite of Acts, principally: 
 State Policies and Projects Act 1993 
 Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (LUPA) 
 Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 
 Public Land (Administration and Forests) Act 1991 
 Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 (EMPCA) 
 Historic Cultural Heritage Act (1995) 
 The Resource Planning and Development Commission Act (1997) 
The common objectives of the RMPS are as follows: 
―promote sustainable development of natural and 
physical resources and to maintain ecological processes 
and genetic diversity 
provide for fair, orderly and sustainable use and 
development of air, land and water 
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encourage public involvement in resource management 
and planning 
encourage opportunities that promote sustainable 
development 
promote a shared responsibility for resource 
management and planning between the different spheres 
of government, the community and industry in 
Tasmania‖ (Government of Western Tasmania, 2005) 
2.4 Brazilian Mining Laws, Taxation and Policies 
2.4.1 Mining Laws 
Brazil is a Federation consisting of twenty-six states and one federal district.  
Besides, within each state there are Municipalities, which are autonomous and 
hierarchically independent from both federal and state governments. Under the Federal 
Constitution, enacted on 5
th
 October, 1988, mineral resources are owned by the Union.  
According to the Mining Code of 1967 (Executive Law No. 227 of 28
th
 February, 
1967), the National Department of Mineral Production (DNPM), Ministry of Mines and 
Energy, is responsible for supervising mineral exploration and exploitation in Brazil.  
The private sector can operate a mining business by means of a joint venture with the 
Federal, State, or Municipal Governments or by taking 100 percent privatization 
investment in the mining industry as stipulated in Constitutional Amendments Nos. 6 
and 9 dated 15
th
 August, 1995.  Exploration and mining cannot take place without 
permits from the Government.  An Exploration Authorization Permit is granted by the 
Director-General of the DNPM, while a Development Concession is issued by the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy in accordance to Article 7 of Executive Law No.9314 of 
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January 1997.  For industrial minerals including those used for construction, the 
authorities who are empowered to grant licenses to mine and utilize the minerals are 
local governments (City halls) together with environmental agencies. The licenses are 
required to register with the DNPM. 
With regard to environmental protection, the legislation that is applied to 
mining connects to the following environmental requirements: an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA), environmental licensing (LA), and a plan for recovery of degraded 
areas (PRAD). An EIA is required in every mining project.  An LA is mandatory for 
the installation, expansion, and operation of any mining activities.  The Resolution 010 
of the National Council for the Environment (CONAMA) of December 6, 1990, 
stipulates that mineral rights can be granted by the DNPM only after LAs have already 
been obtained.  Article 225 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution dictates that mined-out 
areas that were environmentally damaged must be reclaimed, and a PRAD requires 
suitable technical solutions to rehabilitate the soil and other aspects of the environment 
degraded by mining activities  
Laws and regulations that govern the mining sector with regard to 
environmental protection are as follows: 
 Federal law No. 6938 of August 31, 1981, and its amendments (Acts Nos. 
7804 of July 18, 1989, and 8028 of April 12, 1990) provide the purpose and 
mechanism for formulating the National Environmental Policy;  
 Federal law No. 9605 of February 12, 1998, provides sanctions against 
activities harmful to the environment;  
 Federal Decree No. 97632 of April 10, 1989, deals with rehabilitation of 
areas damaged by mining;  
 Federal Decree No. 99274 of June 6, 1990, regulates law No. 6938; 
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 Resolution No 1 of the CONAMA of January 23, 1986, provides basic 
criteria and general guidelines for writing the Report on Environmental 
Impact (RIMA);  
 Resolution No. 009 of the CONAMA of December 6, 1990, regulates 
environmental licenses for mineral extraction; 
  Resolution No. 010 of the CONAMA of December 6, 1990, regulates 
environmental licenses for mineral extraction used in civil construction; 
 Resolution No. 2 of the CONAMA of April 18, 1996, provides for 
compensation for environmental damages; and 
 Resolution No. 237 of the CONAMA of December 19, 1997, provides the 
procedures and guidelines used in environmental licensing. (Gurmendi, 
2004) 
2.4.2 Mining Taxation 
Mining companies must pay tax to three levels of government: federal, state, 
and municipal.  Brief details of taxation at the Federal and state levels are show as 
follows. 
a) Federal Government 
i) Federal General Taxation 
Corporate Income Tax: The corporate income tax is levied at the rate of 15 
percent on net profit, plus an additional tax of 10% on any net profit exceeding R$ 
240,000 (US$ 111,600)  
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ii) Federal General Levies 
Social Contribution Tax on Net Income (CSLL): CSLL is levied at the rate 12 
percent on the adjusted net profit, before income tax.   
Social Integration Program (PIS): PIS is levied monthly at the rate of 0.65 
percent on gross operating revenue. This tax, which is spent on financing an 
unemployment-insurance programme, is not collected on income from exports.  
Contribution for Social Security Fund (COFINS): COFINS is levied monthly at 
the rate of 3 percent on earnings.  Income from exports is exempt from this 
contribution.  
Social Charges: There are some other social expenses to be paid by a company: 
National Social Security Institute (INSS) and Employees’ Indemnity Guarantee Fund 
(FGTS).  INSS and FGTS are levied at rate of 20 and 8 percent on payroll, respectively. 
iii) Mineral Royalties 
In Brazil, mineral royalty is called Financial Compensation for Exploiting 
Mineral Resources (CFEM).  The CFEM rates are 3 percent for bauxite, manganese 
ore, rock salt, and potassium; 2 percent for iron ore, fertilizers, coal, and other minerals; 
1 percent for gold; and 0.2 percent for other precious minerals and precious stones.  
CFEM levied is distributed to three levels of government, municipality, state and 
federal, in proportion of 65, 23 and 12 percent, respectively. 
b) State Governments 
i) State General Taxation 
Added Value Tax on Sales and Services of Interstate and Inter-municipal 
Transportation and Communication (ICMS): ICMS is due at all stages of selling a 
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product, along the chain from producers to end-users.  All minerals, produced in Brazil 
or imported, are liable for ICMS collection, with rates varying from state to state, but 
not exceeding the maximum rates as shown in Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8 The Brazilian Maximum Rate of ICMS in each Operation  
Operation Maximum Rate 
Interstate 18% 
Interstate – Taxpayer 12% 
Interstate – End-user 18% 
Exportation 13% 
Importation 18% 
Source: Ministry of Mines and Energy (2000) 
2.4.3 Mining Promotion Policies 
From U.S. Geological Survey (2004), Brazil is a world leader in producing 
bauxite, columbium, graphite, iron ore, manganese, tantalum, and tin.  To continue as a 
world leading mineral producer, the Federal Government has had a policy on 
encouraging mineral exploration by providing interested investors with up-to-date 
geological information.  In 1994, the Government decided to resume public 
investments in basic geological mapping, by transferring the Company of Research on 
Mineral Resources (CPRM), which was set up in 1969 with a mixture of state and 
private ownership, to be entirely owned by the Federal government.  The CPRM has 
been designated to carry out the functions of the Geological Survey of Brazil, under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Mines and Energy.  At present, the Programme Geology of 
Brazil in the formulation of the Multi-Year Investment Plan 2004-2007 of the CPRM is 
tasked with gathering geological, economic and metallogenic information across the 
entire country and in the areas of high potential metallic mineralization.  In 2005 and 
2006, CPRM has given priority to studies that can help activities in: small scale mines; 
the increase of supply of industrial minerals used in agriculture and construction; and, 
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the development of metallogenic studies. Specific projects have been carried out in 
three separate sub-programmes (Company of Research on Mineral Resources, 2006). 
In addition, to assist the mining and mineral industry technologically, the 
Mineral Technology Centre for Mineral Technology (CETEM), an organization linked 
to the Ministry of Science and Technology, was established in 1979.  The CETEM 
works to develop and propagate technologies in the areas of mining, metallurgy, and 
materials.  
Besides providing geological information and technologies to the private sector, 
the Federal Government also grants income tax reduction to investors investing in the 
less economically and socially favoured regions of Brazil.  Such regions are Northeast 
and Amazon regions, which are administered by the Northeast Development Agency 
(SUDENE) and Amazon Development Agency (SUDAM), respectively. 
At state level, most Brazilian States stimulate foreign trade and development of 
the States by means of ICMS exemption or reduction authority, by reducing the 
calculation base of the tax or deferring its collection. Some states offer to convert the 
tax to be collected into a financing scheme at preferential rates (National Department of 
Mineral Production, 2006).  
2.4.4 Relevant Environmental Policies 
The environmental management of Brazil is rather complicated.  The 
Environmental Policy of Brazil (BEP), which is coordinated and formulated under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Environment (Ministrio de Meio Ambiente: MMA), is 
executed at three levels: federal, state, and municipal. The BEP included such 
instruments as a Permit System for Polluting Activities, compulsory performance of 
environmental impact assessments, environmental zoning, and environmental quality 
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standards. Under the MMA is the National Counsel for the Environment (Conselho 
Nacional de Meio Ambiente), which has authority to grant the environmental licenses 
required for all mining activities in Brazil.   
There is a National System for the Environment set by law in 1986, which 
comprises various agencies and entities of the Union, states, municipalities and 
foundations instituted by the government as follows:  
 
― (a)  Government Council as the governing body; 
(b) National Counsel for the Environment (CONAMA) as 
the consulting and deliberating body; 
(c) SEMAN/PR (Secretariat for the Environment of the 
Presidency of the Republic) coordinated by the 
Environment Department of the Executive Branch as the 
central body;  
(d) The Brazilian Institute for the Environment and 
Renewable Resources (IBAMA) as the executive board 
responsible for policing and enforcement of all federal 
environmental laws, in which all information concerning 
fines or other environmental problems of a targeted 
company in its data banks can be accessed;  
(e) District Agencies; and 
(f) Local agencies 
Due to the many government agencies involved, it is not 
unusual for conflicts to arise that need to be settled in the 
courts.‖ (Noronha Advogados, 2003) 
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Relating to the construction and demolition waste (CDW), which can be used as 
substitutes for construction minerals, Brazil has a policy to regulate its transportation 
and dumping.  However, in a big city like São Paulo, such policy alone is not very 
effective in preventing illegal dumping of CDW.  It has to be complemented by a 
network of transfer stations, which helps cut down the legal transportation costs, to 
make illegal dumping less attractive. However, a new policy, as presented by National 
Resolution 307 of the CONOMA requires all municipalities and building contractors to 
set up CDW management schemes. Recycling will be a very important tool for 
managing CDW in big cities like São Paulo (Angulo et al., 2002). 
Besides policies on rules and regulations, Brazil uses various technologies to 
help manage the environment.  CETEM also conducts research on reclamation and 
environmental damage abatement.  Since 1998 CETEM has received the assistance in 
implementing the application of mined land reclamation of the Canadian Mining and 
Minerals Sciences Laboratories, under a sponsorship programme of Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) (Natural Resources Canada, 2001). 
 
2.4.5 Sustainable Development Policies 
Brazil also employs the popular term of ―sustainable development‖ in its policy 
statements.  The current policy statements are in the Brazil‘s 2004-2007 Multi-Year 
Plan (Plano Plurianual: PPA). Brazil‘s 1988 Constitution requires that a four-year PPA 
be submitted by each newly elected government at the beginning of its four-year 
mandate to the national Congress for approval. PPA is to guide fiscal and public 
expenditure management. The notion of sustainability is firstly adopted in the macro-
objectives of the PPA 2004-2007, which place emphasis on social issues such as land 
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reform, gender and racial equality, and social inclusion of indigenous people. The three 
core ―mega‖ objectives of the PPA 2004-2007 are: 
(i) Social inclusion and reduction of inequality; 
(ii) Growth with environmental sustainability and reduces regional inequalities; 
and 
(iii) Promotion of citizenship and democracy. 
Some of the macro objectives under the mega objective of Growth with 
Employment Generation, Environmental Sustainability and Reduced Regional 
Inequalities, are as follows: 
― - Attain macroeconomic equilibrium and the 
recuperation of sustainable economic growth, with better 
income distribution and with employment generation; 
- Expand jobs, promoting professional development and 
the reduction of the informal sector; 
- Implement effective land reform, and promote 
sustainable rural agriculture and development; 
- Coordinate and promote productive investment and 
productivity, with emphasis on the reduction of external 
vulnerability; 
- Expand and strengthen scientific and technical 
knowledge regarding sustainable development, with 
emphasis on equity across regions; 
- Stimulate investment in infrastructure in a manner that 
is coordinate and sustainable; 
81 
 
- Reduce regional inequalities, using an approach that 
addresses development at the national, regional as well as 
local levels, stimulating participation of society in local 
development; and 
- Promote environmental quality, as well as the 
conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, 
with emphasis on education regarding the environment.‖ 
(World Bank, 2003) 
With regard to technology that supports sustainable development, Brazil has 
also received assistance from the Federal Government of Canada.  From 1995-1999, 
under the Canada-Brazil Cooperation Project for Sustainable Development in the 
Minerals Sector, the Natural Resources Canada, helped train Brazilian scientists from 
CETEM in the area of technical environmental management consisting of acid mine 
drainage, aquatic effects, life cycle assessment, and ISO 9000 accreditation (Natural 
Resources Canada, 1999). 
2.5 The Comparisons of Thailand’s Policies with Those of Canada, 
Australia, and Brazil 
In comparisons of policies on mineral resources of Thailand and those of 
Canada, Australia, and Brazil, one should take into account of the differences in 
government structures between the four countries.  Thailand is a single state country 
where local administrations are still in their infancy.  At present, a local administration 
is authorized to give or refuse consent to mining in its jurisdiction, but the final say on 
the matter of mineral resources rests with central government.  On the other hand, 
Canada, Australia and Brazil are governed by systems of federation with different 
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degrees of state or provincial power.  In Canada and Australia, states or provinces have 
full authority over mineral resources, but in Brazil, mineral resources are proclaimed by 
the nation‘s constitution as properties belonging to the Union. 
Besides government structure, different geographies, environments, and 
population densities also affect countries‘ policies on mineral resources.  Thailand and 
Brazil are tropical countries and parts of the countries are dense tropical forests.  
Canada and Australia are in temperate-to-cold climate zones and large parts of the 
countries are arid land.  Among the four, Thailand‘s population density is the densest, 
while major parts of Australia and Canada are sparsely populated. 
2.5.1 Mining Promotion Policies 
a) Exploration Investment Promotion 
Canada is a land of vast areas and rich natural resources.  Its economy and its 
people have depended significantly on the exploitation of its natural resources, 
including mineral resources.  Because of its abundant mineral resources and the 
extensive experience of its workforce, more than 60% of the world‘s mining companies 
are based in Canada.  The importance of the mineral sector to their economies ensures 
the state and national governments support and encourage the country‘s mineral 
industry.  Canada devised a fiscal incentive scheme to encourage mineral exploration, 
called Flow-Through Shares (FTS) programme, which grants 15% federal tax credits 
for mineral exploration activities.  The FTS means that the federal government will 
share 15% of the cost of every successful exploration project in the private sector.  
With the FTS programme, Canada may be the most supportive, among the four 
countries, to the mineral industry as a whole. 
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Australia, another country that is rich in mineral resources and its economy 
depend somewhat on them, also treats the mineral industries favourably.  Fiscal 
incentives to the private sector are not prevailed as much as in Canada for only the 
State of South Australia offered to co-fund the approved drilling projects under a plan 
for accelerating exploration.  Governments of various states and the Commonwealth 
resort to the strategy of supplying potential investors with useful information.  Such 
information involves geoscience data, regional development plans, guidelines for 
investors, innovation roadmaps identifying priorities for research and development in 
some important minerals, etc.  Besides providing information, some states invested in 
initial exploration aiming to identify potential areas of mineral deposits for investors to 
conduct detailed exploration for mineral deposits, at less risk.  Another strategy 
employed by the Commonwealth and states to encourage mineral exploration is the 
establishment of research centres.  The Australian Resources Research Centre (ARRC) 
of the Commonwealth Government of Australia has been established with the focus on 
developing technologies to improve the probability of discovering high-quality mineral 
deposits.  At the state level, the Cooperative Research Centre for Landscape Evolution 
and Mineral Exploration (CRCLEME) is another research centre that has been 
established by the New South Wales Government to assist the discovery of new 
resource areas, and to provide support in landscape mapping projects.  
Developing countries such as Brazil and Thailand use similar methods to 
Australia in promoting their mineral industries by providing useful information to 
potential investors, and investing in geological surveys and initial exploration.  In 
attempting to specify areas with potential deposits, Thailand sponsored two projects: 
the Mineral Resources Development Project (MRDP) and the Accelerated Mineral 
Resources Exploration and Evaluation Project (AMREEP).  Thailand does not offer a 
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fiscal incentive to an exploration project, but a mine investor can apply for income tax 
exemption from Thailand‘s Board of Investment similar to other business investors.  In 
Thailand mineral investors may request technical assistances from the government, but 
no research centres specifically designed to perform research and development on 
minerals are established. In the case of Brazil, however, Federal Government has 
established the Company of Research on Mineral Resources (CPRM) to study potential 
mineral deposits and assist mining companies with geological information services. 
b) Land Use Conflict Alleviation 
Each country solves its land use conflicts differently. While developed countries 
such as Canada and Australia resort to preventive measures, the developing countries 
such as Brazil and Thailand have seldom anticipated problems in advance.  Details how 
each country solved land use conflict are as follows:  
Because of the cost of transportation, aggregate mines, for sands and crushed 
stones, are usually situated close to cities.  In the case of Canada, as cities grow, 
available infrastructure and utilities at the sites of aggregate mines and mills entice new 
settlements near and around them.  To solve the ensuing land-use conflict, the 
Government of Ontario Province introduced the Mineral Aggregate Resources Policy.  
Its two main parts consist of (1) developing mineral aggregate resources in deposits 
which are as close to markets as possible, and (2) protecting mineral aggregate 
operations from land use conflicts by restricting migration of people to mineral 
aggregate supply areas. 
Unlike Canada that restricts settlements around mining areas, Australia attempts 
to solve land use conflict prior to the commencement of mining operation by inducing a 
compromise between mining companies and nearby communities.  For example, the 
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Victoria Government introduces the Extractive Industry Interest Areas (EIIA) report 
aiming to increase stone supply for the vitality of Victoria‘s economy and, at the same 
time, to reduce land use conflicts between mining companies and communities.  The 
EIIA report is a guideline for both mining companies to find new stone deposits and 
local communities to realize and prepare for long-term plans for public land use of the 
mined-out areas.  
In Brazil, one cause of land use conflict with aggregate mine is dust pollution 
emitted by mines and mills.  The Brazilian Federal and State Governments use 
command and control instruments to solve this environmental problem caused by 
aggregate production.  Mining firms that do not comply with environmental regulations 
will be closed, while the others that manage to get dust emission below the required 
standard can continue to operate.  A lack of long-term land use planning that designates 
aggregate supply areas and no guidelines for mining firms and communities to reach a 
compromise makes land use conflicts in Brazil a chronic problem.  
 
In Thailand, in the case of aggregate minerals, the designation of rock resources 
all over the country that are suitable for crushed stone production and permitted to be 
mined has been achieved.  A local administration is empowered to give a say before a 
mining concession in its jurisdiction is granted by the authority in Bangkok.  The 
conflicts between miners and local communities are further alleviated by a scheme of 
tax-revenue sharing.  Local and provincial authority administrations will get 60 per cent 
of mineral royalties collected by the Department of Primary Industries and Mines 
(DPIM) from mines in their jurisdiction.  As a result of the aforementioned government 
policies and actions, land use conflicts between aggregate producers and local 
communities in Thailand are not so severe.  The land use conflicts are more of a 
problem among governmental agencies overseeing environment and various land 
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resources for example: national forests, national parks, wild life preservation areas, 
watershed areas, and agricultural areas. 
2.5.2 Relevant Environmental Policies 
a) Mine and Mill Pollution Alleviation 
In Canada and Australia, pollution from aggregate mines and rock crushing 
mills rarely occurs because of the close supervision of Provincial/State Governments 
and the efficient environmental management of mining firms.  On the other hand, 
Brazil is still plagued with the problems.  Brazilian federal and state governments seem 
to use only command and control instruments, however, with insufficient manpower 
and budget. 
In Thailand, besides command and control instruments, technological transfer is 
employed to solve environmental problems. In 1997, the DPIM established a project to 
mitigate dust pollution in the most concentrated crushed stone production area, Tha-
pra-lan and adjacent districts in Saraburi province, under the consultancy of the Faculty 
of Engineering, Chulalongkorn University. The objectives of this project were (1) to 
reduce dust pollution in the area to the safe level by means of dust prevention and 
suppression technology and engineering and environmental management, and (2) to be 
a pilot project for solving the dust pollution problem caused by quarries and rock 
crushing mills in other areas. At the end of the project, the air quality in this area met 
the standard but not for so long because of a lack continuous enforcement by both the 
local and central authorities.  
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b) Abandoned Mined-Out Area Rehabilitation 
In all four countries, after mining projects ceased, mining companies are 
required by law to reclaim, restore, or rehabilitate mined-out areas.  But, in the cases 
that reclamation fails or mined-out areas are abandoned, each country has different way 
to solve this problem as follows: 
In Canada, the Government of Ontario Province set up the Management of 
Abandoned Aggregate Properties (MAAP) Programme to restore abandoned aggregate 
quarries within Ontario under the Aggregate Resource Act.  The abandoned mined-out 
areas were rehabilitated to appear natural or converted to agricultural lands or 
recreational areas. 
Australia deals with the problem of abandoned mine-out areas through three 
approaches.  The first approach, like those implemented by Canada, is to set-up a 
reclamation programme.  For example, the New South Wales State created the New 
South Wales Derelict Mines Programme to reclaim abandoned mining areas where no 
individual, company or organization can be found responsible.  The second approach is 
to implement progressive monitoring processes and to offer incentives for miners to 
provide progressive rehabilitation of mined-out areas.  For example, in Queensland, the 
practice of performing land reclamation inspections by government officials only at the 
end of a mining project was replaced by a practice of intermittent scheduled visits by 
officials in accordance with the land reclamation programme, which should start long 
before the mining project ends.  Queensland also developed a scheme of incentives to 
encourage progressive rehabilitation. The third approach is to assist miners through 
science and technology innovation.  The Australian Centre for Minesite Rehabilitation 
Research (ACMRR) was established by Commonwealth Government to develop 
processes and evaluate indicators of ecosystem rehabilitation success. 
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Brazil, like many other developing countries, just recently took the 
environmental problems of abandoned mined-out areas seriously.  The problems were 
so severe that it is even stated in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution that mined-out areas 
that were environmentally damaged must be reclaimed.  Brazil also uses the Australia‘s 
third approach in dealing with problems.  Through the Mineral Technology Centre for 
Mineral Technology (CETEM) of the Federal Government, with the assistance, under 
the Brazilian Mine Rehabilitation Project of the Natural Resource Canada, scientific 
and technological knowledge about reclamation is being developed and transferred to 
Brazilian miners. 
In the case of Thailand, all Australia‘s three approaches have been used.  
However, Thailand has not established an institute for research and development on 
mining and related technology.  In Thailand, universities are funded to transfer 
scientific and technological knowledge to miners.  At present, DPIM runs a project to 
reclaim mining areas efficiently by hiring the Faculty of Forestry at Mahidol University 
to train miners in land rehabilitation and covering: area preparation, soil quality 
adjustment, tree selection, tree planting, and tree growth improvement. 
c) Recycling 
Solid waste from industries and communities has become a problem of most 
developed and developing countries.  Therefore, most countries promote recycling as a 
means to reduce solid waste and to help preserve their mineral resources.  In comparing 
the environmental policies on recycling of the four countries, one must understand that 
each country has different kinds and severity of problems and also face different 
difficulties in solving them.  A fact is that richer countries normally generate more 
waste per capita than poorer countries.  Richer countries have to set strong policies and 
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measures to support recycling businesses.  But in less developed and developing 
countries, because of high unemployment and lower income among labourers, useful 
and saleable wastes from household waste and city waste dumps are the lifelines of 
many of the poor.  Hence, in a poorer country the problem of solid waste is 
comparative less severe and easier to induce recycling. 
In the case of Canada, the richest among the four countries in terms of national 
income per capita, its Federal Government lay the scope of recycling to cover retrieval 
of metals and minerals that are the raw materials of industries.  The Natural Resources 
Canada, a Federal government agency supervising natural resources sector of Canada, 
launched the Enhanced Recycling Programme to foster an increase in recycled minerals 
and metals by seeking partnerships with automobile, construction, electro-plating and 
electronics industries.  
Australia however, stressed its recycling promotion policy on the sources of 
waste: commerce and industry, municipalities, and construction and demolition.  The 
Government of Victoria State released the Towards Zero Waste strategy with the 
following objectives: to reduce solid waste from three sectors: commerce and industry, 
municipal, and construction and demolition; to increase the amount of materials reused 
and recycled; and to decrease environmental damage caused by these solid wastes.  The 
South Australian Government also issued a waste strategy, while the New South Wales 
Government introduced the Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Strategy with the 
same objectives as those of the Victoria Government. 
Brazil is a developing country; therefore, a major part of valuable household 
wastes, such as metals and plastic, are always collected and sold for recycling by some 
poor people.  Its chief concern regarding solid wastes, however, is illegal dumping of 
waste from demolition.  Therefore, Brazilian scope of recycling emphasizes on 
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construction and demolition waste.  The National Council for the Environment 
(CONAMA) of Brazil is now in the process of approving a management scheme of 
construction and demolition waste (CDW).  The scheme requires all municipalities and 
building contractors to establish their own management plans to recycle CDW. Besides 
recycling CDW for use, the construction sector in Sao Paulo has started utilizing 
artificial sands produced by washing grainy residual by-products from crushed stone 
production as a substitute for natural sand.  
Solid waste problems in Thailand, as a developing country, are partly solved by 
the poor in a similar way to that of Brazil, and by small recycling businesses that buy, 
separate, and sell sorted waste items as raw materials to industries.  However, the poor 
and small recycling businesses have become less and less effective as the country has 
grown economically.  The Thai Ministry of Industry took action by creating a Division 
in the DPIM to promote recycling in industry.  With regard to the illegal dumping of 
construction and demolition waste, Thailand, especially the great metropolitan of 
Bangkok, has not faced the same problem as has Brazil.  Bangkok, which is situated on 
a soft flood plain with an elevation of just a few meters above sea level, demands a lot 
of landfill materials to elevate the ground before buildings and other structures can be 
erected.  All construction and demolition wastes are, therefore, used as landfill.   
2.5.3 Sustainable Development Policies 
Canada and Australia adopted the concept of sustainable development using 
similar strategies. The Canadian Federal Government issues the Minerals and Metals 
Policy of the Government of Canada stating its aim to be Partnerships for Sustainable 
Development.  The Australian Commonwealth Government has adopted a long term 
strategic vision for sustainable development of minerals and the petroleum industry.  
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The main objective of both governments is to provide a framework for the country‘s 
sustainable mineral development on three-dimensions: economic, environmental, and 
social.  But in the viewpoints of Provincial/State Governments of both countries, 
sustainable development is focused on (1) physical sustainability of mineral production 
through mineral exploration and development and (2) sustainability of ecosystems and 
the environment in mining areas through mine site rehabilitation because of their need 
to earn revenue for developing their own provinces/states.  
Both Brazil and Thailand adopted the concept of sustainable mineral 
development by stating their aims to realize it in their national plans: the Federal 
Government Multiyear Plan (PPA) for Brazil, and the National Economic and Social 
Development Plan for Thailand.  Both countries accept that the sustainable 
development has to be achieved through the balance of three-dimensions: economic, 
environmental, and social.  But indeed, at the departmental level, the policies of both 
the National Department of Mineral Production of Brazil and the Department of 
Primary Industry and Mines of Thailand still insist on only one dimension: the 
sustainability of minerals revenues.  This is because both are developing countries and 
revenues from mining industries still play an important role to their own country‘s 
development.  
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Chapter 3    The Notion of the Natural Resource Curse 
3.1 Introduction 
Natural resources all over the world are non-uniform in nature: arable lands, 
rivers and seas have differing yields; forests have different timber densities; mineral 
deposits have differing grades; etc. Producers of a commodity will have different 
production costs, depending upon how good the endowments of the natural resources 
employed in their production are.  Since the global aggregate supply of a commodity is 
the sum of the outputs of all producers, according to economic theories, the price of a 
commodity is driven by the marginal production cost of the highest-cost producer.  As 
a result, the marginal production costs for a commodity borne by the majority of the 
producers are, in general, less than the market price of the commodity.  Hence, 
extraction of natural resources normally generates economic rents.  It is logical for 
most economists and policy makers to believe that, for a country, revenues in term of 
foreign exchanges accruing these economic rents should generate wealth for an 
economy, promote economic progress and reduce poverty.  However, the past couple of 
decades have witnessed the emergence of a new and far less benevolent view of the 
contribution of natural resources, especially nonrenewable ones, to economic 
development, particularly in the developing world.  Based on empirical studies, many 
scholars have reported that resource rich countries appear to have experienced a worse 
economic performance than resource poor countries (Auty, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 
1995; Bravo-Ortega, and De Gregorio, 2001; and Leite, and Weidmann, 1999).  
Though some argued against this conclusion (Maloney, 2002; Gylfason, 2001; Wright 
& Czelusta, 2002; Stijns, 2001), there appears to be a broad agreement that natural 
resource wealth may not really be a blessing for a developing country.  This 
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phenomenon has become known as the ―resource curse‖.  The term was first used in 
formal economics literature in 1993 (Auty, 1993).  However, it should be noted that not 
all countries appeared to suffer a ―curse‖ as a result of the influx of large natural 
resource revenues (Sachs and Warner, 1997).  Thus the ―resource curse‖ phenomenon 
is not exactly unavoidable.  We should, therefore, learn the causes of this phenomenon 
in order to prevent its strong recurrent tendency occurring in a country. 
3.1.1 Why do Economic Rents Become a Resource Curse? 
There seems to be no single explanation why a country with good revenue from 
natural resources tends to suffer a ―curse‖.  However, all explanations base upon the 
simple notion that the curse occurs when a country‘s abundance in natural resources 
causes a distortion in the country‘s economy that becomes difficult to manage and 
results in resources being used less efficiently than they would be otherwise.  Compiled 
and derived from various literature, the causes of resource curse comprise: long term 
decline in terms of trade, revenue volatility, structural economic change, and socio-
cultural and political impacts. 
a) Long Term Decline in Terms of Trade 
Countries whose foreign exchanges depend on export of the primary products of 
natural resources face long term decline in ―terms of trade‖, statistically defined as the 
ratio of the average price of exports to the average price of imports.  Several empirical 
works, including those on Thailand, from my unpublished research paper to be 
mentioned later (Arnonkitpanich, unpublished), and Jamaica (Atkins, 2000), 
demonstrated that, in the long term, the prices of primary commodities decline relative 
to the prices of manufactured goods (Brohman, 1996).  Continuing progression in 
technology may play an important role in this tendency.  Technological improvements 
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mean higher capacities of commodity production with lower costs of production and, at 
the same time, production of manufactured goods uses fewer raw materials than before 
(Prebisch 1950, 1964; Singer, 1950).  Except in the cases of some specific 
commodities, such as petroleum oil and diamond, whose producers have formed 
cartels, commodities markets are generally competitive; therefore, any reductions of 
production costs are passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices.  On the other 
hand, the producers of manufactured products have greater market power, which allows 
them to maintain the prices and pass the benefits of falling costs to workers and 
shareholders.  Decline of export revenue, in itself, is negative to economic growth.  
Furthermore, over time, a resource rich country would be able to buy less and less 
imports of capital goods thereby inhibiting development-creating investment in an 
economy.  
b) Revenue Volatility 
Revenue volatility of a resource rich country is clearly evident.  It was found 
that during 1972-92, regions with high primary export shares experienced terms of 
trade volatility two to three times greater than industrial countries in the same period 
(Mikesell, 1997).   Because the demand for a commodity, a product from natural 
resources, is a derived demand, which has rather low elasticity by nature; therefore, the 
commodity price is very sensitive to change in the demand for the commodity.  When 
the world economy is booming the commodity prices are more likely to shoot up. 
Conversely, when the world economy is in recession the commodity prices tend to be 
depressed severely.  This means that, for the resource rich country, export earnings and 
tax revenue are particularly volatile.  This volatility could cause a variety of problems.  
Fluctuating revenue profiles make it very difficult for a government to pursue a prudent 
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fiscal policy and macro-economic management.  This creates problems in the economy 
ranging from aggravating investor uncertainty to ―stop go‖ spending policies.  Because 
markets are far from fluid, there exists a significant asymmetry between the economic 
impacts of excess aggregate demand versus deficient aggregate demand likely to arise 
from fluctuating government spending.  Thus, excess leads to inflation and a high 
propensity to import while deficient demand causes falling real output, unemployment 
and falling real income.  Hence the economic benefits from a mineral boom might be 
more than offset by the adjustment costs during any following recession (Gelb and 
Associates, 1988).   
c) Structural Economic Change 
The undesirable structural economic change that deindustrializes a nation‘s 
economy as the result of the discovery and exploitation of natural resources is known 
as ―Dutch Disease‖.  The phenomenon was first observed in the Netherlands in the 
1960s, when large reserves of oil and natural gas in the North Sea were discovered and 
exploited.  It was found later that the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands declined 
during the period. Total exports from the Netherlands decreased markedly relative to 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the 1960s. The expansion of petroleum exports 
in the 1960s reduced other exports disproportionately (Gylfason, 2006).  The 
mechanism of the Dutch Disease is that the rapid increase in oil and gas exports leads 
to a surplus in international trade that causes the domestic currency to appreciate.  The 
rise of the real exchange rate of the domestic currency makes the domestic 
manufacturing sector vulnerable to import goods.  Furthermore, the increasing 
volatility of exchange rate as the result of the oil price fluctuation also hurts foreign 
trade in manufacturing goods.  In addition, the boom in the oil and gas industries 
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pushes up the domestic wage rate since other sectors have to compete for labour with 
the booming oil and gas sector, which enjoys high profit from economic rent.  These 
bias effects make the other domestic sectors, especially the manufacturing one, less 
competitive and decline (Fardmanesh, 1991; McKinnon, 1976; Van Wijnbergen, 1984).  
As a result, domestic investment in the sectors other than the oil and gas industries will 
stagnate or shrink.  A study found that the level of domestic investment was inversely 
related to dependence on primary product exports (Gylfason et al., 1999).  
d) Socio-cultural and Political Impacts 
There is an argument that natural resource rents, particularly those that are 
easily exploited, create tendencies for rulers to do badly.  Initially, the easy revenues 
remove the budget constraint, which encourages spending in wasteful but politically 
important projects.  A study, for example argues that in the case of Venezuela it was 
bad government management that caused the problems rather than direct distortions 
from the export booms of the 1970s and 1980s (Mikesell, 1997).  In many resource rich 
countries, this imprudent spending leads to a budget deficit.  Besides, resource rich 
countries tend to have big governments that are normally bureaucratically inefficient.  
Easy money induces corruption.  High resource rents, particularly those from oil and 
mineral resources, lure people to seek the easy rents.  An example was the case of 
Ghana where corruption could be seen as rent seeking behaviour (Mbaku, 1992).  More 
often, rush for rents causes over investment in the sectors that render rents.  This is 
especially true in the cases of gold rush and the discoveries of the deposits of other 
high-price minerals.  Because of the Dutch Disease resource rich governments tend to 
adopt protectionism policies on other domestic industries, which encourage 
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inefficiency. A study found a positive correlation between dependency on primary 
products and a closed trade regime (Sachs and Warner, 1995).   
3.1.2 How Can Resource Curse Be Avoided? 
Because of the resource curse phenomenon, the possession of wealthy natural 
resources, especially mineral deposits, alone is not a guarantee of economic 
development.  However, it seems that few scholars, if any, refute the significant 
contribution to the economic development of a country.  There is widespread consensus 
that:  
i) Mineral deposits that can be extracted profitably are (natural) capital 
assets.  If they are converted into human or physical capital, they can promote 
economic growth; and if they are consumed, they can lower current poverty.  In either 
case, they can enhance economic development.  In short, mineral resources provide 
developing countries with opportunities that they would not otherwise enjoy. 
ii) Some countries have taken advantage of these opportunities, and used 
their mineral wealth to promote economic development. Historically, Britain, the 
United States, and Germany are often cited as successful examples.  In more recent 
times, it is generally agreed that mineral resources have promoted economic 
development in Australia, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and 
Norway.  It should be noted that Botswana, the world‘s leading producer of diamond 
by value, is the only country ever to graduate from the United Nations‘ least developed 
country grouping, and it holds the world record for per capita economic growth since 
1965 (Gylfason, 2001). 
iii) Similarly, it is widely recognized that in other countries, such as 
Zambia and Sierra Leone, mining has increased poverty and impeded long-term 
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economic development through many of the avenues described earlier (Davis and 
Tilton 2002). 
Since the performances of all resource rich countries are varied, the extent to 
which most of the potential benefits of natural resources are realised entirely depends 
on the quality of the developing country‘s administrative, judicial and legislative 
institutions.  These governmental institutes have the power to support or hinder 
economic development in the developing world.  The ultimate question should be: 
Which are the appropriate measures and policies to be implemented in the developing 
world in order to ensure economic development?  Recommendations by scholars in the 
literature have a number of different analytical strands as follows: 
a) Gradual Exploitation 
The extreme option under this recommendation is to leave natural resources, 
especially oil and minerals, in the ground as suggested by the Oxfam study (Ross, 
2001).  This study essentially stated that: ―Oil and mineral dependence produce a type 
of economic growth that offers few direct benefits for the poor; moreover, oil and 
mineral dependence make pro-poor forms of growth more difficult, due to the Dutch 
Disease.‖  This suggestion, which was contrary to Davis and Tilton‘s conclusions 
mentioned above, is considered to be flawed by some critics.  However, while this 
cannot be regarded as a serious option, it does raise issues about the speed with which a 
natural resource project, especially the oil, gas or mineral one, is undertaken and hence 
the consequent production/revenue profile.   
If a country is in danger of the resource curse because it is about to develop a 
new mineral deposit, the slower the development of the project, the greater the chance 
the economy and society has to adjust to the inflow of revenue.  Furthermore, slow 
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development is likely to allow the development of a service industry based on the 
project whereas swift development must be based upon imported services.  The 
difficulty of this solution is how to persuade the investors to slow development.   
A variant on the theme of slowing development is the nature of the revenue 
flow from the projects.  Differing forms of extractive agreements – concession based 
on royalty and taxes, joint ventures, production sharing agreements, service agreement 
etc. – will create differing patterns of revenue flow.  For example, in the case of 
Botswana, the agreement with De Beers on diamond sales effectively smoothes the 
revenue flow to the government (Stevens, 2003).  
Though the agreement governing the revenue distribution between Government 
and De Beers is confidential, some analysts estimate that the Botswana Government 
takes about 75% of the profits from diamond mining through taxes, royalties and 
dividends.  The Sales Marketing Agreements, typically for a 5 year period, and Mining 
Agreements for 25 years, provide a stable framework for both the investor and the 
Government (Modise, 2000). 
b) Diversification 
Many scholars recommended this solution (Ross, 2001; Auty, 1994).  However, 
this is a solution that is difficult to achieve, if not an illusive one.  The performances of 
resource rich countries, in general, have been very poor for huge amounts of public 
money being poured into inefficient and uncompetitive industries (Stevens, 2003).  The 
reasons might be because of the consequence of Dutch disease and crowding out 
effects, which depressed other non-natural resource sectors.  Furthermore, the 
diversification policy has consisted of governments trying to pick industries to be 
promoted.  Notwithstanding wrong choices, it is more likely that they will attract 
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subsidies and protection that will eventually inhibit their development, and if they are 
monopoly public enterprises, such enterprises tend to be high cost and inefficient.   
However, the experience of the Asian tigers shows that the only really effective 
diversification comes from private sector investment, although governments can play a 
supporting role in this process (World Bank, 1993).  To strengthen this avenue, it might 
be a good suggestion for a government to leave a good portion of resource rent in the 
hand of the private sector rather than the public sector.  However, this affects the issue 
of income distribution.  Another way to encourage successful diversification is to 
liberate trade policy.  It was quite noticeable that the ―usual suspects‖ who avoided the 
curse – Botswana, Chile, Indonesia and Malaysia - all pursued a policy of trade 
openness with the rest of the world coupled with a deliberate policy of exchange rate 
depreciation to ensure the competitiveness of non-natural resource industries (Stevens, 
2003).  
c) Sterilization of Revenue  
This solution recommended the resource rich countries to neutralize the impact 
of the large windfall revenue inflow on the rest of the economy.  Fiscal prudence is 
needed to prevent the revenues from translating immediately into greater aggregate 
demand and inflation.  Ideally, a government should resist spending pressures and 
either to accumulate budget surpluses or to channel the revenues into some form of 
fund to be spent appropriately later.  A country that has attempted to follow this 
recommendation is Norway, the third largest oil exporter in the world.  Norway is a 
country that can avoid the resource curse.  In 1990, Norway, considered a developed 
country, established the Government Pension Fund (formerly, Norwegian Petroleum 
Fund), to which all revenues from petroleum have accrued.  The Fund has been 
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designed to ensure that petroleum revenues are used not only by the current generation 
but also by future generations (Gylfason, 2006).  The Norwegian Government Pension 
Fund will be discussed further in the next section. 
However, for most resource rich developing countries, total sterilization of the 
revenue from natural resources is not practicable because of its size in comparison with 
the total government revenue.  (Of course if the revenue from natural resources is 
small, which means the share of natural resource sector in the economy is small, the 
effect of resource curse should not be a matter of concern to a government.)  In the real 
world, countries have mostly opted to cautiously spend the revenue and make great 
attempts to stabilize rather than to sterilize it.  Stabilization of revenue from natural 
resources by way of setting revenue funds will be mentioned in the next section. 
Using the promises of expected revenue from natural resources to increase 
borrowing should be avoided at all costs for it increases revenue fluctuation even more.  
Increased foreign borrowing also has a further disadvantage of helping appreciate the 
exchange rate thus directly contributing to the Dutch disease effect.  Very often in the 
case studies, the experience of Indonesia who did not borrow is compared to the 
experience of Mexico who did (Usui, 1997). 
Another important recommendation under this solution is for a government to 
avoid exchange rate appreciation.  A fixed exchange rate policy should be discarded 
when domestic inflation of any magnitude exists.  Currency devaluation is even 
encouraged.  One option is for the central bank to purchase foreign exchange to hold 
down the nominal rate (Mikesell, 1997).  One common factor in the case of those who 
recently avoided the resource curse, i.e. Botswana, Chile, Indonesia and Malaysia, is 
that all four experienced significant depreciation of the real exchange rate as a result of 
explicit policy choices (Stevens, 2003).  
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d) Setting up Revenue Funds 
Another mechanism to stabilize spending is to establish a fund or funds, 
financed by a good portion of the revenues from natural resources.  To insulate the 
domestic economy from large revenue windfalls the funds have to invest outside the 
country.  Such funds can be used as a mechanism to put assets aside for future 
generations.  Only the earned income from the funds should be allowed to be spent at 
present, while the accumulated capital sum of the funds should be left intact to allow 
future generations to share the benefit from the depletable natural resources.  However, 
during the down turn when the revenue from natural resources falls below a certain 
level the funds may be withdrawn to top up the government budget.  But integrating the 
funds into the overall fiscal policy ―has proven problematical, and despite the operation 
of a fund, the stabilization of expenditure has remained elusive…‖ (Davis et al., 2001).   
Anyway, it can be argued that even if conditions are not ideal, the creation of 
such funds can make some contribution to avoiding the worst excesses of the resource 
curse because of the role of the funds in dampening spending expectations.  The 
success story of Norway is owed in part to the establishment of the Government 
Pension Fund.  Besides putting off money for future generations, the Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund also aims to serve as a buffer between current petroleum 
revenues and the use of these revenues in the Norwegian economy.  Thus the domestic 
economy is shielded from fluctuations in prices and extraction rates in the petroleum 
sector.  By law, the capital from the fund can only be used over the central government 
budget, which is capped by a Norwegian parliament‘s guideline not to exceed 4 per 
cent of the fund or the expected real return on the fund.  As in 2006, the Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund reached the amount of about USD 300 billion (Gylfason, 
2006).  Besides Norway, Chile and Indonesia have also established successful revenue 
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funds (Mikesell, 1997; Usui, 1997).  At a state or provincial level, the Alaska 
Permanent Fund of the Alaska State Government, U.S.A., and the Alberta Heritage 
Fund of the Alberta Provincial Government, Canada, can be considered as successful 
funds accrued from natural resource revenues (Hanneson, 2001). 
e) Political Reforms to Carry Out the Corrective Politics 
To avoid the risk of suffering a resource curse, a country need to be a 
developmental rather than a predatory state whose rulers prey on their subjects rather 
than promoting development.  However, recent research suggests that mineral wealth 
may actively promote a predatory style of government (Fridthof Nansen, 2000; Birdsall 
and Subramaniam, 2004).  Part of the reason is that revenues from natural resources, 
especially oil and minerals, reduce the need to impose taxes on the general population.  
At first this seems like a blessing, but it is not.  States that tax their citizens need to seek 
their consent, or at least their acquiescence, and this involves a process of political 
bargaining—typically through elections.  Resource-rich governments that are already 
inclined towards authoritarianism are likely to choose a different option.  They can use 
rich revenue to buy off political opponents, strengthen their personal praetorian guards 
and suppress dissent. 
There is an argument for a country to develop democracy.  However, while this 
may well be highly desirable for many reasons, the successful stories of authoritarian 
states, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore, Chile, Botswana, etc. 
during their early development, show that democracy is not a necessary condition for 
successful economic performance.  The more important avenues are for a regime to 
contain corruption and to reduce rent seeking.  A clean-up campaign must start with an 
agreement on a common standard of morality (Gillespie and Okrhlik, 1991).  
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Incorporation of corruption controls in legal codes, setting up independent and fearless 
enquiries, and practicing transparency or good governance are ways to reduce 
corruption.  Reducing rent-seeking opportunities can be done by de-politicizing 
resource allocation, through deregulation and privatization allowing free markets to 
take politicians and bureaucrats out of the resource allocation process (Mbaku, 1992).  
The competition will squeeze out illicit margins, as demonstrated by an empirical study 
(Gregoire, 1992)
9
. 
Developmental state is defined as a state aiming at an improved standard of 
living for the majority.  To become one requires two components: the strong elite 
whose interests are aligned with the population, and the institutional capacity to 
implement the necessary policies without being captured by narrow private interests.  
Securing an alignment of interests is crucial and, of course, one route to achieve it is 
democracy where the government must satisfy public interests or be voted out.  
However, it seems not to be the only route.  For example, Chile under Pinochet 
together with Malaysia, Indonesia and indeed Botswana as a one party democracy 
managed the alignment quite well (Stevens, 2003).  It is fortunate for some countries, 
such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, that they long have possessed both two 
components—that are the strong elite and the necessary institutional capacity.  That 
was the reason why those countries could avoid the effects of the resource curse.  For 
some other countries, outside help may be need.  Clearly international organizations, 
such as UNDP, the international financial institutes, such as the World Bank and Asia 
Development Bank, and the investing companies have roles to play.  Help can be in the 
                                                 
9
 Gregoire, Emanuel (1992), in his book titled ―The Alhazi of Maradi: Traditional Hausa merchants in a 
changing Sahelian city‖, studied the rise of a merchant class of the Hausa ethnic groups who live across 
the border between Northern Nigeria and Niger.  The border was hardly patrolled or not patrolled at all.  
The local merchants have often benefited from the caprices of the national governments on either side of 
the Niger-Nigeria border.  Gregoire found that the cross-border illicit trade in cigarettes rendered 
minimal profit margin of about 4 to 6 percent as the result of competition among large groups of 
smugglers and local merchants. 
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forms of seconding expertise to governments and training up those elements of the 
bureaucracy who could play a key role in policy making (Stevens, 2003).  
3.2 The Case of Thailand10 
Thailand can be considered a resource-rich developing country for it is endowed 
with a variety of mineral resources and fertile arable lands.  At the early stage of its 
development, the well being of Thai people depended much upon resource base 
economy.  During the 1960‘s, agricultural and mineral commodities, derived from 
forest, marine and land resources, accounted for more than eighty per cent of the total 
export of the country, and their sectors accounted for about one-third to forty per cent 
of the annual gross national product (GNP). 
3.2.1 Encountering the Resource Curse 
a) Experiencing Export Revenue Fluctuation 
As shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, between years 1960 and 1985, when the 
exports from Thailand were dominated by commodities, the annual export revenues of 
Thailand declined in several years.  The maximum change of export revenue from year 
to year during the mentioned period was 54%, which could be considered huge, but not 
so severe when taking into account the average annual growth during the period of 
13.2%.  The reason that Thailand had exported varieties of commodities might help 
because the declines in prices of some commodities were often offset by the increases 
in prices of other commodities.  Today commodities still play an important role in 
generating foreign exchange for Thailand.  However, after 1985, when the values of 
                                                 
10
 An excerpt from my unpublished research paper done to fulfil a course at Colorado School of Mines 
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exports from manufacturing sector surpassed those of the commodities, Thailand has 
never again faced a negative growth in export revenue. 
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Figure 3.1 Shares of Commodities and Manufactured Goods as a Percentage of Total 
Exports, 1960 – 1996 
Source: Department of Customs (2000) 
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Figure 3.2 Annual Export Values in Current-Dollar and Rates of Export Growth of 
Thailand, 1960-1997 
Source: Department of Customs (2000) 
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b) Facing Decline in Terms of Trade 
As shown in Figure 3.3, Thailand has experienced long term decline in terms of 
trade, matching the theory nicely.  At a period of time before 1985, when agricultural 
and mineral commodities played major roles in Thailand‘s total export, the decline in 
terms of trade deteriorated fast, especially during the early part of the 1980‘s.  The 
World Development Report 1986 by the World Bank, found that, during the 5-year 
period from 1980 to 1984, out of its 125 member countries, both developed and 
developing countries, Thailand was among the group of ten countries that faced the 
most severe decline in terms of trade.  The worst decline in terms of trade occurred 
after the ―Commodity Boom‖ of the period from 1970 to 1979, during which Thailand 
benefited greatly.  The decline in terms of trade for Thailand has been mild since 1988, 
when manufactured products became the major source of export earnings for the 
country.  
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Figure 3.3 Terms of Trade of Thailand, 1960-1999 
Source: Department of Customs (2000) 
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c) Catching No Symptom of the Dutch Disease 
Since modern times, Thailand‘s currency has never faced the pressure to 
appreciate.  On the contrary, before the economic and financial crisis of 1997, the 
opposite was true for Thailand which long faced chronic trade deficit.  In the 1960‘s 
and 1970‘s, even after the end of the Brenton Woods Agreement, the Thai Baht moved 
in a narrow band between 20.35 and 20.965 Baht per US$.  During the first half of 
1980‘s, the long persistent deficit of the Balance of Payment forced Thailand to 
depreciate its currency twice—from 20.775 Baht per US$ to 23 Baht per US$ in July 
1981, and from 23 Baht per US$ to 27 Baht per US$ in November 1984.  Indeed export 
revenue from natural resources had never overwhelmed the balance of trade of 
Thailand.  The reason may be that Thailand has never suddenly discovered a deposit of 
mineral resources with comparatively high value.  Both important land and mineral 
resources have been exploited for export since more than a century ago.  It is safe to 
say that Thailand has not caught the Dutch disease. 
d) Socio-cultural and Political Impacts from Exploiting Natural Resources 
When commodities dominated the country‘s economy, easy profits were in the 
business of trading agricultural commodities, besides mining.  A major part of valuable 
domestic capital was locked in stockpiling agricultural commodities with the intention 
of profiting from the seasonally fluctuating prices. As a result, industrialization of the 
country was slow at the beginning, even though the government implemented industrial 
promotion and protectionism policies.  The manufacturing sector flourished later only 
after the flux of foreign investments. 
At that time also, export duties from agricultural commodities and mineral 
royalties were major sources of total tax revenue of the government because of the ease 
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of their collections.  In 1960, export duties plus mineral royalties accounted for about 
22 per cent of the total tax revenue of the Thai government.  (By comparison, in 2003, 
export duties plus revenues from mineral and petroleum resources was only 6.5 per 
cent of the total tax revenue.)  During that period of time, it is not difficult to 
understand why the wealthy class was almost exclusively people engaging in trading 
and the poorest were farmers who were, indirectly, heavily taxed. 
Like many other developing and under-developing countries such as the 
Philippines and Indonesia, Thailand has been plagued with corruption.  According to 
Transparency International (TI) who compiles the TI Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) Scores
11
 of countries, the average score for Thailand between 1995 and 2006 was 
very low, only 3.3 points out of maximum 10 points compared with an average of 9.2 
and 5.1 points, for those of Singapore and Malaysia, respectively (see Figure 3.4).  But, 
because tax revenue from natural resources plus foreign aid had never surged to 
overwhelm the economy, misspending on bad projects by the Thai government was not 
so obvious at the time when Thailand depended on commodities. 
 
                                                 
11
 CPI Score, compiled by Transparency International, relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption 
as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly 
corrupt). 
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Figure 3.4 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) Scores for some Countries (1995 – 
2006) 
Source: Transparency International (2006) 
3.2.2 How Thailand is Fighting Back  
Before 1997, Thailand always managed economic woes by prudent and rather 
conservative economic policies.  An example case was the implementation of economic 
policies during years 1981-85, the period after the ―Commodity Boom‖, when 
Thailand‘s terms of trade declined by about twenty per cent from the previous five-year 
period.  As a result, the average annual GDP growth during the period was down to 5.2 
% from the figure of 7.4 % of the last five-year period.  The country faced heavy 
deficits in both the country‘s balance of payment and the government budget.  Inflation 
in 1980 and 1981 reached two-digit levels. 
To cope with the above-mentioned economic problems, the Thai government 
resorted to restrictive economic policies.  Regarding monetary policy, interest rates 
were pushed to remain high to entice foreign investment, while commercial bank loans 
were kept tight.  In 1981 and 1984 the domestic currency – the Baht – was devaluated 
twice: 9.7 % and 14.8 %, respectively.  Regarding financial policy, the Thai 
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government adopted zero growth budgeting and the tax rates were increased to fight 
budget deficits.  This, so called restrictive domestic demand management policy, 
helped reduce the balance of payment deficit from the average rate of 5.6 % of GDP for 
the preceding five-year period to the average rate of 5.2 % of GDP.  This achievement 
came at the price of high unemployment that came together with slow economic 
growth.  It demonstrated that the Government of Thailand was not afraid to implement 
painful economic policies. 
Another indicator that proves the good deeds of the Thai Government was its 
improvement in the ability to collect direct taxes (income taxes).  In the 1960‘s, tax 
revenues depended much upon import duties at an average of 32 % and, taxes derived 
from natural resources (export duties collected from commodities plus mineral and 
petroleum royalties and taxes) at an average of 17 %.  During that period of time 
income taxes accounted for an average of only 10 %.  In 1996, the share of income 
taxes improved to become 35 % of the total tax revenues, while that of import duties 
reduced to become only 16 % of the total tax revenues and the taxes derived from 
natural resources become almost negligible (only 1 % of the total tax revenues).  
However, we do not need to go into every detail to prove that the Government of 
Thailand, in general, acted responsibly.  The overall economic performance over the 
whole period may give a better summary. 
During 1960-1996, the GNP per capita of Thailand, in current dollars, grew at 
an average rate of 9.7 %, from $101 in 1960 to reach $2,836 in 1996.  This rather 
impressive growth was the result of the country‘s high economic growth together with 
the reduction in population growth rate.  Thailand was lauded as a special case among 
developing countries, with not very high GNP per capita, that effectively implemented 
family planning, for it has reduced its population growth from the rate of about 4 % in 
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1960 to a level of about 0.6 - 0.7 % at present.  From 1961 to 1996, Thailand faced an 
average inflation rate (rate of growth of consumer price index) of 5.4 %, which was a 
moderate figure in comparison with other developing countries.  Only in two two-year 
periods: 1973 - 1974, and 1980 – 1981, when Thailand and the world encountered oil 
crises, did the country have two-digit rates of inflation. 
The strongest indicator that refuted the bias effects of the resource curse on 
other economic sectors was the impressive growth of the country‘s manufacturing 
industry.  The manufacturing sector in Thailand, in current dollars, grew at an average 
rate of 14.6 %, from $419 million in 1960 to $49.274 billion in 1996, and the share in 
the country‘s GDP of the total value of the manufacturing products, in current dollars, 
increased from 14.5 % in 1960 to 34.5 % in 2004. 
From the above-mentioned economic evidence, it can be concluded that 
Thailand‘s economy, which once depended very much upon natural resources, has been 
developing very well.  Though it felt certain effects of the resource curse, the Thai 
Government has been quite successful in industrializing the country, and made the 
people of Thailand a lot better off. 
3.2.3 Explaining the Tame Impact of the Resource Curse Faced by Thailand 
The tame impact of the resource curse on the Thai economy may be contributed 
to by the following factors: 
a) Strong Elite Bureaucrats 
The ability of Thailand to weather through the resource curse was partly due to 
the successive implementation of appropriate economic measures by the Thai 
government.  This economic success was contrary to the fact that, on the surface, 
Thailand had not been stable politically.  During the period 1960 to 1996 Thailand had 
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thirteen Prime Ministers and fifteen governments, an average of about 2.4 years per 
government.  Even worse, some transfers of power from government to government 
were undemocratic—by three bloody events of civil strife and by three bloodless coups 
(not to mention two failed coup attempts)—during the period.  However, the backbone 
of every Thai Government was the highly educated civil servants, especially in the field 
of economics.  Because of the complexity of economics, Thai Prime Ministers and 
coup leaders always appointed elite economists to oversee the Finance Ministry and left 
the Bank of Thailand to work almost without political interference. 
Another factor that has constrained the abuse of power of Thai politicians is the 
unique nature of Thailand‘s social and political norms.  The political stability of 
Thailand, which is a kingdom, was not as bad as it seemed to be.  For more than half a 
century, above all politics is the present constitutional monarch, King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej who is revered by all Thai people.  Even the communist insurgents did not 
dare to criticize him.  All coup leaders paid homage to the King, and governed the 
country under his name, though he seldom intervened in politics.  The beloved King, 
who has been accepted by all concerned as the supreme political arbitrator, might be 
the reason that Thai politics seldom went to extremes. 
b) Cultural Homogeneity 
Except for the Malay minority in the four southernmost provinces, most people 
in Thailand are rather culturally homogenous—speaking Thai, adopting Buddhism, and 
revering the King.  Thailand is so successful in implementing its assimilation policy 
that descendants of Chinese, the biggest minority, adopt Thai names.  To the outside 
there are no Thai Chinese, but Thai.  This cultural homogeneity removes racial 
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conflicts and helps the Thai Government to reach appropriate political consensus, 
including economic matters, easier. 
c) Orthodox and Conservative Economic Policies 
As already explained in other parts of this study, Thailand managed its economy 
prudently.  Orthodox and conservative economic policies, especially on controlling 
inflation and keeping foreign and domestic loans of the Government under limits, was 
the reason why Thailand has never faced hyperinflation like many Latin American 
countries did.  The economic and financial crisis of 1997 was not caused by the size of 
the Government‘s foreign loans but by the burden of the large foreign loans of the 
private sector, which was the result of the Government‘s mistaken policy in partially 
opening the country‘s financial system12. 
Since 1961, Thailand has managed its economic policies as guided by a five-
year Economic and Social Plan.  The First Economic and Social Plan, 1961-66, and the 
Second Economic and Social Plan, 1967-71, were set up with the assistance of the 
World Bank, while the latter plans were organized mainly by Thai bureaucrats.  During 
the early stages, the plans pinpointed specific targets for the Government to follow.  
However, since the latter plans did not link directly with annual government‘s budgets, 
the latter plans looked more like good guidelines than true plans.   
                                                 
12
 With an ambition to establish Bangkok as a leading offshore financial centre in the region, in 1993, a 
few years before the crisis, the Government of Thailand liberalized the capital control, however, without 
floating the foreign exchange market.  Because of relatively high interest rates in Thailand during that 
time period, such financial liberalization led to a great influx of foreign capital.  With a long history of 
rigid foreign exchange rates, few investors saw the perilous risk associated with the cheap foreign 
capitals.  Therefore, in late 1997, when the Bank of Thailand had not been able to defend the over-valued 
Baht, the sudden drop of the Thai currency caused a large number of investors who had resorted to 
foreign loans to be suddenly overwhelmed by debts and bankrupted.  As a result, Thailand‘s 1997 
economic and financial crisis was ensured.   
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d) Geo-Politics and Regional Events 
Thailand‘s economy was also strongly shaped by external factors as follows. 
i) Vietnam War: Considered by the U.S.A. as a frontline state in fighting 
against communists, Thailand was strongly affected, both good and bad, by the 
Vietnam War of the 1960‘s and the first half of the 1970‘s.  During the War, Thailand 
was a close ally of the U.S.A. and allowed the U.S.A. to use its lands as air bases to 
bomb Vietnam.  Thailand even sent some troop to fight in South Vietnam along side 
the U.S. soldiers.  As a result, Thailand received financial aid from the U.S.A.  The 
total foreign aid was substantial in some years, such as in 1968 when the total foreign 
aid was almost equivalent to 10 % of the value of Thailand‘s exports for that year.  But 
some authors (Harford and Klein, 2005) equate foreign aid with a curse similar to that 
of the resources.  Certainly, during that period of time, the Thai Government enjoyed 
receiving foreign aid because it helped support its currency during a time of persistent 
trade deficit.  But, as shown in Figure 3.5, foreign aid that Thailand received from 1961 
to 1991, fluctuated widely.  With its fluctuation, foreign aid was no different than 
volatile revenue from natural resources; therefore, it might also have contributed to 
adverse effects on Thailand‘s economy during the period. 
The indirect effect of the war might be more important than the grants from the 
U.S. Government.  The U.S. expenditure on war supply stimulated the economies of 
many countries in the region.  The war period coincided with a period of high growth 
rates in the manufacturing sector in Thailand.  Therefore Thailand might owe the 
beginning of its industrialization partly to the war.  
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Figure 3.5 Foreign Aid Received by Thailand, in Current Dollars, 1961 - 1991 
Source: Bank of Thailand (2007) 
ii) Economic Spillover from the Success of Japan: The economic success of 
Japan after the Second World War was phenomenal.  During the 1980‘s, the high 
labour cost in Japan together with the low cost of foreign capital, as a result of the Yen 
appreciation, induced Japanese investors to look outside their country for investment.  
Thailand was one of the countries most favoured by Japanese investors.  The share of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan in the total FDI from 1970 to 2006, 
averaging 32.5 %, is shown in Figure 3.6.  The hefty foreign investment, led by Japan, 
after 1988, as shown in Figure 3.7, coincided with the rapid increase in Thailand‘s GNP 
per capita.  Indeed, foreign direct investment has been the most important factor in the 
economic success of Thailand. 
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Figure 3.6 The Percentage Share of Foreign Direct Investment from Japan, 1970-2006 
Source: Bank of Thailand (2007) 
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Figure 3.7 Foreign Direct Investment and Thailand‘s GNP Per Capita, in Current 
Dollars, 1960 - 1996  
Source: Bank of Thailand (2007) 
iii) The Nature of Thailand’s Natural Resources: In the 1960‘s, the resource 
base economy that Thailand depended upon was dominated by agriculture and 
accounted for an average of 35% of GDP, while the mineral sector contributed less than 
2% of GDP.  During that period of time, agricultural commodities were also the 
dominant exports from Thailand, while minerals accounted for only 9% of the total 
export value.  Some authors argued that exploitation of agricultural resources, which 
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involve a lot of peasant farmers, renders less curse effect than that of mineral or 
petroleum resources, the so-called ―point‖ resources. 
Even exploitation of ―point‖ resources in Thailand might have less curse effect 
than normal.  Tin, the main mineral produced in Thailand during the 1960‘s, was 
dominated by small mines and employed mining methods developed in the region that 
used more local made tools and equipment.  Tin mining costs in Thailand were low in 
comparison to those in Bolivia.  Thus, tin mining in Thailand rendered high resource 
rent.  However, the Thai Government levied very high rates of tin royalty, a kind of ad 
valorem taxes.  The rates of tin royalty in Thailand have been progressively varied with 
tin prices.  It has been applied under the concept that the state should get higher share 
of the economic rent when the price gets higher and the miners should pay royalties at 
the lesser rates when the price is down.  Until late 1985, the effective ad valorem rate 
was always in the range above 20 % of tin price, and it reached the level above 30 % of 
tin price around late 1970‘s.  As a result, economic rent from mining in Thailand was 
widely distributed to people, through both upstream and downstream private 
investment related to tin mining and through government expenditure, than those in 
many other developing countries. 
Another important fact about the exploitation of Thailand‘s natural resources 
was that it had been done long before the time period of study.  There was not a sudden 
surge of economic rent to overwhelm the national economy from new agricultural 
crops or from the new discovery of large mineral or petroleum deposits.  The country 
was already accustomed to the unavoidable effects of the curse, and found ways to live 
with them. 
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3.2.4 An Index of the Resource Curse for Thailand 
From resource curse literature, some authors used the non-negative genuine 
saving as the index to decide whether or not a country faces the resource curse.  Matsen 
and Torvik (2005) stated that Thailand is one of the countries that have claimed to have 
escaped the resource curse because the average genuine saving rate of Thailand 
between 1972 and 2000 was 20% of its gross national income.  Costantini and Monni 
(2006) stated that the countries that have managed to escape the resource curse 
(Malaysia and Thailand, as only developing country examples) have higher genuine 
savings rates than those that have not escaped (Congo, Nigeria, and United Arab 
Emirates, among others).  Appropriate policy was claimed to be the main reason 
Thailand avoided the resource curse.  For example, Esanov, Raiser and Buiter (2003) 
stated that Botswana, Chile, Malaysia and Thailand were a small number of countries 
having actually made the policy choices to turn natural resources into a blessing rather 
than a curse.  Furthermore, Gylfason (2001) stated that, of 65 resource rich developing 
countries only four managed to achieve long-term investment exceeding 25 percent of 
GDP and an average GDP growth exceeding 4 per cent, namely Botswana, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand.  The three resource rich Asian countries have managed to do 
this by economic diversification and industrialisation. 
3.3 Conclusion 
The case of Thailand confirms the existence of some effects of the resource 
curse.  At the time when Thailand depended upon a resource-based economy, it was 
plagued with revenue volatility and long term decline in terms of trade.  However, the 
present outcome of the economic and social development of Thailand demonstrated 
that it could steer itself through the resource curse successfully.  Of course, its 
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achievement was arrived at by the help of some external factors, notably the flux of 
foreign direct investment.  However, one should not downplay the importance of the 
implementation of the right economic policies, the amiable Thai people, and the rarely 
violent politics, which have made Thailand inducive to foreign investors. 
The results of this study, together with the conclusions of other literature, 
indicate that the resource curse is a real issue.  But the curse is just a factor among 
many others that affect a county‘s development.  In the South-East Asia region, not 
only Thailand, but also Indonesia and Malaysia (Rosser, 2004; Sachs and Warner, 
1997), which are also resource rich countries, have been successful in avoiding the 
curse.  Maybe the studies that postulate the existence of the curse might look at only 
one side of the story.  There are also benefits from the exploitation of natural resources.  
The easy money can be used as a springboard for development.  It is difficult to see 
how a poor country with little natural resources like Bangladesh can easily take off 
from poverty.  Looking back long enough (a century or longer), we could see that 
nearly all developed countries, including the U.S.A. and Japan, used to depend more or 
less on a resource-based economy.  Therefore, the question for a country is not whether 
or not to exploit the country‘s rich natural resources, but how to mitigate the effect of 
the resource curse. 
The next chapter will talk about sustainable development, which is a broader 
picture concerning the future wellbeing of mankind under limited natural resources.  
Among other things, it will present rules and conditions proposed by economists that 
are necessary to achieve non-declining consumption, one of the economic 
interpretations of the sustainable development.  Avoiding resource curse and 
sustainable development are related. Indeed, avoiding resource curse and pursuing 
sustainable development have the same objective, that is, to maintain the wellbeing of 
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people into the future.  However, the next chapter will cover a broader subject ranging 
from theoretical discussion about intergeneration equity to methods measuring 
performances of countries with regard to sustainable development, while this chapter 
talks about ways to avoid pitfalls from being a resource rich country.  Anyway, they 
will form the bases for some of the recommendations in Chapter 8 of this thesis to the 
Thai government on how to appropriately manage the resource rents derived from the 
exploitation of its mineral resources.  
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Chapter 4    The Principle of Sustainable Development 
Exploitation of natural resources for its well-being is the hallmark of humanity. 
However, exploitation of natural resources affects the environment, especially the 
nonrenewable resources whose extractions result in depletion. As a result, it is logical 
to perceive that heavy exploitation of some natural resources at present will 
compromise the well-being of future generations.  In the last few decades, there were 
several scholars proposing some concepts, theories and observations pertaining to the 
natural resources and the effects of their exploitation.  This research will briefly present 
some relevant concepts, theories and observations as follows. 
4.1 A Brief History of the Sustainable Development Principle 
Human development involves exploitation of natural resources, both renewable 
and nonrenewable.  There has been fear that the present wellbeing of humanity, which 
is associated with the fast rate of natural resource exploitation, is gained at the expense 
of the future.  As a result of this fear the concept of sustainable development was 
slowly developed.  Its brief history in chronological order is shown below. 
In 1972 the Club of Rome, an informal international association, with a 
membership of about seventy individuals from twenty-five nations, published its major 
report – Limits to Growth, being the results of a study, in which a computer model, 
World3, was used to simulate the world‘s future.  The conclusions of the report are as 
follows:  
 
 ―1. If the present growth trends in world population, industrialisation, 
pollution, food production and resource depletion continue unchanged, 
the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the 
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next 100 years. The most probable result will be a sudden and 
uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity. 
 2. It is possible to alter these trends and to establish a condition of 
ecological and economic stability that is sustainable far into the future. 
The state of global equilibrium could be designed so that the basic 
material needs of each person on earth are satisfied and each person has 
an equal opportunity to realise his or her individual human potential. 
 3. If the world's people decide to strive for this second outcome rather 
than the first, the sooner they begin working to attain it, the greater will 
be their chances of success.‖ (Meadows et al., 1972) 
 
It should be noted that the term ―Limits to Growth‖ in this report does not mean 
limits to ―economic growth‖, which includes the consumption of not only the output of 
the agricultural and industrial sectors but also that of the service sector.  In fact, the 
conclusions quoted above indicate that there were limits to the growth of material 
throughputs for the world economic system.  Although these conclusions overstated the 
speed with which the world was exhausting many natural resources, the report was an 
important precursor of modern debates (IISD, 2002). 
The Limits to Growth also caught the interest of economists.  Among the early 
responses from the mainstream economists to the Limits to Growth were those of 
Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow (1974), Stiglitz (1974), and Hartwick (1977, 1978).  
Their works will be briefly discussed in the next section.  
In 1980, a significant document, jointly proposed by the UN Environment 
Programme, the World Wildlife Fund, and the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources, entitled the World Conservation Strategy was published 
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by the World Conservation Union. The most important goal of the document was "to 
persuade the nations of the world to adopt ecologically sound development practices".  
It also argued that ―For development to be sustainable, it must take account of social 
and ecological factors, as well as economic ones; of the living and non-living resource 
base; and of the long-term as well as the short-term advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative actions‖ (UNEP/WWF/ IUCNNR, 1980). 
In 1987, the UN Commission on the Environment and Development was 
created by the United Nations.  The Commission‘s members comprised both 
conservationists and important figures in international development.  The report of this 
commission entitled "Our Common Future", which has also been known as the 
Brundtland Report, created a globally accepted general definition for Sustainable 
Development--"development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." 
In 1992, the UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) 
in Rio de Janeiro developed Agenda 21, a complete solution to succeed in sustainable 
development.  This plan compiled economic, social and environmental factors for 
decision-makers and established a global foundation for sustainable development.  
However, Agenda 21 did not go far enough to effectively convert the principles of 
sustainable development into action. 
 The commitment to work towards sustainable development was reaffirmed by 
world leaders at the 2002 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development, at which the 
new goals, schedules, and commitments to take action were set.  All nations were urged 
to urgently push forward their national sustainable development strategies and to start 
putting them into action by 2005.  
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 With regard to mineral resources, an important part of the whole natural 
resources, the widely publicized concept of sustainable development received the 
attention of the world mining sector.  In response to the planned 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development, nine of the world‘s largest mining firms launched a 
project to study the sustainable development in the minerals sector.  Through the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development, they, together with the support of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, contracted with the International Institute for Environment and 
Development to undertake the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Project 
(MMSD).  Under this project the terms of sustainable mineral development and mineral 
sustainability were studied and defined (IIED, 2002). 
4.2 The Concept of Sustainable Development 
Secrett (1995) breaks down the original Brundtland definition of sustainable 
development into four conditions as follows:  
- Material and other needs for a better quality of life have to be fulfilled for 
people of this generation, 
- Distribution of the benefits from development has to be done as equitably as 
possible, 
- Ecosystem limits have to be respected, and 
- A basis on which future generations can meet their needs has to be built. 
However, since its inception more than two decades ago, the concept of 
sustainable development has been further refined and augmented by several scholars.  
Because the definition given by the Brundtland Report is short and vague, and the 
concept deals with the future, different authors with different backgrounds, interests 
and motivations have interpreted the concept differently. According to Holmberg and 
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Sandbrook (1994), by 1994 there were more than 80 different definitions and 
interpretations that fundamentally shared the core concept of the Brundtland Report‘s 
definition. Nevertheless, one of the versions describing the lately-developed concept of 
sustainable development is that of MMSD‘s study.  The study provides a set of guiding 
principles for each of the four dimensions of sustainable development consisting of 
economic, social, environmental, and governance spheres shown below. 
 
―Economic Sphere 
• Maximize human well-being;  
• Ensure efficient use of all resources, natural and 
otherwise, by maximizing rents;  
• Seek to identify and internalize environmental and social 
costs; and 
• Maintain and enhance the conditions for viable enterprise. 
Social Sphere 
• Ensure a fair distribution of the costs and benefits of 
development for all those alive today; 
• Respect and reinforce the fundamental rights of human 
beings, including civil and political liberties, cultural 
autonomy, social and economic freedoms, and personal 
security; and 
• Seek to sustain improvements over time; ensure that 
depletion of natural resources will not deprive future 
generations through replacement with other forms of 
capital. 
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Environmental Sphere 
• Promote responsible stewardship of natural resources and 
the environment, including remediation of past damage; 
• Minimize waste and environmental damage along the 
whole of the supply chain; 
• Exercise prudence where impacts are unknown or 
uncertain; and 
• Operate within ecological limits and protect critical 
natural capital. 
Governance Sphere 
• Support representative democracy, including participatory 
decision-making;  
• Encourage free enterprise within a system of clear and 
fair rules and incentives; 
• Avoid excessive concentration of power through 
appropriate checks and balances; 
• Ensure transparency through providing all stakeholders 
with access to relevant and accurate information; 
• Ensure accountability for decisions and actions, which are 
based on comprehensive and reliable analysis; 
• Encourage cooperation in order to build trust and shared 
goals and values; and 
• Ensure that decisions are made at the appropriate level, 
adhering to the principle of subsidiarity where possible‖ 
(IIED, 2002). 
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Nevertheless, the MMSD‘s study does not specify a clear time frame for the 
principle to maximize human well-being in the economic sphere.  It is not certain that 
the study purposely means to maximize human well-being over time across 
generations.  Another ambiguity of that study is the principle to ensure efficient use of 
all resources, natural and otherwise, by ―maximizing rents‖.  Efficient use also involves 
time in future.  The report did not explicate whether the rents obtained from the 
exploitation of a natural resource at different times are weighted by a discount rate.  If 
the concept of discounting future values was adopted, to attain the maximum present 
value of rents, the exploitation or production rates of a natural resource will decline 
over time in accordance with the famous Hotelling models, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 6.  Since a natural resource is exploited either as a necessary raw material for 
the production of final goods for consumers or for direct consumers‘ consumption, the 
less the resource extracted, the less the consumption.  Apparently, the declining rate of 
consumption suggested by the Hotelling model is contrary to another standing principle 
of sustainable development that requires non-declining consumption over time.  
However, scholars in the field of economics focus on sustainability in a context 
of concern for intergenerational equity over several generations.  Pezzey (1992) classified 
the economic definitions of sustainable development into two approaches as follows: 
i) The definitions based directly on the welfare of people, such as the one that 
consumption (or utility) is non-declining through time.  
ii) The definitions based on the means to provide people with welfare, such as 
the one that the total capital stock is non-declining through time. 
Discussion about the non-declining consumption through time under the finite 
non-renewable resources, the first approach of the economic definitions of sustainable 
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development, by economists took place not long after the publication of the Limits to 
Growth.  Among the early works were those of Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow 
(1974), and Stiglitz (1974).  Their models of studies were based on the assumptions 
that natural resources are finite, non- renewable, and essential to production and that 
human-made capital is indefinitely substitutable for resources via a Cobb–Douglas 
production function.  Dasgupta and Heal (1974) suggested that if the objective of 
society is to maximize the present value (PV) of the representative agent‘s 
instantaneous utility using a constant positive discount rate with no technological 
progress the level of consumption and utility approach zero in the very long run.  
However, Stiglitz (1974) pointed out that the PV-optimal path can have sustained 
increases in per capita consumption as a result of ongoing technical progress. In his 
model, the technical progress rate is assumed to be large enough to offset the resource 
depletion effects.   
Solow (1974) showed that, with Cobb-Douglas production function, zero 
population growth, and no technical progress, the constant consumption could be 
sustained over time by a suitable path of capital accumulation.  Sequels to Solow‘s 
1974 work were those of Hartwick (1977, 1978), from which the Hartwick rule was 
proposed.  The rule states that a constant level of consumption can be sustained if all 
the rents on non-renewable resources extracted at each point in time are totally invested 
in reproducible capital.  Since the net investment in all the economy‘s productive 
stocks is the capital investment minus resource rents, the rule can simply be rewritten 
as ―Zero net investment forever results in constant consumption forever‖ (Pezzey and 
Toman, 2002b).  However, later works pointed out that Hartwick rule is just a 
necessary but not sufficient condition.  To attain non-declining consumption through 
time other three conditions have to be met: 1) an economy has to be already on a 
130 
 
sustainable path, 2) the resource extraction path must be efficient in a competitive 
economy, and 3) the conditions of the economy‘s production technology are right.  The 
second condition pertains to Hotelling rule, while the possible production functions that 
satisfy the third condition are those of the Cobb-Douglas and the Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution with some conditions, or any production functions if a backstop 
technology is permanently available. The details of such possible production functions 
are shown as follows (Perman et al., 2003): 
Case I: Under fully competitive conditions through a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with constant returns to scale and two inputs consisting of a non-renewable 
resource, R, and manufactured capital, K, then the output,  
  1RKQ  
where α is the distribution parameter indicating the relative share of manufactured 
capital in the product. 
In the case that there is no technological progress and population growth is zero, 
constant consumption over time is possible if the share of total output going to capital is 
greater than the share going to the natural resource (that is, if α > 1- α).  However, if the 
population growth is positive, the ratio of the rate of technological progress to the rate 
of population growth must be greater than or equal to the share of output going to the 
resource to maintain the constant consumption over time (Stiglitz, 1974). 
Case II: Under fully competitive conditions through a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution production function with constant returns to scale, the output 
  /1])1([   RKAQ  
where  is the substitution parameter determining the value of the elasticity of 
substitution, , and  = 1/(1 + θ). 
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In the case that there is no technological progress and population growth is zero, 
constant consumption over time is possible if the elasticity of substitution, , is greater 
than or equal to one.  In the case that the elasticity of substitution is less than one and 
the population growth is zero, to maintain the constant consumption over time the 
technological progress on production must be continual (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). 
Case III: Under the permanent existence of backstop technology, the constant 
consumption over time is possible disregarding the depletion of a non-renewable 
resource.  For example, in the energy sector, under the assumption of this case, the 
backstop technology can deliver an unlimited amount of energy from another 
renewable resource like wind or solar power (Nordhaus, 1973).  Conclusively, the 
constant consumption over time is possible under the permanent existence of backstop 
technology, but the level of consumption may be limited, depending on the potential of 
the backstop technology.  
For a specific example of the second approach of the definitions of sustainable 
development--the non-declining through time of the total capital stock--it is classified 
as weak sustainability, as opposed to the strong sustainability that does not accept 
perfect capital substitution.  In this sense, the capital, which is defined as a necessary 
tool for a human-being to have a good quality of life (Willett, 2002), consists of the 
following: 
- Natural capital, such as biological diversity, scenic areas, clean air and 
water, forest, and mineral resources, which provide ecosystem benefits to 
human beings ranging from the enjoyment of its intrinsic value and good 
health to necessary basic materials; 
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- Manufactured capital, such as machinery, buildings, and infrastructure, 
which provide human beings with cheap goods; 
- Human capital, in the form of knowledge, skills, health, and cultural 
endowment, which are the most important assets in the development of 
mankind; 
- Social capital, the institutions and structures that allow individuals and 
groups to develop collaboratively; and 
- Financial capital, which can be invested to receive financial returns. 
The above five capitals may be grouped into two parts: the natural capital and 
the human-made capitals comprising manufactured, human, social, and financial 
capitals.  The latter is sometimes referred to as reproducible capital.  Indeed, the 
difference between weak and strong sustainability is the extent of the possibilities of 
substitution between the natural and the human-made capitals.  
The assumption of perfect substitution between natural and human-made 
capitals is the core of ‗weak sustainability‘, and to attain sustainability requires the total 
capital stock, the sum of natural and human-made capitals, to be non-declining.  
Historic evidence supporting this assumption was the role of lead as the raw material 
used for covering electric cables for insulation and for general protective purposes, 
during the 1960s and 1970s.  But technological innovations have caused this role of 
lead to disappear (IIED, 2002).  This event has shown the potential of human-made 
capital (technology) to perfectly substitute for natural capital (lead) in the role of raw 
material.  
‗Strong sustainability‘ is based on the concept that there are constraints on 
substitution between natural and human-made capitals, and to attain sustainability 
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requires not only the non-declining total capital stock but also the non-declining natural 
capital stock (Neumayer, 1999).  Proponents of strong sustainability argued that, like 
natural capital, the human-made capital can provide the necessary life-support services 
such as temperature control, breathable air, etc., but only on a small scale.  In regard to 
amenity services, some take the view that a lack of contact with the natural 
environment is dehumanising, and would argue that we should regard the substitution 
possibilities of human-made capital for natural capital substitution as limited.  In fact 
the argument some people make is that natural capital and man-made capital are 
complements rather than substitutes.  These academics, whose thought is dubbed the 
‗thermodynamic‘ school, argue that while substitution within each of the two types of 
capital may be highly possible (e.g. coal for charcoal, plastics for metals, or modern 
machines for old machines, computers for labour, machines for labour), substitution 
between the two types are seldom feasible (Christensen, 1989; Daly, 1990).  
Complements mean that, to increase consumption, both types of capital have to be 
utilized in increasing quantities together.  
In conclusion, the weak versus strong sustainability question is multi-faceted, 
and has no exact answers to the general question: how far is human-made capital 
substitutable for natural capital?  In some circumstances, the answer is as much a 
matter of taste and/or ethics as it is a matter of science and technology (Perman et al., 
2003). 
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4.3 Sustainable Development and Mineral Resources 
4.3.1 Roles of Mineral Resources 
Mineral resources certainly play critical and controversial roles in sustainable 
development.  Besides being natural capital, the exploitation of mineral resources 
provides humans with goods and services: the materials of human well-being.  With the 
present size of the world population, all humans on the earth cannot totally survive 
without mining, let alone maintain their standard of living.  Currently only recycling 
can partly substitute for mining in supplying such necessary materials to humans.  But 
mineral resources are nonrenewable, though their depletion is not as crucial to the 
survival of mankind as that of ozone layer.  As a result, exploitation of mineral 
resources or mining remains to be a central topic for hot debate with regard to 
sustainable development. 
However, a scholar concluded that mining production can be physically 
sustainable because of the following three factors (Eggert, 2000).  First, mining 
companies replace depleted reserve by investing in mineral exploration and 
development.  Second, using technological innovation, miners can now extract mineral 
resources that were previously either technically difficult or commercially unfeasible to 
be mined.  Third, recycling adds mining production to markets which helps it be more 
sustainable, especially metals and many nonmetallic materials, such as cement and 
construction aggregate. 
Scholars who adopted the narrow ―or strong‖ concept of sustainable 
development require very tough protection of the natural environment.  In the case of 
mineral resources, they tend to be pessimistic about the capacity of new discoveries and 
technological advances to continue to keep pace with rising demand for mineral 
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commodities.  Therefore, their minimum requirement is that depletion through mining 
must be fully offset by replenishment of known economic resources through 
exploration and technological advances, so that there is no rise in real prices in the 
long-term.  A stricter interpretation would require that this applies to each mineral 
commodity.  A government that adopts the narrow concept of sustainable development 
will interfere with an efficient allocation of resources because that concept effectively 
places an infinite price on environmental resources at the limit, leaving no room for 
trade-offs that are in the interests of society.  As a result investment and operational 
decisions will be interfered with to an extent greater than necessary to ensure social 
costs of adverse environmental effects are fully accounted for or internalised.  These 
distortions will cause economic waste (Willett, 2002). 
In the views of the proponents of the broad ―or weak‖ concept of sustainable 
development, intergenerational equity will be satisfied as long as exploration and 
technological progress offset the depletion and degradation of mineral resources.  
Acceptance of the broad concept means substantially less intervention by governments 
than the narrow concept.  However, governments still have a responsibility to ensure 
that the ecological processes on which life depends are maintained or restored; and that 
the mining sector and governments are fully accountable for the social costs of adverse 
environmental and other effects of their activities (Willett, 2002). 
4.4 Sustainable Development Indicators 
In recent years, considerable effort has been made to implement the concept of 
sustainable development.  The foremost effort was the creation of macroeconomic 
indicators to measure and monitor the sustainable development of a country.  In the 
same manner as that of the concept of sustainable development itself, consensus has not 
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yet been reached on which indicator is the best one.  Based on their popularities and 
modernity, six proposed indicators for sustainable development will be briefed here: 
Genuine Savings, Green Net National Product, Augmented Genuine Savings, 
Augmented Green Net National Product, UN Commission on Sustainable Development 
(CSD) Indicators of Sustainable Development, and World Bank World Development 
Indicators. 
4.4.1 Genuine Savings and Green Net National Product (GNNP) 
 Genuine Savings and Green Net National Product are the results of an attempt 
to incorporate the effects of the exploitation of natural resources into the existing 
indicators that we use to measure our well being and development.  These two 
indicators and their ―augmented‖ versions, together with their linkage, will be 
discussed separately below. 
a) Genuine Savings (GS) 
Genuine Saving (GS) is a more comprehensive concept of saving than that used 
in conventional national accounts.  It was developed and introduced as the World 
Development Indicators, by the World Bank in 1998 to measure whether one country‘s 
saving rate is large enough to overcome the total depreciation of natural and man-made 
capitals (World Bank, 2006).   
i) Brief Theoretical Concept 
The formal model of Genuine Saving was presented by Hamilton 
(2000), an economist working in the World Bank.  He started with a theoretical 
assumption of a simple closed economy with a single resource used as an input to the 
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production of a composite good, denoted F, that may be consumed, invested in 
produced assets or human capital, or used to abate pollution, so that  
maKCNRKF 

),,(   
where  K is physical capital, 
 R is resource use,  
N is human capital,  
C is consumption,  

K is investment in physical capital,  
a is pollution abatement expenditures, and  
m is current education expenditures.  
The education expenditures are transformed into human capital by the 
equation: )(mqN 

   
Pollution emissions are a function of production and abatement,  
e = e(F, a)  
The pollutants accumulate in a stock X such that )(XdeX 

, where d 
is the quantity of natural dissipation of the pollution stock.  
Resource stocks S grow by an amount g and are depleted by extraction 
R, so that )(SgRS 

. 
The utility of consumers is assumed to be a function of consumption and 
environmental services, U = U(C, B).  The flow of environmental services B is 
negatively related to the size of the pollution stock.  Wealth, W, is defined to be the 
present value of utility on the optimal path. Then we can maximize wealth by using a 
fixed pure rate of time preference r as follows: 



t
rsdseBCUW ),(max   
subject to:        maCFK 

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
 
The Hamiltonian function can be written as, 
 


 

qqdebgRFbeKUBCUH RFC /)()()1(),(        (4.1) 
where b is the marginal cost of pollution abatement.  
The parenthesized expression in the second term of the right side of 
equation 4.1 is equal to the change in the real value of all assets in the economy; 
therefore, it may serve as the definition of genuine saving, G, in equation 4.2. 
qqdebgRFbeKG RF 

/)()()1(     (4.2) 
In words, the genuine savings are composed of the investment in 
produced assets and human capital, less the values of depletion of natural resources and 
accumulated pollutants. 
NNP, the maximum amount of produced output that could be consumed 
while leaving total wealth instantaneously constant, of a closed economy is as follows: 
qqdebgRFbeKCNNP RF 

/)()()1(    (4.3) 
NNP for an open economy that includes foreign and depreciation of 
produced assets is given as, 
qqdebgRFbeiAMEKKCNNP RF 

/)()()1(   (4.4) 
where  is the depreciation rate of produced capital,  
A is net foreign assets,  
E is exports, M is imports, and  
i is a fixed international rate of return.  
The first six terms in equation 4.4 are the standard measure of NNP.  The 
whole equation 4.4 implies that, to get a truthful NNP, the standard NNP should be 
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adjusted by deducting net depletion of natural resources and the marginal damages from 
net pollution accumulation, and by adding investments in human capital.  
If the net marginal resource rents is defined as: RF Fben )1(  , NNP can 
be written as follows: 
qqdebgRnmaKGNPNNP  /)()(   
m
qm
q
debgRnaKGNP 







 1
/
/1
)()(   (4.5) 
where 1/q  is the marginal cost of creating a unit of human capital, and   
m/q  is the average cost.  
Equation 4.5 shows that the value of investments in human capital should 
be greater than current education expenditures and the current expenditures are a lower-
bound estimate of the investment in human capital. Furthermore, equation 4.5 expresses 
that pollution abatement expenditures, a, should be deducted in measuring genuine 
saving.  But, in practice, most current abatement expenditures are already treated as 
intermediate inputs in standard national accounting.  Therefore, we can calculate 
genuine saving from real data by the following equation 4.6:  
G = GNP - C - K - n(R - g) - (e - d) + m     (4.6) 
where K is produced asset depreciation,  
n is net resource rental rate,  
R is resource extraction, 
g is amount of growing resource stock  
 is marginal social cost of pollution 
e is pollution emissions 
d is quantity of natural dissipation of the pollution stock 
m is current education expenditures 
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GNP - C is traditional gross saving, which includes foreign savings, while  
GNP - C - K is traditional net saving (Hamilton, 2000). 
    ii) Practical Solutions 
  In 2002, the World Bank published ―Manual for Calculating Adjusted 
Net Savings‖ written by Katharine Bolt, Mampite Matete, and Michael Clemens to help 
nations to come up with their Genuine Saving figures.  The publication rewrites the 
above equation 4.6 in the following form:  
G = GNS – Depr + EE – ED – MD – NFD – CO2D – PM10D  
where  G = Genuine Saving 
GNS = Gross National Saving,  
Depr = Depreciation of fixed capital,  
EE = Educational expenditure,  
ED = Rent from Energy depletion, 
MD = Rent from Mineral depletion, 
NFD = Rent from Net forest depletion, 
CO2D = Damages from carbon dioxide emissions, and 
PM10D = Damages from PM10 emissions. 
Please note as follows: 
GNS, Gross National Saving, is the terms (GNP – C) of the equation 4.6.  
Gross National Saving is calculated as the difference between Gross National Income 
(GNI) and public and private consumption plus net current transfer.  It can be 
calculated by the following expression: 
GNS = GNI – public consumption - private consumption + net current transfer,  
141 
 
where GNI is the Gross National Income.  According to the 1993 System of National 
Accounts, GNI in current (nominal) prices is equal to Gross National Product (GNP), 
while GNI in constant (real) prices is equivalent to GNP plus the terms of trade 
adjustment. 
Depr, Depreciation, is the term K of the equation 4.6.  Depreciation of 
fixed capital is the replacement value of capital used up in the process of production. 
EE, educational expenditure, is the term m of the equation 4.6.  
Educational expenditure is defined as the public current operating expenditure in 
education, including wages and salaries and excluding capital investments in buildings 
and equipment. 
(ED + MD + NFD), the total determinable natural resource depletion, is 
equivalent to the terms n(R-g) of the equation 4.6. 
Energy depletion, ED, is asset depreciation measured as the ―user cost‖ – 
the change in asset value associated with extraction of the energy over the accounting 
period. It covers coal, crude oil, and natural gas. It is estimated as the product of the 
unit resource rents and the physical quantities of energy extracted.  ED can be 
calculated by the following expression: 
ED = production volume (international market price – average unit 
production cost) 
Mineral depletion, MD, is asset depreciation measured as the ―user cost‖ 
– the change in asset value associated with extraction of the mineral over the 
accounting period. It covers tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, 
and phosphate. It is estimated as the product of the unit resource rents and the physical 
quantities of mineral extracted.  MD can be calculated as follows: 
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MD = production volume (international market price – average unit 
production cost) 
NFD, net forest depletion, is the estimate of the rent on the amount of 
forest extraction that exceeded the natural increment in wood volume.  NFD can be 
calculated as follows: 
NFD = (roundwood production – increment) * average price * rental 
rate, where rental rate = (price – average cost) / price 
(CO2D + PM10D), the total determinable damages from pollution (CO2 
and PM10), is equivalent to the term (e - d) of the equation 4.6. 
CO2D is the product of carbon dioxide emissions (tons) and the marginal 
global damages per ton of carbon emitted, which is assumed to be $20 in 1995 
(Fankhauser, 1994). As the emissions data is for CO2 and the damage estimate per ton 
is for carbon, the emissions data is transformed by the following expression:   
CO2D = emissions (tons) * $20*(12/44) 
PM10D, damages from PM10 emissions, is determined by the willingness 
to pay (WTP) to avoid mortality and morbidity attributable to particulate emissions.  
PM10D can be calculated by the following expression: 
PM10D = disability adjusted life years lost due to PM emissions * WTP 
With regard to the estimation of energy and mineral depletions, in 2007, 
Atkinson and Hamilton published an article investigating and compiling the estimating 
methods to calculate the ―user cost‖ of exploiting non-renewable resources.  Among the 
five discussed methods, the article favours the quasi-optimal approach as proposed by 
Vincent (1997).  The approach assumes that the extraction cost function is isoelastic 
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with increasing marginal cost, the prices of minerals and mineral fuels are constant, and 
the Hotelling rule is applied.  As a result, 
ED and MD = production volume (international market price – average 
unit production cost) × [ε/{1+(ε-1)(1+r)N}]  
where: ε is the elasticity of the isoelastic extraction cost function, 
 r is the discount rate, and 
 N is the reserves-to-production ratio.  
Details of the methods will be briefed in Appendix A. 
 In summary, Genuine Saving can be calculated by making adjustments 
to the Gross National Saving of the conventional national account.  There are four 
adjustments. First, depreciation of fixed capital is deducted from Gross National Saving 
to become Net National Saving. Second, the education expenditures, which are treated 
as investments in human capital, are added to the figure (in the conventional national 
accounting, education expenditures are treated as consumption). Third, the depreciation 
of natural resources is deducted from summation of Net National Saving and education 
expenditures. The depreciation of natural resources is based on resource rents 
calculated from the difference between world prices and the average extraction costs of 
such natural resources. Energy, mineral and forest depletion are included. Finally, the 
pollution damages, including carbon dioxide emissions and air pollution, are deducted 
from the resulting figures to become the Genuine Saving, as shown in Figure 4.1.  
Since no special conditions are placed on the level of natural capital, the 
Genuine Saving indicator is of the broad concept of sustainable development, i.e. weak 
sustainable development.  It is assumed that man-made and natural capitals have the 
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same ability to produce welfare; therefore, this concept allows investment in 
reproducible capital to compensate natural resource degradation and depletion. 
The non-negative Genuine Saving is the key to sustainable development, 
because it ensures that total wealth is at least intact over time.  On the other hand, 
negative Genuine Saving means decline in total wealth.  The persistent decline in total 
wealth will certainly lead to the decline in welfare of people; therefore, such 
development is unsustainable.  The Genuine Saving has some advantages as a policy 
indicator because it presents resource and environmental issues within a framework that 
politicians who set government policies can easily understand.  However, there are 
several criticisms of ‗Genuine Savings‘.  First, measurement of depreciation of natural 
capital (for instance biodiversity) is very difficult.  Second, it is not convincing how 
investments in man-made capital can always be substituted for some natural capital 
such as photosynthesis, etc.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Calculation of Genuine Saving  
Source: World Bank (2006) 
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b) Green Net National Product (GNNP) 
  In a perfectly competitive economy, Net National Product (NNP), which is 
derived from the conventional System of National Accounting (SNA), represents the 
value of the flow of goods and services that are produced by the productive assets of an 
economy.  It is the popular yardstick for the measurement of a country‘s economic 
performance.  But NNP does not take account of the deterioration of environment as a 
result of economic activities.  An attempt has been made to transform NNP and other 
national accounts into the measurements of welfare of a country and whether such 
country is on a sustainable path, given that economic activity and the environment are 
inter-linked.  Correctly adjusted NNP, i.e. the Environmentally Adjusted National 
Product (EANP) or the Green Net National Product (GNNP) is an outcome of such an 
attempt.  To derive GNNP, the conventional NNP is to be adjusted by three groups of 
adjustments for: the depletion of non-renewable resources, the exploitation of 
renewable resources, and the effects of pollution (Pezzey, 1992).  
i) Adjustments for the Depletion of Non-renewable Resources 
In determining the adjustments for the depletion of non-renewable 
resources, we begin with an optimal growth model with a single produced good, Q, 
which may be consumed or added to the stock of reproducible capital.  The production 
of the good requires the capital, K, and a non-renewable resource, R, which has a fixed 
quantity of resource stock, S.  The resource extraction is costly and there is exploration 
activity.  N is new discoveries brought about by exploration activity with a cost 
function, F(N, S), such that costs rise with the level of exploration activity, 
0/  ttN NFF , and as the stock of resources is depleted, .0/  ttS SFF   The 
costs of extraction are given by G(R, S), such that costs rise with the level of extraction, 
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0/  ttR RGG , and as the stock of resources is depleted, .0/  ttS SGG   The 
optimization problem is to maximize the present value of utility for a single agent over 
an infinite time horizon.  Utility is a function of consumption C only and the utility 
discount rate  is constant.  The optimal growth problem is thus: 



0
)( dteCUMax tt
  
subject to ttt NRS 

, and ),(),(),( tttttttt SNFSRGCRKQK 

 
The current-value Hamiltonian is  
)],(),(),([)()( ttttttttttttt SNFSRGCRKQwNRPCUH  .  
By maximization, and further mathematical processing we get: 
))(( ttRRttt NRGQKCGNNP 

    (4.7) 
From the first derivative equations, necessary conditions of maximization, we can come 
up with the following equation: QR – GR = FN; therefore, the equation 4.7 can be 
rearranged as: 
tNtRRttt NFRGQKCGNNP 

)(      (4.8) 
In words, if taking into account only the depletion of non-renewable 
resources, then GNNPt for this economy is NNPt ( tt KC

 ) less the depreciation of the 
non-renewable resource stock, which is the total Hotelling rent—that is, marginal rent, 
(QR – GR), multiplied by extraction net of new discovery, (Rt – Nt).  
ii) Adjustments for the Exploitation of Renewable Resources 
In this analysis, renewable resources are exploited for three alternative 
uses: one totally for raw materials or inputs of the production of the 
consumption/capital goods; another totally for direct human consumption, which is an 
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argument in the utility function, the other is the mix of the first two.  These three kinds 
of exploitation give different effects on the GNNP as discussed below. 
Renewable Resource as an Input of Production  
The same optimal growth model of the above non-renewable resources 
is assumed, however, with R as a renewable resource in production instead.  Therefore, 
the current value Hamiltonian is  
)],(),([(])([)( ttttttttttt SRGCRKQwRSFPCUH   
where Rt is a renewable resource and F(St) is the intrinsic growth function.  Note that 
the harvest cost depends on the size of the harvest and the stock size, G(Rt, St).  
Following the same mathematical processing as above, we obtain the following 
expression:  
))()(( ttRRtt SFRGQNNPGNNP      (4.9) 
So that, if considering only the exploitation of a renewable resource as an input of 
production, then GNNPt for this economy is NNPt less the product of the marginal rent, 
(QR – GR), and the harvest net of intrinsic growth, (Rt – F(St)).  We can see that 
equation 4.9 has similar structure as equation 4.7.  
  Renewable Resource as a Direct Consumer Good  
In the case that a renewable resource, such as fish and other sea food, is 
harvested for direct human consumption, which is an argument in the utility function, 
the current value Hamiltonian will be: 
)],()([(])([),( ttttttttttt SRGCKQwRSFPRCUH  .  
By maximization, and further mathematical processing we get:    
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))(]()/[( ttRCRtt SFRGUUNNPGNNP           (4.10)
 This has the same structure as equation 4.9 in that GNNPt is NNPt less 
depreciation, but note that the term ( RCR GUU )/( ), used to value the change in stock 
size, is different in this case. 
Renewable Resource as Both an Input of Production and a Direct 
Consumer Good 
An example of this case is the harvested timber that may be used in 
production, while standing timber is a source of aesthetic pleasure and recreation.  In 
such a case, the Hamiltonian is  
)],(),([(])([),( tttttttttttt SRGCRKQwRSFPSCUH    
With the same previous mathematical processing we get: 
))()(()/( ttRRtCStt SFRGQSUUNNPGNNP            (4.11) 
As compared with equation 4.9 there is a structural difference here.  As well as 
subtracting depreciation from NNPt, it is now necessary to add the value of the stock of 
the renewable resource, where the value uses US/UC. 
iii) Adjustments for Pollution 
To illustrate the effect of pollution, consider a model that has an index of 
environmental quality, E, affecting both utility and production, where that index has a 
negative effect upon utility.  Thus the utility function is U = U(C, E) in which, by 
assumption, UC > 0 and UE < 0.  Furthermore, the index E depends on the rate of 
resource use, R, and on the accumulated stock of pollutant in the relevant 
environmental medium, A.  So we have E = E(R, A), in which ER > 0 and EA > 0.  The 
way in which the accumulated stock of pollution, A, changes over time is modelled by 
the following expression: 
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   )()( tttt VFARMA 

 .  
 The above expression says that the pollution stock is increased by the 
emissions arising from resource use, M(Rt), and is decreased by natural decay, tA         
(with an assumption that a constant proportion  of the ambient pollutant stock decays 
at each point in time), and by the effect of defensive expenditure, F(Vt).  The term F 
describes the reduction in the pollution stock brought about by some level of defensive 
expenditure V.  
The optimization problem in this case is: 
  


0
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
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Here )(G  is the extraction cost of resource.  The current value Hamiltonian is 
 ]),()),(,,([)()),(,( ttttttttttttttt VSRGCARERKQwRPARECUH   
         )]()([ tttt VFARM    
With tEtC EUCUU )( , thus  
]/))/(([)()/( VRCEERttRRtCEtt FMUUQERRGQEUUNNPGNNP   
     )]()()[/1( tttV VFARMF                  (4.12) 
Therefore, from the expression 4.12 above, if we just take account of the effect of 
pollution, going from NNP to GNNP now involves four adjustments.  While the first 
two: the value of the environmental quality index, (UE/UC)Et, and the depreciation of 
the resource stock, (QR – GR)Rt, are easy to interpret, an intuitive interpretation of the 
latter two is complicated.  Anyway, an important fact is that implementing these 
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adjustments would require non-market valuation.  This certainly makes global 
standardization of GNNP more difficult, and may require the world‘s political arena to 
settle differences.  Without conformity that makes comparison meaningful, an index is 
almost useless.  
Note that GNNP is derived from the concept not far from that of the 
adjusted NNP used in determining the above-mentioned Genuine Saving.  Both kinds 
of indicators incorporate the negative effects of the exploitation of natural resources 
and of the pollution created by economic activities.  The major difference between the 
two is that the Genuine Saving gives extra importance to educational expenditures. 
Nevertheless, GNNP is far from being the perfect indicator of 
sustainable development.  Besides difficulties and problems in determining parameters 
for calculation, GNNP can only be a good welfare indicator in a convex economy 
(Maler, 1991) (see Appendix B).  Rising GNNP might tell us that welfare was 
increasing over the accounting period, but it does not tell us whether this trend is going 
to continue.  Falling GNNP would be a sign of unsustainable development, but again it 
does not tell us whether such a situation will continue (Mulalic and Olsen, 2004). 
c) Augmented Green Net National Product (GNNP) and Augmented 
Genuine Saving (GS) 
Based on Genuine Saving (GS) and Green Net National Product (GNNP), 
Pezzey and Toman (2002a) have derived two fairly general, one-sided tests for the 
unsustainability of an economy with constant population and constant production 
possibilities.  If the value of GS is momentarily zero or negative, or if GNNP is 
momentarily constant or falling, then at that moment the economy is unsustainable, 
meaning that its current level of utility cannot be sustained forever.   They are one-
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sided tests because they show only unsustainability, not sustainability.  An economy 
that will encounter an unsustainable peak of development must go through a period 
before the peak.  Thus, there are possibilities that the changes of ordinary net 
investment and GNNP may send a false message, by being strictly positive when the 
economy is in fact unsustainable. 
In the real world, population growth and the changes in production as the result 
of technological progress and/or changes in terms of trade are the norm.  The 
production possibilities of a real economy certainly have direct dependence on time 
from at least three sources: technological progress; changes in world prices that face a 
trading country; and population growth.  An upward movement of the production 
possibilities, which represent an increase in economic opportunities, alone may cause 
an increase in the GNNP and the GS.  Because of this fact, an economy may have 
positive GNNP and GS when it is actually unsustainable.  Therefore, in order to apply 
the above-mentioned tests to economies where production possibilities change 
exogenously over time, both GS and GNNP have to be ‗augmented‘ to include a term 
called here the ‗value of time‘, which measures the value of future exogenous changes 
to production possibilities.  Referring to Pezzey et al. (2006), the methods of 
calculating augmented GNNP and GS are as follows: 
t
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where: NNP   is the conventional Net National Product 
 eE  is the (dis-)amenity costs of emissions 
  bB – J  is the net benefit of agri-environmental schemes  
  

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R )(  is the negative value of rents from resource stock depletion 
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  C  is consumption 
  J is government spending on agri-environmental improvement 
schemes, and 
  Q
t
   is the value of time that can be derived by the following 
expression: 


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where Fs  is the exogenous technological change 
 

RQ         is the resource price changes, and 
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X
 – RM)  is the net resource exports. 
d) Linkage between Genuine Saving and Green Net National Product 
Initially, the GS and GNNP were developed separately as indicators of 
sustainable development.  However, if the same accounting data are used the relation of 
the two is as follows: 
GNNP =  Consumption Expenditure + Net Investment 
Since in an equilibrium economy, Net Investment is equal to GS.  Therefore, 
  GNNP =  Consumption Expenditure + GS 
Asheim and Weitzman (2001) have found the linkage between the GNNP and 
the GS.  The two authors have theoretically proven that, in a present value-maximising 
economy, the time derivative of the real GNNP is equal to the GS multiplied by the real 
interest rate.  This can be mathematically expressed as follows: 
dGNNP/dt = GS×i                (4.13) 
where i is the real interest rate. 
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Pezzey and Toman (2002a), who developed one-sided tests for the 
unsustainability of an economy, refined the concept further by using ‗augmented 
GNNP‘ and ‗augmented GS‘ instead of the regular GNNP and GS.  That is: 
Augmented GNNP = Consumption + Augmented GS, and  
The time derivative of augmented GNNP is always the interest rate times 
augmented GS, or 
d(augmented GNNP)/dt = (augmented GS)×i                   (4.14) 
The above expression looks plausible and very logical, for an additional 
national income (defined as its time derivative) should come as the result of the return 
on the augmented net investment (or the interest of the augmented GS).  However, the 
empirical work of Pezzey et al. (2006), which used Scotland‘s economic data to 
compute the change in augmented Green Net National Product (GNNP) and the interest 
on augmented Genuine Savings (GS) as shown in Table 4.1, found a mismatch of the 
figures.  Shown by the last two rows of the first part of Table 4.1, the change in 
augmented GNNP of every year is very much bigger than the interest on augmented 
GS.  The discrepancies between these two sets of figures are still huge even using a 
higher interest rate of 6%, the UK Treasury‘s discount rate for public sector 
investments during 1992–1999 instead of the UK‘s real consumption discount rate of 
2%, and making an ad hoc allowance for the Scottish business cycle.  The finding 
certainly cannot be claimed as the proof of the theory of Asheim and Weitzman (2001).   
Pezzey et al. (2006) proposed some explanations to this mismatch, but could 
not conclusively identify a real heavyweight culprit.  In this regard, this thesis wishes to 
offer additional explanatory hypotheses as well as some views, which might have been 
overlooked, as follows: 
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Table 4.1 Totals and Constituent Parts of Change in Augmented GNNP and Interest on 
Augmented GS for Scotland, 1992–1999 
  Source: Pezzey et al. (2006) 
i) It is too inaccurate to use a real consumption discount rate as the rate of return 
on a net investment of an economy.  The real consumption discount rate, which might 
be close to a bank deposit interest rate, could only be considered as the rate of return on 
household savings.  In addition, the UK Treasury‘s discount rate for public sector 
investments, which was used to determine the interest from the augmented GS, is 
certainly not the same figure as that of the rate of return on the augmented net 
investment of the UK because, the net investment of the economy of UK includes 
private investments.  For private investors in the whole economy, whether they are 
corporate bodies or wealthy individuals, a rate of return on investment depends on their 
business opportunities, not the utility or consumption discount rate.  The private rate of 
return on investment indirectly relates to the consumption discount rate only via the 
bank‘s lending interest rate, which moves in harmony with the bank deposit interest 
rate.  This is because it is normal practice for an investor to loan money from banks and 
financial institutes to partly finance his/her investment.  Another result of this normal 
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practice is that an expected rate of return on such an investment is certainly higher than 
the lending interest rate.  (If the rate of return on an investment is lower than the 
interest rate on a loan, an investor will lose money because of the loan.)  Furthermore, 
corporate income taxes paid by business entities are parts of the return on investments.  
Therefore, the value of i in equations 4.13 and 4.14 should be the before-tax rate of 
return on investment of the whole economy.  
ii) A real economy is not composed of only a single individual.  In a nation, an 
addition earning of an individual will generate and regenerate incomes for others 
through spending and re-spending, as well as saving and re-saving.  Thus, to determine 
the full affect accrued to the national income by an additional income generated from 
an investment, we have to take account of the Keynesian multiplier effect into the 
calculation.  
Since the aggregate expenditure, AE, = C+I+G;  
where C is the consumption, 
  I is the investment, and 
  G is the government spending. 
Let M be the spending multiplier. Therefore, M = dNNP/dAE  
Thus, dNNP = MdAE 
           = Md(C+I+G) 
           = M(dC+dI+dG) 
Assume G is constant, then, 
      dNNP = M(dC+dI) 
Since in an equilibrium economy I = S, the saving; therefore, 
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      dNNP = M(dC+dS)                (4.15) 
Let R be the return on the investment, I, and r be the before-tax rate of return on 
investment.   
Therefore, dR  =  Irdt.   
Replacing I by S, then, dR  =  Srdt 
Since dR will be consumed and/or saved, then 
  dR  =  dC+dS 
Therefore,  dC+dS = Srdt 
Thus the equation 4.15 can be rewritten as follows: 
      dNNP = M Srdt     
Replacing the terms NNP and S by the terms augmented GNNP and augmented 
GS, the above equation can be rewritten as follows: 
d(augmented GNNP) = M×(augmented GS)×r dt 
Thus  d(augmented GNNP)/dt = (augmented GS)×r× M            (4.16) 
The equation 4.16 can be quoted in words as follows: 
“In a present value-maximising economy, the time derivative of the augmented 
GNNP is equal to the augmented GS multiplied by the before-tax rate of return on 
investments and the spending multiplier.” 
By conjecture, taking the above two hypotheses into account might increase the 
sizes of the figures of the last row in Table 4.1, by at least few folds and make them 
closer to the corresponding figures of the change in augmented GNNP.  However, it is 
not the objective of this thesis to research for the appropriate discount rate and the 
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spending multiplier.  Therefore, whether the gaps between these two sets of figures is 
small enough to prove the Asheim and Weitzman‘s proposition remains unanswered.  
4.4.2 UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) Indicators of 
Sustainable Development 
Following the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the UN 
Environment Programme (UNEP), later the UN Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD), developed a series of indicators designed to determine 
governmental progress towards sustainable development goals.  The selection of 
Sustainability Indicators is based broadly on the sections of the Agenda 21 document 
(United Nations, 1992) and falls into four categories: social, economic, environmental, 
and institutional, with a total of 132 indicators given in 16 subdivisions.  A revision 
was made in 2001 when the total number of core indicators was reduced by the CSD to 
58, grouped in 15 themes and 38 sub-themes under the same four categories.  The third 
and last revised CSD indicator set was finalized in 2006 by an expert group of indicator 
experts.  The set consists of 98 indicators, of which 50 are core indicators.  At this 
juncture, their detailed methodology sheets, as references for all countries to develop 
national indicators of sustainable development, are not yet available.  The latest 
indicators are no longer explicitly categorized into four pillars of sustainable 
development.  They continue to be placed in a framework of themes and sub-themes.  
As shown in Table 4.2, the framework contains 14 themes, which are slightly modified 
from the previous edition.  The indicators are an attempt to reflect common priorities 
among national and international issues. 
The main objective of the CSD in developing the indicators was to make the 
indicators of sustainable development for the use of a government in decision-making 
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processes at the national level.  Within the framework of 58 core indicators, a 
government can select and use a suitable set of indicators to measure progress towards 
sustainable development of its nation in accordance with its own distinctive concerns.  
The CSD stresses that its framework and core set of indicators provide just a good 
starting point for such a national programme to monitor its sustainable development.  
Therefore, this mode of sustainable development indicators, though matching the name 
and concept exactly, could not be used to compare degrees of sustainable development 
of two or more countries.   
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Table 4.2 CSD Theme Indicator Framework 
Social 
Theme Sub-theme Indicator 
Equity Poverty (3) Percent of population living below poverty line 
Gini index of income inequality 
Unemployment rate 
Gender equity 
(24) 
Ratio of average female wage to male wage 
Health (6) Nutritional status Nutritional status of children 
Mortality Mortality rate under 5 years old 
Life expectancy at birth 
Sanitation Percent of population with adequate sewage disposal facilities 
Drinking water Population with access to safe drinking water 
Healthcare 
delivery 
Percent of population with access to primary health care 
facilities 
Immunization against infections childhood diseases 
Contraceptive prevalence rate 
Education (36) Education level Children reaching grade 5 of primary education 
Adult secondary education achievement level 
Literacy Adult literacy rate 
Housing (7) Living conditions Floor area per person 
Security Crime (36, 24) Number of recorded crimes per 100,000 population 
Population (5) Population change Population growth rate 
Population of urban formal and informal settlements 
Environmental 
Theme Sub-theme Indicator 
Atmosphere (9) Climate change Emissions of greenhouse gases 
Ozone layer 
depletion 
Consumption of ozone depleting substances 
Air quality Ambient concentration of air pollutants in urban areas 
Land (10) Agriculture (14) Arable and permanent crop land area 
Use of fertilizers 
Use of agricultural pesticides 
Forests (11) Forest area as a percent of land area 
Wood harvesting intensity 
Desertification 
(12)  
Land affected by desertification 
Urbanization (7) Area of urban formal and informal settlements 
Oceans, seas and 
coasts (17) 
Coastal zone Algae concentration in coastal waters 
Percent of total population living in coastal areas 
Fisheries Annual catch by major species 
Fresh water (18) Water quantity Annual withdrawal of ground and surface water as a percent of 
total available water 
Water quality BOD in water bodies 
Concentration of faecal coliform in freshwater 
Biodiversity (15) Ecosystem Area of selected key ecosystems 
Protected area as a % of total area 
Species  Abundance of selected key species 
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate relevant Agenda 21 chapters. 
Source: UN Division for Sustainable Development (2001) 
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Table 4.2 CSD Theme Indicator Framework (Continued) 
Economic 
Theme Sub-theme Indicator 
Economic 
structure (2) 
Economic 
performance 
GDP per capita 
Investment share in GDP 
Trade Balance of trade in goods and services 
Financial status 
(33) 
Debt to GNP ratio 
Total ODA given or received as a percent of GNP 
Consumption and 
production 
patterns (4) 
Material 
consumption 
Intensity of material use 
Energy use Annual energy consumption per capita 
Share of consumption of renewable energy resources 
Intensity of energy use 
Waste generation 
and management 
(19-22) 
Generation of industrial and municipal solid waste 
Generation of hazardous waste 
Generation of radioactive waste 
Waste recycling and reuse 
Transportation Distance traveled per capita by mode of transport 
Institutional 
Theme Sub-theme Indicator 
Institutional 
framework (38, 
39) 
Strategic 
implementation 
of sustainable 
development (8)  
National sustainable development strategy 
International 
cooperation 
Implementation of ratified global agreements 
Institutional 
capacity (37) 
Information access 
(40) 
Number of internet subscribers per 1000 inhabitants 
Communication 
Infrastructure (40) 
Main telephone lines per 1000 inhabitants 
Science and 
technology (35) 
Expenditure on research and development as a percent of GDP 
Disaster 
preparedness 
and response 
Economic and human loss due to natural disasters 
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate relevant Agenda 21 chapters. 
Source: UN Division for Sustainable Development (2001) 
4.4.3 World Bank World Development Indicators 
Unlike the above five indicators, the World Bank World Development 
Indicators are the non-national account ones.  As suggested by their names, these 
indicators were actually created to track progress towards the international goals of 
development, which focus on reducing poverty; achieving universal primary education, 
gender equality in enrolments in primary and secondary education and drastic cuts in 
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infant and child mortality rates.  Their aim is also to reverse environmental degradation.  
Since all of these are aspects of the wider aims of sustainability and sustainable 
development, we can classify these indicators as sustainable development indicators. 
The concept of the World Development Indicators was initiated by the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD in 1996 when it chose 7 
international development goals from resolutions of UN conferences.  In 1998 a joint 
meeting was held between the UN, OECD and World Bank that led to a proposal of 21 
indicators to track progress towards the goals.  Subsequently annual reports have been 
produced, i.e. ―World Development Indicators 2000‖ (Warhurst, 2002).  Its latest 
version ―World Development Indicators 2006‖ including more than 900 indicators in 
over 80 tables organized in six sections: World View, People, Environment, Economy, 
States and Markets, and Global Links (World Bank, 2006).  
4.5 Indicators for Sustainable Development in Thailand 
 Since Thailand has a long history of benefiting from its rich natural resources, 
its people have been well aware of the environmental damage caused by such 
exploitation.  As a result, the concept of sustainable development has been quickly 
adopted by both the Government and its people.  Thailand was among the UN member 
countries that ratified multilateral agreement on the Earth Master Plan ―Agenda 21‖ of 
the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil in 1982.  Since then, Thailand has adopted Sustainable Development 
and Agenda 21 as a framework for the national development plan.  Sustainable 
development has been put on the national agenda and was first addressed in the 9
th
 
National Economic and Social Development Plan (2002-2006).  It was defined as a 
holistic development which involves six dimensions: economics, social, environment, 
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politics, technology and knowledge, and mental and spiritual balance.  Furthermore, in 
2003, Thailand established the National Sustainable Development Council chaired by 
the Prime Minister.  The council is responsible for formulating operational plans, 
implementing processes, and evaluating outcomes.  The council‘s objective is to arrive 
at a balanced state of economics, social, natural resource and environment for the well 
being of people across generations. 
4.5.1  The Genuine Saving of Thailand 
Since introducing the Genuine Saving in 1998, the World Bank has calculated 
and published the Genuine Savings of most countries, including Thailand.  The latest 
version revealed the Genuine Savings of countries from 1990 to 2004, calculated in 
accordance to the 2002 World Bank‘s Manual for Calculating Adjusted Net Savings 
(Bolt et al., 2002).  Hence, the rents from energy and mineral depletion, two 
adjustments in defining the Genuine Savings, were estimated by the following 
expression: 
Rent = production volume (international market price – average unit production cost) 
As mentioned in a previous section, there are new proposals to calculate the 
user costs or the rents from natural resource depletion as investigated and compiled by 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2007), and among five approaches mentioned, the authors 
suggested the quasi-optimal approach as the most appropriate method.  For comparison, 
this study recalculates the rents from energy and mineral depletion by the quasi-optimal 
approach.  Current dollar (world) price and extraction data of energy and mineral 
resources were derived from the World Bank‘s Genuine Saving database, as published 
in World Development Indicators 2005 (World Bank, 2005), while energy reserves data 
were taken from The BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007 (British Petroleum, 
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2007).  Mineral reserves data were taken from the Department of Mineral Resources, 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Thailand.  The social discount rate, r, 
is assumed to be 5% following Atkinson and Hamilton (2007), and the elasticity of the 
extraction cost function, , is 1.15 following Vincent (1997). 
Note that the rents from the energy and mineral depletions, calculated by the 
quasi-optimal approach, are slightly lower than those posted by World Bank (2004).  
As a result, the figures of the recalculated Genuine Savings of Thailand are slightly 
higher than those of World Bank (2004) as shown in Figure 4.2.  From the figure, the 
Genuine Savings of Thailand, from 1990 to 2004, is positive which means that the Thai 
economy was on the sustainable development path.  Therefore, if Genuine Saving is 
used to measure sustainability of development, Thailand could claim to be successful.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Genuine Savings (GS) of Thailand as a Percentage of Gross National 
Income (GNI) from 1990 to 2004  
4.5.2 The Green Net National Product (GNNP) of Thailand 
In 2006, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) of 
Thailand launched a five-year project to develop a ―road map‖ for establishing 
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environmental accounting to create ―Green GDP‖ as a part of the national income 
accounts.  The project is an attempt to implement the guidelines set by the SEEA.  Its 
two aims are to provide the Thai Government with the following (Koomsup, 2006): 
a)  Details of the satellite accounts designed for natural resources and 
environment in Thailand comprising: 
i)   Classification of the activities related to natural resources and 
environment,  
ii)  Establishment of supply and use accounts for natural resources and 
environment in physical and monetary terms,  
iii)  Establishment of environmental assets accounts,  
iv)  Establishment of environmental protection expenditure accounts,  
v)   Establishment of the ―green GDP‖ national income account 
reflecting the impacts on natural resources and the environment with 
adjustments for depletion, defensive expenditures, and degradation. 
b) A road map of the establishment of environmental accounts comprising the 
following phases: 
i)   Revision of the classification of activities in the national account by 
adding those related to natural resources and the environment in 
accordance with the SEEA,   
ii)   Development of the supply and use accounts and environmental 
asset accounts for natural resources and environment, 
iii)  Establishment of expenditure accounts on protection and 
management of natural resources and environment, 
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iv)  Integration of phase b) and c) to come up with at least the Extraction 
Adjusted Domestic Product and the Depletion Adjusted Domestic 
Product. This account should compare with the adjusted GDP in 
other countries, and 
v)   Recommendation for governmental agencies to make use of the 
results from phases a) to d) in setting policies and measures for 
dealing with natural resources and environment. 
In order to make some contribution to the above-mentioned work, this thesis 
attempts to calculate the GNNP figures of Thailand, from 1993 to 2004.  In doing so, 
the conventional NNP is to be adjusted for depletion of natural resources and pollution 
damage.  The natural resources depletions in this calculation comprise depletions of 
energy (oil, natural gas, and coal), minerals (lead, tin, zinc, and iron), fish, and forest.  
The energy and mineral depletions of Thailand are calculated by using the 
quasi-optimal approach (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2007).  Current dollar (world) price 
and extraction data of energy and mineral resources are derived from the World Bank‘s 
Genuine Saving database, as described in World Bank (2005).  Energy reserves data are 
taken from British Petroleum (2007), while mineral reserves data are taken from the 
Department of Mineral Resources, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, 
Thailand.  The social discount rate, r, is assumed to be 5% following Atkinson and 
Hamilton (2007), and the elasticity, , is 1.15 following Vincent (1997).  
Fisheries data are obtained from the Department of Fisheries, Thailand.  For 
forestry, productions, increments and unit rent are derived from the World Bank‘s 
Genuine Saving database, as described in World Bank (2005).  
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The air pollutions considered in this calculation comprise CO2, CO, NOx, SO2, 
and SPM (Suspended Particulate Matter).  The CO2 emissions are derived from World 
Bank (2005) and the conservative figure of $20 marginal global damage per ton of 
carbon emitted is from Fankhauser (1994).  
For calculating the social costs of CO, NOx, SO2, and SPM emissions, two 
kinds of data are required; the energy consumption for all economic sectors and the 
emission factors of energy consumption, defined as kiloton of pollution per kiloton of 
oil equivalent (KTOE) consumed, of each economic sector.  The energy consumption 
of five sectors, transportation, electricity generation, industry, residence, and 
agriculture, was estimated by the Energy Research Institute (ERI), Chulalongkorn 
University.  The emission factors of each economic sector are shown in Table 4.3 (ERI, 
2006).  The costs of pollution abatement for CO, NOx, SO2, and SPM are derived from 
Guenno and Tiezzi (1998) and their values per ton, in 2006 $, are 2, 192, 499 and 28, 
respectively. 
Table 4.3 Emission Factors of Energy Consumption by Economic Sector 
Sector Emission Factor (kiloton of pollution per kiloton of oil 
equivalent (KTOE)) 
CO NOx SO2 SPM 
Transportation 
Electricity generation 
Industry 
Residence  
Agriculture 
0.11 
0.0009 
0.03 
0.65 
0.03 
  0.03 
  0.01 
  0.01 
  0.007 
  0.04 
       0.01 
       0.06 
       0.02 
       0.0004 
       0.02 
0.001 
0.07 
0.0005 
0 
0.004 
Source: ERI (2006) 
The calculated figures of the GNNP together with those of the conventional 
NNP of Thailand are shown in Figure 4.3.  All figures of GNNP are a bit smaller, less 
than 6 per cent, than those of the NNP, and the two sets of figures move in harmony.  It 
can be said that Thailand‘s GNNP is sensitive to conventional NNP.  During the period 
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of study, the GNNP and NNP of Thailand decreased in 1997 and 1998 and again in 
2000 and 2001.  The decreases were attributed to the 1997 Asian economic and 
financial crisis.  If the one-sided tests for the unsustainability, proposed by Pezzey and 
Toman (2002a), is used, it can be said that Thailand‘s development was briefly 
unsustainable during the years 1997, 1998, 2000, and 2001.  This is not in agreement 
with the conclusion from the GS indicator of subsection 5.1.  However, since 2002, 
Thailand‘s economy has fully recovered with no sign of unsustainability.  Another 
point is that during the period of study, there was another bad sign of sustainable 
development for the adjustments for resources depletion and pollution damages were 
increasing over the period of time studied.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Green Net National Product of Thailand from 1993 to 2004 
4.5.3 Augmented Green Net National Product (GNNP) and Augmented 
Genuine Saving (GS) of Thailand 
 This thesis will follow in the footsteps of Pezzey, Hanley, Turner, and Tinch 
(2006) by trying to determine the Augmented Green Net National Product (GNNP) and 
Augmented Genuine Saving (GS) of Thailand and to see whether they are also 
168 
 
mismatched.  The results, which are shown in Table 4.4, are based on the sources of 
data and assumptions explained below.  Note that, due to different sources of basic and 
intermediate data and variant forms of calculation, the figures of GNNP and GS here 
are close to but not exactly the same as those in subsections 5.1 and 5.2, though they 
basically have the same meanings. 
a)  Sources of Data and Assumptions 
 GNP, NNP, and capital depreciation were available from the National 
Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand.  Two values of real interest rate 
(r), 5% and 10% are used in calculation.  The 5% rate was the mean value of real 
interest rate of Thailand from 1977 to 2000 (Holmes and Maghrebi, 2003).  The 
alternative rate of 10% is chosen because it was the discount rate used by the World 
Bank for project evaluation in developing countries (Hayes and Smith, 1993), and 
because it was close to the rate of 11.7 %, which was the average before-tax rate of 
return of all companies traded on the Thailand‘s Stock Exchange from 1993 to 2004.  
(11.7 % was derived from the average price per earning (P/E) of 12.20 and the 30 % 
corporate income tax rate.)  Due to lack of data, the proposal of this thesis, in 
subsection 4.1.4, to apply the before-tax rate of return on investments of the whole 
economy instead of the real interest rate and to take into account the spending 
multiplier effect of income, is disregarded here. 
 The natural resource depletion, consisting of energy, minerals, forest, fish, and 
pollution damages from CO2, CO, NOx, SO2, and SPM are the same as those in topic 
5.2.  For the agri-environmental spending of Thailand, the details of the cost and area 
of take-up for the schemes for improving quality of soil from acid, alkaline, and 
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infertile soil problems were from the Land Development Department, while the value 
of benefits per square kilometre came from the study of Israngkul (2006).  
 In computing the value of time, the estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) 
and TFP growth rate from Bank of Thailand (2006) are used as the estimates of Ft/F, 
which are projected forward to 2024.  Differing from the approach of Vincent et al. 
(1997), changing terms of trade in fishery products (shrimp, fish, and cuttlefish), is 
used instead of changing terms of trade in oil and minerals because Thailand is an 
important fishery product-exporting country while export of minerals is small.  The 
data of the price change of fishery products (shrimp, fish, and cuttlefish), their imports, 
and exports come from the Bank of Thailand.  Actual price data (up to 2006) and its 
predictions (2006 onwards) are used to calculate changes in prices, and the future 
fishery product exports from Thailand is assumed to be constant at the average level of 
actual exports during 1993–2006. 
b) Results 
 The calculated results are shown in Table 4.4.  As also shown in Figure 4.4, 
during the study period, the augmented GNNP moved down in some years, but the 
augmented GS is always positive.  According to the one-sided tests developed by 
Pezzey and Toman (2002a), this means that the augmented GNNP suggested 
unsustainable development in Thailand in some years, while the augmented GS did not 
suggest unsustainable development in Thailand at all during the period.  The contrasts 
between augmented GS and augmented GNNP are in the same pattern as those between 
the GS in subsection 5.1 and the GNNP in subsection 5.2.  
 Note that the figures of augmented GNNP are about 6-1% less than those of 
NNP.  The green and augmentation terms have a small effect on NNP.  Therefore, the 
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sustainable development of Thailand depends mostly on NNP.  Thailand‘s NNP 
dropped by 20 per cent in 1997, a strong sign of unsustainable development, as the 
result of the economic crisis near the end of 1996 and NNP has increased continuously 
since 2002.  It can be said that in the case of Thailand, a medium economy, the GNNP 
and augmented GNNP can be greatly affected by the severe business cycles of the 
country.  On the other hand, in the case of GS, the economic crisis did not cause the 
values of net saving to go negative.  Furthermore, they greatly outweighed the sums of 
resource depletion and pollution damage.  In the same way, the augmented GS were all 
positive because the figures of NNP were much higher than the sums of consumption, 
government spending on agri-environmental improvement schemes, and resource 
depletion values.  Because the economic crisis of late 1996 was an unusual event, the 
GS and augmented GS might be better indicators of sustainable development in 
Thailand.  
If the theory developed by Asheim and Weitzman (2001) is true, the annual 
change in augmented GNNP of Thailand should be equal to the interest on augmented 
GS.  But, from Table 4.4, the absolute values of the changes in the augmented GNNP 
of all years were a lot (from 2 to 28 times) bigger than the values of interest on the 
augmented GS.  This ―mismatch‖ is similar to those of Scotland calculated by Pezzey 
et al. (2006).  The details are also shown in Figure 4.5. 
To check how robust the mismatch problem is, sensitivity tests are done as 
reported in the second part of Table 4.4.  The first sensitivity test examines the effect of 
using a higher interest rate of 10%.  The results are shown in Table 4.4 and 
demonstrated as the lower and middle graphs in Figure 4.6.  The higher discount rate 
decreases the absolute value of the value of time by about 49%, so the value of 
augmented GS is lower.  But this reduction is outweighed by the doubled interest rate 
171 
 
and the falling user cost of resource depletion as the quasi-optimal approach which is 
used in this calculation (
Nt r
cpq
UC
)1)(1(1
)(





).  The interest on 
augmented GS increases when using the higher interest rate while the augmented 
GNNP is barely changed, so its results are not shown.  
 Following Hamilton and Clemens (1999), the second sensitivity test is 
performed by reclassifying educational expenditure as investment in human capital in 
the national accounting calculation.  Reclassifying educational expenditure from 
consumption to investment increases augmented GS but augmented GNNP (the total) is 
not affected.  Figure 4.6 shows that adding educational expenditure to augmented GS 
makes the graph of the interest on augmented GS move from the middle to upper 
positions.  Although the higher interest rate and the change of the educational 
expenditure accounting decrease the difference between the change in augmented 
GNNP and interest on augmented GS, the mismatch remains strong.  The causes of this 
problem could be the difficulties of valuing environmental resource depletion and 
degradation, lack of some specific data of Thailand, and the effect of business cycles.  
As discussed in sub-section 4.1.4, the huge mismatch might be because the rate of 
return on the net investment that is used is much smaller than the actual one and 
because we disregard the spending multiplier effect of income. 
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Table 4.4 Totals and Constituent Parts of Change in Augmented GNNP and Interest on Augmented GS for Thailand, 1993–2004 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Main calculation using 5% real interest rate             
Conventional GNP  171879 193289 218640 228597 184543 133526 144244 141257 129340 139869 153352 168848 
K (depreciation of man-made capital) 39481 45056 51402 56527 46905 34540 37601 35290 32596 35958 39603 41610 
NNP = GNP - K 132397 148233 167238 172069 137638 98986 106643 105968 96745 103911 113748 127238 
eE = pollution damage 1526 1673 1878 2037 2071 1834 1905 1898 1983 2094 2193 2489 
bB - J = net benefit of agri-environmental schemes 6 7 7 7 5 4 4 3 4 3 4 5 
(QR - fR) 

S = negative resource rents -708 -588 -645 -917 -1741 -1147 -653 -2290 -3254 -1977 -3002 -4034 
Qt = value of time 1028 1194 -879 -1085 -4468 338 659 -627 74 -173 1954 1667 
Augmented GNNP = NNP - eE + bB - J + (QR - fR) 

S + Q
t 131198 147173 163843 168037 129363 96346 104749 101156 91586 99671 110511 122388 
Augmented GNNP/NNP  99% 99% 98% 98% 94% 97% 98% 95% 95% 96% 97% 96% 
Augmented genuine savings (GS) 37335 42867 47514 44317 27830 23261 23640 22484 18192 20356 23257 26428 
Change in augmented GNNP  15976 16670 4194 -38675 -33016 8402 -3593 -9570 8085 10840 11876 
Interest rate r x augmented GS 1867 2143 2376 2216 1391 1163 1182 1124 910 1018 1163 1321 
interest rate 0.1                       
Sensitivity testing by using 10% interest rate; then adding educational expenditure                     
(QR - fR)
 

S  = negative resource rents -654 -563 -596 -827 -1643 -1089 -613 -1930 -2823 -1694 -2448 -3540 
Qt = value of time 530 615 -420 -522 -2220 176 341 -303 46 -75 990 849 
Change in augmented GNNP   15866 17732 4339 -36981 -35466 8227 -2630 -9851 8063 10050 11961 
Interest rate r x augmented GS 3689 4231 4802 4497 3018 2316 2336 2317 1860 2074 2285 2610 
Estimated educational expenditure 3952 4014 4686 5734 6475 8750 9210 8508 6079 6595 6546 5996 
Interest rate r x augmented GS including educational expenditure 4084 4633 5271 5070 3665 3191 3257 3168 2467 2733 2939 3210 
All values except % are US$ million in constant 2006 prices.                         
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Figure 4.4 Augmented Green NNP and Augmented Genuine Savings for Thailand from 
1993 to 2004 
 
Figure 4.5 Change in Augmented Green NNP and Interest on Augmented Genuine 
Savings for Thailand from 1993 to 2004 
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Figure 4.6 Sensitivity Tests on Interest on Augmented Genuine Savings for Thailand 
from 1993 to 2004 
4.5.4 The Sustainable Development Indicators and the Sustainable 
Development Composite Index of Thailand  
a) Sustainable Development Indicators 
Chapter 40 of Agenda 21, which was ratified by Thailand, calls on countries at 
the national level, as well as international, governmental and non-governmental 
organizations to develop and identify indicators of sustainable development that can 
provide a solid basis for decision-making at all levels.  However, up until 2004, 
Thailand had not had indicators that could officially evaluate the level of sustainable 
development, or the balance of economic, social and environment, of the nation.  To 
amend this inadequacy, in 2003, the NESDB of Thailand sponsored Thailand‘s 
Environment Institute and Kenan Institute of Asia to implement a one-year project with 
the main objectives being to develop an evaluation framework for Thailand‘s 
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sustainable development, and to develop Sustainable Development Indicators (SDI) and 
a composite index as evaluation tools to monitor and assess Thailand‘s sustainable 
development.  
The outcome of the project defined a total of 37 indicators, as shown in Table 
4.5, comprising: 13 environmental indicators, 12 economic indicators and 12 social 
indicators. The indicators were developed under some guidelines of the CSD‘s 
Indicators of Sustainable Development: Framework and Methodologies (2001), but did 
not follow all of the CSD Theme Indicator Framework.  However, of the 37 indicators 
developed, 17 indicators are consistent with the CSD Theme in 2001 and 3 indicators 
are similar with a slight difference in calculation process of those of the CSD Theme in 
2001.  It should also be noted that Thailand considered only the original three pillars of 
sustainable development—the economic, environmental, and social dimensions; it has 
not taken the institutional dimension into account. 
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Table 4.5 Sustainable Development Indicators of Thailand
1
 
No. Indicators Unit Status
3 Completeness 
level of data4 
 Economic dimension    
1 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Percentage DF 1 
2 Ratio of energy consumption to GDP Percentage S 1 
3 Consumption of renewable energy Percentage S 1 
4 Rate of waste recycling in all communities Percentage R 2 
5 Total unemployment rate Percentage DF 1 
6 Ratio of public debt to GDP Percentage DF 1 
7 Ratio of current account to GDP Percentage S 1 
8 Gini coefficient of income distribution 0 to 1 S 1 
9 Achievement in poverty reduction Percentage DF 1 
10 Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) Baht S 2 
11 Ratio of imported goods Percentage DF 1 
12 Ratio of short-term foreign debt to foreign reserve Percentage DF 1 
 Social dimension    
13 Average years of education Year S 1 
14 Test results of 4 major subjects Percentage R 2 
15 Ratio of research and development investment to GDP Percentage S 2 
16 Life expectancy at birth Year S 1 
17 Rate of sickness and number of population who have health 
insurance 
Sickness/capita/year 
and Percentage 
R 1 
18 Ratio of crime and drug cases to number of population Cases/1000 persons S 2 
19 Corruption index Percentage S 1 
20 Proportion of female to male members in local council Female to 100 male S 2 
21 Loss of life and property to disaster Persons, baht R 2 
22 Cultural indicator2 No indicator at the 
present 
S 3 
23 Violation of human rights by the government Cases/100,000 persons S 3 
24 Accessibility to safe drinking water Percentage S 2 
 Environmental dimension    
25 Proportion of forest area to nation‘s area Percentage S 1 
26 Proportion of the current mangrove forest area to the 1961 
mangrove forest area 
Percentage DF 2 
27 Abundance of coastal marine life Percentage DF 2 
28 Surface water and ground water used per water consumption Percentage S 3 (surface water) 
2 (ground water) 
29 Proportion of good quality water resources to all water 
resources 
Percentage S 1 
30 Air quality in major urban areas that is below standard Percentage DF 1 
31 Properly treated hazardous waste  Percentage R 3 
32 Chemical used in agriculture Metric ton/year S 2 
33 Important settlement Number S 3 
34 Lands unsuitable for agriculture Percentage (sq. km.) S 1 
35 Public projects that have public participation Percentage R 3 
36 Emission of green house gases Giga-gram/GDP 
Giga-gram/capita 
DF 3 
37 Consumption of ozone depleting substances Ton/year DF 1 
Note:   
     1
 Have 17 indicators that are consistent with the United Nations in 2001 and 3 indicators that are 
similar with a slight difference in calculation process. 
 
2
 In process of selecting proper indicators. 
 
3
 DF  means  Driving Force 
    S  means  State 
    R  means  Response 
 
4
 Level 1 means data are fully complete and ready for evaluation  
                Level 2 means data are moderately complete and usable for trend estimation 
                Level 3 means data are incomplete or unavailable and needs to be collected 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (2004) 
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b)  Composite Index 
Besides developing sustainable indicators, the NESDB‘s project also attempted 
to quantify each indicator and to combine all the grades (called index, in percentage) of 
the indicators into a single composite index.  However, it was found that of the 37 
indicators, some have limitations in their data, either lacking collection processes or 
being not up to date.  At the end of the project in 2004, there were 23 indicators that 
could be used to make the composite index, comprising 9 indicators in the economic 
dimension, 7 indicators in the social dimension and 7 indicators in the environmental 
dimension.  At this preliminary stage, the research team of the project gave each 
dimension an equal weight, and also gave all indicators equal weight within a 
dimension.  Table 4.6 shows the calculation methodology of the index for each 
indicator of the three dimensions of sustainable development.  The indicators and the 
indices, the calculated results of Table 4.6, of the three dimensions in comparison with 
the levels of Thailand‘s development are shown in Table 4.7.  Figure 4.7 shows the 
graph of the Sustainable Development Indices of the three dimensions, while Figure 4.8 
shows the graph of the Sustainable Development Composite Index of Thailand (1999-
2003). 
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Table 4.6 The Calculation of the Index for each Indicator of Three Dimensions of 
Sustainable Development  
No. Dimension of Sustainable 
Development Indicators 
Calculating criteria 
 Economic dimension  
 - Quality development  
1 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Compare with the changing rate of the TFP in the past, the 
minimum point is 0 percent and the maximum point is 5.0 
percent. If the development results in a 5.0 expansion rate this 
indicator will receive 100 points. If the expansion rate is 0 
percent this indicator will receive 60 points. 
2 Ratio of energy consumption to 
GDP 
The ratio of energy consumption to GDP of the year 1994 which 
was at the lowest at 0.01515 is set to be the maximum target. 
The ratio of energy consumption to GDP of the year 1990 which 
was at the highest at 0.01751 is set to be the minimum target. If 
the ratio is 0.01515 or lower, this indicator will receive 100 
points. If the ratio is 0.01751 or higher, this indicator will 
receive 0 point. 
3 Consumption of renewable 
energy 
The goal of renewable energy is set at 28 percent of total energy. 
The points received in each year are calculated from the 
achievement of this goal. 
4 Rate of waste recycling in all 
communities 
The goal of recycling waste is set at 30 percent of all waste 
generated. The points received in each year are calculated from 
the achievement of this goal. 
 - Stable development  
5 Total unemployment rate The suitable unemployment rate is 2 percent. If the 
unemployment rate is 2 percent or below this indicator will 
receive 100 points. 
6 Ratio of public debt to GDP Target of public debt to GDP of 30 percent. The lowest point of 
70 percent is considered having no sustainability. The score is 
varied between the highest and the lowest points. If the score is 
beyond the set level, the highest and the lowest points will be 
used instead. 
7 Ratio of current account to GDP A good ratio of current account to GDP is between 4 to -4 
percent of the GDP. If the current account is -4 percent or lower, 
or the current account is 4 percent or higher, this indicator will 
receive 60 points. If the current account is equal to 0 percent, 
this indicator will receive 100 points. 
 - Wealth distribution  
8 Gini coefficient of income 
distribution 
Good Gini coefficient of income distribution is 0.40. If the Gini 
coefficient is at the goal, the indicator will receive 100 points. 
9 Achievement in poverty 
reduction 
The Eighth National Social and Economic 
Development Plan set the goal of poverty reduction to 10 
percent. The indicator will receive 100 points if the poverty rate 
reaches this goal. 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (2004) 
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Table 4.6 The Calculation of the Index for each Indicator of Three Dimensions of 
Sustainable Development (Continued) 
 
No. Dimension of Sustainable 
Development Indicators 
Calculating criteria 
 Social dimension  
 - Capacity building  
10 Average years of education The Ninth National Social and Economic Development Plan set 
the minimum years of education at 9 years. The points received 
are calculated from the achievement of such goal. 
11 Achievement in education Transform the test result of 100 point base to the achievement of 
the development using 75 points as goal. 
 - Improvement of quality of life  
12 Life expectancy at birth The expected average age is 80 years and the lowest tolerable 
average age is 25 years. If the average age of Thai people is 80, 
this indicator will receive 100 points. 
13 Human health Calculated from healthy (non-sick) population from the total 
population with the goal of 100 percent healthy. 
14 Life security Calculated from the average ratio of cases reported per year per 
1,000 persons compared with the lowest ratio of cases reported 
as the goal. The lowest ratio of crime cases is 1.2 cases per 
1,000 persons and the lowest ratio of drug cases is 1.8 per 1,000 
persons. 
 - Creating equality and 
participation 
 
15 Participation index 
 
Calculated from the rate of people using their rights to vote with 
the goal set at 100 percent. 
16 Corruption index Calculated from the Belief in Corruption Ranking result by  
Transparency International (TI) with the highest point =10 and 
the lowest point = 1. 
 Environmental dimension  
 - Conservation  
17 Proportion of forest area to 
nation‘s area 
At least 40 percent of the land area must be forest to maintain 
the balance in ecosystem. If the forest area is 40 percent of the 
nation‘s area, it will receive 100 points. 
18 Proportion of the current 
mangrove forest area to the 1961 
mangrove forest area 
The goal is 80 percent of the mangrove forest area in the past 
(1961) which was abundant at 3,680 square kilometres. If the 
area is 2,944 square kilometres, it will receive 100 points.  
19 Amount of economic marine 
livestock caught within 3 
kilometers of the Thai coast 
The goal of catching economic marine livestock is 10 kilograms 
in 1 hour. If the marine livestock is abundant to the catching 
limit, it will receive 100 points. 
20 The use of ground water to the 
available amount 
The goal of the amount of useable ground water is between 20-
160 percent. If the ground water is used less than 20 percent, the 
score received is 100 but if it is used to more than 160 percent, 
the score is 60. 
 - Good environmental quality  
21 Proportion of good quality water 
resources to all water resources 
Calculate the proportion of good quality water resources to the 
total water resources with the goal of 100 percent. 
22 Air quality in major urban areas 
that is below standard 
Percentage of the air quality monitoring stations that reports low 
air quality (measure for particles smaller than 10 microns) with 
the goal set at 100 percent report good air quality. 
23 Properly treated hazardous waste  The goal of properly treated hazardous waste is 50 percent of all 
hazardous waste in year 2006. 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (2004) 
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Table 4.7 The Sustainable Development Indicators and the Indices of the Three 
Dimensions of Thailand (1999-2003) 
Dimension of Sustainable 
Development Indicators 
Index (%) 
The Eighth National Social 
and Economic Development 
Plan 
The Ninth National 
Social and Economic 
Development Plan 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Economic dimension 70.23 69.84 66.65 76.44 79.05 
Quality development 69.95 68.39 58.64 67.35 68.05 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 75.53 64.29 71.11 76.13 78.91 
Ratio of energy consumption to 
GDP 
99.01 100.00 53.48 75.19 75.19 
Consumption of renewable energy 61.77 61.32 57.95 57.49 57.49 
Rate of waste recycling in all 
communities 
43.48 47.96 52.01 60.61 60.61 
Stable development 71.46 69.45 69.51 80.04 86.96 
Total unemployment rate 47.73 55.71 61.92 89.29 98.69 
Ratio of public debt to GDP 71.23 63.76 63.12 65.84 78.43 
Ratio of current account to GDP 95.42 88.87 83.50 85.00 83.75 
Wealth distribution 68.97 73.31 78.38 89.20 89.20 
Gini coefficient of income 
distribution 
75.05 76.19 79.84 78.40 78.40 
Achievement in poverty reduction 62.89 70.42 76.92 100.00 100.00 
Social dimension 61.90 61.11 62.51 62.80 65.37 
Capacity building 64.43 63.06 62.69 64.37 65.48 
Average years of education 78.89 80.00 82.22 84.40 86.67 
Achievement in education 49.97 46.11 43.16 44.29 44.29 
Improvement of quality of life 76.13 75.19 75.17 74.73 79.61 
Life expectancy at birth 82.00 83.50 83.50 83.50 83.50 
Human health 85.80 85.80 84.90 84.90 81.30 
Life security 60.58 56.22 57.07 55.75 73.99 
Creating equality and 
participation 
38.05 38.05 43.35 43.35 43.90 
Participation index 51.70 51.65 62.25 62.25 62.25 
Corruption index 24.44 24.44 24.44 24.44 25.56 
Environmental dimension 40.85 39.14 44.33 48.57 48.57 
Conservation 53.05 53.20 59.20 61.20 61.20 
Proportion of forest area to 
nation‘s area 
63.20 63.20 63.20 63.20 63.20 
Proportion of the current 
mangrove forest area to the 1961 
mangrove forest area 
56.92 56.92 56.92 56.92 56.92 
Amount of economic marine 
livestock caught within 3 
kilometers of the Thai coast 
40.10 32.00 42.70 42.70 42.70 
The use of ground water to the 
available amount 
52.00 60.67 74.00 82.00 82.00 
Good environmental quality 24.57 20.40 24.49 31.71 31.71 
Proportion of good quality water 
resources to all water resources 
25.00 18.00 18.00 40.00 40.00 
Air quality in major urban areas 
that is below standard 
18.18 9.09 28.00 28.00 28.00 
Properly treated hazardous waste  30.52 34.10 27.48 27.14 27.14 
Total Sustainable Development 
Index of Thailand 
57.66 56.70 57.83 62.60 64.33 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (2004) 
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Figure 4.7 The Sustainable Development Indices of the Three Dimensions 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (2004) 
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Figure 4.8 The Sustainable Development Composite Index of Thailand (1999-2003) 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (2004) 
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c) Interpretation of the Results 
 Observing Table 4.7 and Figure 4.7, Thailand‘s sustainable development of the 
economic and social dimensions during the period from 1999 to 2003 were relatively 
good, but its sustainable development index of the environmental dimension failed 
because it fell below the 50 % mark.  However, the indices of all three dimensions 
showed improving trends during the period. The results of the Sustainable Development 
Indicators and the composite indices during the period were conclusively interpreted by 
NESDB as follows: 
―The economic development at the macro level has better stability 
but the quality of economic growth and the distribution of wealth 
and development to all sectors remain poor.  The disparity in 
income distribution and social inequality still affects the 
sustainable development of Thailand, though the living quality of 
Thai people is improving, especially the accessibility to 
healthcare, drinking water, information and better environment.  
However, when compared to other countries with the same level 
of economic development, the living quality of Thai people is still 
below par.  People still suffer insecurity in life and property and 
also lack the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes of national development policies.  People still overly 
consume goods and services and lack capacity to adapt to being a 
learning society.   
One positive sign concerning environmental dimension is that the 
destruction of natural resources, the reserve capital of the future 
generations, has been reduced, and they show trend to be 
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recovered, though, over the long future. This demonstrates that 
the management of natural resources and environment of 
Thailand has been more efficient.  However, the government must 
place greater importance on strengthening economic and social 
development at the grassroots level, supporting the system of 
monitoring natural resources by communities, building protection 
systems for all sectors, introducing mechanisms enabling public 
participation of all sectors in pushing for the sustainable 
development, and reforming the attitudes and the consumption 
and production patterns of Thai people.‖ (NESDB, 2004) 
d) Critique 
The research team of this project admitted that the indicators developed in this 
project do not cover all factors of sustainable development.  Therefore, they 
recommended that both the indicators and the calculation of the composite index need 
further improvement in order to better evaluate Thailand‘s sustainable development. 
As mentioned previously, Thailand‘s approach partly deviated from the CSD 
Theme Indicator Framework from 2001, the most up-to-date version at the time when 
Thailand implemented this SDI project.  It did so to suit the circumstances and 
conditions of the country, for many CSD‘s theme indicators are less applicable to 
Thailand.  Though it did not set any indicators under the institutional dimension, two of 
the six CSD‘s indicators under the institutional dimension—Expenditure on R & D as a 
percent of GDP and Economic and Human Loss due to Natural Disasters—were 
included in its SDI‘s.  Some of its invented indicators—Total Factor Productivity and 
Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare—are geared towards measuring the 
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sustainability of its rapid economic growth, while some—Ratio of Import Goods and 
Ratio of Short-term Foreign Debt to Foreign Reserve—are indicators created to 
forewarn the government of the possible recurrence of economic crisis of 1997.  It 
seems that Thailand gives a little more importance to social development and good 
governance as some of its invented indicators outside CSD‘s theme indicators are in the 
social realm.  Certainly Thailand‘s SDI‘s were specially designed to be monitoring 
tools facilitating the Thai government in its decision-making, which is the main aim of 
the CSD Theme Indicator Framework.  
 With regard to the Sustainable Development Composite Index, it was a good 
attempt.  However, since the chosen set of SDI‘s is not yet officially settled, and a set of 
social parameters changes through time, the created Sustainable Development 
Composite Index will certainly change in the future. In addition, without some perusal 
of Thailand‘s SDI‘s development and their methodology, the composite index, itself, 
tells us very little about the status of sustainable development of Thailand.  At best, the 
high score of more than fifty per cent of the Index just points to an average achievement 
of the goals of Thai government development policies. The world has not set and 
endorsed the standard set of SDI‘s and the suitable weight of each indicator in the 
composite index is not thoroughly studied.  As countries choose and create their own 
SDI‘s, the resultant composition indices of a country have not the same meaning; 
therefore, they cannot be meaningfully compared. 
Indeed, the research team of this project admitted that the indicators developed 
in this project do not cover all factors of sustainable development.  Therefore, they 
recommended that both the indicators and the calculation of the composite index need 
further improvement in order to better evaluate Thailand‘s development in a 
sustainability context. 
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4.5.5 Conclusions 
 When applying GS, augmented GS, GNNP, augmented GNNP and the 
sustainable development composite index to Thailand, the different indicators provide 
different answers.  This is because each indicator is derived from different fundamental 
concepts and methods.   GS and augmented GS show that the development of Thailand 
during the period of study, between 1993 and 2004, was sustainable because both sets 
of figures were all positive.  On the other hand, the development of Thailand was 
unsustainable sometime during the period when GNNP, augmented GNNP, or the 
sustainable development composite index were used as indicators.  A conclusion from 
this study is that, in the case of Thailand, the green and augmentation terms have a 
small effect on NNP; therefore, sustainable development of the country depends almost 
entirely on the conventional NNP.  As Thailand faced the economic crisis in 1997, 
which dropped the country‘s NNP by 20 per cent, the sign of unsustainable 
development in Thailand appeared.  But such a negative sign has disappeared since the 
NNP started to increase continuously in 2002, when the economy showed sign of 
recovery.  Similarly, the drop of the value of sustainable development composite index 
in 2000 indicated that the development of Thailand was unsustainable in that year.  
However, the index rose again from 2001 to 2003.  If we take all these five sustainable 
development indicators into consideration it is still unclear whether the development of 
Thailand is sustainable or not. 
 A factor that can explain the conflicting outcomes of these indicators was the 
severity of the Thailand‘s economic and financial crisis of 1997.  Several other Asian 
countries also stumbled from the ripple effect of economic crisis. Though the crisis was 
the result of an indigenous mismanagement, Thailand was resilient enough to recover 
quickly.  Thailand‘s resilience is certainly considered as a good sign of sustainable 
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development.  Every country in the world, developed or not, once in a while 
experiences an economic recession—a decline in a country's gross domestic product or 
negative real economic growth.  We certainly cannot say that there are not countries 
with sustainable development in the world.  Therefore, the declination of GNNP and 
the augmented GNNP in a short period of time might only be treated as warning 
indicators of unsustainable development.  To make GNNP and augmented GNNP more 
useful as indicators of long-term sustainable development, we at least may need to 
incorporate the effect of business cycles into them. 
 With regard to the sustainable development indicators and the composite index, 
developed by the NESDB of Thailand, it can be said that they are useful monitoring 
tools as these specific micro-level indicators can help the government to mend each 
problem directly.  Therefore, we may say that all indicators, especially genuine saving, 
GNNP, and sustainable development composite index, are useful policy tools for 
guiding Thailand to attain long-term sustainable development. 
4.6 A Remark 
Disregarding its sectional numbering, this chapter can be roughly divided into 
two parts.  The first part covers a broad subject of sustainable development in general, 
including its history, its conceptual meanings in the views of economists, the roles of 
mineral resources, and its indicators.  In this part the Hartwick rule, which is a 
necessary condition to maintain non-declining consumption per capita through time, 
and other necessary conditions are presented.  In the second parts, the performance of 
Thailand with regard to such indicators of sustainable development was demonstrated.  
The Hartwick rule and the past performance of Thailand in sustainable development 
will be the bases for some of the recommendations in Chapter 8 to the Thai government 
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on how to deal with the resource rents obtained from the exploitation of its non-
renewable resources. 
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Chapter 5    Gypsum Resource of Thailand 
5.1 Introduction 
For understanding its background, problems, opportunities, and constraints in 
formulating policy, this chapter will firstly provide the general information about 
gypsum, particularly with respect to Thailand.  In the latter part of the chapter, attempt 
is made to develop a model determining gypsum demands in Thailand and some 
countries that imported gypsum from Thailand. Because of the very small and 
incomplete data, the demand equations of the model derived from the Ordinary Least 
Squares technique will be very simple and should be treated as a very rough method of 
approximation of the demands for gypsum that is better than a guesstimate.  
Notwithstanding, it is not really an intended objective of this thesis to do a thorough 
econometric research on the demands for gypsum.  However, future demands for 
gypsum are necessary inputs in determining the empirical solutions of the models on 
optimal extraction paths of gypsum resource in Thailand, the most important aim of this 
thesis, which will be presented in Chapter 6. 
5.1.1 The Nature of Gypsum 
Gypsum is a soft mineral composed of calcium sulfate dihydrate, CaSO4.2H2O. 
Its colour is white to grey. It has a hardness of 2 on the Mohs scale and a specific 
gravity of 2.2 – 2.4. By origin, gypsum can be divided into two groups: natural and 
synthetic gypsum.  Natural gypsum is mainly found in marine evaporite, an inorganic 
chemical sediment that precipitates when the salty water in which it had dissolved 
evaporates. Synthetic gypsum is produced as a by-product of various industrial 
processes.  It can be used as a substitute for natural gypsum, principally for plasterboard 
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manufacturing, Portland cement production, and soil conditioning for agriculture. The 
major source of synthetic gypsum is Flue Gas Desulfurization (FGD) to reduce sulfur 
dioxide emissions from coal-fired electricity power plants.  Smaller amounts of 
synthetic gypsum are derived as a by-product of various acid-neutralization processes.  
5.1.2 Uses of Gypsum  
 Gypsum is utilized in two forms: raw gypsum and calcined gypsum.  The major 
use of raw gypsum is in the production of Portland cement, where it acts as a retarder to 
prolong the setting time of the Portland cement. Raw gypsum is also used in 
manufacturing sulfuric acid, blackboard chalk, and coloured pencil.  Furthermore, it is 
utilized in agriculture as a fertilizer and soil and water conditioner.  The calcined 
gypsum, which is a ground gypsum roasted at 150-165°C to reduce water content from 
2 molecules (CaSO4.2H2O) to ½ molecule (CaSO4.½H2O), is mainly used in 
manufacturing gypsum wallboard and ceramics.  In developed countries, gypsum is 
predominantly used for wallboard, while in developing countries its major use is in the 
production of Portland cement.  In the case of Thailand, gypsum is mainly used in the 
industrial sector comprising the cement industry (65 %), gypsum wallboard industry (26 
%), plaster industry (5 %), and others (4 %) (Department of Primary Industries and 
Mines, 2006). 
5.1.3 Substitutes  
There are not any materials that can directly substitute gypsum in all uses.  In 
such uses as stucco and plaster, Portland cement and lime may be substituted.  Brick, 
glass, metallic or plastic panels, and wood are alternatives to gypsum wallboard.  
However, in the manufacturing of Portland cement, gypsum has no practical substitute.  
Synthetic gypsum is very important as a substitute for mined gypsum in wallboard 
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manufacturing, Portland cement production, and agricultural applications (in 
descending tonnage order). In the U.S.A., in 2007, synthetic gypsum accounted for 22% 
of the total domestic gypsum supply (USGS, 2008). 
5.2 Gypsum Availability in Thailand  
In Thailand, the natural gypsum deposits are found in Suratthani, Nakhon 
Sithammarat, Phichit, Nakhon Sawan, and Loei provinces, with the estimated amounts 
of proven plus probable reserves as in 2006 in each province of 58, 27, 18, 132, and 36 
million metric tons, respectively.  The figures of Suratthani, Nakhon Sithammarat, 
Phichit, and Nakhon Sawan, can be classified as proven reserves for they were gathered 
from data of present-day mining licenses and applications for mining licenses, while 
that of Loei is close to be probable reserves.  The gypsum deposits in Loei can be 
classified as marginally sub-economic deposits since they cannot compete, on price, 
with the deposits in the Phichit and Nakhon Sawan that are closer to industrial users of 
gypsum near Bangkok than them.  In total, the estimated gypsum reserves (proven + 
probable) of Thailand as in 2006 were 271 million metric tons.   
As for synthetic gypsum, it is produced by two entities: the Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), a government enterprise that generates and 
distributes electricity all over the country, at its lignite-combustion power plants in 
Lampang province; and NFC Fertilizer Public Limited Company (NFC), a private 
company producing fertilizer located in Rayong province.  
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5.3 Gypsum Production, Export, and Domestic Consumption of 
Thailand 
5.3.1 Natural Gypsum 
 In Thailand, natural gypsum is produced in 4 provinces, Suratthani, Nakhon 
Sithammarat, Phichit, and Nakhon Sawan and the productions from each province from 
1966 to 2005 are shown in Figure 5.1. The total production increased from 27 thousand 
metric tons in 1966 to 7.113 million metric tons in 2005. During 1966 – 1996, before 
the Asian economic crisis in 1997, production increased to 8.899 million metric tons 
with an average annual growth rate of 26 per cent. During the period from 1997 
onwards, the production decreased to 4.334 million metric tons in 1998 as a result of 
the Asian economic crisis, but the production increased again in 1999 after the economy 
recovered. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Natural Gypsum Production in Thailand by Province, 1966 – 2005 
Source: Department of Primary Industries and Mines (2007) 
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 Thailand‘s export and domestic consumption of natural gypsum increased from 
467 and 26,545 metric tons in 1966 to 4,569,331 and 2,527,871 metric tons in 2005, 
respectively (see Figure 5.2). During 1966 – 1996, before the Asian economic crisis in 
1997, export and domestic consumption increased to 5,977,284 and 2,410,352 metric 
tons, respectively, an average annual growth rate of 20.1 and 16.1 per cent, 
respectively. During the period from 1997 onwards, the export and domestic 
consumption decreased to 3,561,425 and 1,152,802 metric tons in 1998, respectively, as 
a result of the Asian economic crisis, but the export and domestic consumption 
increased again in 1999.  
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Figure 5.2 Natural Gypsum Export and Consumption in Thailand 1966 – 2005 
Source: Department of Primary Industries and Mines (2007) 
5.3.2 Synthetic Gypsum  
a) Synthetic Gypsum Produced by EGAT 
EGAT has produced synthetic gypsum since 1995 since it installed and started 
running the first Flue Gas Desulfurization equipment at its thirteenth electricity power 
plant in Lampang province, which utilizes lignite—the poorest class of coal—as its 
193 
 
fuel.  The high sulfur content in the fuel lignite, which causes a severe air pollution 
problem, makes Flue Gas Desulfurization necessary after EGAT enormously increased 
electricity production capacity at this power plant complex.  At present, EGAT 
produces synthetic gypsum at a rate of around 3 million metric tons per annum, which 
is higher than the country‘s total consumption of gypsum.  However, only a very small 
portion of the production has been dispatched and utilized.  As a result, an estimated 
several hundred million metric tons of synthetic gypsum is stockpiled uselessly at the 
power plant complex.  
 The drawbacks of synthetic gypsum produced by EGAT are the same as that 
produced by others--its inconsistent grade, ranging from 85% to 95% CaSO4.1/2H2O; 
and its very high moisture content, 14 – 20% H2O.  In some uses the consistency of 
grade is more important than degree of purity because consistent gypsum is more 
convenient for blending.  Furthermore, EGAT synthetic gypsum is complicated by high 
traces of salt (0.1% NaCl), which makes it unsuitable for plasterboard production.  At 
present only a Portland cement plant in Lampang province, situated about 60 kilometres 
from the power plant complex, uses EGAT synthetic gypsum, about 30,000 – 50,000 
metric tons annually.  The Portland cement plant controls quality by blending synthetic 
gypsum with mineral gypsum, which is hauled a greater distance than EGAT synthetic 
gypsum.  For more distant Portland cement plants, the cheap price of EGAT synthetic 
gypsum cannot yet compensate for the hauling cost and the burdensome blending to 
adjust the quality.  To sum up, the distance from users is the paramount drawback of the 
EGAT synthetic gypsum. 
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b) Synthetic Gypsum Produced by NFC 
 Since 1997, the NFC Fertilizer Public Limited Company (NFC) has been the 
second source of synthetic gypsum in Thailand.  It produces about 800,000 – 1,000,000 
metric tons of synthetic gypsum annually as a by-product in producing phosphoric acid.  
The NFC controls its synthetic gypsum quality and sells it as soil conditioner for 
agriculture under the company brand name, Soil-Man®.  NFC also sells it as a raw 
material for construction to other users. 
5.4 World Production and Trade 
 The top five world rankings of gypsum producers are the United States, Iran, 
Canada, Spain, and China, respectively. Almost half (48 %) of the total world 
production in 2006 came from these five countries: United States (17.3 %), Iran (10.2 
%), Canada (7.5 %), Spain (6.5 %), and China (6.1 %).  Thailand ranked seventh with 
its share of total world production of about 5.9 %.  Figure 5.3 represents the gypsum 
productions of the top five producing countries from 1990 – 2007. The top five world 
rankings of gypsum importers are the United States, Japan, Malaysia, Belgium, and 
Indonesia, respectively (see Figure 5.4). As for gypsum exporters, the top five world 
rankings are Canada, Thailand, Spain, Mexico, and Australia (see Figure 5.5).  Canada, 
Mexico and Spain are the main sources of the United States‘ imported gypsum, while 
Thailand is the major gypsum supplier of Malaysia and Indonesia.  Australia has Japan 
as its main client.  
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Figure 5.3 Top Five World Gypsum Productions by Country, 1990 - 2007  
Source: USGS (2008) 
 
Figure 5.4 Top Five World Gypsum Imports by Country, 1999 – 2006 
Source: Global Trade Information Services (2007) 
 
Figure 5.5 Top Five World Gypsum Exports by Country, 1999 – 2006 
Source: Global Trade Information Services (2007) 
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5.5 Prices of Natural Gypsum in Some Important Markets 
 Because gypsum‘s deposits are normally large, close to the surface, and easily 
mined, gypsum production cost, in general, is low.  As a result, gypsum is a low price 
commodity and transportation costs are an important share in the price paid by users.  
Freight and logistics costs can be 50% to 70% of delivered cost of mineral to customer 
(Barker, 2007).  In other words, some faraway customers have to pay for gypsum up to 
100/(100 – 70) = 3.333 times the price at a gypsum mine.   For a user, distance will 
dictate which mine is the source of its gypsum supply.  Though gypsum reserves are 
ample, deposits are not distributed evenly around the world.  Therefore, international 
trade of gypsum is regional in nature.  The gypsum prices paid by users in all regions 
are not the same all over the world and mostly not interrelated because of the huge 
transportation cost relative to price.   
With regard to the grades of gypsum, it should be noted that gypsum is a 
commodity that is utilized because of its physical property.  Except in some special 
uses, chemical grade plays no role in price determination.  In most applications, users 
value uniformity of the mineral as the most important property.  Users mostly dislike 
bulks of mineral with small amounts of foreign contaminants, such as pieces of shoes, 
sandals, wood, equipment spare parts, etc because these materials interrupt their 
production processes.  In this study, import and Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF)
13
 
prices in the U.S.A. and Japan, the two biggest gypsum consuming countries, and Free 
On Board (FOB)
14
 prices in Thailand and Australia, which are relevant to this study, 
together with that of the U.S.A. are demonstrated. 
                                                 
13
 Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) price is the selling price of the goods at a port of the buyer‘s country 
(arrival port). It includes the cost of the goods, the freight or transportation costs and the cost of marine 
insurance.  In other words, it is the Free On Board (FOB) price at a departure port plus the freight and 
insurance costs from the departure port to the arrival port. 
14
 Free On Board (FOB) price is the selling price of the goods put on a ship at a port of the seller‘s 
country (departure port).  
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5.5.1 Import and Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) Prices  
a) United States Market 
The United States has imported gypsum from three main gypsum producing 
countries: Canada, Mexico, and Spain. From 1993 to 2004, the average imports of 
gypsum into the U.S.A. from Canada, Mexico, and Spain were 5.813, 1.956, and 0.631 
million metric tons, respectively.  During this period, the average Cost, Insurance and 
Freight (CIF) prices of gypsum in constant dollars (year 2005=100) at U.S.A. ports 
from Canada, Mexico, and Spain were 10.48, 8.43, and 10.47 US$/metric ton, 
respectively. Imports of gypsum into the U.S.A. and the corresponding Cost, Insurance 
and Freight (CIF) prices from some countries from 1993 to 2004 are shown in Figure 
5.6 and Figure 5.7.   
 It should be noted that Figure 5.7 confirms the apparent independence of 
gypsum prices in different regions of the U.S.A. that are far apart.  However, when 
taking the huge freight and logistics costs into account, this behavior of gypsum prices 
may not contradict the law of one price.  Most imports from Canada went to east coast 
plants, and Mexican sources chiefly served the west coast (USGS, 2006).  The prices of 
gypsum at ports on the west coast of the U.S.A., which is imported from Baja 
California Sur and from Colima, Mexico, were mostly cheaper and fluctuated less than 
those at ports on the east coast, which are imported from Nova Scotia, Canada, and 
Spain.  The prices of the imports from Canada and Spain serving the same region were 
nearly identical and moved mostly in the same direction.  The higher cost of production 
at Nova Scotia, Canada, because gypsum ore there has to be processed through a heavy 
media plant, may be the cause of the higher prices on the east coast.  This might also be 
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the reason why gypsum from far away Spain was more or less competitive and could 
seep into the U.S.A. in small amounts as shown in Figure 5.6. 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Year
Thousand tons
CANADA
MEXICO
SPAIN
 
Figure 5.6 Imports of Gypsum into the U.S.A. by Country, from 1993 to 2004 
Source: USGS (2006) 
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Figure 5.7 The CIF Prices of Gypsum in Constant Dollars (year 2005=100) at U.S.A. 
Ports by Country, from 1993 to 2004 
Source: USGS (2006) 
b) Japanese Market 
Japan has imported gypsum mainly from Thailand and Australia. Figure 5.8 and 
Figure 5.9 show the imports of gypsum into Japan and the corresponding Cost, 
Insurance and Freight (CIF) prices from Thailand and Australia, from 1988 to 2005. In 
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Figure 5.8, the gypsum import statistics into Japan demonstrated two sharp contrast 
periods: the first period from 1988 to 1997 and the second period from 1998 to 2005.  
During the first period, when the Thai gypsum was noticeably cheaper than that of 
Australian as shown in Figure 5.9, imports from Thailand were high while those from 
Australia were very low.  The reason that the imports from Australia, with a price 
disadvantage, did not cease may be due to the commercial strategy of gypsum users in 
Japan to keep an alternative source of the vital raw material open.  However, during the 
second period, when prices from the two exporting countries were roughly on par, the 
imports from Thailand decreased sharply while that from Australia increased 
considerably.  The cause of this phenomenon was that, Yoshino Gypsum Co., Ltd., the 
largest plasterboard producer in Japan with the market share of 78% of the total 
plasterboard sales in Japan, concluded an agreement with Dampier Salt, Western 
Australia, Australia‘s largest natural crude gypsum producer, in 1995.  After Dampier 
Salt started production and supplied gypsum to Yoshino Gypsum Co., Ltd., the 
company stopped imports from Thailand.  As a result, the imports of gypsum from 
Thailand into Japan dropped from an average annual tonnage of 3,093,428 metric tons 
during the first period to only 994,639 metric tons during the second period.  In 
contrast, the imports of gypsum from Australia into Japan increased substantially from 
an average annual tonnage of 54,933 metric tons during the first period to 928,771 
metric tons during the second period.  After Yoshino Gypsum Co., Ltd., shifted its 
gypsum supply source from Thailand to Australia, the advantage of Cost, Insurance and 
Freight (CIF) prices of gypsum from Thailand disappeared.  The roughly on par 
Australian and Thai Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) prices of gypsum in Japan during 
the second period might be the result of the agreement between the two trading 
partners.  
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Figure 5.8  The Imports of Gypsum into Japan from Thailand and Australia, from 1988 
to 2005 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan (2006) 
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Figure 5.9 The CIF Prices of Gypsum in Constant Dollars (year 2005=100) at Japanese 
Ports from Thailand and Australia, from 1988 to 2005 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan (2006) 
5.5.2 Free On Board (FOB) Prices 
 Due to its vast area and the proximity of gypsum users in its neighbour, the 
U.S.A. also exports some of its gypsum.  That is the reason why the U.S.A. has Free On 
Board (FOB) prices of gypsum, (FOB price is the price of export at the port of seller‘s 
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country or departure port).  The FOB prices of gypsum in three gypsum-producing 
countries: Thailand, Australia and U.S.A., from 1988 to 2004 are shown in Figure 5.10.  
During the period, the average annual FOB prices in constant dollars (year 2005=100) 
in the U.S.A., Australia, and Thailand are 8.9, 14.3, and 15.5 US$/metric ton, 
respectively. We can see that FOB prices in Thailand and Australia were closely 
correlated, and the average FOB price per metric ton in Thailand was 1.2 US$ higher 
than that in Australia.  The FOB price in the U.S.A. was significantly lower and less 
volatile than those in Thailand and Australia.  The different trends and movements of 
the FOB prices in the two regions, Thailand and Australia versus U.S.A., confirm that 
international trade of gypsum is regional in nature.   
  The costs of freight and insurance for transporting crude gypsum from Thailand 
to Japan and from Australia to Japan during that period are shown in Figure 5.11.  The 
costs are really the differences between the import (CIF) prices into Japan and the FOB 
prices in the two countries.  The average freight and insurance costs
17
 in constant 
dollars (year 2005=100) for transporting gypsum to Japan from Australia and Thailand 
during the period from 1988 to 2004 were 18.7 and 15.0 US$/metric ton, respectively. 
The 3.7 US$/metric ton advantage of the average freight and insurance cost to Japan 
from Thailand over that from Australia was due to shorter hauling distance.  The 
location of Thailand, which is close to the busy shipping lane from the West to the Far 
East, may also contribute to the lower freight cost from Thailand.  We can see that the 
average freight and insurance costs to Japan from Thailand and Australia were even a 
little bit higher than the average FOB prices in Thailand and Australia.  This means that 
distance plays an important role in determining the CIF prices of gypsum to the 
consumers in the Far East, and Thailand has this distance advantage over Australia.    
                                                 
17
 Freight and insurance costs are difference between Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) and Free On 
Board (FOB) prices. 
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Figure 5.10 The FOB Prices of Gypsum in Constant Dollars (year 2005=100) in 
Thailand, Australia and U.S.A., from 1988 to 2004 
Sources: ABARE (2006); USGS (2006); and Department of Primary Industries and Mines (2007) 
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Figure 5.11 The Costs of Freight and Insurance in Constant Dollars (year 2005=100) for 
Transporting Crude Gypsum to Japan from Thailand and Australia, from 
1988 to 2004 
Sources: ABARE (2006); Ministry of Finance, Japan (2006); and Department of Primary Industries and  
Mines (2007) 
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5.6 A Gypsum Demand Model for Thailand and Its Client Countries 
The main purpose of the thesis is to use economic theories to set long-term 
strategies and plans for the government of Thailand to manage its gypsum mineral 
resources.  An economic model determining the optimal depletion path of Thailand‘s 
gypsum resources will be developed in the next chapter.  In such a model, the demand 
for Thailand‘s gypsum resources needs to be known in defining the optimal path of 
extraction or depletion of the gypsum resources.  Therefore, a gypsum demand estimate 
for Thailand and the countries buying Thai gypsum will be defined below. However, as 
stated in section 5.1 ‘Introduction’ that becauseof the very small and incomplete data, 
the demand equations to be determined will be very simple and should be treated as a 
very rough method of approximation of the demands for gypsum that is better than a 
guesstimate.  The approximate gypsum demand forecast obtained from this chapter 
will be used for determining the optimal extraction paths of gypsum in Chapter 6 
later. 
5.6.1 A Review of Empirical Studies on Demands for Minerals and Metals 
Journals were searched back to year 1990 to find empirical studies on demands 
for minerals and metals.  Only eleven papers were discovered attempting to determine 
the consumption or demand functions of some metals, while similar studies on 
industrial minerals or ball park estimates of parameters concerning future 
consumption or demand of gypsum have not been found.  Methodologies used in these 
eleven papers can be divided into two categories: 1) An econometric model called 
‗Intensity of Use (IU) Model or Technique‘ and 2) Models with double-log demand 
functions.   
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 a) Intensity of Use (IU) Model 
There were six papers of five main authors employing IU models: Roberts 
(1990) on steel consumption in U.S.A.; Valdes (1990) on steel consumption in 
Australia; Roberts (1996) on world consumption of aluminium, copper, lead, and zinc; 
Crompton (2000) on steel consumption in Japan; Guzman et al. (2005) on copper 
consumption in Japan; and Rebiasz (2006) on steel consumption in Poland.  The model 
was developed from the intensity of use hypothesis firstly suggested by W. Malenbaum 
(Valdes, 1990).  The most critical point of this model is that it outright discarded price 
factors while GDP was weighted heavily in forecasting future consumption of a metal.  
Note that all five main authors of the papers in this category have sufficient knowledge 
of economics since they either were teaching at relevant departments in universities or 
were mineral economists by profession. 
 In the IU model, the metal requirements of the final products purchased by 
consumers need to be determined.  The metal consumption is disaggregated by end-use 
industries.  Assumed there are n metal consuming industries, a basic model can be 
formulated as follows. 
 



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it
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it
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       (5.1) 
or  tit
n
i
itt GDPPCIMCPM 
1
 
or ttt GDPIUM   
where Mit = metal quantity consumed by industry i at time t; 
 Mt = metal consumed across all n metal consuming industries at time t; 
 Pit = total value of production in industry i at time t; 
 GDPt = Gross Domestic Product at time t; 
MCPit = Mit/Pit =  material composition of product for industry i at time t,  
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PCIit = Pit/GDPt = product composition of income for industry i at time t, and 
IUt = Mt/GDPt =  an average intensity of metal use across n metal consuming 
industries at time t. 
 
 b) Models with Double-Log Demand Functions 
Five papers included prices into their constructed double-log demand functions 
together with some additional parameters.  The authors invented a model that utilized 
the Divisia index approach with only two variables, own prices and quantities in his 
study on world demands on aluminium, copper, lead, nickel, tin, zinc, and steel (Tcha 
and Takashina, 2002).  Others—Suslick and Harris (1990) on Brazil‘s demand for 
aluminium; Vial (1992) on U.S.A.‘s demand for copper; Batchelor and Gulley (1995) 
on the demand for steel in high-income countries; and Pei and Tilton (1999) on the 
demands for aluminium, copper, lead, nickel, and tin in the both groups of high-income 
and low-income countries—put some other parameters into their unique double-log 
demand functions. Table 5.1 summarizes the parameters or variables employed by 
various authors. 
Table 5.1 The Relevant Variables in the Metal Demand Functions Constructed by 
Various Authors  
Author GDP 
Own 
price 
Substitute 
price 
Previous 
year 
consumption 
Energy 
price 
Time as a 
proxy for 
technical 
change 
Industrial 
production 
using the 
metal 
Suslick and 
Harris (1990)        
Vial (1992)        
Batchelor and 
Gulley (1995) 
       
Pei and Tilton 
(1999)        
Tcha and 
Takashina 
(2002) 
       
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  i) Divisia Index Approach 
Tcha and Takashina (2002) used Divisia index approach to analyze demand 
patterns of major metals.  The Divisia index approach was an attempt to address the 
problem arisen from the move of a demand curve through time as a result of change in 
consumers‘ incomes.  A demand function under the Divisia index approach is as 
follows.   
Let pit be the price of metal i (i = 1, …, n) in year t, and qit be the quantity 
consumed per capita of metal i in year t.  

n
i
ititqp
1
is the total expenditure or income and 


n
i
ititititit qpqpw
1
/ is the budget share of metal i in year t.  Then the arithmetic average 
of the budget share of metal i over the years t-1 and t is )(
2
1
1,  tiitit www .  
 The log-change in the price of metal i from years t-1 to t is Dpit = ln pit – ln pi,t-1  
and the log-change in the quantity of metal i from years t-1 to t is Dqit = ln qit – ln qi,t-1 .  
The Divisia price index is a budget-share-weighted average of the n price log-
changes, DPt = 

n
i
itit Dpw
1
, and the Divisia volume index is DQt = 

n
i
itit Dqw
1
.  A double-
log demand equation for metal i is as follows: 
it
k
j
ijijititiiit dDpDQDq  
1
*      (5.2) 
where i = a constant term representing an autonomous trend of metal i, 
 i = the income elasticity of demand for metal i, 
i = the own-price elasticity of demand for metal i, 
dij = the dummy variable of metal i in year j, 
ij = the coefficient of the dummy variable of metal i in year j, 
it = a disturbance term of metal i in year t, and 
 
207 
 
 titit DPDpDp
*  the log-changes in the relative price of metal i defined as the 
nominal change deflated by the Divisia index. 
The empirical results of this paper were summarized by the authors as follows: 
―The consumption pattern of seven major metals--steel, aluminum, copper, 
lead, nickel, tin and zinc--has frequently violated the law of demand in the late 
20th century.  …..  Divisia price–quantity covariance indexes report that the 
price and quantity consumed moved frequently in the same direction, and the 
elasticity approach shows that the own-price elasticities are extremely small and 
insignificant, while income elasticities are significant.‖   
Disregarding their poor levels of statistical significance, the results of this study 
show the own-price elasticities of the world demand for those metals were between -
0.004 for aluminum to -0.064 for tin.  By comparison, the paper found that the income 
elasticities of the world demand for those metals were about +1, ranging from +0.674 
for lead to +1.286 for nickel, with all passing the 1 % level of statistical significance.  
The results were even worse when the world was partitioned into regions, for many 
figures of own-price elasticities of demand for some metals in some regions had 
positive values that contradict economic theory of normal demand.  The complete price 
elasticities of demand for aluminium, copper, lead, nickel, tin, zinc, and iron obtained 
from this study are shown in Table 5.2.   
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Table 5.2 Income and Price Elasticities of Demands for Metals 
Metal Income elasticity Price elasticity 
With a 
constant term 
in the function  
Without a 
constant term 
in the function 
With a 
constant term 
in the function 
Without a 
constant term in 
the function 
Aluminium 0.848 0.971 0.004 -0.009 
Copper 0.846 0.867 -0.025 -0.025 
Lead 0.674 0.615 -0.006 0.001 
Nickel 1.286 1.321 -0.047 -0.049 
Tin 0.911 0.833 -0.064 -0.053 
Zinc 0.945 0.952 -0.020 -0.020 
Steel 1.030 1.024 -0.012 -0.013 
Source: Tcha and Takashina (2002) 
 
  ii) Other Double-Log Demand Models 
Suslick and Harris (1990) ran a regression on aluminium demand in Brazil from 
1950 to 1987, in the double-log form, as follows: 
0.33590.08241.3587610x4.5277 tttt PwYD 
       (5.3) 
where  Dt  = aluminium demand, 
 Yt  = gross domestic product (billion 1980 US$), 
 t  = time as a proxy for technical change, and 
 Pwt = constructed price obtained through the following equation: 
)0.1442.(0.1365.ln.ln)2.1057.(2.0472.ln7.6227ln 2121 tttttttt xxPcuPalxxPalPw 
where Palt = aluminium price at London Metal Exchange,; 
 Pcut = copper price at London Metal Exchange, as a substitute price; and 
 x1t and x2t are dummy variables defined in the following way: 
 1,1 tx  19791950  t and 0,1 tx 19871979  t  
 0,2 tx 19791950  t and
 
1,2 tx 19871979  t  
The authors used constructed prices because price regulation was imposed from 
year 1979 onwards.  A result shows that the constructed price elasticity of demand was 
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-0.0824, while the income elasticity of demand was 1.3587, and the elasticity of 
demand with regard to technical change is 0.3359.  
Vial (1992) ran a regression on copper demand in the U.S.A. from 1967 to 1989 
as follows: 
t
T
i
iti
S
i
iti
N
i
ititt UPEPSUSPCUQtCU   






0
5
0
4
0
3210 lnlnlnln)(ln        (5.4) 
where CUt = the demand for refined copper in year t, 
 Qt = an appropriate index of industrial production in year t, 
 PCUt = the price of copper in year t, 
PSUSt = the price of materials that compete with copper in the uses of this 
particular industry in year t, 
 PEt = the price of energy in year t, and 
 Ut = an error term in year t. 
The author divided industrial sectors into five main end-uses of refined copper: 
electrical products, transportation equipment, industrial equipment, construction, and 
general products.  The elasticities of demands with regard to various variables of all 
five sectors and the aggregate are shown in Table 5.3.  The results show that the 
elasticities of demand with respect to industrial production were in the range of 0.646 to 
2.072.  Except for the transportation equipment sector, the own price elasticities of 
demand were inelastic while cross-price and energy price elasticities of demand were 
in the range of 0.088 to 1.232 and -0.111 to -1.238, respectively.    
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Table 5.3 Elasticities of Demand for Copper in the U.S.A. with Respect to Various 
Variables 
Sector Elasticity with respect to 
industrial production 
using copper  
Price elasticities 
Own Substitute Energy 
Electrical products 1.464 -0.103 0.787 -0.323 
Transportation equipment 1.212 -1.050 0.647 -1.202 
Industrial equipment 1.384 -0.607 1.232 -1.238 
Construction 1.092 -0.843 1.102 -0.389 
General products 0.646 -0.416 0.521 -0.572 
Aggregate  2.072 -0.188 0.088 -0.111 
Source: Vial (1992) 
Batchelor and Gulley (1995) ran regressions on gold jewellery demand in high-
income countries from 1978 to 1993 as follows: 
itititiitiiit uPGYD  )/ln()ln()ln( 210       (5.5) 
ititiititiitiiit DPGYD 413210 )ln()/ln()ln()ln(   
    
                        
itititiititi uGGGG   )/ln()/ln( 1615                      (5.6) 
where  Dit = the quantity of gold jewellery demand, 
           Yit = the total income or expenditure of consumers, 
           Git = the price of gold jewellery, 
           Pit = an index of the general price level,  
           4it = time trend, 
 Git+1/Git = future change of gold price, 
 Git/Git-1 = past change of gold price, and 
           uit = an error term, with the subscripts indicating that variables refer to country i 
and year t. 
Equation 5.5 was estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) but the problem 
that cov (uit, ujt)  0, for (i,t)  (j,t), occurred.  The authors used Zellner‘s Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression, SURE (Zellner, 1962), technique to eliminate the problem.  
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SURE were used to solve the equations 5.5 and 5.6.  The addition of several  
variables—lagged dependent variable (previous year consumption), taste trend, future 
and past changes of gold price—improved the fit of the estimated equations.  The price 
elasticities of demands with respect to various variables obtained from equation 5.6 are 
shown in Table 5.4. Table 5.4 shows that the income elasticities of demand were highly 
elastic for all countries while the price elasticities of demand were inelastic.  This 
paper considers both cross-section and time-series data and the resulted price 
elasticities of demand for the metals correspond to those from other papers.    
Table 5.4 Elasticities of Demands for Gold Jewellery with Respect to Various Variables 
Variable USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
Consumer income or 
expenditure 
3.24 6.74 1.15 2.24 3.89 4.32 
Price of gold -0.58 -0.71 -0.64 -0.20 -0.88 -0.89 
Previous year consumption    0.28   
Time trend -0.06 -0.19 -0.03  -0.09 -0.12 
Future change of gold price 0.07   0.48   
Past change of gold price  -0.12 0.27    
Source: Batchelor and Gulley (1995) 
Pei and Tilton (1999) ran regressions on metal demands by using a partial 
adjustment model.  The partial adjustment model assumes that long-run price and 
income elasticities of demand are larger than those for short-run.  It attempts to 
distinguish between the actual demand over a given time period t (Qt) and the long-run 
equilibrium, toward which demand is moving during the same period )( *tQ .   
The long-run equilibrium demand is as follows: 
ttttt YSPPQ   lnlnlnln 3210
*      (5.7) 
where *tQ = long-run equilibrium demand in period t, 
 Pt = the commodity‘s own price in period t, 
 SPt = the price of a substitute in period t, 
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 Yt = income in period t, and 
 t = an error term in period t.  
  The partial adjustment model assumes that the change in actual demand between 
any two periods, t-1 and t, is only some fraction () of the difference between the 
logarithm of actual demand in period t-1 and the logarithm of the long-run equilibrium 
demand in period t. That is, 
)ln(lnlnln 1
*
1   tttt QQQQ    where 0 <  < 1   (5.8) 
Substituting equation 5.7 into equation 5.8 gives, 
tttttt QYSPPQ   143210 lnlnlnlnln    (5.9) 
The time variable is included into equation 5.9, to capture the combined effect on metal 
demand of technological change and consumer preferences, as follows.  
tttttt TQYSPPQ    5143210 lnlnlnlnln              (5.10) 
where tQ = actual demand in period t, 
 Pt = the commodity‘s own price in period t, 
 SPt = the price of a substitute in period t, 
 Yt = income in period t, 
 T = time variable, and 
 t = an error term in period t.  
Both equations 5.9 and 5.10 were run by the method of Ordinary Least Squares 
and when serial correlation occurred the method of Generalized Least Squares was 
used.  The resulted income, own price, and cross-price elasticities of demands for 
aluminium, copper, lead, nickel, tin, and zinc for high and low-income countries 
obtained from equations 5.9 and 5.10 are shown in Table 5.5.  For high-income 
countries, the average income elasticities of demand were underestimated when the 
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time trend was omitted. On the other hand, for low-income countries, except for tin, the 
average income elasticities of demand were overestimated when the time trend was 
omitted.  We can see that, from Table 5.5, the income elasticities of demands were 
substantial but some were inelastic, while the own price and cross-price elasticities of 
demands for some metals were very small (highly inelastic) and others were 
abnormally positive.  The resulted price elasticities of demand for metals in this paper 
correspond to those from other papers.    
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Table 5.5 Average Short-Run Income, Own Price, and Cross-Price Elasticities of Demands for Metals 
Metal Income Elasticity of Demand Own Price Elasticity of Demand Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand 
High-income 
countries 
Low-income 
countries 
High-income 
countries 
Low-income 
countries 
High-income 
countries 
Low-income 
countries 
Without 
time 
variable 
With 
time 
variable 
Without 
time 
variable 
With 
time 
variable 
Without 
time 
variable 
With 
time 
variable 
Without 
time 
variable 
With 
time 
variable 
Without 
time 
variable 
With 
time 
variable 
Without 
time 
variable 
With 
time 
variable 
Aluminum 
Copper 
Lead 
Nickel 
Tin 
Zinc 
1.026 
0.232 
0.134 
0.662 
-0.204 
0.386 
2.210 
1.450 
0.680 
1.923 
1.086 
1.922 
3.264 
2.009 
1.578 
1.156 
-0.635 
1.772 
0.878 
-0.008 
0.465 
-0.587 
0.548 
-0.995 
0.00 
0.11 
0.08 
-0.06 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.02 
0.02 
0.06 
-0.03 
-0.03 
0.01 
0.019 
-0.025 
-0.056 
-0.313 
-0.283 
0.158 
0.317 
0.188 
-0.023 
-0.313 
-0.151 
0.318 
0.10 
-0.09 
0.00 
0.14 
0.04 
0.02 
0.05 
-0.09 
0.00 
0.07 
-0.04 
-0.01 
0.401 
-0.011 
0.000 
0.718 
0.137 
-0.025 
0.373 
0.142 
0.000 
0.718 
0.282 
0.256 
Source: Pei and Tilton (1999) 
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5.6.2 An Assumption and a General Model 
 A general demand model for Thailand and its client countries will be based on 
the representative agent assumption, which treats the behaviour of a typical individual 
as that of the aggregate.  For the representative individual, a demand function for a 
good can be written as: 
  qt = F(It, Pt, Ost)       (5.11) 
where  qt denotes the quantity of the good consumed at time t, 
 Pt denotes the price of the good at time t, 
It denotes the income of the individual at time t, and 
Ost denotes the other factors. 
If the good is mineral gypsum, therefore, under the representative agent 
assumption we have: 
qt = 
t
t
POP
Q
, and 
It = yt 
where  Qt is the aggregate quantity of mineral gypsum consumed in the nation at time t, 
 POPt is the population of the nation at time t, and 
 yt is the Gross Domestic Product (or Income) per capita of the nation at time t. 
Hence the demand function (equation 5.11) for gypsum in a nation is as follows: 
 qt = 
t
t
POP
Q
= F(yt, Pt, Ost)      (5.12) 
Pt in this gypsum demand model should be the gypsum price in an individual 
nation.  In other countries, besides Thailand, such prices should directly correlate to the 
gypsum price in Thailand and Australia, the sources of imported gypsum.  Therefore, 
TH
tP , the gypsum price in Thailand at time t and 
A
tP , the gypsum price in Australia at 
time t, may replace Pt in the model.  Note that 
TH
tP  and 
A
tP  are the prices of the same 
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commodity demanded in total by the representative individual; therefore, neither one is 
the price of a substitute.  
With regard to the other factors, Ost, there are the following four possible 
relevant factors that need to be considered:  
1) S
tP  = the price of synthetic gypsum, a substitute for mineral gypsum, at 
time t; 
2) t = time, representing the changes in technology and consumer taste; 
3) 
tx  = the construction expenditure of the representative individual at time 
t, which is represented by the country‘s GDP of the construction industry 
per capita; and 
4) 
tm = the cement consumption of the representative individual at time t, 
which is represented by the country‘s cement production per capita =  
t
t
POP
CM  , where CMt is the total national cement production at time t. 
Therefore, equation 5.12 can be rewritten as follows: 
qt = 
t
t
POP
Q
= F(yt, t, 
TH
tP , 
A
tP , 
S
tP , tx , tm )    (5.13) 
Equation 5.13 states that gypsum consumption per capita is a function of GDP 
per capita, time, gypsum price at Thai ports, gypsum price at Australian ports, the price 
of domestic synthetic gypsum, construction expenditure per capita, and cement 
production per capita.  However, in running the model, the variable S
tP , the price of 
synthetic gypsum at time t, has to be excluded because of the lack of data.  Its 
elimination is not really critical since synthetic gypsum has a rather high purifying cost 
that makes it less competitive with mineral gypsum.  Furthermore, synthetic gypsum is 
not technologically a complete substitute for the mineral gypsum in the wallboard 
production.   
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Finally, there are seven relevant variables to be considered in the following 
three possible demand equations:  
qt = tt
A
t
TH
tt mxPPty 6543210             (5.14) 
qt = ttA
t
TH
t
t mx
P
P
ty 657210              (5.15) 
tt
A
t
TH
ttt mxPPtyq lnlnlnlnlnln 6543210       (5.16) 
If mineral gypsum is a normal good, 1 and γ1 are expected to be positive since 
gypsum demand should increase when the income of the representative agent increases.  
The expected signs of 2 and γ2 can be either positive or negative since gypsum demand 
may react to technological improvement and change in taste either way. Based on the 
law of demand, when Pt or its representatives, 
TH
tP  and 
A
tP , increase qt should decrease, 
and vice versa.  Therefore, the expected signs of 3, 4, γ3, and γ4 should be negative.  
With regard to 5, 6, γ5, and γ6, they are expected to be positive because when 
construction expenditure and/or cement consumption of the representative individual 
increases, the gypsum consumption would increase too.  Of the relative price factor, 7, 
the expected sign, in the equation 5.15, is ambiguous.  
5.6.3 Testing the Model  
Equations 5.14, 5.15, and 5.16 are estimated by putting in the 1990 - 2006 data 
from Thailand and the other seven countries mainly importing gypsum from Thailand: 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.  The GDP 
and GDPPC figures are provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  The data 
of domestic consumption of gypsum of Thailand are from the Department of Primary 
Industries and Mines.  For other countries the consumption figures are calculated from 
the following equation, consumption = domestic production + import – export.  
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The source of gypsum domestic production data is the US Geological Survey (USGS), 
while the gypsum imports and exports are provided by Global Trade Information 
Services. 
  After running Ordinary Least Squares regression of the equations 5.14, 5.15, 
and 5.16 of all seven countries, there is no equation of any countries that all of its 
coefficients have the right signs and the t-statistics significance at the 95 per cent level 
of confidence.  Therefore, some variables will be eliminated. At this stage there is no 
obvious reason for choosing between the linear function and logarithmic forms. But the 
aim of this chapter is to have reasonable demand functions for solving mathematically 
complex models in the next chapter that requires integral calculus. Therefore, the linear 
function form of equations 5.14 or 5.15 is adopted because of its easiness to be 
performed by integral calculus.  The results of the nonlinear equation 5.16 are to be 
discussed just a little bit here, with respect to the elasticities of demand, qt, but the 
equation will not be further processed and adopted. 
a) An Analysis of the Logarithmic Demand Function 
The t-statistics and the values of all coefficients of equation 5.16 of the seven 
countries importing gypsum from Thailand are shown in Tables C.40 and C.41.  We 
can see that the coefficients of A
tP and xt of all countries, which are the elasticities of qt 
with respect to A
tP and xt, are not statistically different from zero.   This means that, 
while holding other variables constant, changes in gypsum price in Australia and 
construction expenditure of people did not affect individual gypsum consumption in all 
countries statistically.  The reasons behind these results were that these countries 
imported just small amounts of gypsum from Australia, and the country‘s GDP of 
construction industry per capita might include a huge government expenditure per 
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capita on highway and other infrastructure construction that did not use Portland cement 
much.   
The coefficients of equation 5.16 whose t-statistics are significant at the 95 per 
cent level of confidence can be divided into two groups, having right and wrong signs 
as shown in Table 5.6.  They can be interpreted as follows: 
Table 5.6 Significant Coefficients of Variables in the Equation 5.16  
Having the right sign Having the wrong sign 
Coefficient  Country Value Coefficient Country Value 
γ1 Malaysia 
Vietnam 
0.786 
1.058 
γ1 Japan -0.789 
γ2* Indonesia 
Korea 
Philippines 
0.052 
0.176 
0.062 
γ3 Japan 0.336 
γ6 Japan 
Taiwan 
1.117 
1.321 
   
Note: * The sign of γ2 can either be positive or negative for gypsum consumption may react to 
technological improvement and change in taste either way.  
(i) For the values of γ1 of the variable yt, which are the income elasticities of 
demand: 
- If the income per capita of Malaysia and Vietnam increased by 1 per 
cent, the individual gypsum consumption in those countries would increase by 0.786 
and 1.058 per cent, respectively.  
- Any changes in income per capita of Indonesian, Korean, Filipino, and 
Taiwanese people did not affect their individual gypsum consumption, statistically.  
- If the income per capita of Japan increased by 1 per cent, the individual 
gypsum consumption there would decrease by 0.789 per cent.  This means that for 
Japanese people, gypsum was an inferior good as the consumption declined when 
income increased, or 0/  tt yq .  But, in all other countries, gypsum was considered 
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to be a normal good as the consumption in those countries increased or was maintained 
when income increased, or 0/  tt yq  (Nicholson, 2005). 
(ii) For the values of γ2 of the variable t: 
- If time increased by one year while other variables were kept constant, 
the individual gypsum consumption in Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines would 
increase by 5.2, 17.6, and 6.2 per cent, respectively.  
- The changes in the individual gypsum consumption in Japan, Malaysia, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam were statistically insignificant over time if other variables were 
fixed.  
(iii) For the values of γ3 of the variable 
TH
tP , which are the price elasticities of 
demand: 
 - The change in gypsum price in Thailand did not statistically affect 
individual gypsum consumption in all countries except Japan.  In other words, the 
elasticities of qt with respect to 
TH
tP were not statistically different from zero. 
- If the price of gypsum in Thailand increased by 1 per cent, while 
holding other variables constant, the individual gypsum consumption in Japan would 
increase by 0.336 per cent.  This means that the gypsum demand curve of Japan was 
upward sloping.  This abnormality would possibly be true for gypsum which was 
probably an inferior good for Japanese as mentioned in (i) above.  The demand curve 
for an inferior good will have an upward slope if the income effect on the demand 
outweighed the substitution effect (Binger and Hoffman, 1998).   
(iv) For the values of γ6 of the variable mt, which are the elasticities of demand 
with respect to cement production per capita: 
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 - Any changes in cement production per capita in Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam did not seem to affect the individual gypsum 
consumption in those countries, statistically. 
- If cement production per capita in Japan and Taiwan increased by 1 per 
cent, the individual gypsum consumption in those countries would increase by 1.117 
and 1.321 per cent, respectively.  
b) Determining the Best Suitable Linear Form of the Demand Function 
The best suitable form of the demand function should be the one that all of its 
coefficients have the right signs and the t-statistics significance at the 95 per cent level 
of confidence.  To find it, the variables with wrong signs or insignificance in equations 
5.14 and 5.15 are alternatively dropped, each one or two or three at a time.  All equation 
forms are shown in Table 5.7 and their t-statistics and values of all coefficients in all 
equation forms of all eight countries are shown in Appendix C. 
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Table 5.7 The Possible Equation Forms for the Gypsum Demand of a Representative 
Individual  
No. Equation Form 
1.1 tt
A
t
TH
ttt mxPPtyq 6543210    
1.2 t
A
t
TH
ttt xPPtyq 543210    
1.3 t
A
t
TH
ttt mPPtyq 643210    
1.4 tt
TH
ttt mxPtyq 653210    
1.5 tt
A
ttt mxPtyq 654210    
1.6 
A
t
TH
ttt PPtyq 43210    
1.7 t
TH
ttt xPtyq 53210    
1.8 t
TH
ttt mPtyq 63210    
1.9 t
A
ttt xPtyq 54210    
1.10 t
A
ttt mPtyq 64210    
1.11 tttt mxtyq 65210    
1.12 
TH
ttt Ptyq 3210    
1.13 
A
ttt Ptyq 4210    
1.14 ttt xtyq 5210    
1.15 ttt mtyq 6210    
2.1 ttA
t
TH
t
tt mx
P
P
tyq 657210    
2.2 tA
t
TH
t
tt x
P
P
tyq 57210    
2.3 tA
t
TH
t
tt m
P
P
tyq 67210    
2.4 
A
t
TH
t
tt
P
P
tyq 7210    
2.5 tyq tt 210    
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 It is found that coefficients 4, 5, and 7 of the variables AtP , xt, and 
TH
tP /
A
tP , 
respectively, in the equation forms nos. 1.3, 1.1, 1.4, 1.5, 1.11, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, of 
all eight countries have the t-statistics insignificance at the 95 per cent level of 
confidence.  Therefore, these equation forms are discarded.   
 With regard to the variable A
tP  in the equation forms nos. 1.2, 1.6, 1.9, 1.10, and 
1.13, its coefficients, 4‘s, have the t-statistics insignificance at the 95 per cent level of 
confidence for all countries except the Philippines.  But the coefficient 4 for the 
Philippines has the wrong sign.  If the statistics were correct it would mean that gypsum 
consumption in the Philippines increased when gypsum price in Australia had increased 
and vice versa.  The fact is that the Philippines imported a negligible amount of gypsum 
from Australia.  In other words, during the study period, the gypsum consumption in the 
Philippines had no known connection to the gypsum price in Australia.  Besides, 
gypsum could be classified as a normal good in the Philippines for its consumption 
increased when the Philippines‘s income per capita increased.  By the law of demand, a 
normal good must have a downward-sloping demand curve (Binger and Hoffman, 
1998), and it does not make sense for the Philippines to consume more gypsum when its 
price elsewhere increased or vice versa.  Therefore, the statistical significance of the 4 
for the Philippines was deemed to happen by chance.  Hence, all those equation forms 
are dropped. 
As for the variable TH
tP  in the equation forms nos. 1.7, 1.8, and 1.12, its 
coefficients, 3‘s, have the t-statistics insignificance at the 95 per cent level of 
confidence for all countries except Taiwan in the equation form no. 1.7; the Philippines, 
Taiwan, and Japan in the equation form no. 1.8; and the Philippines and Taiwan in the 
equation form no. 1.12. But these coefficients have the wrong signs.  The statistical 
interpretation would mean that when gypsum price in Thailand had increased gypsum 
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consumption in the Philippines, Japan, and Taiwan increased and vice versa.  This 
means that their demand curves were upward-sloping.  But, for Filipino and Taiwanese 
people, gypsum was a normal good since their gypsum consumption increased when 
their income per capita increased.  Therefore, the statistical significances of 3‘s for the 
Philippines and Taiwan could be coincidental because a normal good must have a 
downward-sloping demand curve.  As for Japan, the upward-sloping demand curve 
might be attributed to gypsum being possibly an inferior good there.  But Japan 
produces and consumes a lot of synthetic gypsum, which is a substitute for mineral 
gypsum in many uses. The omission of synthetic gypsum in this thesis, which is due to 
lack of data, might result in some positive bias. By these reasons, this thesis will treat 
the statistically positive sign of 3 for Japan as positive bias caused by omitting the 
price of synthetic gypsum. Therefore, the equation forms nos. 1.7, 1.8, and 1.12 are 
eliminated.  
At this stage, all the price variables: TH
tP , 
A
tP , and 
TH
tP /
A
tP , in all the equation 
forms have been discarded.  This means that the analysis of this thesis found that at 
least in the short run either gypsum price does not affect consumption or the price 
elasticity of demand for gypsum is too low to be defined.  Therefore, the consumption 
model of this thesis will be done without price variables or, in other words, 
consumption of gypsum is considered highly price inelastic in this thesis.  Indeed the 
exclusion of prices from empirical models forecasting consumption of minerals, 
especially the low-price ones, is the norm as demonstrated by other empirical studies 
(Intensity of Use), such as those of Roberts, 1990; Valdes, 1990; Roberts, 1996; 
Crompton, 2000; Guzman et al., 2005; and Rebiasz, 2006.  (All the cited articles are 
from a single journal: Resources Policy, which is specifically devoted for mineral 
policy and economics.  No other article dealing with this subject in other journals has 
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been found.  Unfortunately, knowledge about minerals is a specific, small and narrow 
field of study.)  The rationale behind the irrelevance of price in the actual consumption 
will be further discussed in the subsection 5.6.4: Discussion. 
Looking into the variable xt in the equation form no. 1.14, we find that its 
coefficients, 5‘s, have the t-statistics insignificance at the 95 per cent level of 
confidence for all countries except Indonesia.  For Indonesia, the coefficient 5 has the 
t-statistics significance at the 95 per cent level of confidence but a wrong sign.  The 
simple correlation coefficient between variables xt and yt for Indonesia is 0.972.  If the 
variable xt for Indonesia in the equation form no. 1.14 is dropped to become the 
equation form no. 2.5, the t-statistics of the coefficients 1 and 2 decrease from 4.203 
and 12.227 to 1.78 and 8.57 (see Table 5.8), respectively.  But 1 and 2 in the equation 
form no. 2.5 are still statistically significant and have the right signs.  This statistical 
result means that both the equation forms nos. 1.14 and 2.5 can be used to determine the 
gypsum consumption of Indonesia.  If this statistical analysis was correct it would mean 
that, for other countries, the construction expenditures of the representative individual 
have no effect on individual gypsum consumption, while Indonesian people would 
consume less gypsum when they paid more construction expenditure and vice versa.  
The result is unexpected.  Since gypsum is a mineral used mainly in construction, xt‘s 
should have a positive correlation with the gypsum consumption of the representative 
individual of every country.  The causes of this abnormality may lie on the fact that the 
country‘s GDP of construction industry per capita, representing xt, includes a huge 
government expenditure per capita on highway and other construction that does not use 
Portland cement much.  Therefore, the equation form no. 1.14 is eliminated.  
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Table 5.8 The t-statistics and Values of Coefficients in the Equation Forms Nos. 1.14 
and 2.5 for Indonesia 
 Equation form no. 1.14 Equation form no. 2.5 
Variable Coefficient t-statisitc Coefficient t-statisitc 
yt 5.666814 4.203 0.918154 1.78 
t 301.0209 12.227 285.6207 8.57 
xt -56.73860 -3.666 - - 
Investigating the variable mt in the equation forms nos. 1.8 and 1.15, we find 
that its coefficients, 6‘s, for Philippines and Vietnam are statistically significant at the 
95 per cent level of confidence but have wrong signs and very small values, while those 
for Korea and Malaysia are statistically insignificant.  Therefore, the variable mt in the 
two equations for Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam can be dropped.  But those 
for Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand have the t-statistics significance at the 95 
per cent level of confidence and the right signs.  However, we also find that the simple 
correlation coefficients between variables mt and t for Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, and 
Thailand are 0.936, -0.877, -0.680, and 0.725, respectively, which are strong.  When we 
drop mt from the two equation forms to become the equation form no. 2.5, the 
coefficients 2‘s of variable t, are more statistically significant for all four countries (see 
Table 5.9).  This is a problem of multicollinearity; therefore, the variable mt in the two 
equation forms for Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand can be dropped.  Another 
reason to support the elimination of the variable mt is that its data was not so accurate.  
A country‘s cement production per capita is not exactly the same as the cement 
consumption of the representative individual because Portland cement is a commodity 
traded worldwide.  If countries produce more cement than they consume, the surplus 
can be exported.  Other countries may produce less than they need and supplement their 
deficits by importing.  Furthermore, the cement production of a country may also be 
influenced by the movement of huge government expenditure on infrastructure and 
government policies. The examples are: in 2004, the Indonesian Government, after 
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economic recovery, invested in infrastructure, including roads and ports, for more than 
$150 billion resulting in the increase in cement production (the USGS Minerals 
Yearbook, 2004); in 2004 cement production in Japan decreased because of the 
cutbacks in public works spending (the USGS Minerals Yearbook, 2004); and in 2006 
cement production in Taiwan decreased slightly because China restricted the export of 
sand and gravel (the USGS Minerals Yearbook, 2006). Therefore, the equation forms 
nos. 1.8 and 1.15 are eliminated.  
Table 5.9 The t-statistics of the Coefficients of Variable t in the Equation Forms Nos. 
1.8, 1.15, and 2.5 for Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand 
 t-statistics of 2 
Country Equation form no. 1.8 Equation form no. 1.15 Equation form no. 2.5 
Indonesia 0.800 0.838 8.57 
Japan 1.057 -0.927 -4.35 
Taiwan -0.767 -0.819 -4.68 
Thailand 3.250 3.309 3.51 
The values and t-statistics of the coefficients 0, 1 and 2 for all eight countries 
of the remaining equation form no. 2.5, consisting of only variables yt and t, are shown 
in Table 5.10.  We can see that almost all of the coefficients are statistically significant 
at the 95 per cent level of confidence.  Therefore, finally, the equation form no. 2.5 is 
adopted as the consumption model for all eight countries. 
Note that, of the equation form no 2.5, the values of t-statistics of the coefficient 
1 of all countries, except for Japan and Korea, are significant.  However, for Japan the 
values of both the coefficient 1 and its t-statistics are low.  This means that, in Japan, 
people‘s incomes have insignificant influence on their mineral gypsum consumptions.  
Income may also not affect mineral gypsum consumption in Korea.  But in Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam when people‘s incomes 
increase mineral gypsum consumption will rise.  
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With regard to the values of the coefficient 2 for all countries, except for Japan 
and Taiwan, are positive.  This means that the consumption of mineral gypsum of Japan 
and Taiwan will have negative trends if their populations and GDPs remain constant, 
while the other six countries have the trends to consume more mineral gypsum.  The 
trend may reflect the possible change in the taste of the people in these two countries.  
However, this thesis will not investigate further on this matter for it is not the main 
objective of this thesis to go in depth on the demand for gypsum. 
According to the equation form no. 2.5, it can be rewritten as follows: 
t
POP
GDP
POP
Q
q
t
t
t
t
t 210    
Therefore, 
tttt tPOPPOPGDPQ 201       (5.17) 
The equation 5.17 will be utilized to estimate future national gypsum 
consumptions of all the eight countries in the models of the next chapter. The 
comparisons between the actual mineral gypsum consumptions and the estimates from 
the models of the eight countries from 1990 to 2006 are shown in Figure 5.12 - Figure 
5.19. 
Noted that equation 5.17 can be summarized as follows: 
tQ  F(GDPt, POPt, t·POPt) 
In words, a national aggregate consumption of gypsum is in the function of GDP, 
population, and the interaction of time and population.  The interaction of population 
and time, or the term ―time t times POP at time t‖ is the result of the representative 
agent assumption.  It simply means that the effect of the changes in technology and the 
taste of the representative agent on his/her gypsum consumption multiplied by the total 
population becomes the aggregate effect of the changes in technology and taste of the 
nation on the national gypsum consumption. 
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Table 5.10 Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Equation Form 2.5 
Country Coefficient 
0 1 2 R
2 F-statistic 
Indonesia -568497.9 (-8.53) 0.918 (1.78) 285.621 (8.57) 0.87 45.60 
Japan 2268538 (4.42) 0.181 (0.75) -1104.577 (-4.35) 0.74 19.71 
Korea -7214542 (-9.96) 1.006 (1.34) 3620.388 (9.90) 0.90 63.60 
Malaysia -900731.2 (-4.74) 5.433 (7.31) 451.575 (4.72) 0.63 11.84 
Philippines -334353.6 (-11.70) 1.472 (2.77) 168.171 (11.78) 0.91 75.00 
Taiwan 1969560 (4.71) 2.496 (3.17) -992.767 (-4.68) 0.62 11.44 
Vietnam -1545571 (-3.51) 20.494 (3.15) 777.901 (3.51) 0.54 8.33 
Thailand -2243722 (-8.87) 9.162 (6.59) 1124.918 (8.91) 0.86 42.73 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and critical t-value is 1.761.  
 
 
Figure 5.12 Actual and Estimated Gypsum Domestic Consumption of Indonesia, 1990 – 
2006 
Sources: USGS (2006) and Global Trade Information Services (2007) 
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Figure 5.13 Actual and Estimated Gypsum Domestic Consumption of Japan, 1990 – 
2006 
Sources: USGS (2006) and Global Trade Information Services (2007) 
 
 
Figure 5.14 Actual and Estimated Gypsum Domestic Consumption of Korea, 1990 – 
2006 
Sources: USGS (2006) and Global Trade Information Services (2007) 
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Figure 5.15 Actual and Estimated Gypsum Domestic Consumption of Malaysia, 1990 – 
2006 
Sources: USGS (2006) and Global Trade Information Services (2007) 
 
 
Figure 5.16 Actual and Estimated Gypsum Domestic Consumption of Philippines, 1990 
– 2006 
Sources: USGS (2006) and Global Trade Information Services (2007) 
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Figure 5.17 Actual and Estimated Gypsum Domestic Consumption of Taiwan, 1990 – 
2006 
Sources: USGS (2006) and Global Trade Information Services (2007) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.18 Actual and Estimated Gypsum Domestic Consumption of Thailand, 1990 – 
2006 
Sources: USGS (2006) and Global Trade Information Services (2007) 
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Figure 5.19 Actual and Estimated Gypsum Domestic Consumption of Vietnam, 1990 – 
2006 
Sources: USGS (2006) and Global Trade Information Services (2007) 
5.6.4 Discussion 
As already mentioned in the literature review of this chapter, the analytic result 
of this chapter, demonstrating the strong influence of people‘s income over and the 
insignificant effect of prices on mineral demand, reaffirms many previous studies in the 
field of mineral economics.   
It should be noted that the low price elasticity of demand for a mineral conforms 
to the nature of the derived demand for most primary goods in general.  Almost all 
minerals and their derivatives, metals, are produced as raw materials for the production 
of consumer goods.  Hence, the costs (or prices) of mineral raw materials, especially the 
bulky low price ones, comprise just a fraction of the prices of consumer goods.  With 
regard to some metals, Tcha and Takashina (2002) summarized their literature review 
to support their findings as follows: 
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―…. Seo (1995) found that, based on 1990 data for Korea, input coefficients for 
steel for most industries that used steel intensively, were extremely low. His study 
showed that the value of steel used to produce US$1 value of each product was 
US$0.11 for general machinery, US$0.07 for automobiles, US$0.05 for 
construction and US$0.02 for electric and electronic appliances. In their 
comprehensive input–output analysis of the Western Australian economy, 
Clements and Qiang (1995) also showed that the portion of metals was extremely 
small across all 43 industries they considered, including those industries which 
used metals relatively intensively such as construction, road transport and general 
mechanics and equipment. Becker (1976) considered the case in the UK and 
found that the direct steel component of the value of motor vehicles was 0.10 in 
1968, which recently would have dropped much further. Tin may be regarded as 
the most important input of cans, however, Demler (1984) reported that total cost 
of tin accounted for only 2.3% of the total production cost of one can. Another 
study by Tilton (1983), concerned with tin consumption, showed that tin 
constitutes between 18 and 35% of the final cost of producing organotin 
stabilizer, while, at later stages of production, tin‘s portion of the total cost 
becomes increasingly smaller, accounting for 1% or less of the final price of PVC 
plastic pipe.‖ 
In the case of gypsum as a raw material in the production of Portland cement, 
the major use (58 % in 2002) of gypsum mineral produced in Thailand and other 
developing countries, the price accounts for less than 0.5 % of the Portland cement‘s 
price (Department of Primary Industries and Mines, 2004).  Mineral price movement, 
within a reasonable range, affects the prices of consumer goods very little; therefore, 
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the consumption of consumer goods and its mineral raw materials will not change 
much.   
Another reason that makes the demand for minerals highly price inelastic, 
especially in the short run, is that in some uses they are necessary raw materials, and 
people are slow to change their behaviour and taste. Moreover, it costs somewhat and 
takes time for industrial plants that use minerals to change their processes of production 
and to reinstall new equipment and machines to suit new substitute raw materials.  As in 
the case of gypsum wallboard, another important use of mineral gypsum, no other 
materials can be wholly substituted for mineral gypsum in its production.  Consumers 
may switch from gypsum wallboard to plywood or other kinds of partitions at will.  
However, gypsum wallboard producers have no choice but to be faithful to gypsum in 
their production, or else they have to shut their plants or to make heavy reinvestment to 
produce other products instead.  Furthermore, in fighting to maintain or to increase its 
market share, an industry using mineral raw materials would tend to refrain from 
passing the burden of higher mineral costs, a very small portion in the price of its final 
product, on to consumers.  Therefore, the demand for the product will not decrease, and 
as a result the demand for minerals used in the production of such a product will not be 
affected. 
It should also be noted that for high price mineral commodities--such as gold, 
silver, tin, copper, zinc, etc--extra demand or extra supply of middlemen for their 
speculative investment and disinvestment in markets make the price elasticity of 
demand for such a commodity less inelastic.  Since it is impractical to hoard low price 
bulky minerals, which require huge space for stockpiling, for profit, the inelastic 
demand for low priced minerals is rather vivid. 
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It is conceivable that substitution demand of a mineral is not highly inelastic in 
the long run.  But, by the reasons mentioned above, the short run low price elasticity of 
demand for a mineral stays effective for quite a while.  Hence, no mineral producers 
discern and take account of the long run behaviour of mineral consumers.  As a result, 
in a competitive market, an individual mineral producer would never consider the long 
run price elasticity of demand in their production planning.  The highly inelastic 
demand for minerals together with the continual technological progress may be a 
critical factor that fails the Hotelling model‘s prediction that mineral production should 
decline through time. 
Because of highly inelastic demand of a mineral, the relation between the price 
and consumption of a low priced mineral cannot usually be determined from historical 
data, while the correlation between GDP per capita and mineral consumption is 
prominent.  This means that the change in mineral consumption is the result of the shift 
in demand function due to, among others, the change in consumers‘ incomes, 
technology and taste. 
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Chapter 6    An Economic Model Determining the Optimal 
Depletion Path of Thailand’s Gypsum 
Resources 
6.1 Introduction 
 Exploitation of mineral resources basically transforms the resource rent of the 
natural capital into financial capital.  If we accept the assumption of weak 
sustainability, then financial capital gained from the exploitation of mineral resources is 
more relevant to the people‘s welfare than the unexploited mineral resources, 
themselves.  Normally, the capitals, especially the financial one, which can generate 
returns through business activities, will grow over time if parts or all of the capitals are 
reinvested properly.  Under these assumptions, therefore, the mineral resources should 
be optimally exploited in such a way that renders maximum economic rents, through 
time.   
The concept to maximize the present value through time of the economic rents 
(from now on shall be called ―Resource Rents‖) obtained from the extraction of mineral 
resources was firstly introduced in a renowned article ―The Economics of Exhaustible 
Resources‖, written by Harold Hotelling in 1931.  This article and its extensions by 
other authors will be reviewed in a later section.  Hotelling‘s article did not talk about 
sustainability since it was published long before the inception of the concept of 
sustainable development. However, Hotelling‘s model has become the basic of many 
later works that involve the optimal mineral resources exploitation.  In 1977, J. M. 
Hartwick postulated in his article that the resource rents from an efficient extraction 
path can be reinvested in reproducible capital to maintain non-decreasing consumption 
over time.  This postulation is called Hartwick rule, which was briefly explained and 
discussed in Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4. 
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However, exploitation of mineral resources renders not only resource rents, 
which is, in other words, ―producer surplus‖, to mineral producers but also ―consumer 
surplus‖ to consumers consuming minerals.  An economic model determining the 
optimal depletion path of Thailand‘s gypsum resources to be developed in the later part 
of this chapter will follow the Hotelling‘s model, but it will also take into account the 
benefit of consuming gypsum by Thai people in the form of ―consumer surplus‖.  In the 
model the concept of discounting future values shall be accommodated as a way to 
weight the total economic welfare accrued to Thai people at different time.  The model 
will be presented in details from Section 6.3 of this chapter onwards. 
 
6.2 Literature Review 
6.2.1 The Hotelling Model 
a) Hotelling Model as a Method to Determine the Rates of Extraction of 
Mineral Resources 
In addition to treating a mineral resource as a known, finite stock, Hotelling 
simplified his economic models by making six assumptions as follows (Tilton, 2002): 
i)   The goal of mining is to maximize the present value of the stream of net 
benefits from extraction, 
ii)  The mining industry is perfectly competitive, 
iii) The quantity of mineral stock, current and future costs of extraction and 
market price of the mineral are known, 
iv)  The mine has unlimited production capacity, 
v)   The resource stock of mine is homogeneous, and 
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vi)  There is no technological advance. 
The objective of his model is to select a time path for efficient mineral 
extraction, denoted q(t), that maximizes the present value of the stream of net benefits 
from extraction, subject to the constraint that cumulative extraction is no greater than 
the initial resource stock, denoted S0.  If total benefits from mineral extraction are 
denoted by B(q(t)), and extraction costs are denoted by C(q(t)), where S(t) denotes the 
remaining stock, then mining company should determine q(t) by maximizing: 
 
dttqCtqBe
T
t ))](())(([
0

     (6.1)  
subject to: 
),()( tqtS 

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where  denotes the rate of discount ( > 0), and 
T denotes the time of final extraction 
Letting (t) denote the co-state variable for the resource stock, the current value 
Hamiltonian, H, for this problem is: 
H(q(t), (t)) = B(q(t)) – C(q(t)) - (t)q(t)    (6.3) 
The co-state variable, (t), can be interpreted as the current-value shadow price 
of the resource stock – its in situ value or net price – at time t.  The first order necessary 
conditions include both the static and dynamic efficiencies.   
The static efficiency condition is: 
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,  p(t)  = mc(t)  + (t)      (6.4) 
This condition requires that at each point in time, the marginal benefit from 
extracting the resource (or market price of resource, denoted p(t)) equals the sum of the 
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marginal cost of extraction, denoted mc(t), and the net price of depleting the resource 
stock, (t).  
Letting )(t

 denote the time derivative of net price, the dynamic efficiency 
condition is: 
 


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S
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
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
      (6.5) 
In words, the equation 6.5 means that the shadow price of the resource stock 
should increase at the rate of discount,  

, which is the Hotelling rule. 
The equation 6.5 can be rewritten in the new form as follows: 
)()( tt  

        (6.6) 
By integration of equation 6.6, we obtain: 
tet  )0()(   ,  )0()(  tet constant   (6.7) 
The meaning of equation 6.7, another form of the Hotelling rule, is that the 
discounted net price of the natural resource is constant along an efficient resource 
extraction path.   
While a resource is extracted more and more, its stock is depleting over time. 
We now define the efficient extraction path when the marginal extraction cost is 
increasing with the depletion of stock.  The assumption is logical because the mine 
extraction progressively needs deeper and deeper mining operation that requires higher 
marginal extraction cost.  
Give   f
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, where f is positive constant. 
From equation 6.2, we get )(tq
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Assuming the demand curve is linear, 
 p(t) = a – bq(t),where a and b are positive constants   (6.9) 
Differentiate equation 6.9 with respect to time, t, yielding: 
)()( tqbtp

       (6.10) 
In the same way, differentiate equation 6.4 with respect to time, t, yielding: 
)()()( ttmctp

       (6.11) 
Substituting equations 6.8 and 6.10 into 6.11, we obtain: 
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The equation 6.12 shows that the efficient extraction path is decreasing over 
time.  This result, on the surface, is rather contrary to the aim of the most accepted 
concept of sustainable development, which requires a non-decreasing consumption 
level over time.  Indeed, Hotelling rule is not a sustainability rule. Further conditions, 
under Hartwick rule, have to be met before the efficient extraction path under Hotelling 
rule shall be deemed sustainable.   
In summary, the Hotelling model is an economic theory to explore the optimal 
output over time for a mine with a given amount of known resources under a number of 
strong assumptions.  The Hotelling rule can be interpreted as the intertemporal 
efficiency conditions which must be satisfied by any efficient process of resource 
extraction.  The static efficiency condition requires that at each point in time, the market 
price of a resource shall equal the marginal cost of extraction, including the net price, 
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and the dynamic efficiency requires that the net price should increase at the rate of 
discount.  The drawbacks of the Hotelling model and its validity will be discussed in the 
next section. 
b) Some Further Extensions of Hotelling Model 
 Attempts have been made to generalise Hotelling Model by incorporating real 
conditions, such as technological change and external costs, into it.  Technological 
change alters the extraction cost of resource stocks, and the extraction of a 
nonrenewable resource involves external costs.  Some extensions of the Hotelling 
model are as follows.   
i) Perfect Competition with Zero Extraction Cost and a Backstop Resource 
It is an extension of the original Hotelling model.  The model will take account 
of a backstop resource, which is defined as a perfect substitute for the nonrenewable 
resource that will come into the market at a higher price.  Such a price is called the 
backstop price, at which the demand for the nonrenewable is supposed to be nil.  The 
backstop resource may be the same nonrenewable resource stocked in a sub-marginal 
deposit, another natural resource, or a man-made product, and its price at present is 
higher than the nonrenewable resource‘s price.  The following equations for the optimal 
extraction path model in a perfect competition market without extraction cost and with 
a backstop resource are adapted from Hanley et al. (2007).   
Under the Hotelling rule and zero extraction cost, the growth rate of the price of 
the nonrenewable resource is equal to the discount rate.  Therefore; 
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where 
243 
 
  p = the price of nonrenewable resource, 

p = the rate of price change, and 
 r = the discount rate.  
The demand switches altogether from the resource to the backstop technology at 
time, t = T
c
.  Let p
b
 be the price of the backstop technology.  Then the price of the 
resource at time T
c
 is the price of the backstop technology.  Therefore, 
 p(T
c
) = p
b
.  
From equation 6.13, we obtain 
)()( tTrb
c
eptp        (6.14)  
Assume that the demand curve is a straight line, and its inverse curve cuts the vertical 
axis at price, p = p
b
.  Therefore, the inverse demand curve can be written as follows: 
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where β is a positive constant and q is the quantity of resource extraction.  
By substituting equation 6.14 into equation 6.15, we get 
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Differentiating equation 6.16 with respect to time we get:
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Therefore, based on equations 6.16 and 6.17, we can conclude that, for the perfect 
competition market with a backstop resource and zero extraction cost, the optimal 
extraction path declines through time and the rate of the decline in quantity extracted 
increases through time. 
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ii) Taking Account of Scarcity 
Scarcity is the problem of insufficient productive resources to fulfill human 
wants and needs.  Resource scarcity is related to the resource price and its extraction 
costs.  In general, it is economic to extract a resource when the price is higher than the 
marginal cost.  Based on the analysis in section 6.2.1, an economic resource stock has a 
positive shadow price.  It can be inferred that p = μ + cx.  That is, the price equals the 
shadow price (μ) plus the marginal cost, cx.  The shadow price of a stock is also termed 
‗scarcity rent‘.  While the shadow price or scarcity rent is the correct measure of its 
scarcity, the resource price and the marginal cost are a lot more readily available.  As a 
result, price and marginal cost, or average cost, have often been used as measures of 
resource scarcity (Hanley et al., 2007).  The model below, taken from Farzin (1992), 
summarizes the effects of costs on the optimal time path of scarcity rent, 

 .   
The cost function is in the form of c(xt, Xt, zt), where xt is the extraction rate at 
time t, zt is an index measuring technological stage at time t, Xt is cumulative extraction 
up to time t, and Xt =   dx
t

0
.  The assumptions for the cost curve are cx > 0, cX > 0, cz 
< 0, cxx > 0, cxX > 0, and cxz < 0.  Hence the cost curve is convex in x and X.  Therefore, 
with no technical change, an optimal solution will be obtained.   
The problem is to find the optimal time path of the shadow price or the scarcity 
rent by maximizing the present value of net benefit.  In a competitive resource market, 
the resource is extracted at the rate determined by: 
Maximizing dtzXxcpxe
rt


 
0
)],,([  
subject to 0)0(; 

XxX  
The current-value Hamiltonian is  
xzXxcpxH  ),,(  
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where the co-state variable  is the marginal cost of cumulative extraction instead of the 
scarcity rent of stock, , and they are related as  = -. The necessary conditions are 
0 xcp        (6.18)  
Xcr 

        (6.19)  
The transversality condition is  
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Solving the co-state condition in equation 6.19 on the basis of no technical change 
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Substituting equation 6.20 into equation 6.19, we obtain: 
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Using equation 6.20 and LHospital‘s rule to assess the scarcity rent as t ,we 
obtain: 
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This implies that )0,,0(lim Xcc XX
t


, whereX is the maximum cumulative 
extraction from economic reserves and may be less than the total stock.  To analyze the 
time path of scarcity rent, substitute equation 6.20 into equation 6.19 and integrate by 
parts to give:  
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Noting that 
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Equation 6.23 defines the slope of the time path for the scarcity rent of the resource 
stock. If there is no technological change, 







0z , and the extraction rate is constant, 








0x , the scarcity rent rises monotonically as the path a in Figure 6.1.  But, under 
other conditions, paths b, c, d, and e are also possible.  
 From the time derivative of equation 6.18, which is xc
dt
d
p 

 , we can see 
that if the changes in the marginal cost and the scarcity rent are of opposite sign, it is 
quite possible that the direction of change in price is opposite to that of the scarcity rent.  
Therefore, the change in the resource price does not necessary mean a change in the 
scarcity rent of stock, though price, marginal cost, and shadow price (or scarcity rent) of 
stock are all used to measure scarcity. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Time Paths for the Scarcity Rent of a Resource 
Source: Farzin (1992) 
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iii) The Effects of Technological Change on Scarcity 
 It can be inferred from equation 6.23 that technological change will decrease the 
resource scarcity by reducing the scarcity rent.  Farzin (1995) created a model to study 
the effects of technological change on resource scarcity.  According to his model, the 
impact of technological change can be divided into three forms: (i) extraction-biased, 
which decreases extraction costs, or cxz < 0, (ii) depletion-biased, which decreases the 
marginal cost increase because of depletion, or cXz < 0, and (iii) neutral technological 
change, which decreases both costs by the same proportion.  In conclusion, the 
extraction-biased technological change accelerates the rising pace of the scarcity 
measures—cost, price, and rent, while the depletion-biased technological change 
decelerates them.  However, the effect of the neutral technological change on the rate of 
change in the shadow price is ambiguous.  See Farzin (1995) for more details. 
iv) The Consideration of External Costs 
 The following combined model of socially optimal resource extraction and 
external costs is adapted from Farzin (1996).  In this regard, the external costs consist of 
environmental damage cost from pollution emissions and the pollution abatement cost.   
The net social benefit function of the model is as follows: 
)(),(),()(),,,( nESzDXxcxBSXnxW   
where  B(x) is the consumer surplus;  
c(x, X) is the extraction cost as a function of current extraction rate, x, and 
cumulative extraction, X; 
D(z, S) is the environmental damage as a function of net flow of emissions, z, 
and emission stock, S; and 
n is abatement activity and its convex cost function is E(n).  
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Let s be the flow of emissions, which directly varies with  x.  That is s = αx.  To 
simplify the model set α = 1; 
The stock of pollution accumulates by )()()( tztntsS 

. The problem is to 
find time paths for resource extraction and emission control that maximize the present 
value of net social benefit. 
Max dttWe rt )(
0



 
subject to 00 )0(;)0(;; SSXXzSxX 

 
The current-value Hamiltonian is 
)(),,,( nxxSXnxWH    
where  is the shadow price of the resource stock and  is the marginal cost of an 
increase in pollution stock.  
The Hamiltonian condition for extraction is  
0)(  zxx DcxpH  
  zx Dcxp )(  
That is, the extraction will continue until the net benefit, p(x) – cx, is equal to the 
sum of marginal damage from extraction, Dz, shadow price of resource stock, , and the 
marginal cost of an increase in pollution stock, . 
The Hamiltonian condition for abatement is  
0 nzn EDH  
 zn DE  
This implies that the marginal abatement cost En is equal to the sum of the 
marginal damage from extraction, Dz, and the marginal cost of an increase in pollution 
stock, .  The policy implication of this result is that, to attain the social optimality, a 
government should apply an emission tax to the nonrenewable resource industry at the 
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rate equal to the sum of marginal damage from extraction, Dz, and the marginal cost of 
an increase in pollution stock, . 
c) Criticism of the Hotelling Model  
i) Its Concept of Discounting Future Values 
Discounting is the procedure of giving a present value to financial flows 
happening in the future.  The function of the discount rate in the Hotelling model is to 
change future resource values into the present values because the resource stock is 
considered as an asset.  Since the owner of an exhaustible supply wishes to make the 
present value of all his future resource rents maximum, the market rate of interest must 
be used by an entrepreneur in his calculations.  Under this concept the consequence of a 
change in the discount rate is that the higher the discount rate the quicker the resource 
will be depleted.  There have been discussions about whether the rates of extraction of 
exhaustible resources are too high from a social point of view.  Thus Solow (1974) 
made a comment about Hotelling‘s (1931) work as follows.  
―Hotelling mentions, but rather pooh-poohs, the notion that market rates 
of interest might exceed the rate at which society would wish to discount future 
utilities or consumer surpluses. I think a modern economist would take that 
possibility more seriously. It is certainly a potentially important question, 
because the discount rate determines the whole tilt of the equilibrium 
production schedule. If it is true that the market rate of interest exceeds the 
social rate of time preference, then scarcity rents and market prices will rise 
faster than they ―ought to‖ and production will have to fall correspondingly 
faster along the demand curve. Thus the resource will be exploited too fast and 
exhausted too soon.‖ (Solow, 1974) 
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Furthermore, Kay and Mirrlees (1975) state that ―a general bias in the economy 
to consume now and leave too little to our children or our future selves . . . would be 
reflected in high rates of interest, which will lead to somewhat more rapid depletion of 
resources.‖  Although higher discount rates increase extraction rates, they may also 
have other effects in the economy.  Pearce and Turner (1990) conclude that higher 
discount rate may lead to declined demand for investment in general in the economy.  
As a result, utilization of materials, energy, and natural resources will decrease also.   
The above discussion cautions the use of the market rate of interest to discount 
future values of a mineral asset.  The economists have seriously looked into appropriate 
discount rates in an intertemporal dimension that involve more than one generation.  It 
has been proposed that the discount rates to be used on matters related to sustainable 
development should be based on utility or consumption enjoyed by generations.  Both 
utility and consumption discount rates are discussed below. 
Utility Discount Rate 
Instead of discounting the future financial benefits, we now measure the 
present values of future utility enjoyed by generations.  Then 
0
e
t
t
t
t
W U dt
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

      (6.24) 
where  W is the sum of utilities of people from the present to future generations, 
Ut is the utility of generation t, and 
 ρ is the utility discount rate, which is defined by economists in another 
term as the pure rate of time preference 
 There are two possible values of pure time preference rate.  A zero pure 
time preference rate means that future generations are treated symmetrically with 
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present generations, while a positive pure time preference rate means that utility is 
preferred sooner rather than later (Zhu and Weikard, 2003). 
The presence of a positive pure time preference rate is controversial.  A 
zero pure time preference rate is claimed to be the proper one because it is a moral 
obligation to treat all generations equally.  Jevons (1871), Bohm-Bawerk (1884), Rae 
(1905), Pigou (1932), and Harrod (1948) proposed a low discount rate.  Ramsey (1928), 
considering the intergenerational equity, suggested that a zero utility discount rate 
should be used because giving any less weight to the utility of future generations is 
―ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination‖.  
On the other hand, Fisher (1930), Eckstein (1957), Henderson (1965), 
and Lindstone (1973) argued that at the very least, mortality implies a positive time 
preference.  Mortality is a rational reason to prefer consumption today than tomorrow.  
Moreover, the effect of lowering the pure time preference rate towards zero in the 
discounted-utility model is to increase the amount of saving that the current generation 
should undertake.  Arrow (1995) argued that ―the strong ethical requirement that all 
generations be treated alike, itself reasonable, contradicts a very strong intuition that it 
is not morally acceptable to demand excessively high saving rates of any generation, or 
even of every generation‖ and he suggested that the utility discount rate should be 
approximately equal to 1 per cent. 
Consumption discount rate 
The consumption discount rate, or the time preference rate of 
consumption, indicates how a unit of the future consumption is evaluated, in terms of 
utility, in comparison to a unit of the consumption today.  Because the changes in utility 
of an individual are normally not proportionate to the changes in his/her consumption, 
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the consumption discount rate varies with the level of consumption.  Under the 
assumption that consumption will increase over time, the consumption discount rate 
may be defined as the rate at which the value of a small increment of consumption falls 
as time changes.  Mathematically, for the time invariant utility function,  ( )t tU U C , 
the equation 6.24 can be rewritten as: 
       
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
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t
t
t dteCUW
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)(                          (6.25) 
The consumption discount rate, r, can be expressed as: 
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Simplifying the above expression we have the following relationship between utility 
discount rate and consumption discount rate: 
  r = ρ + g 
Where η is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption  
 CC
C
C U
U


  , in case of diminishing marginal utility, UCC < 0,  
 η is positive, and  
 g is the growth rate of consumption, 
C
C
. 
Therefore, the consumption discount rate is determined by two factors.  
One is the impatience of individuals.  An individual generally values future satisfaction 
of her needs lower than the immediate satisfaction and it is represented by the utility 
discount rate.  The second factor is intertemporal consumption smoothing: because of a 
diminishing marginal utility of consumption, an individual wants to stretch 
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consumption over time.  In the case that consumption does not change, g = 0, the utility 
discount rate equals the consumption discount rate.   
The above-mentioned theoretical analysis of the two discount rates does 
not disprove the validity of a positive discount rate.  Therefore, it is fair to conclude at 
this stage that the efficient extraction path from the Hotelling model, shown to be a 
continuous decreasing trend, looked contrary to the concept of sustainable development 
that requires a non-decreasing consumption level over time. 
ii) Validity of the Hotelling Model 
Though there are some inconsistencies in its assumptions with facts of the real 
world, the Hotelling model looks very logical.  Attempts have been made to test the 
validity of the Hotelling rule.  An approach was to look into the difference between the 
market price of a resource and the marginal extraction cost.  The studies of Slade (1982) 
and Stollery (1983) found evidence of increasing net price that support the Hotelling 
rule.  But Halvorsen and Smith (1991) failed to find any significant increasing trend of 
net price, while Farrow‘s study (1985) implicitly showed the evidence of decreasing net 
price.   
 Another approach for testing the Hotelling rule used by Miller and Upton (1985) 
was the valuation principle.  This states that the stock market value of a reserve of 
unextracted resources is equal to the present value of its resource extraction plan.  As a 
result, if the Hotelling rule is valid, the market value of the reserve of unextracted 
resources will be constant.  Using the market values of the reserves of U.S. domestic 
oil- and gas-producing companies, the result supports the Hotelling rule. 
Pesaran (1990), in his study of North Sea Oil production, devised a model based 
on that of Hotelling to determine an optimal level of extraction.  However, when real 
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data were tested, the obtained results show some theoretical discrepancies.  This led to a 
conclusion by Hanley et al. (2007) saying, ―Pesaran's paper illustrates the problems of 
applying theoretical models of nonrenewable resource extraction to data. The 
assumption of profit maximization embedded in Hotelling's rule is a strong assumption 
when firms are uncertain about many aspects of the production process.‖  Other 
approaches to testing the Hotelling rule can be found in a survey paper by Berck (1995).  
It may be concluded that the results of the tests to verify the validity of the 
Hotelling rule are inconclusive.  This is because, by theory, the Hotelling rule exists in a 
particular condition under a number of strong assumptions.  A lot of the critical 
assumptions are not held in the real world.  Besides, the errors from using the proxies of 
the unobservable variables, such as marginal extraction cost, might certainly be the 
main cause of the inconsistency between the results.  However, the Hotelling rule is a 
theoretical concept pertaining to a particular condition.  So unless it contains a logical 
error, the Hotelling rule can never be wrong (Perman et al., 2003). 
6.2.2 Empirical Works 
Not many empirical researches have been done in this hypothetical field of 
study.  After a long search, two empirical papers involving maximization of people‘s 
total economic welfare were found.  The two are: i) OPEC as a Social Welfare 
Maximizer, by Celta and Dahl (2000); and ii) Allocation of Canadian Natural Gas to 
Domestic and Export Markets, by Rowse (1986). 
 i) OPEC as a Social Welfare Maximizer, by Celta and Dahl (2000) 
The paper sets a maximization model based on the different benefits accrued to 
an OPEC country from domestic consumption and from export of oil.  However, its aim 
was to determine the optimal domestic oil price, not the optimal extraction path.  This 
255 
 
paper incorporated both consumer surplus and producer surplus into the model in the 
same manner that this thesis is planned to do.  It said that social welfare in OPEC's oil 
market, SW, consists of consumer welfare, CW, in the domestic oil market plus resource 
rents from both the domestic, dom, and export market, x.  That is: 
SW CW dom x 
The basic model of this paper is stated as follows: 
Max   )()()( xdomxxx
Q
0
domd QQTCQQPdQQPSW
dom
   
Where )( domd QP  = Inverse domestic demand function for OPEC 
)( xx QP Residual export demand function for OPEC, and 
TC = Total production costs 
However, static demand functions with constant elasticity for domestic 
consumption and export were assumed in this paper.  The domestic demand elasticity 
was -0.050, which is highly inelastic, while the world demand elasticity was -0.406.  
The non-zero elasticity of both domestic demand and world demand for oil is 
essentially true since oil is a consumer good, which should conform to the normal 
theory of demand.   
ii) Allocation of Canadian Natural Gas to Domestic and Export Markets, by 
Rowse (1986) 
This paper is very close to what this thesis is planned to do.  The paper‘s 
objective was to allocate Canadian natural gas to domestic and export markets using a 
non-linear optimization model.  However, the maximization functions of this paper are 
discounted by discrete-time factors as opposed to continuous-time factors done 
normally by most literature.  The objective function to be maximized in this paper is the 
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difference between (1) the sum of the discounted Canadian consumer surplus and 
revenues from domestic and export gas consumption, and (2) the discounted costs of 
gas production and transport to domestic markets and border export points.  Because 
this paper attempted to cover the large part of Canadian natural gas deposits and 
domestic markets, the objective function stated in this paper is complicated and needs a 
lengthy explanation.  Therefore, the whole function will not be reproduced here.  In 
short, the objective function is as follows: 
 = A + B + C – D – E – F – G 
where  is the maximized net present value of the net social benefit of Canada. 
The term ―A‖ is the discounted total consumer surplus enjoyed by Canadians, 
consisting of the integrals under all Canadian inverse demand functions of every 
domestic consuming region.  Constant elasticity demand functions were employed and 
no shifts in the demand functions were assumed.  A consumer surplus is based on the 
area under each constant elasticity demand curve between the choke price and the 
equilibrium price. The choke price, the price at and above which natural gas demand is 
nil, may be the delivered price of backstop gas.  
The non-zero elasticity of demand for natural gas applied in the paper is 
appropriate for the gas which is a consumer good consumed by households in cooking 
and heating.  If the gas price is low a household may indulge themselves with warmer 
bed rooms and living rooms and when the gas price is high they may economize by 
lowering room temperature in the winter.  This paper did not take into account the 
normal shift in a demand as a result of increases in individual and national incomes.  
However, it allowed the demand response to vary with time by assuming the absolute 
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price elasticity to change, stepwise, over time, but no theoretical explanation was 
provided why the figures were chosen.   
 Term ―B‖ is the discounted total differences between the export revenues and 
the relevant transport costs accrued to the Canadian natural gas producers. 
Term ―C‖ is the discounted total salvage values of all existing conventional gas 
left in the ground at the horizon.  Salvage values are determined by the backstop cost at 
the horizon. 
Term ―D‖ is the discounted total costs of transporting gas within Canada from 
all supply regions to all domestic consuming regions 
Term ―E‖ is the discounted total supply costs, which consist of extraction and 
processing costs plus costs of transportation to a central collection point, from proved 
reserves. 
Term ―F‖ is similar to E but for new supply sources. It includes capital costs as 
well as all the costs in E.  
Term ―G‖ is the discounted total non-linear supply costs for the marginal costs 
of conventional gas production, which are assumed to rise linearly as the gas production 
progresses.  Conventional gas production costs are expected to rise with cumulative 
production, owing to deeper wells, drilling in less hospitable environments, and smaller 
expected discoveries per meter drilled.   
Another fact in this paper is the nature of conventional natural gas production.  
Conventional natural gas production typically follows a recovery profile due to factors 
such as reservoir pressure decline, gas processing for liquids extraction, contracted 
delivery rates, and so on.  In this regard, the paper based on National Energy Board of 
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Canada assumes that the production of conventional natural gas is flat for eight years 
then declines at 8.22 per cent annually.   
The paper employed a social discount rate of 5 %.  By using a software package, 
it determined the optimal depletion paths for both domestic consumption and export of 
Canadian natural gas deposits as well as the domestic price trajectories for all 
consuming regions in Canada under various specific assumptions and scenarios.  The 
most important assumption was export prices, which were discrete and were changed 
up or down in only few steps following no rules including Hotelling‘s rule.  Another 
important assumption was the maximum allowed exports, which were also discrete.  
These two assumptions dictate the export and, as its outcomes, influence the domestic 
consumption and price.  In one case it assumed the export price to be 4 $/gigajoule, 
which was higher than the domestic price, for just the first 3-year period, starting 1984, 
and 3 $/gigajoule for all later periods.  As a result, all exports in that case will terminate 
in 2013 because there will be no profit from export while production for domestic 
consumption still goes on.  In another case the export price was assumed to be 4 
$/gigajoule for the first 3-year period, and 3 $/gigajoule for the second and third 3-year 
periods (6 years altogether), and 5 $/gigajoule for all later periods.  Under this 
assumption export ends later and it was found that the higher export price would not 
reduce exports in the first three periods but it would increase future exports and reduce 
near-term Canadian consumption to accommodate future higher exports.  Note that this 
paper found that the domestic price trajectory does not follow Hotelling‘s rule for 
resource pricing.  It explains that factors such as the recovery profile, allowance for 
shut-in production, and technology transition constraints bear on optimal pricing and 
invalidate the standard Hotelling‘s rule. 
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6.3 Rationale behind the Model Formulation 
 The determination of the optimal depletion of Thailand‘s gypsum resource will 
be based on the concept of maximizing Net Present Value (NPV) of the total benefits 
accrued to a society.  Here, the benefits accrued to a society are represented by the total 
economic welfare (also called social surplus or total surplus), which is composed of the 
consumer surplus and the producer surplus.  However, the society in this study is 
Thailand only, covering just producers and consumers within Thailand‘s boundary, not 
the whole world as presumed by other studies.  All gypsum production, either for 
domestic consumption or for export, renders producer surplus, but only gypsum 
consumed in the country offers consumer surplus.  Therefore, the production of gypsum 
mineral for export gives less net benefit to Thailand than the production of gypsum for 
domestic consumption.   
There are some minor economic effects resulted from extra foreign income from 
the export of gypsum.  In an open economy as Thailand  extra foreign earnings will 
either strengthen Thai currency, or enlarge the Thailand‘s total foreign exchange 
reserves, or do both in between.  Rich foreign exchange reserves give at least some 
benefit to general investors since they will pay less interest on foreign loans as the 
country earns higher credit rating.  However, a stronger domestic currency gives 
benefits to domestic consumers of foreign goods and helps push down inflation, while 
undesirably lowers the competitiveness of domestic products in foreign countries.  
Pressure to strengthen domestic currencies may not be always welcome by some 
governments of many developing countries as they pursue the policy of weak domestic 
currencies with the aim to support their export sectors.  Because of its small effects, 
since the export of gypsum is small in comparison with the value of Thailand‘s total 
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export, together with its associating complexity if it is taken into account, the effect of 
extra foreign earnings will be disregarded by this thesis.  
It is an aim of this study to put an economic theoretical concept into practice by 
incorporating real data.  However, to deal with real world complexity and other 
shortcomings, the following assumptions are applied: 
i)   Gypsum is an abundant mineral worldwide.  After Thailand‘s gypsum 
resource is depleted completely, it is assumed that Thailand will import 
gypsum from other countries for consumption.  (The imported gypsum is 
indeed the backstop resource as discussed in the subsection 6.2.1 part b of 
Chapter 6.)  Therefore, the depletion of gypsum in the country means that, in 
the future, Thai consumers will have to import foreign gypsum at prices more 
expensive than Thai gypsum when it is plentifully available.  
ii) Demand for gypsum in Thailand is very small in comparison with the total 
world demand for gypsum.  Therefore, its effect on world gypsum price is 
either nil or negligible.  
iii) The price paid by Thai consumers for gypsum produced domestically is on 
par with the F.O.B. (Free on Board) price or export price of gypsum.  This 
assumption is based on the highly competitive nature of gypsum trade in 
Thailand, though in captive markets a producer may sell its product to 
different customers at different prices. 
iv) The amount of gypsum reserves left in the ground in Thailand is not affected 
by a gypsum price rise.  In other words, this thesis assumes a fixed stock of 
gypsum reserves left in the ground.  Although ore deposits of the high price 
metal have various metal contents and they are generally unidentifiable by 
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normal eyes, a price rise should induce extensive exploration for such metal 
ore deposits.  Such a case is unlikely for cheap construction minerals such as 
limestone, granite, and gypsum.  Economical or marginal deposits of these 
minerals are massive with mostly visible outcrops and easy to identify.  They 
are cheap simply because they are abundant and easy to find, explore, 
excavate and process.  As regards the exploration for gypsum, Sharpe and  
Cork (2006) stated as follows:  
―Commercial deposits of gypsum may be almost pure …...  ….., much is 
known about the worldwide distribution of deposits.  …..  The potential 
for the existence of evaporite minerals
19
 can be determined by studying 
the stratigraphy in regions where sedimentary rocks occur. If shallow 
evaporite rocks
20
 are believed to be present, then further information 
may be delivered by examining outcrops and topographic maps. Deeper 
deposits can be initially investigated by examining geophysical logs, oil 
and gas lithologic strip logs, or water-well information.    ....., outcrops 
of gypsum support only sparse vegetation.‖   
Gypsum deposits in Thailand are in geologically known areas of high 
potential for gypsum discovery and are located just a few meters beneath 
subsoil, which are shallower than most ground water tables.  They are located 
in plains or slightly undulating terrains with sparse outcrops.  Gypsum 
deposits in the Central region expose their outcrops, while those in the 
Northeastern region were found by a geophysics exploration done by the 
Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) (Utha-aroon and Rattanajaruraks, 
1996).  Some deposits in the Southern region were discovered by ground 
                                                 
19
 Evaporite minerals mean gypsum mineral. 
20
 Shallow evaporite rocks mean gypsum mineral. 
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water-well information.  Since Thailand has a rather complete Geological 
map done by the DMR, and drilling for ground water in Thailand has been 
extensive; therefore, it is rather pessimistic about a chance to discover 
substantially additional gypsum reserves in Thailand.  
v) The price elasticity of demand for gypsum in Thailand and its client countries 
is very small.  The rationale behind this assumption is the result of the 
analysis in section 5.7 of Chapter 5, which discarded the price variable out of 
the demand (or consumption) functions of gypsum.  As a result and for 
reasons of simplicity, some models determining the optimal depletion path of 
Thailand‘s gypsum resource will be formulated under the assumption that the 
price elasticity of demand for gypsum is zero.  This assumption might be 
contrary to the conventional wisdom; however, as presented in Chapter 5, 
several studies to forecast the consumption of metals either outright discarded 
price factors or found the price elasticities of demand for metals were close to 
zero or very small, except the elasticity of demand for gold in high-income 
countries.  Furthermore, some results show positive price elasticities of 
demand for metals, which are contrary to the behaviour of normal goods that 
metals are supposed to be. The own price elasticity of demand for gold in 
high-income countries was also inelastic but substantially high as a major 
part of the total gold consumption is consumed directly by people. Table 6.1 
is the summarizing results of the studies that were reviewed in Chapter 5 with 
regard to the own price elasticities of demand for metals.  Note that similar 
studies on any industrial minerals have not been found.   
However, to see the effect of the influence of prices on the optimal 
depletion path, a model with demand functions of constant price elasticity of 
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demand will be formulated and tested in an empirical study in this thesis.  
Since no viable form of relation between the price and demand was found in 
the analysis of the last chapter, some specific small values of the price 
elasticity of demand for gypsum will be assumed.  Note that, with a very low 
price elasticity of demand, the apparent significant change in consumption of 
gypsum is because of the shift in the demand curve as a result of the changes 
in consumer income and technology.  Figure 6.2 shows the shifts in demand 
curves.  In the Figure, X1, X2 and X3 are productions in years 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively for the demand curves with the perfect price-inelasticity, and Q1, 
Q2 and Q3 are productions in years 1, 2, and 3, respectively for the demand 
curves with constant price elasticity, b. 
vi) The consumption model, as developed in the last chapter, comprises 
population and GDP variables.  However, since there are not better 
methodologies to predict the future population and GDP of a country, 
constant growth rates of populations and real dollars GDPs are assumed.  
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Figure 6.2  Showing the Shift in Demand Curve 
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      Table 6.1 Own Price Elasticities of Demand of Some Metals 
Method Author Condition Country 
Metal 
aluminium copper lead nickel tin zinc steel gold 
Intensity 
of Use  
Roberts (1990) 
Outright 
discarding 
price factors 
USA       0.000*  
Valdes (1990) Australia       0.000*  
Roberts (1996) World 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*   0.000*   
Crompton (2000) Japan       0.000*  
Guzman et al. 
(2005) 
Japan  0.000*       
Rebiasz (2006) Poland       0.000*  
Double-
log  
demand 
function 
Suslick and Harris 
(1990) 
 Brazil -0.0824        
Vial 
(1992) 
 USA  
-0.103 to 
-1.050 
      
Batchelor and 
Gulley (1995) 
 
High-
income  
       
-0.5 to 
-0.9 
Pei and Tilton 
(1999) 
Without time 
variable 
High-
income  
0.000 0.110 0.080 -0.060 -0.010 0.010   
Low-
income  
0.019 -0.025 -0.056 -0.313 -0.283 0.158   
With time 
variable 
High-
income  
-0.020 0.020 0.060 -0.030 -0.030 0.010   
Low-
income  
0.317 0.188 -0.023 -0.313 -0.151 0.318   
Tcha and Takashina  
(2002) 
With a 
constant term 
World 
0.004 -0.025 -0.006 -0.047 -0.064 -0.020 -0.012  
Without a 
constant term 
-0.009 -0.025 0.001 -0.049 -0.053 -0.020 -0.013  
 
      *Interpreted figures as this method does not take price factors into consideration.
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6.4 Formulation of a General Model 
6.4.1 A Function Maximizing the Total Surplus 
The optimal control formulation of gypsum depletion in Thailand is to 
maximize the discounted flow of the total economic welfare or total surplus generated 
by the exploitation of gypsum, which is the sum of the producer surplus, or the resource 
rents of gypsum mining industry, from present to the time the gypsum resource in 
Thailand is depleted, and the consumer surplus from consuming gypsum from present 
to infinity.  However, the consumer surplus can be divided into two parts.  The first part 
is the consumer surplus from consuming cheap domestically produced gypsum, while 
the second part is the consumer surplus from consuming expensive imported gypsum 
after the gypsum resource in Thailand is depleted.  Therefore, the maximizing function 
can be mathematically written as follows:  
Max  


T
t
rt
t
T
rt
T
t
rt dt'DedtDedtBe
00
    (6.26) 
where r is discount rate, 
 T is time when the gypsum resource in Thailand is exhausted, 
 Bt is the producer surplus at time t, 
Dt is the consumer surplus from consuming cheap domestically produced 
gypsum at time t, 
D't is the consumer surplus from consuming expensive imported gypsum at time 
t after the gypsum resource in Thailand is exhausted. 
If the function 6.26 is added and subtracted by dtD'e t
rt


T
0
 we have: 
 Max  


T
t
rt
t
T
rt
T
t
rt dt'DedtDedtBe
00
+ dtD'e t
T
rt


0
dtD'e t
T
rt


0
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which can be rewritten as: 
Max 

 
000
)( dtD'edtD' -DedtBe t
rt
tt
T
rt
T
t
rt
   (6.27)  
 
Figure 6.3 Demonstrating D't, consumer surplus (shaded areas) at time t, for t = 0, 1, 2, 
3, …, ∞, in three dimensions, when gypsum consumption in Thailand is 
totally from import 
Figure 6.3 shows D't‘s, for t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ….  d0-d0, d1-d1, d2-d2, d3-d3, …, are 
domestic demand curves at time t = 0, 1, 2, 3, …, respectively.  These domestic demand 
curves are fixed under a given function of domestic demand through time.  pimt ‘s, for t = 
0, 1, 2, 3, …, are the expected import prices, at time t = 0, 1, 2, 3, …, respectively.  
Since the demand for gypsum in Thailand will not affect the world gypsum price, as 
stated in the assumption ii) of the section 6.3, each of pimt ‘s, for t = 0, 1, 2, 3, …, ∞ is 
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fixed in this analysis. Therefore, each of D't‘s, for t = 0, 1, 2, 3, …, ∞,   (shaded areas in 
Figure 6.3) is fixed.  Hence, 


0
dtD'e t
rt
 is a constant.  Therefore, 


0
dtD'e t
rt
 can be 
eliminated from the function 6.27 to become as follows: 
Max dtD' -DedtBe tt
T
rt
T
t
rt )(
00

       (6.28) 
 The term )( tt D' -D  can be defined as the net consumer surplus from 
consuming cheap domestically produced gypsum at time t. 
6.4.2 Determining the Producer Surplus, Bt 
a) A Basic Formula 
 The producer surplus of the expression 6.28 is simply the total resource rents 
earned by gypsum producers.  In this analysis production of gypsum in Thailand is 
divided into two groups--for domestic consumption and for export--and the gypsum 
resource is divided accordingly.  Therefore,  
Bt = )( ttt QCQp   
          = )( t
e
tt
d
tt QCQpQp       (6.29) 
Subject to:
 
tS

 = tQ = )(
e
t
d
t QQ   
S(0) = S0, S(T) = 0 
S 0    = SS
ed
00   
dtQS
T
d
t
d
0 
0
, and dtQS
Te
e
t
e
0 
0
 
where              pt = price of gypsum in Thailand at time t,  
  Qt = production of gypsum at time t; 
d
tQ = domestic consumption of gypsum at time t; 
  
e
tQ = export of gypsum at time t; 
  C(Qt) = cost of extraction; 
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S(t) = the amount of gypsum left in the ground at year t,  
  tS

 = the rate of depletion of gypsum resource at year t;  
  S
d
0 = gypsum resource allocated for domestic consumption; 
  S
e
0 = gypsum resource allocated for export; and 
Te = the time that export of gypsum ceases, by measures enforced by the 
government such as heavy taxation or an outright prohibition of gypsum export.  Since 
domestic consumption offers higher social benefit than export, the
 
S
e
0  and
 
S
d
0  are 
allocated such that Te ≤ T. 
b) The Cost of Extraction, C(Qt) 
According to Hanley et al. (2007), the marginal cost of extraction should 
increase as the remaining stock in the ground decreases.  Since the stock decreases at 
the same rate as accumulative production, it can be said that, under such hypothesis, the 
marginal cost of extraction increases when the accumulative production increases.  
However, it was found that mineral extraction costs have decreased over time due to 
technological advances, which improved mining productivity and efficiency (Wilburn 
et al., 2005).  Therefore, given that c0, c1, c2, and c3, are positive constants, the general 
function of the cost of extraction of gypsum is as follows:  
t
t
210t QtcdQcccQC 







 

3
0
)(

   
Subject to 

t
dQ
0
   0S , and 
ed QQQ    
where Q  is the total production of gypsum in Thailand at time τ, 
 

t
dQ
0
   represents the accumulative production up to year t, 
 dQ  is the production of gypsum for domestic consumption at time τ, 
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 eQ  is the production of gypsum for export at time τ, 
c0 is the extraction fixed cost, 
c1 is the normal extraction variable cost, 


t
dQc
0
2

   represents the increase in the marginal cost as a result of the decrease 
in the remaining stock at time t, and 
-c3t represents the decrease in the marginal cost as a result of technological 
advances at time t, 
c) The Detailed Formula Determining the Producer Surplus, Bt 
Therefore, equation 6.29 can be rewritten as follows: 
t
t
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e
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        (6.30) 
6.4.3 Determining the Net Consumer Surplus, )( tt D' -D  
In determining the net consumer surplus, )( tt D' -D , of the expression 6.28, let 
us assume that the domestic demand curve of gypsum with a constant price elasticity of 
demand, – b, in year t is q = at p
 –b
, where qt is the gypsum quantity at time t, pt is the 
gypsum price at time t, and at is a constant for year t.  In a complex demand function 
that includes other parameters besides price, such as consumers‘ incomes, tastes, 
technology, etc., at may be considered as the factor covering the total effect of such 
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parameters that are fixed in the partial analyses of the price and quantity relations.  If at 
increases through time the demand curve will shift to the right as time passes.   
 Figure 6.4 shows the domestic demand curve and the net consumer surplus.  
Therefore, 
 


p
b-
tt
t
dppa  D , the consumer surplus from consuming cheap domestically 
produced gypsum at time t; and 



p
b-
tt
im
t
dppa  D' , the consumer surplus from consuming expensive imported 
gypsum at time t after the gypsum resource in Thailand is exhausted. 
where pimt  is the expected import price if the domestic production of gypsum is stopped 
or insufficient for domestic consumption.  Hence, the net consumption surplus at time t, 
tt D' -D , which is the shaded area demonstrated in Figure 6.4, can be defined as follows: 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Demand Curve and the Net Consumer Surplus (the Shaded Area) 
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Because mineral gypsum is traded worldwide, price difference from place to 
place is mainly due to transportation cost.  In Thailand, the difference between the 
expected import price, pimt , and the real domestic price, pt , is certainly positive at 
present and in the near future.  Being price takers gypsum producers have little market 
power to raise the domestic price to the level of the expected import price.  For 
simplicity, this fact is assumed to hold true up until the time the gypsum resource in 
Thailand is exhausted.  However, even if near the time of exhaustion the price of 
domestically produced gypsum rises to reach the level of the import price, the loss of 
consumer surplus, due to the increase in price, simply changes to be the gain of the 
producer surplus.  As a result, error caused by the assumption will not significantly 
affect the analysis of this study.  The analysis in a latter part of this chapter will show 
the insignificance of the real domestic price movement to the net social benefit (net 
consumer surplus + producer surplus) generated by the gypsum production for domestic 
consumption. 
6.4.4 The General Model 
Substituting expressions 6.30 and 6.31 in expression 6.28, we get: 
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Let etQ  cease at Te and Te ≤ T since, politically and economically, export is 
certainly less favourable than domestic consumption.  Therefore, the function 6.32 can 
be rewritten as: 
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T ≥ 0, Te ≥ 0, and Te ≤ T. 
 We can see that expression 6.33 has two parts.  With a given set of 
 
S
e
0  and S
d
0  
that satisfies equation 6.34, maximizing expression 6.33 means maximizing both parts.  
Therefore, under such conditions, expression 6.33 could be modified to be the general 
model as follows: 
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Expression 6.35 is also bound by the same constraints stated below expression 6.33, 
including equation 6.34. 
The model in the form of expression 6.35, which is discounted continuously, can 
be written as an annually discrete discounting function as follows: 
Max 

















  









 
0
d
t3
e
t
d
21t
im
t
T
t
t
cQtcQQcc
b
b
p
b
p
'r
)(
11)(1
1
11



 
 
 + Max 
















  
 
e
t3
e
t
d
21t
Te
t
t
QtcQQccp
'r
)(
)(1
1
11



         
   (6.36) 
Subject to:
      
)( et
d
tt1tt QQQSS   ,  
S(0) = S0, S(T) = 0,  
ed SSS 000  , or 



Te
t
e
t
T
t
d
t QQS
11
0 , 
T ≥ 0, Te ≥ 0, and Te ≤ T.
 
 
Where r' is an annual discrete discount rate and: 
r' = 1re         (6.37) 
The purpose of introducing an annually discrete discounting maximizing 
function here is for later utilization in the empirical study parts of this chapter when the 
integral functions cannot be simplified and are calculated with difficulty.  Note that, of 
both expressions 6.35 and 6.36, the first parts represent the social benefit or the total 
surplus of the gypsum production for domestic consumption, while the second parts 
represent that of the gypsum production for export.  We can also see that, if the absolute 
value of price elasticity of demand for gypsum, b, is very small, the domestic price, pt, 
is less relevant to the social benefit of the gypsum production for domestic consumption 
of the above two maximizing functions, while the import price, pimt , is important. 
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6.5 Special Models 
 We can see that the full model with the assumed demand function of constant 
price elasticity, either in the general forms of expressions 6.35 or 6.36, consists of some 
parameters that are determined with difficulty and that this thesis failed to determine.  
The ones that are determined with difficulty are c2, indicating the positive effect on the 
marginal cost of extraction, and c3, denoting the negative effect of technology on the 
marginal cost of extraction.  The parameter that cannot be determined in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis is the significant value of b, representing the influence of price on gypsum 
consumption.  
 With regard to b, the price elasticity of demand for gypsum, two approaches will 
be utilized in the empirical study of this thesis.  However, both approaches will be 
based on the assumptions mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and the results of 
some other papers that found highly price inelastic demands for minerals.  One 
approach, having the benefit of simplicity, will assume the value of b is zero, while, in 
the other approach, some small values of b will be tested to see the effects of them. 
 As for c2 and c3, their sizes should be small and they involve a long time-scale 
that makes them difficult to be determined.  The coefficient c2 is supposed to exist in 
theory on the belief that low cost or easy ores are mined first, while the higher cost or 
deeper ores with poorer grades are excavated latter.  To conform to such an assertion a 
mineral has to have the total stock (the total ore reserve) comprising ore deposits of 
varied ore grades or qualities, very thick ore bodies, and/or varied depth.  However, 
gypsum deposits in Thailand possess no such conditions.  In general, mineral gypsum 
all around the world has a similar grade and quality, and most of its deposits are easily 
mined.  All gypsum deposits in Thailand are a shallow flat bed type with only a 30-
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metre thickness at most (only 2-3 levels of open-pit benches).  After removing their 
overburdens, the costs of excavating the top and the bottom of the mineral beds are 
almost the same.  Therefore, the value of c2 should be very small, if any. 
It should be noted that, even though mineral deposits have a variety of ore 
grades, ore body thicknesses, and depths, the belief that the marginal cost of extracting 
minerals increases when the stocks of minerals get smaller has not been proven to be 
true over time.  As time passes minerals are mined from deeper deposits.  Therefore, the 
average extraction cost of a mineral and its price, as a result of the change in cost, were 
supposed to have an increasing trend.  But the real historical price-trends of most 
minerals, including Thai gypsum as shown in Figure 5.10 of Chapter 5, have not 
conformed to such a belief.   
This anomaly was found and investigated by at least two studies.  Tilton (2002), 
in his investigation of the falling trend of copper prices since 1970, quickly eliminated 
the downward shift of the demand curve as the cause of the decline in copper prices.  
His analysis pointed to the downward shift of the supply curve as the real culprit.  He 
stated his rationales behind it as follows: ―…copper producers have been spectacularly 
successful at increasing their productivity and reducing their costs by introducing a 
range of innovations and new technologies across the board, from exploration to mining 
to processing to fabrication and even recycling.  Though widely viewed as an old, 
mature industry, copper has, in fact, much in common with the computer and other high 
technology sectors when it comes to using new technology to reduce costs.‖  He also 
produced an empirical support for his conclusion, based on data from the Rio Tinto 
Mine Information System, to show the dramatic reduction in cash costs for copper 
producers between the years 1980, 1990 and 1999, as shown in Figure 6.5. Please note 
that most copper deposits are massive, and copper open pit mines at present are very 
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deep.  Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation (KUCC), a division of Rio Tinto Group, 
operates one of the largest copper mines in the world in Bingham Canyon, Salt Lake 
County, Utah. In 2008, the Bingham Canyon Mine is more than a kilometre deep.  
Tilton gave one conclusion that technological progress is more than offsetting the 
upward pressure on costs caused by the depletion of the best mineral resources over 
time and the need to mine deeper, lower-grade, remoter, and more difficult deposits. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Copper Mine Costs (cents/lb, real 2001 terms) 
Note: The figure shows pro rata costs. These are the cash costs of producing copper to refined metal 
minus capital costs (depreciation, amortization and interest on external debt). Costs are attributed to all 
salable metals that a mine produces in proportion to the contribution of each to sales.                       
Source: Tilton (2002) 
Another investigation related to this matter is that of the USGS done by Wilburn 
et al. (2005), who provided case studies on aluminum, copper, potash, and sulfur to 
identify the effects of technology on resource supply.  They postulated that decreasing 
prices for natural resources, expressed in constant dollars, would provide one kind of 
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evidence that technological advances have been more than sufficient to overcome 
obstacles to supply.  Their study found very strong evidence supporting this postulation.  
They demonstrated that between 1900 and 1998, world aluminum and copper production 
increased by 310- and 8-fold, respectively, but their prices decreased by 84 and 75 percent, 
respectively.  The study also demonstrated that potash and sulfur had shown similar trends.  
As in the case of copper, the prices declined even though the copper ore grade mined in 
the U.S.A. decreased from above 1 percent (of copper content) in the early 1950‘s down 
to about 0.5 percent (of copper content) in 2000.  This means that the copper extraction 
cost declined tremendously over time.  The study explains that the decrease in mineral 
extraction costs, were due to the advances in blasting, drilling, and equipment design 
and capacity, as well as the use of larger capacity equipment and increased 
mechanization, which improved mining productivity and efficiency.  
Notwithstanding exogenous technological progress that help reduce mineral 
extraction cost over a normally long mining life, improvement always occurs 
continuously in a mine as miners gain more experience.  Therefore, the cost of mining a 
deeper part of an ore deposit will likely be lower than expected.   
Anyway, it is not certain that future technological progress will leap forwards as 
smoothly and as fast as it has been, while the final depletion of many minerals are real.  
Therefore, to compromise the two opposite forces and to simplify the empirical analysis 
of this study, ‗a special model‘ of this thesis will assume that the aggregate marginal 
cost to extract gypsum, in real terms, is approximately constant over time.  Because the 
time frame in this study is not very long, the error caused by this assumption would not 
be too significant to alter the main message of this thesis.  In the other words, the 
special model is under the assumption that:  
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Therefore, expression 6.35 can be modified to become as follows: 
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Subject to the same constraints stated below expressions 6.33 and 6.35. 
 Similarly, expression 6.36, an annually discrete discounting function, becomes 
as follows: 
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Subject to the same constraints stated below expression 6.36. 
6.5.1 A Special Model with Zero Price Elasticity of Demand 
 If the price elasticity of demand for gypsum is assumed to be perfectly inelastic 
or, in other words, the value of b is zero, expression 6.38 will become as follows: 
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Subject to the same constraints stated below expressions 6.33 and 6.35. 
 In the same manner, expression 6.39 will become as follows: 
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Subject to the same constraints stated below expression 6.36. 
In the first parts of expressions 6.40 and 6.41, representing the social benefit of 
gypsum production for domestic consumption, the domestic price is irrelevant and the 
gypsum producers in Thailand have no control over the import price, pimt .  With the 
exception of Hotelling‘s rule, there is not any particular practical method to predict pimt . 
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Analyses based on two alternative assumptions with regard to pimt  will be done here.  
The first one is that the )( int
im
t
c-p  will rise in accordance with Hotelling‘s rule, where cint 
is the marginal cost in other gypsum producing countries to supply gypsum to Thailand 
in the future plus the unit shipment cost to Thailand.  cint should have the same structure 
as its counterpart, c1, which is assumed to be a constant.  Therefore, if the unit shipment 
cost in constant dollars is fixed, cint is also a constant.  For the sake of an economic 
theory, the )( 1t c-p  will also be assumed to follow Hotelling‘s rule in this first 
alternative analysis.  The second alternative will disregard Hotelling‘s rule and assume 
that gypsum prices anywhere will follow the same price trends of most minerals studied 
by Lin and Wagner (2007).  Using data from 1970 to 2004, the two, who re-examined 
Hotelling‘s model, found that the prices for 13 of 14 minerals exhibited a zero growth 
rate.  Therefore, pimt  and tp  in constant dollars are treated as fixed and equal to p
im
0
 and 
0p , respectively, in the second alternative analysis.  
a) Case I: with Zero Price Elasticity of Demand and Applicable Hotelling’s 
Rule 
i) The Model of Case I 
Expression 6.40 can be rewritten as follows: 
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Subject to the same constraints stated below expressions 6.33 and 6.35. 
  Under Hotelling‘s rule, we have: 
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280 
 
Therefore, expression 6.42 can be rewritten as follows: 
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From equation 6.34, dtQSdtQ
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.  Hence, expression 6.43 can be 
modified as follows: 
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With a given set of 
 
S
e
0  and S
d
0  that satisfies equation 6.34, all other terms of the 
right-hand side of equation 6.45 are fixed except the second one,  
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)( .   
Since cint includes the unit transportation cost from other countries to Thailand and the 
gypsum deposits in Thailand are easily mined, the value of (cint - c1) is certainly 
positive.  This means that, to maximize the net present value of the net social benefit, 
Thailand should supply gypsum to the domestic demand as much and as fast as possible 
because the discount rate factor, rte , is weighted against future values.  However, 
because of the highly price inelastic demand, increased consumption cannot be induced 
by lowering prices.  Therefore, gypsum producers have no other option but to fulfil the 
maximum domestic demand, )(tX d , the function of which is defined as equation 5.17 
in Chapter 5.  
If the population and the GDP of Thailand are assumed to grow at constant 
rates, equation 5.17 of Chapter 5 can be rewritten as follows: 
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Where  )(tX dt  is the domestic consumption at time t, which is in the function of time t; 
dGDP0  is the Gross Domestic Product of Thailand at present (year 2007); 
dPOP0 is the total population of Thailand at present (year 2007); 
     d1 , 
d
0 , and 
d
2 are the coefficients 1 , 0 , and 2  of Thailand of equation 
form no. 2.5 in Table 5.10 of Chapter 5, respectively; 
             kd is the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product of Thailand, assumed to be 
constant; and 
             hd is the growth rate of the population of Thailand, assumed to be constant. 
Substituting )(tX dt  from equation 6.46 for 
d
tQ  in equation 6.45 and solving the 
definite integrals, we have: 
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On the right-hand side of equation 6.47, all parameters are fixed or assumed to 
be fixed except for T, the time when gypsum resource in Thailand is exhausted.  T can 
be varied as the result of changing the size of S e0 , the gypsum resource allocated for 
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export.  T is longest if S e0  is zero or, in other words, if all gypsum resources are totally 
allocated for domestic consumption with no export allowed. 
Let Tmax be the longest possible T.  Tmax can be determined by substituting 
d
tQ = 
)(tX dt and 
e
tQ = 0 in equation 6.34.  Hence,  
0)(0   dttXS
maxT
0
d
t       (6.48) 
Therefore, the optimal T, denoted T
*
, that maximizes F1, has to satisfy the 
following inequality (as required by equation 6.34 and the nonnegative Te): 
0 ≤ T* ≤ Tmax       (6.49) 
In determining T
*
, equation 6.47 is differentiated by dT and set to equal zero as 
follows: 
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Equation 6.50 cannot be simplified further and needs to be solved by trial and 
error or a computer program if all fixed parameters are known.  Mathematically, at the 
determined T
*
, the value of F1 is at its maximum if the value of its second derivative is 
negative and all constraints are obeyed.  The second derivative of the function 6.47 is as 
follows: 
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ii) An Empirical Solution for the Special Model of Case I 
  Further attempts will be made to test the special model with perfect 
price-inelasticity of demand Case I, empirically.  Some parameters of Thailand in the 
model are real and known.  Some are real but unknown and a parameter, cint, is just a 
hypothetical figure.  These parameters and their sources of data, for the real and known 
ones, or their basic assumptions, for the unknown or hypothetical ones, are shown in 
Table 6.2.  
284 
 
Table 6.2 Values of Parameters and their Sources or Basic Assumptions 
Parameters Value Source and Basic Assumption 
d
1  9.162 Table 5.10 in Chapter 5. 
d
0  -2243722 Table 5.10 in Chapter 5. 
d
2  1124.918 Table 5.10 in Chapter 5. 
d
0GDP  
208.649 
(Billion 2006$) 
World Economic and Financial Surveys World Economic Outlook 
Database April 2008 Edition, IMF. 
kd 0.056 World Economic and Financial Surveys World Economic Outlook 
Database April 2008 Edition, IMF; five year average, 2003-2007. 
d
0POP  
0.066 
(Billion) 
World Economic and Financial Surveys World Economic Outlook 
Database April 2008 Edition, IMF. 
hd 0.009 World Economic and Financial Surveys World Economic Outlook 
Database April 2008 Edition, IMF; five year average, 2003-2007. 
 
p
im
0
 
 
32.77 
(2006$/ton) 
p
im
0
 is a hypothetical figure. This study assumes that Thailand will 
pay the same CIF price for gypsum imported from Australia as 
Japan is paying now. The figure is the five year average, 2003-2007, 
of CIF price of the Australian gypsum at Japan ports. 
0p  
14.35 
(2006$/ton) 
The five year average, 2003-2007, of FOB price of gypsum in 
Thailand. 
c1 6.14 
(2006$/ton) 
The fixed cost, c0, and variable cost, c1, are derived from an 
unpublished study of DPIM on a typical gypsum mine. The fixed 
cost of the studied mine is multiplied by the total number of gypsum 
mines in Thailand to represent c0. 
c0 5.586 
(million 2006$) 
 
cint 
 
24.57 
(2006$/ton) 
Real cint is a confidential figure. Since all gypsum deposits around 
the world are similar, this study assumes that the production cost 
and market structure of gypsum in Australia are the same as in 
Thailand.  Therefore, producers in both countries earn a similar 
resource rent margin. That is: p
im
0
 - cint ≈ 0p - c1. Hence, cint ≈ p
im
0
 
- 0p  + c1. A higher figure (1 cent/ton higher) of cint is assumed. 
r 10% or 0.1 The discount rate used by the World Bank for project evaluation in 
developing countries (Hayes and Smith, 1993). 
S 0  270.73 (million 
tons) 
Department of Primary Industries and Mines, Thailand. 
With the parameters in the Table 6.2 and by equations 6.50 and 6.51, we find 
that: T
*
 = 75.17 years with the second derivative function having a negative figure.  In 
addition, dF1/dT is positive for all values of T from 0 to 75.17.  However, when we put 
in the values of T
*
 = 75.17 and substitute )(tX dt  from equation 6.46 into equation 6.34, 
with corresponding parameters in the Table 6.2, we find that dtQ
Te
e
t
0
 or eS0 , the total 
gypsum resource allocated for export; is negative.  Therefore the solution of T
*
 = 75.17 
from equation 6.50 is out of the bound of reality.  Hence, F1 will be maximum when T 
is at its possible highest.  The possible highest T is achieved only when all gypsum 
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reserves in Thailand are allocated for domestic consumption with none being allocated 
for export. 
Therefore, eS0  = 0, and Te
*
, the optimal time that export of gypsum ceases, = 0.  
By substituting )(tX dt  from equation 6.46 in equation 6.48, with corresponding 
parameters in the Table 6.2, and by trial and error, we also have: 
  Tmax = 33.07 years 
 Therefore, the adopted T
*
 = 33.07 years. 
 The above solution means that, because the benefit of producing and consuming 
within the country is higher than that of producing for export, Thailand should stop 
export of gypsum and all the remaining gypsum reserves should be produced for 
domestic consumption only.  In this case the gypsum resource in Thailand is expected 
to exhaust completely in 33.07 years. 
iii) Sensitivity Analysis of the Special Model of Case I with Respect 
to Different Discount Rates 
From equation 6.50, we can see that T
*
 and, as a result, Te
*
 are 
influenced by the discount rate, r.  Therefore, it is worth seeing how the solution 
changes when the discount rate changes. Table 6.3 shows the effect on the T
*
 and Te
*
 of 
the special model with perfect price-inelasticity of demand Case I, if the discount rate 
varies. 
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Table 6.3 Solutions of T
*
 and Te
*
 of the Special Model with Perfect Price-Inelasticity of 
Demand Case I, with Respect to Different Discount Rates 
Discount 
Rate (r) 
% 
T
*
 obtained 
from 
equation 
6.50 
(years) 
Time when 
gypsum 
resource 
exhausted 
(adopted T
*
) 
(years) 
Time when 
export of 
gypsum 
ended (Te
*
) 
(years) 
Gypsum 
resource for 
domestic 
consumption 
)( 0S
d  
(million tons) 
Gypsum 
resource 
for export 
)( 0S
e  
(million 
tons)
§
 
2.50 300.77 33.07 0 270.730 0 
5.00 150.38 33.07 0 270.730 0 
7.50 100.25 33.07 0 270.730 0 
10.00 75.17 33.07 0 270.730 0 
12.50 60.12 33.07 0 270.730 0 
15.00 50.08 33.07 0 270.730 0 
17.50 42.90 33.07 0 270.730 0 
20.00 37.52 33.07 0 270.730 0 
22.50 33.34 33.07 0 270.730 0 
22.68 33.07 33.07 0 270.730 0 
25.00 29.99 29.99 7.22 222.299 48.431 
Note: 
 §
  Derived from equation: dttXS
Te
ee
0 
0
)( , where )(tX e  is the production of gypsum for export 
at time t as defined in equation 6.53 to be demonstrated later. 
We can see from Table 6.3 that, of all eleven discount rates we tried only 
at the discount rate of 25.0 %, is T
*
 as the solution of equation 6.50 smaller than Tmax 
and becomes the adopted one.  For the discount rates at 22.5 and below, the adopted T
*
 
remains 33.07 years.  The turning point is at the critical discount rate of 22.68 % when 
the adopted T
*
 begins to be equal or smaller than 33.07 years and the Te
*
 starts to 
emerge above zero.  However, such a rate is considered to be too high to be accepted as 
a social discount rate for a country. 
iv) Sensitivity Analysis of the Special Model of Case I with Respect 
to the Size of Gypsum Reserve 
The amount of gypsum left in the ground at present, S 0 , or the gypsum 
ore reserve updated in 2006, assumed to be fixed in this thesis, may be a parameter that 
is not very accurately estimated because the present figure is the combination of proven 
and probable reserves.  Therefore, it is interesting to see how the solutions change if the 
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size of S 0
 
 alters. Table 6.4 shows the effect on the T
*
 and Te
*
 of the special model with 
perfect price-inelasticity of demand Case I, when the size of gypsum ore reserve 
changes. 
Table 6.4 Solutions of T
*
 and Te
*
 of the Special Model of Case I with Respect to 
Different Sizes of Gypsum Reserve 
Total 
gypsum 
reserve 
(S0) 
(million 
tons) 
T
*
 
obtained 
from 
equation 
6.50 
(years) 
Time when 
gypsum 
resource 
exhausted 
(adopted T
*
) 
(years) 
Time 
when 
export of 
gypsum 
ended 
(Te
*
) 
(years) 
Gypsum 
resource for 
domestic 
consumption 
)( 0S
d  
(million tons) 
Gypsum 
resource 
for export 
)( 0S
e  
(million 
tons) 
135.365 75.17 22.89 0 135.365 0 
270.730 75.17 33.07 0 270.730 0 
406.095 75.17 39.82 0 406.095 0 
541.460 75.17 44.85 0 541.460 0 
2,756.031 75.17 75.17 0 2,756.031 0 
  We can see from Table 6.4 that only when the size of gypsum reserve or 
S 0  is above 2,756.031 million tons (918 % larger than the estimated reserve of 270.730 
million tons as updated in 2006) does the solution of T
*
, the optimal time to completely 
extract all available gypsum reserves, obtained from equation 6.50 become real, and the 
Te
*
, the optimal time that export of gypsum ceases starts to be a positive figure.  
Equation 6.50, in effect, weights the earlier benefit of producing and exporting an 
amount of gypsum now against the later benefit of the producing such an amount for 
domestic consumption at the time when the total gypsum reserves are being depleted.  It 
is weighted this way because the additional consumption of such an amount of gypsum 
will be realized by domestic consumers only when the gypsum reserves originally 
allocated for domestic consumption are depleted.  Therefore, the larger the total gypsum 
reserves, which means the depletion of gypsum reserves allocated for domestic 
consumption will last longer, the more favourable the export of gypsum at present.  
288 
 
However, the critical size of the total gypsum reserve of above 2,756.031 million tons is 
too high to be possibly realistic. 
v) Conclusion of the Empirical Study of the Special Model of Case I 
The solution of the special model with perfect price-inelasticity of 
demand Case I means that if Hotelling’s rule works, to maximize its social benefit 
through time in terms of total economic welfare, Thailand should allocate none of its 
gypsum resource for export from now on or, in other words, should stop export of 
gypsum immediately.  This is because the discounted total economic welfare, 
comprising both producer surplus and consumer surplus, earned from the production 
and consumption of gypsum at the time when the total Thailand’s gypsum reserves 
are being depleted is still higher than the total economic welfare earned from the 
production and export of gypsum now since the latter comprises only the producer 
surplus.  This special model will recommend export of gypsum at present either when, 
with the estimated reserve of 270.730 million tons, the social discount rate is higher 
than 22.68 % or if the total gypsum reserves of Thailand are higher than 2,756.031 
million tons—more than 10 times larger than the total estimate in 2006 of 270.730 
million tons—at 10 % social discount rate.  The rate of 22.68 % is too high to be 
considered as an acceptable social discount rate, while the Thailand’s total gypsum 
reserves of 2,756.031 million tons is unlikely possible. Therefore, it can be said that 
the solution is not altered by the change in the social discount rate within the 
reasonable range of accepted values or a possible size of the total gypsum ore reserve 
of Thailand.   
Based on this special model, the gypsum extraction path is simply the 
path matching domestic demand, which, under the assumption of the model is 
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unaffected by gypsum price, and the total gypsum resource in Thailand will last 33.07 
years.   
b) Case II: with Zero Price Elasticity of Demand and Constant Prices 
i) The Model of Case II 
In this case, the pimt  and tp  in constant dollar do not rise in accordance 
with Hotelling‘s rule and are assumed to be fixed and equal to pim0  and 0p , respectively.  
Therefore, the expression 6.40 can be rewritten as follows:  
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Subject to the same constraints stated below expressions 6.33 and 6.35. 
Because the discount rate factor, rte , is weighted against future values 
and because the demand for the mineral is highly inelastic, producers will fulfil the 
demand as much and as fast as possible.  Hence, the gypsum extraction path in this case 
is also the path matching the demands for domestic consumption and for export.  As a 
result, )(tX dt  and )(tX
e
t  will respectively substitute for 
d
tQ  and 
e
tQ  in the above 
function, in the same manner as Case I, as follows: 
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The function )(tX dt  to be utilized in equation 6.52 is that of equation 
6.46, the same as in Case I.  Regarding )(tX et , it is not easily and truly determinable 
without assumptions.  In this case, the gypsum import from Thailand of a country is 
assumed to be a fixed proportion to such a country‘s consumption.  The consumption 
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functions of seven major client countries of Thailand determined in Chapter 5 will be 
the basis for defining )(tX et .  Furthermore, since a few minor client countries, covering 
only 4 % of the present total gypsum export of Thailand, are not studied in Chapter 5, 
the sum of the gypsum imports from Thailand of the seven countries will be multiplied 
by a factor to become )(tX et .  
The population and the GDP of all the seven countries are assumed to 
grow at constant rates.  Therefore, in the same way in deriving equation 6.46, we can 
define that: 
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(6.53) 
where w is the ratio of the total share of imports of minor countries in the total export 
of Thailand, w = 0.04 in this case; 
i is country number as in Table 6.5, for i = 1, 2, 3, ….7; 
Table 6.5 Coefficients and Factors for Equation 6.53 
Country Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Vietnam 
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i
1  0.918 0.181 1.006 5.433 1.472 2.496 20.494 
i
0  -568497.9 2268538 -7214542 -900731.2 -334353.6 1969560 -1545571 
i
2  285.621 -1104.577 3620.388 451.575 168.171 -992.767 777.901 
zi 0.995 0.111 0.127 0.999 0.928 0.998 0.327 
ki 0.051 0.018 0.048 0.056 0.052 0.045 0.078 
hi 0.013 0.001 0.004 0.019 0.022 0.004 0.014 
iGDP0  375.401 4334.693 902.655 152.605 120.428 369.709 64.234 
iPOP0   0.225 0.128 0.048 0.027 0.089 0.023 0.086 
Note:  1) 
i
1 ,
i
0  and 
i
2  are from Table 5.10 of Chapter 5.                                                                                   
2) zi, ki and hi are the five-year averages of the relevant statistics from 2003 to 2007. 
zi is the proportion of the import from Thailand to the total consumption of 
country i; 
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i
1 ,
i
0  and 
i
2  are the coefficients 1 , 0  and 2  of country i of equation 
5.17 of Chapter 5 as shown in Table 5.10, respectively; 
iGDP0  is the GDP of country i in 2007; 
iPOP0  is the total population of country i in 2007; 
ki is the GDP growth rate of country i; and 
hi is the population growth rate of country i. 
Substituting equations 6.46 and 6.53 for )(tX dt  and )(tX
e
t , respectively, in 
equation 6.52 and solving the definite integrals, we get: 
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  From the constraint equation 6.34, we have: 
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Substituting equations 6.46 and 6.53 for )(tX dt  and )(tX
e
t , respectively, in the 
above equation and solving the definite integrals, we get: 
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  Equations 6.54 and 6.55 are the two equations that can be used in 
determining the two important variables T and Te.  They cannot be further simplified as 
in Case I. 
ii) An Empirical Solution for the Special Model of Case II 
After putting the figures from Table 6.2 and Table 6.5 into equations 
6.54 and 6.55 and by trial and error with a computer program we find: 
 T
*
 = 25.27 years, and  
 Te
*
 = 13.68 years. 
With the known T
*
and Te
*
 we can find that: 
dttXS
T
d
t
d

0
0 )(  
 S
d
0 = 161.164 million tons, and 
 dttXS
Te
e
t
e

0
0 )(  
 S
e
0  = 109.566 million tons 
iii) Sensitivity Analysis of the Special Model of Case II with Respect 
to Different Discount Rates 
Table 6.6 shows the solutions of the T
*
, Te
*
, S
d
0 , and S
e
0  of the special 
model with perfect price-inelasticity Case II with different discount rates.  We can see 
that the lower the discount rate the smaller the resource to be allocated for export and, 
hence, the shorter the time to end export of gypsum, Te
*
.  At the discount rates equal 
and below the critical rate of 3.59 %, Te
*
 is zero, which means that all gypsum resource 
should be totally dedicated for domestic consumption, and, therefore, the export of 
gypsum should be ended immediately.  As for the time period with no export, (T
*
- Te
*
) 
before Thailand‘s gypsum resource is exhausted, it is shorter when the discount rate 
gets larger.  This means that at very high discount rates the net benefit from production 
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for export weights almost the same as the net benefit from production for domestic 
consumption. 
Table 6.6 Solutions of T
*
, Te
*
, S
d
0 , and S
e
0  of the Special Model of Case II with Respect 
to Different Discount Rates 
Discount 
Rate 
(r) 
(%) 
Time when 
gypsum 
resource 
exhausted 
(T
*
) 
(years) 
Time when 
export of 
gypsum 
ended (Te
*
) 
(years) 
Time 
period 
with no 
export 
(T
*
- Te
*
) 
(years) 
Gypsum 
Resource for 
Domestic 
Consumption 
)( 0S
d  
(million tons) 
Gypsum 
Resource 
for Export 
)( 0S
e  
(million 
tons) 
    2.50 33.07 0.00 33.07 270.730      0 
    3.59 33.07 0.00 33.07 270.730      0 
    5.00 30.16   6.91 23.25 224.413   46.317 
    7.50 27.08 11.61 15.47 182.511   88.219 
  10.00 25.27 13.68 11.59 161.164 109.566 
  12.50 24.10 14.83 9.27 147.854 122.876 
  15.00 23.28 15.56 7.72 139.516 131.214 
  17.50 22.67 16.07 6.60 133.258 137.472 
  20.00 22.21 16.43 5.78 128.493 142.237 
  22.50 21.85 16.71 5.14 124.795 145.935 
  25.00 21.55 16.93 4.62 121.955 148.775 
Table 6.7 shows the changes in percentages of the T
*
, Te
*
, S
d
0 , and S
e
0  of 
Case II when the discount rate varies.  Except for those of Te
*
 and S
e
0  at low discount 
rates, the absolute values of the changes in the solutions are less than the absolute 
values of the changes in the discount rate.  Note that Te
*
 and S
e
0  are more sensitive to 
the change in the discount rate, r, than T
*
 and S
d
0 . 
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Table 6.7 The Changes of T
*
, Te
*
, S
d
0 , and S
e
0  of the Special Model of Case II with 
Respect to Different Discount Rates 
Discount 
Rate 
(r) 
(%) 
% Change 
of r from 
the Base 
Case  
% Change 
of T
*
 from 
the Base 
Case 
% Change 
of Te
*
 from 
the Base 
Case 
% Change 
of S d0  from 
the Base 
Case 
% Change 
of S e0  from 
the Base 
Case 
  2.50 -75.0 30.87 -100.00 67.98 -100.00 
  3.59 -64.1 30.87 -100.00 67.98 -100.00 
  5.00 -50.0 19.35 -49.49 39.25 -57.73 
  7.50 -25.0 7.16 -15.13 13.25 -19.48 
10.00
§
 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12.50 25.0 -4.64 8.41 -8.26 12.15 
15.00 50.0 -7.89 13.74 -13.43 19.76 
17.50 75.0 -10.31 17.47 -17.32 25.47 
20.00 100.0 -12.10 20.10 -20.27 29.82 
22.50 125.0 -13.55 22.15 -22.57 33.19 
25.00 150.0 -14.72 23.76 -24.33 35.79 
Note:  
§ 
The base case is at r = 10 %. 
iv) Sensitivity Analysis of the Special Model of Case II with Respect 
to the Size of the Total Gypsum Ore Reserve 
  Table 6.8 shows the solutions of the special model with perfect price-
inelasticity of demand Case II with different sizes of S 0 , the total gypsum ore reserve 
of Thailand.  We can see that both T
*
 and Te get larger when S 0  get bigger.  Note that 
the change in the size of the total gypsum ore reserve barely affects the time period with 
no export, (T
*
 - Te).  This is because the assumed benefit and cost per ton of production 
for both domestic consumption and export are not changed. 
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Table 6.8 Solutions of T
*
, Te
*
, S
d
0 , and S
e
0  of the Special Model of Case II with Respect 
to the Size of the Total Gypsum Reserve of Thailand,
 
S0 
Total 
Gypsum 
Reserve (S0) 
(million 
tons) 
Time when 
gypsum 
resource 
exhausted 
(T
*
) 
(years) 
Time when 
export of 
gypsum 
ended (Te
*
) 
(years) 
Time 
period 
with no 
export 
(T
*
- Te
*
) 
(years) 
Gypsum 
Resource for 
Domestic 
Consumption 
)( 0S
d  
(million tons) 
Gypsum 
Resource 
for Export 
)( 0S
e  
(million 
tons) 
135.365 18.08         6.58 11.50           92.025      43.340 
270.730 25.27 13.68 11.59 161.164 109.566 
406.095 30.55 18.92 11.63 230.327 175.768 
541.460 34.73 23.08 11.65 300.005 241.455 
2,756.031 62.78 51.05 11.73 1430.022 1326.009 
v) Conclusion of the Empirical Study of the Special Model of Case II  
The solution of the special model with perfect price-inelasticity of 
demand Case II means that, with the social discount rate at 10 %, if Hotelling’s rule 
is disregarded and gypsum prices remain constant Thailand should allocate a total of 
109.566 million tons of gypsum resource for export and a total of 161.164 million 
tons of gypsum resource for domestic consumption. The export will last 13.68 years, 
while production for domestic consumption will end in 25.27 years, when all gypsum 
resource in Thailand is totally depleted.  There will be a period of 11.59 years, 
starting 13.68 years from now, that gypsum will be produced just for domestic 
consumption.  The gypsum extraction path for Thailand is simply the path matching 
the sum of the domestic demand and the demand for export, which is hardly affected 
by gypsum prices. 
 If the size of the total gypsum ore reserve is larger, both the time when 
gypsum resource of Thailand is totally depleted and the time that export should end 
will get longer.  The opposite is also true.  But the size of the total gypsum ore reserve 
barely affects the length of the period of no export before the total depletion of 
gypsum in Thailand. 
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The amount of gypsum resource allocated for export and the period of 
time from now that export of gypsum should be allowed get longer if the discount rate 
is higher.  The higher the discount rate the more favourable the production and 
export of gypsum now because a higher discount rate weights more against the 
discounted total economic welfare earned from the production and consumption of 
gypsum at a time far into the future.  Therefore, a larger portion of the gypsum 
resource should be allocated for export and, as a result, the time period that export of 
gypsum should be allowed get longer.  Certainly, this comes at the expense of 
domestic consumption.   
The opposite is also true.  Furthermore, if a social discount rate is less 
than or equal to 3.59 %, any amount of gypsum resources should not be allocated for 
export from now on; and, therefore, Thailand should stop export of gypsum 
immediately. This is because a small discount rate gives more weight to the 
discounted future total economic welfare earned from the production and 
consumption of gypsum in the future.  If the discount rate is small enough—smaller 
than 3.59%, in this case—all the discounted total economic welfare earned from the 
production and consumption of gypsum at any time, up until the total Thailand’s 
gypsum reserves are depleted, are larger than the total economic welfare earned from 
the production and export of gypsum now.  At such a rate, export of gypsum renders 
negative net benefit to Thailand. 
6.5.2 A Special Model with Non-Zero Price Elasticity of Demand 
 As was stated at the beginning of this chapter that the analysis in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis could not determine the relationship between gypsum price and consumption, 
the figures of price elasticities of demand for gypsum produced in Thailand have to be 
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assumed.  The assumed price elasticity of demand will be combined with the 
consumption functions defined in Chapter 5, which take account of the effect of 
incomes on consumption, to form demand functions with constant price elasticity.  It is 
assumed as if, from now on, the price starts to become an influential factor.  Therefore, 
equation 6.46 will truly forecast future consumptions only when prices do not change or 
pt = p0.  Hence, in the form of the demand function with constant price elasticity, we 
get: 
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Where: )(tX t  is the demand function from Chapter 5, which is in the function of 
time t only; 
),( ptQt  is the demand function in the function of time t and price p that 
takes the price elasticity of demand, -b, into account; 
p0 is the gypsum price at present; and 
pt is the gypsum price at time t. 
Figure 6.2 also shows the movement of the demand curves and the relationship 
between  )(tX t  and ),( ptQt  for t = 1, 2 and 3 under the above assumption. 
A further assumption is that gypsum consumers in Thailand and its client 
countries react on prices in the same way.  In other words, the price elasticity of 
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demand for gypsum is the same for Thailand and its client countries.  There are no 
grounds for this assumption.  But since this thesis cannot define the relationships 
between gypsum price and consumption of any countries, to assume each figure of price 
elasticity of demand for each country will make this empirical study more complicated 
without putting an additional credit to it.  Therefore,   
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 Substituting equation 6.46 in equation 6.56, we get:   
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 Similarly, substituting equation 6.53 in equation 6.57, we get: 
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The maximizing functions of a special model with price elasticity of demand are 
expressions 6.38 and 6.39.  When consumption of gypsum is influenced by price, the 
empirical study is more complicated.  Therefore, function 6.39, the annually discrete 
discounting form, will be used as the basic model in this part of the study, and it can be 
modified as follows: 
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Subject to:
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S(0) = S0, S(T) = 0,  
ed SSS 000  , or 

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t QQS
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0 ,     (6.61) 
T ≥ 0, Te ≥ 0, and Te ≤ T. 
The same as in the special model with the perfect price-inelasticity of demand, 
cint is the marginal cost in other gypsum producing countries to supply gypsum to 
Thailand in the future plus the unit shipment cost to Thailand.  Also assuming to have 
the same structure as c1, cint is considered as a constant, and the value of (cint - c1) is 
treated as positive. 
 Solving this special model also faces the same problems as those of the special 
model with perfect price-inelasticity of demand in determining the pimt  and tp .  
Alternative assumptions are needed.  The first one is the same as that of the special 
model with perfect price-inelasticity of demand Case I, which assumed that gypsum 
producers in both Thailand and its competitor act in accordance with Hotelling‘s rule.  
The other will treat pimt  as an exogenous variable that cannot be controlled by Thailand; 
therefore, it will be assumed as fixed.  This second alternative will allow tp , as well as 
the extraction path, to be manipulated to maximize the function 6.39 or 6.60. 
a) Case III: with Low Price Elasticity of Demand and Producers Raising 
Their Resource Rents in Accordance with Hotelling’s Rule  
i) The Model of Case III 
  If gypsum producers both in Thailand and other countries maximize the 
net prices of their gypsum in accordance with Hotelling‘s rule, then 
timim
t 'rcpcp )1)(()( int0int   and 
t
t 'rcpcp )1)(()( 101    
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Therefore, expression 6.60 can be rewritten as follows: 
Max

















0T
TT
t
t
d
t1int
T
t
d
t
im
c
'r'r
'r
'r
Q
b
cc
Q
b
cpbcp
)1(
1)1(
)1()1(
)(
)1(
)()(
11
10int0
  
+ Max 


Te
t
e
tQcp
1
10 )(  
From the constraining equation 6.61, we have 


T
t
d
t
Te
t
e
t QSQ
1
0
1
.  Therefore, the 
above equation can be modified as follows: 
Max

















0T
TT
t
t
d
t1int
T
t
d
t
im
c
'r'r
'r
'r
Q
b
cc
Q
b
cpbcp
)1(
1)1(
)1()1(
)(
)1(
)()(
11
10int0
 
+ Max 


T
t
d
tQScp
1
010 ))((
    
 
Or Max

















0T
TT
t
t
d
t1int
T
t
d
t
im
c
'r'r
'r
'r
Q
b
cc
Q
b
cpcp
)1(
1)1(
)1()1(
)(
)1(
)()(
11
10int0
  
010 )( Scp       
Substituting equation 6.58 in the above function, we get: 
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We can see that function 6.62, in the annually discrete discounting form, 
is not much different from function 6.44, in the continuously discounting form, of Case 
I.  For b < 1, the factor 1/(1-b) just makes the first two terms of function 6.62 higher 
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than those of function 6.44.  As a result, the solutions of T
*
 and Te
*
 can be determined in 
the same manner as those of Case I. 
ii) An Empirical Solution for the Special Model of Case III 
Under the assumption that the price elasticity of demand for gypsum in 
Thailand and its client countries is very small, function 6.62 will be tested by a couple 
of small values of b, 0.05 and 0.10.  With the parameters in Table 6.2 and by trial and 
error, it was found that for b = 0.05, T
*
 = 74.66 years and for b = 0.10, T
*
 = 74.65 years.  
However, substituting ),( ptQdt  from equation 6.58, and S
e
0  = 0 in equation 6.61, and by 
trial and error, we also have: 
 For b = 0.05, Tmax = 34.09 < 74.66 years, and 
for b = 0.10, Tmax = 35.69 < 74.65 years. 
 This means that the T* found by function 6.62 violates the constraining 
inequality T* ≤ Tmax. 
Therefore,  
for b = 0.05, T
*
 = 34.09 years,  
for b = 0.10, T
*
 = 35.69 years, and  
 Te
*
 = 0 in all two cases. 
iii) Critical Discount Rate and Reserve for the Special Model of Case 
III 
Similar to the solutions of Case I, when the discount rate and the reserve 
(or the total stock in the ground) of the mineral gypsum are high enough, Te
*
 becomes 
positive. Table 6.9 shows the critical discount rates and reserves, at which T* = Tmax, for 
the price elasticity of demand, b, = 0, 0.05, and 0.10. The discount rates and reserves 
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being more than the values appearing in Table 6.9 will render positive Te
*
.  We can see 
that the higher the elasticity of demand the smaller the discount rates and the reserve.  
However, the continuous discount rates of 20.48 % and 18.64 % are too high to be a 
universally acceptable social discount rate for any country.  The same as that of Case I 
the critical reserves for b = 0, 0.05, and 0.10 (7.87 and 6.13 times, respectively, of the 
present known reserve updated in 2006) are still too high to be possibly true. 
Table 6.9 The Critical Discount Rates and Reserves, at Which T* = Tmax 
b Tmax and T* 
Critical Annual 
Discrete Discount 
Rate (r'*) 
(%) 
Critical 
Continuous 
Discount Rate 
(r*) 
(%) 
Critical Reserve 
(S0*) 
(million tons) 
0.00
§
 33.07
§
 25.46
§
 22.68
§
 2,756.03
§
 
0.05 34.09 22.73 20.48 2,131.44 
0.10 35.69 20.49 18.64 1,660.38 
Note:  
§
 Solutions of Case I. 
iv) Conclusion of the Empirical Study of the Special Model of Case 
III 
The solution of the special model with low price elasticity of demand 
and producers raising the net prices of their gypsum in accordance with Hotelling’s 
rule is similar to that of Case I, the special model with perfect price-inelasticity of 
demand and applicable Hotelling’s rule. It means that Thailand should allocate none 
of its gypsum resource for export from now on or, in other words, should stop export 
of gypsum immediately. The gypsum extraction path is the path that makes the net 
price of gypsum grow at the rate of the social discount rate.  The total gypsum 
resource in Thailand will last 34.09 years for the price elasticity of demand of 0.05 
and 35.69 years for the price elasticity of demand of 0.10.  The solution is not altered 
by the change in the social discount rate within the reasonable range of accepted 
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values.  Furthermore, the solution is not changed for a possible size of the total 
gypsum ore reserve of Thailand. 
b) Case IV: with Price Elasticity of Demand and Fixed Foreign Gypsum 
Price 
This case will allow the price of gypsum produced in Thailand, tp , as well 
as the extraction path of gypsum resources, to be manipulated to maximize the function 
6.39 or 6.60.  However, the import or foreign price, p
im
t
 is an exogenous variable that 
cannot be controlled by Thailand.  To distinguish from Cases I and III; this case will 
assume p
im
t
, in constant dollars, as fixed.  That is: 
p
im
t
 = p
im
0
 
In Thailand, p
im
0
 will be the ultimate backstop price for domestic gypsum.  
If tp  is higher than such a price, gypsum users will switch to imported gypsum instead, 
and domestic gypsum producers will have to close their gypsum mines.  Therefore, to 
maximize benefit, tp  shall never be greater than p
im
t
. 
Constant p
im
t
 also means gypsum prices abroad, including in Australia, are 
fixed too.  Therefore, if the tp  is controlled in such a way that it is increasing while 
p
im
t
 remains fixed, Thailand‘s price advantage over its competitor, Australia, will be 
diminishing and totally lost some time in some or all markets.  Hence, a constant 
market share in the client countries as in Cases I, II, and III cannot be assumed here.  
For a constant unit cost of transportation, the prices of Thai gypsum abroad will also 
rise when the tp  rises.  Thailand will first lose the market in the farthest client country, 
where Thai gypsum has some price advantage over Australian gypsum at present, when 
the price of gypsum from Thailand becomes more expensive than that from Australia.  
If the price of Thai gypsum rises further to a certain point, below p
im
t
, Thailand will 
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lose the market in its closest client country, and as a result the export of gypsum from 
Thailand will totally stop.  The demand curve for Thai gypsum abroad should kink 
twice as shown in Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6.6 The Characteristic of the Demand Curve for Exported Gypsum 
  In Figure 6.6, line ABCD is the demand curve for Thai gypsum abroad.  
All prices depicted in the figure are domestic prices.  Line AB is the section that the 
prices of Thai gypsum are cheaper than those of its competitor in all client countries.  
Therefore, this section should be zero price elasticity of demand and the total quantity 
of export from Thailand is etX .  Price 
eJp0  is the price that, when the transportation cost 
from Thailand to the farthest client country is added, is equal to the price of gypsum 
imported from Thailand‘s competitor.  The farthest client country means the country 
where Thailand‘s distance advantage, in comparison with its competitor, is smallest.  
Therefore, when the gypsum price from Thailand rises above that price level, the 
demand for Thai gypsum there will start to decline because some gypsum users will 
switch to buy from other sources.  Line BC should be stepwise; however, for simplicity, 
pt 
Qt 
0 
p
im
0
 
p
eM
0  
p0 
eJp0  
0p  
A 
B 
C D 
e
tX  
eM
tQ  
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it is assumed to be smooth with single constant price elasticity.  Line CD is the demand 
section at the price p
eM
0  that, when the transportation cost to the client country closest 
to Thailand is added, is equal to the price of gypsum of Thailand‘s competitor in that 
country.  It should be infinite price elasticity of demand simply by the fact that none 
should import from Thailand when the price of Thailand‘s gypsum is higher than the 
others.  eMtQ is the quantity of export to the country closest to Thailand at time t during 
the time that the price of gypsum from Thailand there is cheaper than those from the 
others. 
i) The Model of Case IV 
  With the demand curve for exported gypsum as shown in Figure 6.6, if 
eb  is denoted as the price elasticity of demand for exported gypsum, then: 
  eb  = 0 for tp ≤
eJp0 ,      (6.63) 
  - ∞ < eb < 0 for 
eJp0 < tp < p
eM
0 , and    (6.64) 
  eb  = - ∞ for tp = p
eM
0 .     (6.65) 
  In addition, expression 6.57 for Case IV will become as follows: 
  
eb
eJ
te
t
e
t
p
p
tXQ

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0
)(      (6.66) 
While expression 6.56 remains the same as follows: 
db
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t
d
t
p
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tXQ
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0
)(        (6.67) 
where db  is the price elasticity of domestic demand for gypsum. 
Under the assumption that p
im
t
 = p
im
0
 and Thailand is able to manipulate 
the gypsum price inside the country, tp , expression 6.39 can be modified as follows: 
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  Because of the none zero db  and eb , for the optimum price path of 
tp , there will be the matched optimum production paths of 
d
tQ  and
e
tQ .  Maximizing 
expression 6.65 can be done by maximizing the discounted net social benefits at every 
time t, for t = 1, 2, 3, ……., T, under the constraint of equation 6.61. 
Let Ht be the discounted net social benefit at time t.  Therefore, 
Ht = 
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 If tp
 
 is manipulated to change by an amount of tdp , then the resulting 
changes in dtQ  and 
e
tQ  shall be defined by differentiating equations 6.67 and 6.66 as 
follows: 
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The change in the net social benefit at time t, dHt, as a result of the 
change in price at time t, tdp , shall be defined by differentiating equation 6.69 as 
follows: 
dHt = 
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bdQ   and bQdppdQ  . 
Therefore, 
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Substituting equations 6.66 and 6.67 in equation 6.72 and simplifying it, we have 
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Under the constraint of equation 6.61, the mineral stock in the ground is 
fixed. The changes in production at time t as a result of a change in price at time t, will 
cause a negative change in the production at time T equal to )( et
d
t dQdQ  .
 
  Let dJt be 
the discounted change in the net social benefit at time T as the result of the change in 
production (for domestic consumption only) at time T for an amount of )( et
d
t dQdQ  .  
dJt is simply the discounted result of the unit net social benefit at time T multiplied by 
)( et
d
t dQdQ   as follows: 
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Let Kt be the sum of the discounted net social benefits at times t and T.  Therefore, the 
discounted net social benefits as a result of manipulating tp  at time t will be at its 
maximum when Kt is also at its maximum.  Maximization of the discounted net social 
benefits as a result of manipulating tp  at time t can be done by maximizing Kt.  Each 
maximum Kt has a set of optimum 
d
tQ , 
e
tQ  and tp .  Therefore, the optimum extraction 
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and price paths of Thai gypsum can be determined by maximizing every Kt, for t = 1, 2, 
3, ….., T.  Since the export demand for Thai gypsum kinks with three different values 
of price elasticities, the optimum price and extraction paths of Thai gypsum for each 
section of the demand have to be determined by three different functions.  Kt is at its 
maximum when the value of its first derivative is equal to zero, the value of its second 
derivative is negative, and all constraints are obeyed.  However, within the range of 
constraints, if the value of the first derivative of Kt remains either positive or negative, 
Kt is at its maximum when the optimum 
d
tQ , 
e
tQ  and tp  are at either end of the 
enforcing constraint. 
dKt can be defined as: dKt = dHt + dJt.  Hence, 
dQ
dJ
dQ
dH
dQ
dK
t
t
t
t
t
t   and 
dp
dJ
dp
dH
dp
dK
t
t
t
t
t
t   
  Note that 
dQ
dH
t
t  can be called ―marginal social benefit of producing a unit 
of gypsum at time t‖ and 
dQ
dJ
t
t  can be called ―marginal social benefit of producing and 
consuming such a unit of gypsum at the time when the total Thailand‘s gypsum reserves 
are being depleted‖.  Maximizing Kt can be solved by set either 
dQ
dK
t
t  or 
dp
dK
t
t  equal to 
0.  By setting 0
dQ
dK
t
t , we get 
dQ
dJ
dQ
dH
t
t
t
t  , which can be said, in words, that 
maximizing Kt can be solved by setting the marginal social benefit of producing a unit 
of gypsum at time t to equal the marginal social benefit of producing such a unit of 
gypsum at the time when the total Thailand‘s gypsum reserves are being depleted.  
However, for a shorter explanation the following mathematical analysis will utilize the 
equation 
dp
dJ
dp
dH
dp
dK
t
t
t
t
t
t  .  
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For a Constant eb  Not Equal to Zero and Minus Infinity, Where 
eJp0  < tp  < p
eM
0  
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  The second derivative of Kt for a constant 
eb  not equal to zero and 
minus infinity is as follows: 
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For eb Equal to Zero, Where tp  ≤ 
eJp0  
  Substituting equations 6.66 and 6.67 in equation 6.72 as well as putting 
zero for eb  and simplifying it, we have 
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Therefore, the first derivative of Kt is as follows: 
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For eb  Equal to - ∞, Where tp = p
eM
0  
  On the assumption that export of gypsum ceases when tp = p
eM
0 , 
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ii) An Empirical Solution for the Special Model of Case IV 
The model of Case IV will be empirically tested by the data in Tables 6.2 
and 6.5 together with assumed and roughly calculated parameters shown in Table 6.10. 
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Table 6.10 Assumed and Roughly Calculated Parameters 
Parameter Value Source and basic assumption 
db  -0.1 An assumed figure. 
 
eb  
 
-3.5 
An approximate figure roughly calculated and 
based on eMX 0 = 1.019 million tons, p
eM
0  = 29.27 
2006$/ton
 
eJ
0X = 5.543 million tons, and 
eJp0 = 
17.85 2006$/ton. 
 
p
eM
0  
 
29.27 
2006$/ton 
A hypothetical figure that is equal to the assumed 
CIF price of Australian gypsum at a Malaysian 
port minus unit transportation cost from Thailand 
to Malaysia. 
 
eJp0  
 
17.85 
2006$/ton 
A hypothetical figure that is equal to the CIF price 
of Australian gypsum at a Japanese port minus unit 
transportation cost from Thailand to Japan. 
  After putting in all data into equation 6.78, it is found that, when the 
mineral is produced for domestic consumption only, 
dp
dK
t
t  is negative for any positive 
tp .  This means that if gypsum is produced for domestic consumption only, maximum 
net social benefit will be obtained if the price is at its lowest possible.  However, 
forcing down the price in combination with export prohibition measure may be 
unconventional and such a policy may be difficult to defend.  Therefore it is 
recommended that the price is fixed at just above p
eM
0 .  At such a price, it will not need 
to enforce export prohibition, for Thailand will have already priced itself out of the 
international gypsum market. 
  For the price range of
eJp0  < tp  < p
eM
0 , it is found that the second 
derivative of Kt demonstrated by equation 6.76 is negative.  This means that the set 
solution by equating the first derivative of Kt of equation 6.75 to zero is the optimal 
one.  Equation 6.75 can be solved by trial and error. 
  With regard to equation 6.77, it is found that 
dp
dK
t
t  is all positive for 
tp ≤
eJp0 .  This means that relatively large export volumes favour pushing the gypsum 
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price up to the maximum end of the price constraint.  This means that to maximize net 
social benefit over time, for any time t, tp  must not be cheaper than 
eJp0 . 
  The empirical results of the price tp  and the rates of extraction 
d
tQ , 
e
tQ  
and tQ  are shown in Table 6.11.  By such solutions, T
*
 = 23.91 years and Te
*
 = 19.60 
years.  
Table 6.11 The Optimal tp , 
d
tQ , 
e
tQ  and tQ  of Case IV 
Time t tp  
(2006$/ton) 
d
tQ  
(thousand tons) 
e
tQ  
(thousand tons) 
tQ  
(thousand tons) 
1 17.849 2,970 5,840 8,809 
2 17.849 3,168 6,150 9,318 
3 17.849 3,374 6,474 9,848 
4 17.849 3,589 6,813 10,402 
5 17.849 3,812 7,169 10,981 
6 17.849 4,045 7,540 11,586 
7 17.849 4,288 7,930 12,218 
8 17.849 4,541 8,337 12,879 
9 17.849 4,805 8,764 13,570 
10 17.849 5,081 9,212 14,292 
11 18.104 5,361 9,213 14,574 
12 19.021 5,632 8,143 13,776 
13 20.013 5,914 7,161 13,075 
14 21.082 6,205 6,271 12,476 
15 22.233 6,507 5,469 11,976 
16 23.466 6,820 4,756 11,576 
17 24.785 7,145 4,125 11,270 
18 26.191 7,482 3,572 11,054 
19 27.685 7,833 3,090 10,923 
20 29.270 8,198 1,587 9,785 
21 29.271* 8,625  8,625 
22 29.271* 9,073  9,073 
23 29.271* 9,541  9,541 
24 29.271* 9,105  9,105 
Total  143,115 127,615 270,730 
Note: * These are non optimal but recommended prices.  At such a price, there is no need to implement 
export prohibition.  Mathematically, the optimal prices at this range of demand curve are the lowest 
possible ones. 
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iii) Conclusion of the Empirical Study of the Special Model of Case 
IV 
The solution of the special model with price elasticity of demand and 
fixed foreign gypsum means that Thailand should immediately push up its gypsum 
price such that in the farthest country (Japan) the price of Thai gypsum is almost on 
par with that of its competitor if such price disparity exists.  At such a price, Thai 
gypsum should still have a small advantage of being cheaper than that of its 
competitor; therefore, the amount of gypsum exported should be maintained, under 
the assumption that the price elasticity of demand for gypsum in such a client country 
is close to zero.  Hence, Thailand should reap all the benefit of higher gypsum price 
with a negligible decline in domestic consumption.  The price should be fixed at that 
level for about ten years.  During this early period of time, the discounted total 
economic welfare earned from the production and export of gypsum, though 
comprising only the producer surplus, is greater than the discounted total economic 
welfare, comprising both producer surplus and consumer surplus, earned from the 
production and consumption of gypsum at the time when the total Thailand’s gypsum 
reserves are being depleted.  Therefore, it is imperative that the price of Thai gypsum 
must not be set too close to that of its competitor to jeopardize the demand from 
abroad.  After this early period, the price should be manipulated to increase again but 
gradually, along the demand functions for Thai gypsum.  During this second period 
of time, the prices should be set so as to equate the discounted marginal social benefit 
of producing a unit of gypsum at a time and the discounted marginal social benefit of 
producing and consuming such a unit of gypsum at the time when the total 
Thailand’s gypsum reserves are being depleted.  The amount of gypsum to export 
each year during this second period of time will determined by the demand function 
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for Thai gypsum from abroad.  The price should be pushed to reach the level that, 
when the transportation cost is added, is equal to the price of gypsum of Thailand’s 
competitor in the client country closest to Thailand (Malaysia).  At just above that 
price level, export of gypsum from Thailand will totally stop since Thailand will have 
priced itself out of all the international gypsum markets.  Thereafter the price of 
gypsum in Thailand should be fixed just above that price level to make export 
prohibition unnecessary.  The time that export will end is 19.60 years from now 
because beyond this point in time the discounted marginal social benefit of producing 
a unit of gypsum for export is smaller than the discounted marginal social benefit of 
producing and domestically consuming such a unit of gypsum at the time when the 
total Thailand’s gypsum reserves are being depleted.  The remainder of the resource 
will be produced for domestic consumption only for another 4.31 years.  Note that the 
time that gypsum should be produced for domestic consumption only of Case IV is 
shorter than that of Case II.  This is because the advantage in the net social benefit 
per unit of gypsum produced for domestic consumption over the gypsum produced for 
export of Case IV is smaller than that of Case II as a result of the price increment of 
Case IV.  Finally, all Thai gypsum resource will be totally depleted in 23.91 years 
from now. 
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6.6 Conclusions 
The four case of the economic model developed in this Chapter assumed 
different indeterminable conditions or scenarios.  However, all cases found that, 
because the consumer surpluses elsewhere are not beneficial to Thailand, exporting 
gypsum is not always good for the country.   
The first case adopts the assumptions that the price elasticity of demand for  
gypsum is zero and that the interaction between gypsum producers and consumers in  
both the domestic and international markets uphold Hotelling‘s rules.  Under these  
assumptions, Thailand should promptly stop the export of gypsum.  All the gypsum  
mineral resources should be dedicated solely for domestic consumption.  In this case, 
the gypsum mineral resources in Thailand will be totally depleted in 33.07 years.  This 
conclusion, which is based on the social discount rate of 10 %, will not be altered by the 
change in the discount rate if it remains within a universally accepted social domain.  
The conclusion is also not affected by a reasonable possibility of discovering new 
gypsum mineral resources in Thailand, for the total ore reserves needs to be over ten 
times the presently known figure before the exportation of mineral gypsum is allowed 
to continue for a short while.  
The second case, which also assumes the zero price elasticity of demand for 
gypsum, disregards Hotelling‘s rule and assumes that gypsum prices remain constant.  
Under this scenario, of all the gypsum reserve of 270.73 million tons, Thailand should 
allocate a total of 109.566 million tons for export and a total of 161.164 million tons for 
domestic consumption.  These solutions are based on a 10 % social discount rate.  By 
such allocation, export will last 13.68 years and, after that, all remaining gypsum 
resource should be produced for domestic consumption only for another 11.59 years.  
The total time of gypsum mineral production in Thailand until the resource is exhausted 
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will be 25.27 years, which is 7.80 years shorter than that of the first scenario.  While the 
length of time allowing for gypsum export and the total time of gypsum production in 
Thailand vary in the same direction as the size of the gypsum reserve, the length of time 
that all gypsum should be produced for domestic consumption change very little.  With 
regard to the discount rate, if it is higher the amount of gypsum resources allocated for 
export will be larger and the time allowed for gypsum export gets longer.  It is certainly 
at the expense of domestic consumption.  The opposite is also true and if the social 
discount rates are equal to or below 3.59 %, no amount of gypsum resources should be 
allocated for export. 
For the first two cases—Case I and Case II-- the gypsum extraction path for 
Thailand is simply the path matching the sum of the domestic demand and the demand 
for export, which is not affected by gypsum prices.  This is the result of the assumption 
of zero price elasticity of demand for gypsum. 
The third case is under the assumptions that there is a small correlation between 
gypsum price and gypsum consumption and the demand curve has low price elasticity 
of demand.  It is also assumed that producers raise the net price of gypsum in 
accordance with Hotelling‘s rule.  The outcomes of this case are very similar to those of 
Case I, the special model with zero price elasticity of demand and applicable 
Hotelling‘s rule.  By this case Thailand should allocate none of its gypsum resources for 
export from now on.  The gypsum extraction path is the path that makes the net price of 
gypsum grow at the rate of the social discount rate.  The total gypsum resources in 
Thailand will last 34.09 years for the price elasticity of demand of 0.05 and 35.69 years 
for the price elasticity of demand of 0.10.  Similar to the first case, the conclusion is not 
altered by the change in the social discount rate within the reasonable range of accepted 
values and the possible size of the total gypsum ore reserve of Thailand. 
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The fourth case is close to a perfect model but with a lot more assumptions and 
assumed data.  The case assumes that domestic demand is low price-elastic, while the 
demand from abroad composes of three sections with different price elasticities of 
demand: zero elasticity at low prices, high elasticity at intermediate prices, and infinite 
elasticity at a high price.  The gypsum price of Thailand‘s competitor, treated as an 
exogenous parameter, is assumed to be fixed over time, while the price of Thai gypsum 
is manipulated in such a way to maximize the total discounted net social benefits.  It is 
found that Thailand should immediately push up its gypsum price such that in the 
farthest country (Japan) the price of Thai gypsum is equal to that of its competitor.  
Then the price should be maintained at that level for about ten years before it should be 
forced to increase again but gradually to reach the level that, when the transportation 
cost is added, is equal to the price of gypsum of Thailand‘s competitor in the client 
country closest to Thailand (Malaysia).  The export will end just above that price level 
at the time 19.60 years from now.  The remainder of the resource will be produced for 
domestic consumption only for another 4.31 years.  Finally, all Thai gypsum resource 
will be totally depleted in 23.91 years from now.  Note that because of the domestic 
price increment of Case IV, which makes the advantage in the net social benefit per unit 
of gypsum produced for domestic consumption over the gypsum produced for export of 
Case IV smaller, the time that gypsum should be produced for domestic consumption 
only of Case IV is shorter than that of Case II.   
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Chapter 7    Discussion 
7.1 Overall Discussion 
The ultimate aim of the thesis is to use economic theories to develop long-term 
strategies and plans for the government of Thailand to manage its gypsum mineral 
resources with the aims to avoid pitfalls and to attain sustainable development.  In 
doing so, the thesis lays down the theoretical, conceptual and practical backgrounds 
relevant to a national administration of natural resources as its introductory parts for 
supporting and easily comprehending the developed economic models as well as its 
recommendations.  The recommendations, which include ways and means for achieving 
the optimal solutions of the analysis of this thesis, will be presented in Chapter 8. 
7.1.1 Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 begins by talking about the group of construction minerals, to which 
gypsum belongs, of Thailand and some of their problems.  Thailand‘s gypsum resource 
is peculiarly unique for it is the major source of gypsum supply in the regions of east, 
south-east and south Asia with almost no rivals.  As a cheap and bulky commodity, 
transportation costs constitute a large proportion of gypsum prices paid by users.  Note 
that, in U.S.A., freight and logistics costs can be 50% to 70% of delivered cost of the 
mineral to customer (Barker, 2007) and, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, from 1988 to 
2004, the average Cost, Freight and Insurance (CIF) price of Thai gypsum at Japan‘s 
ports, which included transportation costs, was almost double the average Free on 
Board (FOB) price of gypsum at Thailand‘s ports, during the same period.  For Thai 
gypsum, the closest competitor in the region is Australia, and the more distant Mexico 
and Morocco.  Theoretically, Thai gypsum producers could set their gypsum prices in a 
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consuming country to a level almost as high as that of the farther Australian gypsum.  
But Thai gypsum producers have almost never realized this advantage because of the 
intense competition by price-cutting among themselves.  This is the reason why the 
government has intervened by imposing export control, enforceable by the country‘s 
mining law, and inducing collusion among gypsum exporters.   
7.1.2 Chapter 2 
In the second chapter, briefs of mining laws, taxation, and policies of Canada, 
Australia, Brazil, as well as that of Thailand are presented as examples of how countries 
manage their mineral resources.  Canada and Australia are the world‘s leading exporters 
of minerals, while Brazil is similar to Thailand for it is a developing country with 
diversified economies that export some minerals.  This thesis shows that all four 
countries manage their mineral resources alike.  Notwithstanding their different 
governmental structures, geographies, environments, and population density, all treat 
their mining industries as special businesses that need tight control and are taxed 
extraordinarily.  All support their mining industry by way of investment promotion in 
mineral exploration activities, at least by supplying potential investors with geoscience 
data and other useful information to private investors.  They also attempt to solve 
environmental and social problems resulting from mining, such as land use conflicts, 
pollution, abandoned mined out areas, similarly.  Indeed, the similarities of the ways 
they manage their mineral resources have stemmed from the roles of mineral resources 
in their economies and the problems caused by them.  At the time when the mineral 
sectors were important, the attentions of the governments were more focused on 
revenue collection and nurturing their mineral industries with the purpose of increasing 
export earnings and tax revenues.  Pollution and environmental damage were not 
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matters of concern to anyone since most mines were located in remote areas.  However, 
it is clear that the relative importance of mineral resources to the economies of these 
four countries has been on a declining path as the countries have developed.  
Furthermore, eyesores and accumulated environmental damage caused by mining 
activities, which expanded exponentially worldwide in the last century, have become 
more evident.  In addition, populations and communities have grown.  Many of the 
remote areas in the past are not remote anymore.  At present, land use conflicts, 
pollution, and environmental damage caused by mining have become social issues in all 
four countries.  No wonder that at present the governments of these four countries work 
more toward rectifying past mistakes and lay greater stress on environmental and social 
issues. 
In Thailand‘s case, several decades ago, with a much smaller population, mining 
activities were almost exclusively conducted in the less populated and faraway areas in 
the southern part of the country.  As stated in Chapter 1, only until just over twenty 
years ago, the mineral sector contributed significantly to the economy of Thailand.  
During such time, laws and policies were aimed toward maximizing government 
revenue and export earnings from minerals, while laws involving environmental 
protection were weak.  As people became better off and more and more affected by the 
environmental problems caused by mining, pressure for change mounted on the 
government.  In 1992, Thailand enacted the National Environmental Quality Act B.E. 
2535.  Since then, all mining applicants have to submit and get their Environmental 
Impact Assessment reports approved by the authority before mining leases can be 
granted.  Also by that legislation, some restricted areas need the Cabinet‘s approval 
before mining leases can be granted, and some environmentally sensitive areas have 
been declared prohibitive to mining.  Now it is difficult and takes time for a mining 
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investor to obtain a mining lease, as he or she has to entangle with several bureaucratic 
agencies.  It is fair to say that Thailand at present adopts the inefficient system of check 
and balance in trying to curb the adverse effects from mining.  The era of full mining 
promotion without questions in Thailand has been literally closed.   
However, it is the opinion of the author of this thesis that the policy and practice 
of Thailand in managing its mineral resources might go too far to the conservation 
extreme.  Though it is true that the direct contribution of the mining sector to Thailand‘s 
economy is very small, Thailand cannot do well without some mining.  Thailand is not 
rich enough to import all kinds of raw minerals for its domestic industries.  In addition, 
as demonstrated in Chapter 3, which talks about ―resource curse‖, neither the ―curse‖ 
resulting from the exploitation nor the depletion of some of its mineral resources 
deterred Thailand from achieving a high average economic growth during the last few 
decades.  Hence, the question is not whether or not Thailand should totally conserve all 
of its mineral resources, but how Thailand exploits its mineral resources to attain the 
maximum intertemporal social benefit.  Therefore, some sensible changes in the 
mineral policy of Thailand might be as follows: 
i) Adopt social cost-benefit analysis and other economic tools to decide a 
specific mineral policy, and to solve land use conflicts; 
ii) Give priority to the production of minerals for domestic consumption, 
especially construction minerals; 
iii) Tighten command and control approach to prevent pollution and to minimize 
environmental damages; and 
iv) Adopt a ―polluter pays principle‖ and employ economic measures to transfer 
environmental costs back to be the private costs of polluters.  
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7.1.3 Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, a phenomenon, called the ―resource curse‖, which seemed to affect 
resource-rich countries, was presented together with an investigation on Thailand‘s 
first-hand experience of the phenomenon.  The chapter gives readers an important 
background that a government should bear in mind in administrating its mineral 
resources and setting up a mineral policy.   
Based on empirical studies, many scholars reported that resource rich countries 
appeared to have experienced worse economic performance than resource poor 
countries.  It seems as if the exploitation of wealthy natural resources, especially 
mineral deposits, is a curse not a gift.  It appears that the resource curse might be the 
effects of long term decline in terms of trade, revenue volatility, undesirable structural 
economic change, and socio-cultural and political impacts as a result of the government 
and some of the people of those nations who get suddenly and easily rich.   However, 
not all resource-rich countries appear to have suffered a long-lasting resource curse.  A 
few resource-rich countries—notably, Botswana, Chile, Malaysia, and Thailand—have 
been able to surpass the resource curse and become high economic growth countries.  In 
Thailand‘s case, before 1985, when agricultural and mineral commodities played major 
roles in total export, it showed some symptoms of the resource curse—export revenue 
fluctuation and decline in terms of trade.  Thailand overcame the problems by 
implementing prudent and conservative economic policies and being open to foreign 
investment.  Interest rates were kept high, commercial loans were kept tight, domestic 
currency was devaluated, zero growth government budgets were adopted, and tax rates 
were increased.  The impressive growth of the manufacturing sector as a result of the 
influx of foreign direct investment can be claimed to be the most important factor in 
Thailand overcoming the recourse curse.  Thailand might be a magnet of foreign 
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investment because of the rather stable internal politics, strong elite bureaucrats, and 
cultural homogeneity.  Geo-politics—Thailand was a frontline state fighting 
communism—and regional events, such as the Vietnam War, also helped Thailand 
economically.  
The results of Chapter 3 confirm that the resource curse is probably real.  But 
the curse is just a factor among many others that affect a county‘s development both in 
good and bad ways.  The postulate of the curse might be only one-sided.  The easy 
money from the exploitation of natural resources can be used as a springboard for 
development.  It is very difficult for a poor country, whose people normally associate 
with poor education—or, in other words, meager human capital—to develop.  In fact, 
not very long ago, nearly all developed countries, including the U.S.A. and Japan, used 
to depend more or less on a resource-based economy.  Therefore, the question for a 
country is not whether or not to exploit the country‘s rich natural resources, but how to 
mitigate the effect of the resource curse.   
At present, the resource curse is not anymore a problem for Thailand.  However, 
as Thailand is a developing country, which means that it is not out of the woods yet, 
and natural resources are still important to its economy, Thailand should not low down 
its guard against the curse.  Some recommendations to the Thai government about the 
exploitation of its gypsum mineral resource, with regard to the resource curse, will be 
presented in Chapter 8. 
7.1.4 Chapter 4 
The principle and concept of sustainable development are presented in Chapter 
4, for the exploitation of minerals, which are non-renewable resources, entwines with it.  
The globally accepted general definition for sustainable development—―development 
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that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs‖—was established by the UN Commission on the 
Environment and Development (UNCED) and first appeared in the Brundtland Report 
or ―Our Common Future‖ in 1987.  However, because the definition is short and vague, 
and the concept deals with the future, different scholars with different backgrounds, 
interests and motivations have interpreted the concept differently.  In the field of 
economics, Pezzey (1992) classified the economic definitions of sustainable 
development into two approaches as follows: 
i) The definitions based directly on the welfare of people, such as the one that 
consumption (or utility) is non-declining through time.  
ii) The definitions based on the means to provide people with welfare, such as 
the one that the total capital stock is non-declining through time. 
 With regard to the first approach of the economic definitions of sustainable 
development, Solow (1974) showed that, with Cobb-Douglas production function, zero 
population growth, and no technical progress, the constant consumption could be 
sustained over time by a suitable path of capital accumulation.  Later Hartwick (1977, 
1978) proposed a rule stating that a constant level of consumption can be sustained if 
all the rents on non-renewable resources extracted at each point in time are totally 
invested in reproducible capital.  This rule is now known as Hartwick rule.  However, 
Hartwick rule is just a necessary but not sufficient condition.  Other three necessary 
conditions are: 1) an economy has to be already on a sustainable path, 2) the resource 
extraction path must be efficient in a competitive economy, and 3) the economy‘s 
production technology is right.  The second condition pertains to Hotelling rule, while 
the possible production functions are that of the Cobb-Douglas and the Constant 
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Elasticity of Substitution ones, or if a backstop technology is permanently available 
(Perman et al., 2003).   
 The second approach of the economic definitions of sustainable development, 
the non-declining through time of the total capital stock (the natural capital plus the 
human-made capitals, comprising manufactured capital, human capital, social capital, 
and financial capital) is also called the weak sustainability approach.  Weak 
sustainability is based on the assumption of perfect substitution between natural and 
human-made capitals, as opposed to the strong sustainability that does not accept the 
concept of unlimited substitutability of capitals and requires not only the non-declining 
total capital stock but also the non-declining natural capital stock to attain 
sustainability.  
 The weak sustainability approach was more often adopted in economic 
literatures involving sustainable development and was the basis in formulating the 
sustainable development indicators to measure and monitor the sustainable 
development of a country.  Six proposed indicators for sustainable development are 
briefed in Chapter 4, together with numerical studies to see how well Thailand fared in 
sustainable development.  The six indicators are Genuine Savings (GS), Green Net 
National Product (GNNP), augmented GS, augmented GNNP, UN Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD) Indicators of Sustainable Development, and World 
Bank World Development Indicators. 
 It is found that when applying GS, augmented GS, GNNP, augmented GNNP 
and sustainable development composite index to Thailand, different indicators provide 
different answers.  This is because each indicator is derived from different fundamental 
concepts and methods.  GS and augmented GS show that the development of Thailand 
during the period of study, between 1993 and 2004, was sustainable because both sets 
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of figures were all positive.  On the other hand, the development of Thailand was 
unsustainable sometime during the period when GNNP, augmented GNNP, or the 
sustainable development composite index were used as indicators.  It should be noted 
that, in Thailand‘s case, the green and augmentation terms have a small effect on NNP; 
therefore, sustainable development of a country depends almost entirely on the 
conventional NNP.  If we take all these five sustainable development indicators into 
consideration it is still unclear whether the development of Thailand has achieved 
sustainability or not.  However, we may say that all indicators, especially GS, GNNP, 
and the sustainable development composite index, are useful policy tools for guiding 
Thailand to attain long-term sustainable development.  Individually, these indicators, 
which incorporate environmental and social components, offer critical markers for the 
government to monitor closely and prevent its development becoming unsustainable.  
Collectively, the government could treat one or two negative indicators among the five 
indicators as a serious warning sign for initiating remedial actions.   
 With regard to the role of minerals in sustainable development, minerals 
production could be physically sustainable—in other words, minerals outputs could at 
least be maintained for a long time—because of the following three factors: 1) depleted 
mineral reserves are replaced by investing in mineral exploration and development; 2) 
technological innovation makes it possible to extract mineral resources that were 
previously either technically difficult or commercially unfeasible to be mined; and 3) 
recycling adds mineral productions to markets.  In the views of proponents of the 
―weak‖ concept of sustainable development, intergenerational equity will be satisfied as 
long as exploration and technological progress offset the depletion and degradation of 
mineral resources (Eggert, 2000).  It is debatable whether these views are too optimistic 
for the rate of technological progress in the long run while the world‘s resources are 
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finite.  Notwithstanding this unsettling belief, a country can always supplant its 
depleted mineral resources by import.  Therefore, the finite quantity of minerals within 
its boundary is not necessarily a barrier to economic development of a country.   
 With an attempt to determine the optimal depletion of Thailand‘s gypsum 
mineral resource by following the Hotelling‘s concept of maximizing the present value 
through time of the resource rents, this thesis has indeed conformed to the second 
approach of the economic definitions of sustainable development, the non-declining 
through time of the total capital stock.  It should be noted that, as shown in Table 7.1, 
from 1993 to 2007, the budgets of the Thai government allocated for capital 
expenditures—expenses on equipments, land, buildings and related expenses—ranged 
from 172 to 375 billion bahts, in addition to huge sums for education and research 
(human capital investments) ranging from 101 to 358 billion bahts (Bureau of the 
Budget, 2007).  In comparison, the Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) originated from 
mining and quarrying sector, including petroleum, ranged from 44 to 277 billion bahts, 
which were lower than either the capital investments or the education and research 
expenditures in all years (Office of the National Economic and Social Development 
Board, 2008).  Therefore, Thailand, in effect, has surpassed the requirement of 
Hartwick rule.  But, as mentioned above, whether or not Thailand is already on a 
sustainable path, depends on which indicator is adopted.  Furthermore, the economy‘s 
production technology is unknown.  Anyway, Chapter 8 of this thesis will recommend 
Thailand to achieve and maintain sustainable development with regard to the 
exploitation of its mineral resources.  
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Table 7.1 Governmental Budgets Allocated for Capital Expenditures and Education and 
Research and the GDPs Originated from Mining and Quarrying Sector, 
from 1993 to 2007, of Thailand 
               (billion bahts) 
Year 
GDP Originated from 
Mining and Quarrying* 
Governmental Budgets Allocated for** 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Education and 
Research 
1993 44 172 101 
1994 49 213 108 
1995 50 254 132 
1996 63 327 144 
1997 82 380 154 
1998 84 279 180 
1999 87 234 178 
2000 117 217 193 
2001 126 219 195 
2002 136 224 206 
2003 155 211 225 
2004 175 293 250 
2005 223 319 279 
2006 257 358 314 
2007 277 375 358 
Source: *  Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (2008) 
             **  Bureau of the Budget (2007) 
 
7.1.5 Chapter 5 
 Chapters 5 and 6 are the quantitative and major analyses of this thesis, which 
aims to propose strategies for maximizing the social benefit from the exploitation of 
Thailand‘s gypsum mineral resource.  In Chapter 6 the economic models based on 
Hotelling‘s concept of maximizing Net Present Value (NPV) of resource rents accrued 
to a society is developed to determine the optimal depletion of Thailand‘s gypsum 
resource.  Solutions of the models of Chapter 6 will be the bases for the recommended 
strategies for maximizing the social benefit from the exploitation of Thailand‘s gypsum 
mineral resource.  The details of Chapter 6 will be discussed later.  However, the 
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models of Chapter 6 require the gypsum consumption or demand functions of countries 
that consumed Thailand‘s gypsum.  Therefore, a model determining gypsum 
consumption in Thailand and some countries that imported gypsum from Thailand is 
developed in Chapter 5.  Because of the very small and incomplete data, the demand 
equations of the model derived from the Ordinary Least Squares technique are very 
simple and the model should be treated as a very rough method of approximation of the 
demands for gypsum that is better than a guesstimate. 
The analysis of Chapter 5 found that the gypsum price does not affect 
consumption or, in other words, the price elasticity of demand for gypsum is zero, at 
least, in the short run.  Though the analysis has some shortcomings as mentioned above, 
its results conform to other empirical studies on demands for minerals and metals.  
Eleven papers on the demands for metals were reviewed in this chapter.  In their 
determinations of demand or consumption functions, all either outright discarded price 
factors or found the price elasticities of the demands for metals, except the demand for 
gold in high-income countries, were close to zero or very small.  Note that all five main 
authors of the papers that did not take price factors into account have sufficient 
knowledge of economics since they either were teaching at relevant departments in 
universities or were mineral economists by profession.   
The empirical solutions of the adopted general consumption models for 
Thailand and seven other Asian countries in Chapter 5 reaffirm many other studies in 
the field of minerals that the consumption of a mineral is strongly influenced by 
consumer income, but insignificantly affected by the mineral price.  Almost all minerals 
and metals are raw materials for the production of consumer goods.  Hence, the costs 
(or prices) of mineral raw materials constitute only fractions of the prices of consumer 
goods.  In the case of gypsum, its price accounts for less than 0.5 % of the Portland 
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cement‘s price (Department of Primary Industries and Mines, 2004).  A reasonable 
movement of a mineral price affects the prices of consumer goods very little; therefore, 
the consumption of consumer goods and its mineral raw materials will not change 
much.   
Moreover, in most cases industrial plants require retooling if raw material is 
changed.  Hence, it costs somewhat and takes time for industrial plants to switch over to 
new substitute raw materials.  As in the case of gypsum wallboard, consumers may 
substitute plywood or other kinds of partitions for gypsum wallboard at will.  But 
gypsum wallboard producers have no choice but to be faithful to gypsum in their 
production or else to make heavy reinvestment to produce other different products 
instead.  Furthermore, in fighting to maintain or to increase its market share, an industry 
would tend to refrain from passing the burden of a small additional cost on to 
consumers.  Therefore, the demand for the product will not decrease, and as a result the 
demand for minerals used in the production of such a product will not be affected. 
This thesis as well as other studies has found that while the relation between the 
price and the consumption of a mineral can hardly be determined from historical data, 
the correlation between the GDP per capita and the mineral consumption of a country is 
prominent.  This means that a change in mineral consumption is the result of a shift in 
the demand function due to a change in consumer income, consumer taste, technology, 
etc.  
7.1.6 Chapter 6 
 In Chapter 6, the economic models, based on the concept of maximizing Net 
Present Value (NPV) of resource rents accrued to a society from the exploitation of a 
mineral resource, are formulated.  The concept is that of Hotelling model in 1931, 
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which is presented in the introductory section of Chapter 6 as a previewing background.  
Hotelling model basically explored an optimal path of mineral resource exploitation 
that maximizes the present value of resource rents through time.  Though, Hotelling 
presented his paper in 1931 several decades before the inception of the idea of 
sustainable development, his model has been connected with the concept of ―weak 
sustainability‖.  Under the concept, the capitals in various forms—natural, 
manufactured, human, social and financial —which are necessary tools for a human-
being to have a good quality of life, are interchangeable.  Hartwick (1977, 1978) has 
shown that, under some conditions, non-decreasing consumption could be maintained if 
the Hotelling rent generated by the exploitation of nonrenewable resources is reinvested 
in some forms of capital stocks to provide for future consumption.  Therefore, as 
nonrenewable resources are depleted, weak sustainability requires that the Hotelling 
rent must be reinvested to develop substitute capital stocks for the time when the 
resource is depleted.  The concept of the Hotelling model is later adopted as the basis of 
the economic models of this thesis to define the optimal extraction path of Thailand‘s 
gypsum mineral resources.  This is essentially the first step for Thailand to attain 
sustainable development in the exploitation of its gypsum resources.  The further step is 
for Thailand to reinvest the resource rent from the exploitation of gypsum resources in 
some forms of capital stocks to provide for future consumption, in accordance with the 
Hatwick‘s rule. 
The economic models created are under the presumption that the benefits are 
represented by the total economic welfare and the society covers just gypsum producers 
and consumers within Thailand‘s boundary.  In addition, it is assumed, in brief, as 
follows:  
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1) After the gypsum resource in Thailand is depleted completely Thailand will 
import gypsum from other countries for consumption;  
2) The effect on the world gypsum price of the relatively small demand for 
gypsum in Thailand is negligible;  
3) The price paid by Thai consumers for gypsum produced domestically is on 
par with the Free on Board (F.O.B.) price;  
4) The amount of gypsum reserves left in the ground is fixed;  
5) The price elasticity of demand for gypsum in Thailand and its client countries 
is very small; and  
6) The rates of growth of populations and GDPs of Thailand and other Asian 
countries importing gypsum from Thailand are constant.  
Admittedly, with such many assumptions, the general model created in Chapter 
6 cannot be construed as a theoretical one.  However, it is the intention of this thesis to 
put presently available theories into practice in real complex world rather than 
proposing a new theory. 
The assumption no. 1) is true up until the total depletion of all gypsum resources 
in the world if mineral gypsum is indispensable for domestic industries.  However, it is 
more likely that the by-product synthetic gypsum will play a part in substituting for 
mineral gypsum when the price rises as the gypsum mineral resources in Thailand are 
nearly depleted.  The assumption no. 2) is logical but it is not certain in the future.  It 
depends on future development of Thailand since the demand for the mineral correlates 
with GDP.  The assumption will start to fall apart if Thailand economically develops 
faster than other countries in the region and the share of Thailand in the total regional 
demand for gypsum grows more significant. 
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The assumption no. 3) gets the backing of the law of one price and there is no 
evidence to say otherwise.  However, the no. 4) assumption, stating that the total 
gypsum reserves are fixed when prices change, is contrary to an economic theory.  The 
assumption is first and foremost for sake of simplicity, but it may not be far off from 
reality in the case of the gypsum mineral resources in Thailand.  As explained in 
Chapter 6 when this assumption was stated, it is unlikely that there will be a discovery 
of substantially additional gypsum reserves in Thailand. 
Among all the assumptions in this thesis, the most controversial one is the 
assumption no. 5), which treats price as an irrelevant factor, literally.  Lengthy 
discussion was done in the subsection on Chapter 5 of this chapter, above; therefore, it 
is too cumbersome to repeat here again. 
The assumption no. 6), which is about the rates of growth of populations and 
GDPs of countries are constant, is just for the convenience of the analysis of this thesis.  
The constant growth rates result in the continual of gypsum consumption with no 
downturns.  Most countries have rather slowly down trends in population growth, but 
the GDP of a country has been neither stable nor always positive.   
In Chapter 6 a general model, which is closer to be a theoretical ideal, was 
created.  However, the general model consists of some parameters that are difficult to 
determine and that this thesis failed to determine. The parameters that are determined 
with difficulty are the positive effect on the marginal cost of extraction, and the 
negative effect of technology on the marginal cost of extraction.  The one that cannot be 
determined in Chapter 5 of this thesis is the significant value of the price elasticity of 
demand for gypsum.  To solve this shortcoming, Chapter 6 presents four cases of 
special models with some assumed parameters and scenarios.  The special models 
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together with their empirical solutions, which will be the bases of the recommendations 
to the Thai government, are to be discussed in the next section.   
The maximizing function of the general model is the function maximizing the 
discounted flow of the sum of the producer surplus, or the resource rents of gypsum 
mining industry, from the present to the time the gypsum resource in Thailand is 
depleted, and the consumer surplus from consuming gypsum from the present to 
infinity.  However, after some mathematical manipulation, the function becomes 
maximizing the discounted flow of the sum of the total surplus (producer surplus plus 
net consumer surplus) of the gypsum production for domestic consumption, from the 
present to the time the gypsum resource in Thailand is depleted, and the producer 
surplus only of the gypsum production for export, from the present to the time the 
export of gypsum from Thailand stops.  From the general model, it is found that the real 
domestic price movement insignificantly affects the net social benefit (net consumer 
surplus + producer surplus) generated by the gypsum production for domestic 
consumption, if the absolute value of price elasticity of demand for gypsum is very 
small.  But the level of the expected import price if the domestic production of gypsum 
is stopped significantly affects the net social benefit.  The higher the level of the 
expected import price the bigger the net social benefit generated by the gypsum 
production for domestic consumption.  It can be deduced from Expressions 6.35 or 6.36 
of the general model that, under the condition that the price elasticity of demand for 
gypsum in Thailand is highly inelastic, Thailand will gain a better total discounted net 
social benefit if the gypsum price within the country is elevated to the level close to the 
expected import price.  The additional gain is obviously from the higher export value.   
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7.2 Discussion on the Empirical Solutions of the Special Models of 
Chapter 6 
7.2.1 Assumptions and Solutions 
As stated in the above section, the created general model consists of some 
parameters that are difficult to determine and that this thesis failed to determine.  To 
solve this shortcoming, Chapter 6 presents four cases of special models with some 
assumed parameters and scenarios.  All four cases assume that the positive effect on the 
marginal cost of extraction, and the negative effect of technology on the marginal cost 
of extraction cancel each other out. It should be noted that the belief that the marginal 
cost of extracting minerals increases when the stocks of minerals get smaller has not 
been evidenced over time.  As time passes minerals are mined from deeper deposits and 
their grades are poorer.  Therefore, the average extraction cost of a mineral and its 
price, as a result of the change in the cost, were supposed to have an increasing trend.  
But the real historical price-trends of most minerals, including Thai gypsum as shown 
in Figure 5.10 of Chapter 5, have not conformed to such a belief.  Since the 
consumption of a mineral, in general, has increased over time, the downward shift, if 
any, of the demand curve alone as the cause of the fall in the mineral price can be 
eliminated.  The downward shift of the supply curve because of the fall in the extraction 
cost should be the main culprit in the decline in price.  As already discussed in Chapter 
5, mineral extraction costs actually have slowly declined over time as the results of the 
successful increase in productivity due to innovations and new technologies.  
Furthermore, over a normally long mining life, improvement always occurs 
continuously in a mine as miners gain more experience.  Therefore, the cost of mining a 
deeper part of an ore deposit will likely be lower than expected.  However, future 
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technological progress is not certain to leap forwards as smoothly and as fast as it has 
been, while the depletion of many minerals are geologically real.  Therefore, to 
compromise the two opposite forces and to simplify the problem, the special models 
assume that the aggregate marginal cost to extract gypsum, in real terms, is constant 
over time.   
The additional assumptions and the solutions of the four cases of special models 
are as follows. 
i) Case I assumes that the price elasticity of demand for Thailand‘s gypsum is 
zero and the gypsum producers in both Thailand and abroad push up the net prices (sale 
prices – marginal costs) to rise in accordance with Hotelling‘s rules.  The first 
assumption stems from the result of Chapter 5 and other studies that found 
consumptions of minerals are insignificantly affected by the mineral prices.  The latter 
assumption has no particular reason but the belief in such a hypothesis.  Under these 
assumptions, Thailand should promptly stop the export of gypsum now.  All the 
gypsum mineral resources of 270.73 million tons should be dedicated solely for 
domestic consumption. This is because the discounted sum of producer surplus and 
consumer surplus, earned from the production and consumption of an amount of 
gypsum at the time when the total Thailand‘s gypsum reserves are being depleted is still 
higher than the only producer surplus earned from the production of such an amount of 
gypsum for export.  At 10 % social discount rate, export of gypsum at present gives 
higher benefit if the total gypsum reserves of Thailand are higher than 2,756.031 
million tons—more than 10 times larger than the total estimate in 2006 of 270.730 
million tons.  With the total gypsum reserves of 270.730 million tons, export of gypsum 
at present also gives higher benefit if the discount rate is higher than 22.68 %.  In case 
the export of gypsum stops now, the gypsum mineral resources in Thailand will be 
337 
 
totally depleted in 33.07 years.  The gypsum extraction path is simply the path matching 
domestic demand, which is under the assumption that it is not affected by gypsum price.  
The results of Cases I, with regard to future domestic price trend, expected import price 
trend, production for domestic consumption, and total production are shown in Table 
7.2. 
Table 7.2  The Optimal Import Price )( imtp , Domestic Price )( tp , Production for 
Domestic Consumption )( dtQ , and Total Production )( tQ  of Case I
 
Time t Import Price 
)( imtp  
(2006$/ton) 
Domestic Price 
)( tp  
(2006$/ton) 
Production for Domestic Consumption and 
Total Production
 )( t
d
t QQ   (thousand tons) 
1 33.63 15.21 3,035 
2 34.59 16.17 3,238 
3 35.64 17.22 3,449 
4 36.80 18.39 3,668 
5 38.09 19.68 3,897 
6 39.51 21.10 4,135 
7 41.08 22.67 4,383 
8 42.82 24.41 4,641 
9 44.74 26.33 4,911 
10 46.86 28.46 5,193 
11 49.20 30.80 5,487 
12 51.79 33.40 5,793 
13 54.66 36.26 6,114 
14 57.82 39.43 6,448 
15 61.32 42.93 6,798 
16 65.18 46.80 7,164 
17 69.46 51.08 7,546 
18 74.18 55.81 7,946 
19 79.39 61.03 8,365 
20 85.16 66.80 8,803 
21 91.53 73.18 9,262 
22 98.58 80.24 9,743 
23 106.36 88.03 10,246 
24 114.96 96.64 10,774 
25 124.47 106.16 11,327 
26 134.97 116.68 11,908 
27 146.58 128.30 12,516 
28 159.42 141.15 13,155 
29 173.60 155.35 13,825 
30 189.27 171.04 14,528 
31 206.59 188.39 15,267 
32 225.74 207.55 16,042 
33 246.89 228.73 11,121 
Total   270,730 
 
ii) The same as Case I, Case II assumes that the price elasticity of demand for 
Thailand‘s gypsum is zero.  However, in this case Hotelling‘s rule is disregarded and it 
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is assumed that gypsum prices anywhere will remain constant.  In fact, the assumption 
of constant gypsum prices is much close to reality than the assumption that prices 
increase continuously in accordance with the Hotelling rule as in Case I.  As shown in 
Figures 5.7, 5.9, and 5.10, the price trends in the past were rather flat and even in 
decline in some markets. Under these assumptions, at a 10% social discount rate, 
Thailand should allocate a total of 109.566 million tons for export and a total of 
161.164 million tons for domestic consumption.  By such allocation, export will last 
13.68 years and all remaining gypsum resource will be produced for domestic 
consumption only for another 11.59 years.  The total time of gypsum mineral 
production in Thailand until the resource is exhausted will be 25.27 years.  If the social 
discount rate is higher, the amount of gypsum resources allocated for export will be 
larger and the period of time allowing gypsum to be exported will be longer. The is 
because a higher discount rate weights more against the discounted total economic 
welfare (producer surplus and consumer surplus) earned from the production and 
consumption of gypsum at a time far into the future.  Therefore, a larger portion of the 
gypsum resources should be allocated for export and, as a result, the time period that 
export of gypsum should be allowed get longer.  However, the opposite is also true, and 
if the social discount rate that is equal to or below 3.59 % is adopted, no amount of 
gypsum resources should be allocated for export from now on, meaning that Thailand 
should stop export of gypsum immediately.  This is because below such a discount rate 
all the discounted total economic welfares earned from the production and consumption 
of gypsum at any time, up until the total Thailand‘s gypsum reserves are depleted, are 
larger than the total economic welfare earned from the production and export of 
gypsum now.  If the size of the total gypsum ore reserve is larger, both the time when 
the gypsum resources of Thailand are totally depleted and the time that export should 
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end will get longer.  The opposite is also true.  But the size of the total gypsum ore 
reserve barely affects the length of the period of no export before the total depletion of 
gypsum in Thailand.  The same as in Case I, the gypsum extraction path is simply the 
path matching domestic demand, which is under the assumption that it is not affected 
by gypsum price.  The results of Cases II, with regard to future domestic price trend, 
expected import price trend, production for domestic consumption, production for 
export, and total production are shown in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3  The Optimal Import Price )( imtp , Domestic Price )( tp , Production for 
Domestic Consumption )( dtQ , Production for Export )(
e
tQ , and Total 
Production )( tQ  of Case II
 
Time t 
Import Price
 )( imtp  
(2006$/ton) 
Domestic 
Price
 )( tp  
(2006$/ton) 
Production for 
Domestic 
Consumption 
)( dtQ  
(thousand tons) 
Production for 
Export
 )( etQ  
(thousand tons) 
Total production 
)( et
d
tt QQQ   
(thousand tons) 
1 32.77 14.35 3,035 5,840 8,875 
2 32.77 14.35 3,238 6,150 9,388 
3 32.77 14.35 3,449 6,474 9,923 
4 32.77 14.35 3,668 6,813 10,481 
5 32.77 14.35 3,897 7,169 11,065 
6 32.77 14.35 4,135 7,540 11,675 
7 32.77 14.35 4,383 7,930 12,312 
8 32.77 14.35 4,641 8,337 12,979 
9 32.77 14.35 4,911 8,764 13,676 
10 32.77 14.35 5,193 9,212 14,404 
11 32.77 14.35 5,487 9,680 15,167 
12 32.77 14.35 5,793 10,172 15,965 
13 32.77 14.35 6,114 10,687 16,801 
14 32.77 14.35 6,448 4,799 11,247 
15 32.77 14.35 6,798  6,798 
16 32.77 14.35 7,164  7,164 
17 32.77 14.35 7,546  7,546 
18 32.77 14.35 7,946  7,946 
19 32.77 14.35 8,365  8,365 
20 32.77 14.35 8,803  8,803 
21 32.77 14.35 9,262  9,262 
22 32.77 14.35 9,743  9,743 
23 32.77 14.35 10,246  10,246 
24 32.77 14.35 10,774  10,774 
25 32.77 14.35 10,123  10,123 
Total   161,164 109,566 270,730 
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iii) In Case III, the assumption about future price trends is that the gypsum 
producers in both Thailand and abroad push up the net prices to rise in accordance with 
Hotelling‘s rules, the same as in Case I.  But the price elasticity of demand for 
Thailand‘s gypsum is not zero.  A couple small figures of the price elasticity of demand 
for gypsum were assumed.  The case was really to test the effect of the price elasticity 
of demand for gypsum on the solutions of Case I.  It found out that Thailand should 
allocate none of the gypsum resources for export from now on.  Such a result is similar 
to that of Case I.  The gypsum extraction path is the path that makes the net price grow 
at the rate of the social discount rate.  At 10% social discount rate, the total gypsum 
resources in Thailand will last 34.09 years, for the price elasticity of demand of 0.05, 
and 35.69 years, for the price elasticity of demand of 0.10.  It means that the higher the 
price elasticity of demand the longer the time the Thai gypsum reserves will last.  This 
is because, with higher price elasticity of demand, the price rise in accordance with 
Hotelling‘s rule will slow the growth of the demand for gypsum.  Similar to Case I, if 
the discount rate or the total gypsum reserves are high enough the export of gypsum at 
present will render higher benefit.  But such a rate is too high to be a social discount 
rate and such a total gypsum reserves is too high to be possible.  The results of Cases 
III, with regard to future domestic price trend, expected import price trend, production 
for domestic consumption, production for export, and total production are shown in 
Table 7.4. 
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Table 7.4  The Optimal Import Price )( imtp , Domestic Price )( tp , Production for 
Domestic Consumption )( dtQ , and Total Production )( tQ  of Case III 
 
Time t 
Import 
Price
 )( imtp  
(2006$/ton) 
Domestic 
Price
 )( tp  
(2006$/ton) 
Production for Domestic Consumption 
and Total Production
 )( t
d
t QQ   
(thousand tons)
 b = 0.05
 
b = 0.1
 
1 33.63 15.21 3,027 3,018 
2 34.59 16.17 3,219 3,200 
3 35.64 17.22 3,417 3,386 
4 36.80 18.39 3,623 3,578 
5 38.09 19.68 3,836 3,776 
6 39.51 21.10 4,056 3,978 
7 41.08 22.67 4,284 4,187 
8 42.82 24.41 4,520 4,401 
9 44.74 26.33 4,764 4,622 
10 46.86 28.46 5,018 4,849 
11 49.20 30.80 5,281 5,083 
12 51.79 33.40 5,554 5,324 
13 54.66 36.26 5,837 5,572 
14 57.82 39.43 6,131 5,828 
15 61.32 42.93 6,436 6,093 
16 65.18 46.80 6,753 6,365 
17 69.46 51.08 7,082 6,647 
18 74.18 55.81 7,425 6,937 
19 79.39 61.03 7,781 7,238 
20 85.16 66.80 8,152 7,548 
21 91.53 73.18 8,538 7,870 
22 98.58 80.24 8,939 8,202 
23 106.36 88.03 9,358 8,547 
24 114.96 96.64 9,794 8,903 
25 124.47 106.16 10,249 9,273 
26 134.97 116.68 10,723 9,656 
27 146.58 128.30 11,218 10,054 
28 159.42 141.15 11,734 10,466 
29 173.60 155.35 12,273 10,895 
30 189.27 171.04 12,835 11,339 
31 206.59 188.39 13,423 11,801 
32 225.74 207.55 14,036 12,281 
33 246.89 228.73 14,678 12,780 
34 270.28 252.15 15,349 13,299 
35 296.12 278.02 1,391 13,839 
36 324.68 306.61  9,893 
Total   270,730 270,730 
 
 
iv) Case IV is close to the general model but with a lot more assumptions and 
assumed data.  The case assumes that domestic demand is low price-elastic, while the 
demand from abroad composes of three sections, as shown in Figure 6.6, with different 
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price elasticities of demand: zero elasticity of demand at low prices, high elasticity of 
demand at intermediate prices, and infinite elasticity of demand at a high price.  The 
gypsum price of Thailand‘s competitor, Australia, treated as an exogenous parameter, is 
assumed to be fixed over time.  At the zero elasticity section of the demand curve, Thai 
gypsum still has the advantage of being cheaper than its competitor in every market.  
But when the price of Thai gypsum goes up above that section and moves into the 
intermediate section of the demand curve, Thailand will start to lose first its customer in 
the farthest market from Thailand but closest to its competitor.  If the price of Thai 
gypsum increases further the loss of its market shares will be bigger and bigger when 
closer and closer customers desert its gypsum.  At a certain price height, Thailand will 
lose all its markets when the closest customer switches over to import gypsum from its 
competitor.  The last section of the demand curve is infinite elasticity because it is more 
likely that the last customer will immediately stop import gypsum from Thailand.  It is 
found that, under these assumptions and with the social discount rate at 10%, Thailand 
should immediately push up its gypsum price such that in the farthest country (Japan) 
the price of Thai gypsum is almost equal to that of its competitor.  At such a price, Thai 
gypsum should still have a small advantage of being cheaper than that of its competitor; 
therefore, the amount of gypsum exported should be maintained.  The price should be 
maintained at that level for about ten years.  During this early period of time, the 
discounted total producer surplus earned from the production of a unit of gypsum for 
export is greater than the discounted sum of the producer surplus and consumer surplus, 
earned from the production and consumption of such a unit of gypsum at the time when 
the total Thailand‘s gypsum reserves are being depleted.   Then, it should be forced to 
increase again but gradually.  During this second period of time, the prices should be set 
so as to equate the discounted marginal social benefit of producing a unit of gypsum at 
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a time and the discounted marginal social benefit of producing and consuming such a 
unit of gypsum at the time when the total Thailand‘s gypsum reserves are being 
depleted.  The amount of gypsum to export each year during this second period of time 
will be determined by the demand function.  When the price of Thai gypsum in the 
client country closest to Thailand (Malaysia) is raised to the level just above that of 
Thailand‘s competitor, export of gypsum from Thailand will end.  The time to reach 
such a critical price level is 19.60 years from now.  Beyond this point in time, the 
discounted marginal social benefit of producing a unit of gypsum for export is smaller 
than the discounted marginal social benefit of producing and domestically consuming 
such a unit of gypsum at the time when the total Thailand‘s gypsum reserves are being 
depleted.  Thereafter, the price of gypsum in Thailand should be fixed just above that 
price level to deter export.  As Thailand prices itself out of all the international gypsum 
markets, the remainder of the resources will be produced for domestic consumption 
only for another 4.31 years.  All Thai gypsum resource will be totally depleted in 23.91 
years from now.  The results of Case IV, with regard to future domestic price trends, 
expected import price trends, production for domestic consumption, production for 
export, and total production are shown in Table 7.5. 
Conclusively, all cases found that the export of gypsum is not always good to 
Thailand.  All solutions suggest that at some point in time before all gypsum resources 
are depleted—ranging from immediately as in Case I and Case III to 19.60 years from 
now as in Case IV—Thailand should stop export of mineral gypsum.  
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Table 7.5 The Optimal Import Price )( imtp , Domestic Price )( tp , Production for 
Domestic Consumption )( dtQ , Production for Export )(
e
tQ , and Total 
Production )( tQ  of Case IV 
Time 
t 
Import 
Price
 )( imtp  
(2006$/ton) 
Domestic 
Price
 )( tp  
(2006$/ton) 
Production for 
Domestic 
Consumption 
)( dtQ  
(thousand tons) 
Production for 
Export
 )( etQ  
(thousand tons) 
Total 
Production 
)( et
d
tt QQQ   
(thousand tons) 
1 32.77 17.850 2,970 5,840 8,809 
2 32.77 17.850 3,168 6,150 9,318 
3 32.77 17.850 3,374 6,474 9,848 
4 32.77 17.850 3,589 6,813 10,402 
5 32.77 17.850 3,812 7,169 10,981 
6 32.77 17.850 4,045 7,540 11,586 
7 32.77 17.850 4,288 7,930 12,218 
8 32.77 17.850 4,541 8,337 12,879 
9 32.77 17.850 4,805 8,764 13,570 
10 32.77 17.850 5,081 9,212 14,292 
11 32.77 18.104 5,361 9,213 14,574 
12 32.77 19.021 5,632 8,143 13,776 
13 32.77 20.013 5,914 7,161 13,075 
14 32.77 21.082 6,205 6,271 12,476 
15 32.77 22.233 6,507 5,469 11,976 
16 32.77 23.466 6,820 4,756 11,576 
17 32.77 24.785 7,145 4,125 11,270 
18 32.77 26.191 7,482 3,572 11,054 
19 32.77 27.685 7,833 3,090 10,923 
20 32.77 29.270 8,198 1,587 9,785 
21 32.77 29.271 8,625  8,625 
22 32.77 29.271 9,073  9,073 
23 32.77 29.271 9,541  9,541 
24 32.77 29.271 9,105  9,105 
Total   143,115 127,615 270,730 
 
7.2.2 Comparisons between Cases of the Special Models 
The differences between the four cases of the special models are their 
assumptions and possible scenarios.  The order of the cases also reflects the 
development the special models, from a simple one to a complex one.  Each case gives 
different solutions from the others.  The comparison of the results of the four cases is 
shown on Table 7.6.   
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Table 7.6 Comparison of the Assumptions and Results of All Four Cases 
 
Case 
Assumed price 
elasticity of demand  Price trends 
 
Time when 
gypsum 
resource 
exhausted  
( T
*
) 
(years) 
Time 
when 
export 
ended 
(Te
*
) 
(years) 
NPV of 
the total 
surplus 
(billion 
2006 $) 
Domestic 
 )( db  
From 
abroad
 )( eb  
Domestic 
price
 )( tp
Import 
price
 )( imtp  
I 0 
Assumed to 
follow 
Hotelling 
rule 
Assumed 
to follow 
Hotelling 
rule 
33.07 0 3.073 
II 0 
Assumed to 
be constant 
Assumed 
to be 
constant 
25.27 13.68 1.538 
III 
- 0.05 
Assumed to 
follow 
Hotelling 
rule 
Assumed 
to follow 
Hotelling 
rule  
34.09 0 3.090 
- 0.1 
Assumed to 
follow 
Hotelling 
rule 
Assumed 
to follow 
Hotelling 
rule  
35.69 0 3.109 
IV - 0.1   0,  Manipulated 
Assumed 
to be 
constant 
23.91 19.60 1.791 
 
 
 a) An Analysis of Case III and Case I 
We can see from Table 7.6 that Case III with the price elasticity of demand of -
0.1 gives the highest Net Present Value (NPV) of the total surplus.  However, NPV 
cannot be the criterion to justify which case is the best because all cases have different 
assumptions.  The assumption that net prices grow in accordance with Hotelling rule 
results in high NPVs for Case III and Case I.  To adopt Case III or Case I, such an 
assumption should be, at least, highly probable or can be attainable by some means.  
But, past price data have not supported the working of Hotelling rule in the extraction 
of gypsum.  Furthermore, if the price elasticity of the aggregate demand for gypsum is 
inelastic (b < 1) as assumed by this thesis, it can be proven below that a price rise in 
accordance with Hotelling rule cannot be attainable by market forces. 
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At a point on a demand curve,  d(PQ) =  Qdp + pdQ 
where p is price, and Q is quantity. 
Therefore,  d(PQ) = pdQ
dQ
dp
p
Q
  + pdQ 
    = pdQpdQ
b

1
 
    = pdQ
b







1
1  
Where –b is the price elasticity of demand at such a point. 
Then 
dQ
pQd )(
 = p
b







1
1  
Since b < 1; therefore, p
b







1
1  < 0 
Hence 
dQ
pQd )(
 
< 0 
The above inequality means that the increase in the aggregate demand will result 
in the reduction of the aggregate revenue (pQ) earned by all producers combined.  
Therefore, to increase sales, the whole industry producing the mineral will earn less.  A 
single producer in a competitive market may face a price elasticity of demand that is 
elastic (b > 1) and could enlarge its revenue by increasing its production and sale.   
Such a producer can maximize the NPV of the stream of net benefits from the 
extraction and sale of a mineral by following Hotelling rule.  But such a producer can 
do so successfully only if few follow him/her.  If every producer thinks and does the 
same, the above inequality tells us that he/she will get the reverse outcomes—losing 
money—because the enlarging aggregate supply will result in the reduction in the 
overall incomes of the whole industry producing a mineral.  Instead, postponing the 
production and sale of a ton of the mineral now means an increase in the industry‘s 
revenues now.  In addition, the sale of the postponed tonnage, sometime in the future, 
347 
 
will add more to the present value of the overall revenues no matter what the future 
price and the discount rate are and when it will be sold.  But at any time, if the price 
elasticity of demand is still inelastic the condition favoring the postponement of the 
production and the sale of such a ton of the mineral remains unchanged, disregarding 
any positive discount rates.  In effect, even if the aim of the industry is to maximize the 
NPV of its revenues, the discount rate has no role in deciding the rates of extraction of a 
mineral in the case that the price elasticity of demand for the mineral is inelastic.  
Without the involvement of a discount rate, Hotelling rule is irrelevant.  This means that 
a monopoly or a collective action of all miners cannot achieve the maximum NPV of 
their streams of net benefits from the extractions and sales of a mineral by following 
Hotelling rule.  Therefore, there will be no monopolistic or collective action to follow 
Hotelling rule.  As a result, the price of a mineral has no chance to rise in accordance 
with Hotelling rule by market forces if the price elasticity of demand of the mineral is 
inelastic.  Of course, this analysis is valid only if all parts of the demand curve are 
totally inelastic.  If the price elasticity of demand is elastic, the above inequality tells us 
that producing and selling a ton of the mineral now renders additional revenue.  In such 
a case, Hotelling rule is logically valid.  Except a vertical line, all linear demand curves, 
no matter how steep their slopes are, always have sections that are elastic.  Therefore, 
this analysis does not totally invalidate the Hotelling rule.  The analysis will not change 
when cost is taken into account.  Therefore, it can be said that the price inelasticity of 
demand for minerals may be the critical culprit that fails Hotelling rule in the real world 
since the price elasticities of the demands for most minerals are supposedly inelastic. 
As a result, Case III and Case I should be discarded.  Indeed, they were 
presented in Chapter 6 just to see the effects of price rises and the price elasticity of 
demand on the optimal extraction paths.  
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b) Advantages and Disadvantages of Case II and Case IV 
With regard to Case II and Case IV, they assume that the world gypsum price is 
constant over time.  Case II also treats the domestic price as a constant, while Case IV 
allows the domestic price to be manipulated by some means.  As already discussed, 
constant prices of gypsum are, more or less, close to reality.  Other minor differences 
between the two are the assumption about price elasticities of demands for gypsum.  
Case II assumes zero price elasticity of domestic demand and the demand from abroad.  
This assumption is supported by the study of Chapter 5 and other studies on mineral 
demands.  Therefore, Case II, though a simple case, is close to reality if authorities do 
not intervene in prices.    
Case IV assumes a small price elasticity of domestic demand, while the price 
elasticity of demand from abroad is determined under two assumptions that 1) the world 
gypsum price is constant, and 2) countries will buy gypsum from Thailand if the 
gypsum price realized by them is cheaper than that of the Thailand‘s competitor.  The 
first assumption is evidenced by past price data, while the second assumption is logical.  
Therefore, the scenario of Case IV can be realized if price manipulation can be done 
effectively by some means. 
Advantages of Case II 
1) It is a realistic case; 
2) It allows market forces to play before the enforcement of export 
prohibition; 
3) The case is simple and therefore easy to monitor, and to make 
readjustment;  
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4) It is easy for the Thai government to enforce since the current mining 
law has already empowered the government to prohibit the export of a 
mineral; and 
5) In comparison with Case IV, the NPV of the total surplus of this case is 
not much lower than that of Case IV. 
Disadvantages of Case II 
1) It does not give the highest NPV of the total surplus to Thailand; and 
2) It may against World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, of which 
Thailand is a member. 
 
Advantage of Case IV 
1) It is a realistic case if the domestic gypsum price can be manipulated 
effectively; 
2) Export prohibition is not necessary; and 
3) It gives the highest NPV of the total surplus to Thailand; 
Disadvantages of Case IV 
1) It is a complicated model and therefore requires a lot of works to 
monitor, and to make readjustment; 
2) It requires heavy intervention and close monitoring of the government; 
3) Price fixing is really a difficult matter; 
4) A further study to reconfirm or dispute the assumption of a small price 
elasticity of demand for gypsum; 
5) Legislation is needed in order to enforce price intervention; and 
6) Prices intervention by the authority may against World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreements, of which Thailand is a member. 
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Case II and Case IV are both high probable scenarios and have both advantages 
and disadvantages.  To choose which case to pursue, consultation among stakeholders 
may be necessary before a decision is made.  
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Chapter 8    Conclusions and Recommendations 
The conclusions of this thesis and the recommendations for the Thai 
government on its gypsum resource are as follows.  
8.1 Conclusions 
Since the aim of the thesis is to propose a strategy involving the administration 
of a construction mineral resource, the thesis is begun by giving a preview of the 
situation of the construction minerals in Thailand and some of their problems in 
Chapter 1.  It points out that the peculiar uniqueness of Thailand‘s gypsum resource for 
Thailand is the major source of gypsum supply in the regions of east, south-east and 
south Asia with almost no rivals.  Thailand‘s closest competitor in the region is 
Australia. As a cheap and bulky commodity, transportation costs constitute a large 
proportion of gypsum prices paid by users.  Therefore, Thailand should have a big 
influence in setting the gypsum price in the region.  In reality, Thai gypsum producers 
have had almost no power in dictating the gypsum price because of the intense 
competition by price-cutting among themselves.  
Briefs of mining laws, taxation, and policies of Canada, Australia, Brazil, as 
well as those of Thailand are presented in Chapter 2 for readers to understand how 
countries administrate their mineral resources.  The four countries manage their mineral 
resources similarly and they treat their mining industries as special businesses that need 
tight control and to be taxed extraordinarily.  All support their mining industry at least 
by supplying potential investors with geoscience data and other useful information to 
private investors.  They also attempt to solve environmental and social problems 
resulting from mining, such as land use conflicts, pollution, abandoned mined out areas, 
similarly.   
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 A phenomenon, called the ―resource curse‖ is presented in Chapter 3 together 
with an investigation on Thailand‘s experience of the phenomenon.  The phenomenon 
is based on empirical studies of many scholars that found resource rich countries 
appeared to have experienced worse economic performance than resource poor 
countries.  It sounds as though the possession of wealthy natural resources is a curse not 
a gift.  These scholars attributed the resource curse to the effects of long term decline in 
terms of trade, revenue volatility, undesirable structural economic change, and socio-
cultural and political impacts resulted from the sudden and easy wealth of the 
government and some of its people.  However, a few resource-rich countries—notably, 
Botswana, Chile, Malaysia, and Thailand—appeared to overcome the resource curse.  
In the case of Thailand, before 1985, it showed some symptoms as if it was under the 
curse—export revenue fluctuation and decline in terms of trade.  Thailand fought such 
dire problems by implementing prudent and conservative economic policies and being 
open to foreign investment.  The influx of foreign direct investment might be the most 
important factor in overcoming the recourse curse.  Foreign investors have been 
attracted by Thailand because of its rather stable internal politics, strong elite 
bureaucrats, and cultural homogeneity.  Regional events, such as the Vietnam War, also 
helped Thailand economically.  Though, at present, the resource curse does not seem to 
be a problem for Thailand, as a developing country, it should not yet low down its 
guard against the curse. 
 Exploitation of mineral resources affects the environment and results in their 
depletion. There has been fear that the present wellbeing of humanity is gained at the 
expense of the future.  The principle and concept of sustainable development are 
presented in Chapter 4, as it should be an aim for Thailand to attain sustainable 
development in its exploitation of its gypsum resources.  It should at least follow 
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Hartwick rule.  Hartwick (1977, 1978) proposed a rule, now known as Hartwick rule, 
stating that a constant level of consumption can be sustained if all the rents on non-
renewable resources extracted at each point in time are totally invested in reproducible 
capital.  However, Hartwick rule is just a necessary but not sufficient condition.  Other 
three necessary conditions are: 1) an economy has to be already on a sustainable path, 
2) the resource extraction path must be efficient in a competitive economy, and 3) the 
economy‘s production technology is right (Perman et al., 2003).   
 Another approach to the economic definitions of sustainable development is 
based on the means to provide people with welfare, such as the one that the total capital 
stock is non-declining through time.  Indeed, to maintain non-declining total capital, 
Hartwick rule is also needed to follow if the exploitation of non-renewable resources is 
involved.  The non-declining through time of the total capital stock is also called the 
weak sustainability approach, which is based on the assumption of perfect substitution 
between natural capital and human-made capitals (comprising manufactured capital, 
human capital, social capital, and financial capital).  In the views of proponents of the 
―weak‖ concept of sustainable development, intergenerational equity will be satisfied as 
long as exploration and technological progress offset the depletion and degradation of 
mineral resources (Eggert, 2000).  It is debatable whether these views are too 
optimistic.  However, a country can always supplant its depleted mineral resources by 
import.  Therefore, the finite quantity of minerals within its boundary is not necessarily 
a barrier to economic development of a country.   
 The weak sustainability approach was the basis in formulating the sustainable 
development indicators to measure and monitor the sustainable development of a 
country.  Six proposed indicators for sustainable development, comprising Genuine 
Savings (GS), Green Net National Product (GNNP), augmented GS, augmented GNNP, 
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UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) Indicators of Sustainable 
Development, and World Bank World Development Indicators, are briefed in Chapter 
4.  In addition, numerical studies to see how well Thailand fared in sustainable 
development are presented.  It is found that, for Thailand, different indicators provide 
different answers.  GS and augmented GS show that the development of Thailand 
during the period of study, between 1993 and 2004, was sustainable.  On the other 
hand, the development of Thailand was unsustainable sometime during the period when 
GNNP, augmented GNNP, or the sustainable development composite index were used 
as indicators.  Therefore, it is still unclear whether the development of Thailand has 
achieved sustainability or not.  Noted that the green and augmentation terms had a 
small effect on NNP of Thailand; therefore, its sustainable development depended 
almost entirely on the conventional NNP.   
 The quantitative and major analyses of this thesis, which aims to propose 
strategies for maximizing the social benefit from the exploitation of Thailand‘s gypsum 
mineral resource, are presented in Chapters 5 and 6.  In Chapter 6 the economic models 
based on Hotelling‘s concept are developed to determine the optimal depletion of 
Thailand‘s gypsum resource.  However, the models of Chapter 6 require the gypsum 
consumption or demand functions of countries that consumed Thailand‘s gypsum.  
Therefore, a model determining gypsum consumption in Thailand and some countries 
that import gypsum from Thailand is developed in Chapter 5.  Because of the very 
small and incomplete data, the demand equations of the model are very simple and the 
model should be treated as a very rough method of approximation. 
 The analysis of Chapter 5 did not find a significant relationship between the 
gypsum price and its consumption.  These results conform to other empirical studies on 
demands for minerals and metals.  Many studies (eleven in all) on the demands for 
355 
 
metals either outright discarded price factors or found the price elasticities of the 
demands for metals were close to zero or very small.  The analysis of Chapter 5 also 
reaffirms those studies that the consumption of a mineral is strongly influenced by 
consumer income.  This means that a change in mineral consumption is the result of a 
shift in the demand function due to a change in consumer income, consumer taste, 
technology, etc. 
 In Chapter 6, the economic models, based on the concept of maximizing Net 
Present Value (NPV) of resource rents accrued to a society from the exploitation of a 
mineral resource, are formulated.  The optimal extraction path of Thailand‘s gypsum 
mineral resources is essentially the first step for Thailand to attain sustainable 
development in the exploitation of its gypsum resources.  The further step is for 
Thailand to reinvest the generated resource rent in accordance with the Hartwick‘s rule. 
The economic models created are under the presumption that the benefits are 
represented by the total economic welfare and the society covers just gypsum producers 
and consumers within Thailand‘s boundary.  Under some assumptions a practical 
general model is formulated.  The initial maximizing function of the general model is 
the function maximizing the discounted flow of the sum of the producer surplus, or the 
resource rents of gypsum mining industry, from the present to the time the gypsum 
resource in Thailand is depleted, and the consumer surplus from consuming gypsum 
from the present to infinity.  From the general model, it is found that the real domestic 
price movement insignificantly affects the net social benefit (net consumer surplus + 
producer surplus) generated by the gypsum production for domestic consumption, if the 
absolute value of price elasticity of demand for gypsum is very small.  But the higher 
the level of the expected import price, the bigger the net social benefit generated by the 
gypsum production for domestic consumption.   
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 However, the general model still consists of some parameters that can be 
determined with difficulty.  To solve this shortcoming, Chapter 6 presents four cases—
Case I, Case II, Case III, and Case IV—of special models with some assumed 
parameters and scenarios together with their empirical solutions.  Case I and Case III 
are based on a strong assumption that the net prices of gypsum both domestic and from 
abroad grow in accordance with Hotelling rule.  In Case II, it is assumed that the prices 
of both domestic gypsum and gypsum from abroad are fixed.  Case IV is also under an 
assumption that world gypsum price is constant overtime but domestic price is 
manipulated by some means to obtain the maximum discounted flow of the sum of the 
total surplus. Conclusively, all cases found that the export of gypsum is not always 
good to Thailand.  All solutions suggest that at some point in time before all gypsum 
resources are depleted—ranging from immediately as in Case I and Case III to 19.60 
years from now as in Case IV—Thailand should stop export of mineral gypsum.   
Overall discussions and a discussion on the empirical solutions of the special 
models of Chapter 6 are presented in Chapter 7.  The overall discussions were done 
chapter by chapter.  This thesis finds that land use conflicts, pollution, and 
environmental damage caused by mining have become social issues in all four 
countries—Canada, Australia, Brazil, and Thailand—that their mining laws, taxation, 
and policies were studied.  As a result, in the case of Thailand, now it is difficult and 
takes time for a mining investor to obtain a mining lease, as he or she has to entangle 
with several bureaucratic agencies.  It is fair to say that Thailand at present adopts a 
system of check and balance in trying to curb the adverse effects from mining.  The era 
of full mining promotion without questions in Thailand has been literally closed.   
With regard to the ―resource curse‖ phenomenon, some of its effects may be 
real.  But the curse is just a factor among many others that affect a county‘s 
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development both in good and bad ways.  The question for a country is not whether or 
not to exploit the country‘s rich natural resources, but how to mitigate the effect of the 
resource curse.   
Sustainable development, its indicators, and the computed indicators for 
sustainable development inThailand were also discussed in Chapter 7.  It found that, 
from 1993 to 2007, Thailand fulfilled the requirement of Hartwick rule as its 
government had budgeted for the capital expenditures (expenses on equipments, land, 
buildings and related expenses) in excess of the Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) 
originated from mining and quarrying sector in every year.  But, it was unclear whether 
the development of Thailand had achieved sustainability or not because when applying 
Genuine Savings (GS), augmented GS, Green Net National Product (GNNP), 
augmented GNNP and sustainable development composite index to Thailand, they 
provided different answers.  Furthermore, the economy‘s production technology is 
unknown. 
The reasons why the consumption of a mineral is strongly influenced by 
consumer income but insignificantly affected by the mineral price and the solutions of 
the adopted general consumption models of Chapter 5 together with those of many 
other studies in the field of minerals are also discussed in Chapter 7.  This thesis 
speculates that it may be because the costs (or prices) of mineral raw materials 
constitute only fractions of the prices of consumer goods.  Therefore, a reasonable 
movement of a mineral price affects the prices of consumer goods very little, and, as a 
result, the consumption of consumer goods and its mineral raw materials will not 
change much.  Moreover, in most cases, industrial plants cannot promptly switch over 
to new substitute raw materials without heavy reinvestment and time for retooling.  This 
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thesis also concludes that a change in mineral consumption is the result of a shift in the 
demand function due to a change in consumer income, consumer taste, technology, etc.  
The assumptions of a general model and the assumptions and empirical 
solutions of the special models of Chapter 6 are also discussed in Chapter 7.  
Assumptions are necessary because some parameters are difficult to determine and it is 
the intention of this thesis to put presently available theories into practice in real 
complex world rather than proposing a new theory.  With regard to the assumption 
about the extraction costs of minerals of the special models, it should be noted that the 
belief that the marginal cost of extracting minerals increases when the stocks of 
minerals get smaller has not been evidenced over time.  Exactly the opposite is more 
common as evidenced by the decreasing trends of the mineral prices despite the 
increase in the consumption of the minerals. 
Concerning the comparison between cases of the special models, this thesis 
recommends discarding Case I and Case III, in which the net prices of gypsum are 
assumed to grow in accordance with Hotelling rule.  This thesis has proven, at 
Subsection 7.2.2 of Chapter 7, that if the price elasticity of the aggregate demand for 
gypsum is inelastic, a monopoly or collusion among all mining companies cannot 
achieve the maximum NPV of their streams of net benefits by following Hotelling rule.  
Therefore, a price rise in accordance with Hotelling rule cannot be attainable by market 
forces.  The supposed price inelasticity of demand for minerals may be the critical 
culprit that fails Hotelling rule in real world. 
The remaining Case II and Case IV are both highly probable scenarios.  Both cases 
assume that the world gypsum price is constant over time.  Case II also treats the 
domestic price as a constant.  Constant prices of gypsum are, more or less, close to 
reality.  But in Case IV the domestic price is manipulated by some empowered means.  
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The major advantages of Case II are as follows: it is simple; it is easy for the Thai 
government to enforce; and it requires no new legislation.  But Case II has the 
disadvantages of rendering a smaller NPV of the total surplus to Thailand, and being 
possibly against the WTO agreements in enforcing export prohibition.  Case IV has the 
major advantages of rendering the highest NPV of the total surplus to Thailand and 
requiring no declaration of export prohibition.  The disadvantages of Case IV are as 
follows: it requires heavy intervention and close monitoring of the authority; legislation 
is needed in order to effectively enforce price intervention; and it may be against the 
WTO agreements in enforcing price intervention.  Conclusively, Case II and Case IV 
have both advantages and disadvantages.  Therefore, to choose which case to pursue, 
consultation among stakeholders may be necessary before a decision is made. 
8.2 Recommendations for the Thai Government on Gypsum 
Thailand should aim to attain sustainable development with regard to the 
exploitation of its mineral resources.  Therefore, in the case of gypsum, the resource 
extraction path of gypsum must be, at least, efficient besides obeying Hartwick rule.  
The possible optimal resource extraction paths of Thailand‘s gypsum are formulated, as 
Case I, Case II, Case III, and Case IV, in Chapter 6.  Thailand must select and follow 
the best suitable case, in addition to adopting Hartwick rule and taking actions to avoid 
resource curse, which will be proposed in the next section.   
In short, the models in Chapter 6 demonstrate that Thailand will gain better 
intertemporal social benefit by doing two things as follows:  
i) Ending export of gypsum some time before the total gypsum resource of 
Thailand is exhausted, and 
ii) Raising gypsum prices up to the level close to the expected import price. 
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8.2.1 A Plan for Ending Export of Gypsum 
The conclusive empirical results of all cases of Chapter 6 suggest that, for 
Thailand to obtain a better total social benefit, represented by the total economic 
welfare (also called social surplus or total surplus), its export of gypsum should be 
ended some time before the total gypsum resource of Thailand is exhausted.  This is 
because all gypsum production, both for domestic consumption and export, renders 
producer surplus to Thailand, but only gypsum consumed in the country offers 
consumer surplus to the country.  With a positive consumer surplus, the production of 
gypsum mineral for export gives less net benefit to Thailand than the production of 
gypsum for domestic consumption.  As a result, at least near the time that the total 
gypsum resource of Thailand is exhausted, the country should be economically better 
off if all remaining gypsum in the ground is allocated for domestic consumption only. 
However, the optimal results of all cases of Chapter 6 cannot be attained without 
government intervention because the social benefit, the sum of producer surplus and 
consumer surplus, is not the same as private benefit, producer surplus only, of private 
gypsum producers.  For producers, there is no difference between selling their product 
for domestic consumption and selling their product for export.  Besides, in the past 
when the gypsum producers were left to interact among themselves and their clients in a 
competitive world, they resort to competition by price cutting.   
Among the cases of Chapter 6, historic data of mineral prices incline to discount 
the scenarios of Case I and Case III, which are based on the assumption that the 
minerals world follows Hotelling‘s rule.  Therefore, this thesis will not recommend 
Thailand to cease export of gypsum immediately.  The objective of this thesis in 
presenting Case I and Case III are just to test the outcome of a theory and to 
demonstrate the extreme possible cases.  
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Though its results depend on many assumed data, Case IV, which allows export 
of gypsum to continue for 19.60 years, is the most interesting model that Thailand 
should follow if it can force the domestic gypsum price up at will.  Expression 6.36 of 
Chapter 6 shows that gypsum price movement in Thailand below an expected import 
price level has minimal effect on the country‘s total social welfare accrued from the 
production of mineral gypsum for domestic consumption.  Therefore, while export is 
allowed, Thailand will gain a better total discounted net social benefit if the gypsum 
price within the country is elevated in accordance with the solution of Case IV.  The 
additional gain is obviously from the higher export value.  However, this has to be done 
by some measures of market intervention by the Government.  The second best model 
for the Government to follow is that of Case II.  Under this case gypsum producers are 
allowed to freely trade in the international competitive gypsum market for 13.68 years.   
Since an abrupt end to exporting gypsum is not a recommended option and the 
next possible critical time is 13.68 years from now, the Thai government has ample 
time to plan, adjust and readjust a selected model, and to refine important parameters.  
The recommended plan for ending export of gypsum is as follows: 
a) Discuss the political and legal feasibility of raising gypsum price in 
accordance with the solution of Case IV.  Ways to raise gypsum price will be presented 
later.  Decision to raise gypsum price should be made as soon as possible because the 
earlier the price is raised the greater the net social benefit accrued to Thailand.  If 
gypsum prices can be raised in accordance with the solution of Case IV, there will not 
be a need to implement export prohibition because the high gypsum prices of the 
solution of Model IV will automatically force Thai gypsum out of the international 
market.  In this case, the process to enact export prohibition should stop.  But even if it 
is infeasible to totally follow the optimal price trend of Case IV, the Thai government 
362 
 
should not relinquish an attempt to raise the gypsum price.  Equation 6.36 of Chapter 6 
shows that the higher the domestic price the greater the total social benefit accrued to 
Thailand. 
b) Start the legislation process if raising gypsum price is politically feasible but 
the chosen way to raise gypsum price has no laws to implement. 
c) Conduct exploration to ascertain the correct total reserve of mineral gypsum 
in Thailand because it affects the time when the export of gypsum should be stopped. 
d) Conduct research to refine the parameters of the chosen model—Case IV or 
Case II—and, especially, the consumption functions because of their dynamic nature 
and their effects on the model solutions.  The parameters and the model should be 
updated regularly. 
e) In the case that it is infeasible to raise gypsum prices in accordance with the 
solution of Case IV, pronounce the policy to stop export of gypsum clearly and firmly 
to let producers, exporters, and foreign clients know in advance as early as possible or 
at least five years before the export prohibition date. 
f) Finally, prepare to implement export prohibition when the time is near. 
8.2.2 Methods and Plans for Raising Gypsum Price  
As stated in the ―Conclusion‖ and mentioned in topic 8.2.1 section a) above, the 
Thai government should attempt to raise gypsum price to increase the Net Present 
Value of social benefit accrued to Thailand.  Government intervention can raise gypsum 
price using two approaches: 
a) Pushing up costs by taxation, and 
    b) Organizing collusion between exporters or monopolizing export. 
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a) Taxation Approach 
Taxes are costs which will cause the price to increase, as shown in Figure 8.1.  
In Figure 8.1, before imposing an extra tax, the equilibrium price and quantity are 
b
tp and 
b
tQ , respectively.  After an extra tax is imposed at the rate of  per unit of tQ , 
the price paid by consumers is dtp , the price received by producers is
 
s
tp , and the 
quantity of gypsum produced after imposing an extra tax is atQ .  Hence, 
 
    
d
tp -
s
tp =  
The revenue from the extra tax is equal to at
s
t
d
t Qpp )(  .  In the case that price elasticity 
of demand for gypsum is not perfectly inelastic the extra tax shall be borne by both 
consumers and producers.  The amounts of extra tax paid by consumers and producers 
are at
b
t
d
t Qpp )(  and 
a
t
s
t
b
t Qpp )(  , respectively.  It should be noted that in case of 
inelastic demand the amount of extra tax paid by consumers is larger than that paid by 
producers and the deadweight loss (shown in Figure 8.1 as the dark shaded area) is 
small.  It means that after imposing an extra tax, the Thai government can collect a 
large part of the extra tax from consumers, but the Thai gypsum producers also bear a 
small part of the extra tax.  However, in the case that price elasticity of demand for 
gypsum is perfectly inelastic (see Figure 8.1 (b)), the extra tax revenue, dtp  times 
a
tQ , 
shall be totally borne by consumers with no deadweight loss, and the Thai gypsum 
producers do not bear any extra tax burden at all. 
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(a)                                                                  (b) 
Figure 8.1 The Effect of an Extra Tax with Price Elasticity of Demand: (a) Inelastic, 
and (b) Perfectly Inelastic  
Source: Binger and Hoffman (1998) 
Raising gypsum price by imposing an extra tax has an advantage of transferring 
a major economic rent resulting from the rising price to the government.  It will 
certainly be opposed by exporters, who appear to bear the burden of the extra tax.  
However, in actual fact, as demonstrated above, because the price elasticity of demand 
for gypsum is highly inelastic, the main burden of the extra tax is transferred to 
consumers.  Since the major use of gypsum is in construction, the largest final 
consumers are people who buy, build or repair homes.  This group of people is mostly 
the middle class.  House or apartment renters also pay indirectly, in the form of rent 
payment, for higher cost of construction.  Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 5 found 
that gypsum is an inferior good in Japan.  Therefore, unfortunately, the consumers who 
bear the slight burden of extra tax are mostly the middle class and the poor.   
It should be noted that if it is politically feasible to increase price in accordance 
with the solution of Model IV, the taxation approach has another advantage of 
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rendering export prohibition unnecessary because the increased price will automatically 
force Thai gypsum out of the international gypsum market.  Extra tax can be levied in 
the following forms: 
i) Export Duty 
Imposing export duty has an advantage of direct influence on the export 
price.  Domestic consumers will not oppose it since it does not affect domestic price.  
However, at present mineral gypsum is not on the list of goods required to pay export 
duty.  Parliamentary legislation is needed to include it and the rate of levy on the list.  
This legislation requirement is really the disadvantage of imposing export duty. 
ii) Mineral Royalty 
Mineral royalty is an ad valorem tax imposed by the government on the sale 
of minerals.  For mineral gypsum, the royalty rate at present is four per cent, and it is 
applied to gypsum produced for both export and domestic consumption.  A ministerial 
regulation, which needs just a cabinet approval, is required to increase a mineral royalty 
rate.  That is an advantage over an attempt to impose export duty.  The maximum that it 
can be increased is twenty per cent, as stated in the Mineral Royalty Rates Act, B.E. 
2509 (1966).  However, to follow the solution of Case IV requires the price to increase 
by about twenty-four per cent immediately, and to be more than double the present 
price twenty years from now.  Hence, the present law is not a complete instrument that 
can be implemented once and for all.  It needs parliamentary actions to revise the Act, 
anyway.  A disadvantage of raising mineral royalty is its effect on domestic gypsum 
users.  Gypsum users together with gypsum producers will certainly protest, though 
they actually can pass on the burden of the additional mineral royalty to consumers.  In 
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spite of that fact, its easiness and quickness to implement makes it suitable as an 
instrument of first choice, at least temporarily.   
iii) Environmental Tax 
Mining in general causes unavoidable environmental damage and creates 
pollution such as dust, contaminated water, noise, and vibration.  Therefore, it is fair to 
a society if the Pollution Pay Principle (PPP) is adopted, especially in case of gypsum 
production and consumption, which will not be much affected by some price increment.  
At present there is not really an environmental tax system in Thailand.  It is well worth 
establishing one and immediately applying it to the production of gypsum, so that all 
hidden environmental costs will be included in the gypsum production cost.  
iv) Plans for the Taxation Approach 
If the taxation approach is adopted either as a sole instrument or as an 
additional instrument to other approaches, the following plan of actions is 
recommended. 
 The royalty rate of gypsum should be increased as high as possible, 
under the constraint of the present Mineral Royalty Rates Act, and as 
soon as possible; 
 Discuss and select which tax or taxes are to be amended so that gypsum 
prices can be raised to reach the optimal point, and then, initiate the 
legislation process; 
 Conduct exploration to ascertain the correct total reserve of mineral 
gypsum in Thailand; 
 Conduct research to refine the parameters of the chosen model and the 
consumption functions; and 
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 Levy the tax or taxes in accordance with the refined model. 
b) Monopolization Approach 
A monopoly always sets the price of its product higher than the price at which it 
could sell in a competitive market.  Therefore, the gypsum price can be raised to a 
certain degree by monopolizing the export of Thai gypsum.  Such a monopoly, which 
will be authorized to be the sole exporter of Thai gypsum, can be formed as: 1) a state 
enterprise with the aim to serve the public, or 2) a private enterprise.  In any forms, 
legislation is needed to authorize a monopoly in export of the commodity.   
i) State Enterprise 
A state enterprise as the sole gypsum exporter will serve the purposes of 
increasing export prices and looking after the public interest.  A state enterprise can be 
set up by legislation.  Thailand used to have state enterprises in the mining industry.  
However, past experience did not support the establishment one for most state 
enterprises have been inefficient, prone to corruption, and often interfered with by 
politicians.  Most of all, the present economic and political trend makes the 
establishment of a state enterprise rather difficult and it will certainly be opposed by 
present gypsum exporters. 
ii) Private Monopoly 
If the monopoly is owned by the private sector, it will not act in accordance 
with the solution of Case IV because private benefit is not the same as social benefit.  A 
private monopoly will give Thailand better total social benefit than the present free 
market approach, but it needs a supplement of the taxation approach to get the optimal 
result.  To reduce opposition, private monopoly can be formed by letting the present 
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gypsum stakeholders become the shareholders of the monopolistic central gypsum 
exporting company in accordance with their present sizes of interests.   
iii) Plans for Monopolization Approach 
If a monopolization approach is chosen, the following plans are 
recommended. 
 The royalty rate of gypsum should be increased as high as possible, 
under the constraint of the present Mineral Royalty Rates Act, and as 
soon as possible.  The action is recommended because it takes time to 
establish a monopoly. 
 Discuss and choose the form of monopoly.  If the private form is chosen, 
a decision is also needed on whether to supplement it with the taxation 
approach. 
 Start the legislation process to authorize a sole exporter of gypsum and 
also to set up a state enterprise if it is chosen.  In the case that a private 
form of monopoly is chosen, the supplemental taxation approach in topic 
8.2.2 section a) part iv) should be considered. 
 Organize and let the monopoly operate. 
 Conduct exploration to ascertain the correct total reserve of mineral 
gypsum in Thailand for guiding the monopoly based on accurate data. 
 Conduct research to refine the parameters of the chosen model and the 
consumption functions for guiding the monopoly. 
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8.3 Recommendation for the Thai Government with Regard to 
Hartwick Rule and Resource Curse 
8.3.1 Obeying Hartwick Rule 
To have a chance to attain sustainable development in the exploitation of its 
mineral resources, Thailand has to obey the Hartwick rule, which states that a constant 
level of consumption can be sustained if all the rents on non-renewable resources 
extracted at each point in time are totally invested in reproducible capital.  However, 
Thailand has committed to develop its mineral resources through the private sector and 
the government has only limited means to capture the resource rents.  Therefore, direct 
reinvestments of the resource rents are in the hands and the will of the private sector.  
But it is the duties of a government to build infrastructure and support education and 
research, whether or not non-renewable resources are exploited.  Infrastructure is 
manufactured capital while the expenditure on education and research is an investment 
in human capital.  Therefore, a government can circumvent the problem of privately 
owned resource rent by allotting annual budgets to capital investment, education and 
research large enough to cover the total resource rent earned from the extraction of the 
country‘s non-renewable resources in each year.  As already discussed in the sub-
section 7.1.4 of Chapter 7, the government of Thailand has done so.  The 
recommendation of this thesis is for the government to maintain the present budgeting 
practice.  Expenditures on capital investment, education and research must always 
exceed the GDP originated from mining and quarrying sector. 
8.3.2 Avoiding Resource Curse 
As stated at the conclusion of Chapter 3 and other places in this thesis that 
Thailand has steered itself through the resource curse successfully.  With their small 
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contribution to the national economy now, non-renewable resources in Thailand could 
not invoke another round of the resource curse.  However, Thailand has not been 
economically well developed and there is always a slim chance that Thailand will 
discover economically large deposits or sources of non-renewable resources.  It is still 
possible that Thailand might depend on non-renewable resources again.  Therefore, 
Thailand should not low down its guard against the curse.  In case that it discovers a 
very rich deposit of a non-renewable resource, Thailand should do as follows: 
a) Gradual Exploitation 
The slower the development of mining projects, the greater the chance the 
economy and society have to adjust to the inflow of revenue. Different forms of 
extractive agreements—concession based on royalty and taxes, joint ventures, 
production sharing agreements, service agreement etc—will create different patterns of 
revenue flow.  
b) Sterilization of Revenue 
Sterilization of resource revenue is to neutralize the impact of the large windfall 
revenue inflow on the rest of economy. Ideally, a government should resist spending 
pressures and either to accumulate budget surpluses or to channel the revenues into 
some form of fund to be spent appropriately later.  If Thailand is in danger of the 
resource curse because it is about to develop a new rich mineral deposit, it may follow 
the way Norway, Chile and Indonesia has done by establishing a revenue fund.  The 
fund, to which all revenues from such a rich mineral resource have accrued, should be 
used not only by the current generation but also by future generations.  The fund should 
also aim to serve as a buffer between current mineral revenues and the use of these 
revenues in the Thai economy.  Thus the domestic economy is shielded from 
fluctuations in prices and extraction rates in the non-renewable resource sector.  
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Withdrawal from the fund might be capped by a fixed small percentage of the fund or 
the expected real return on the fund.  Indeed, putting all revenues from a rich mineral 
resource into a fund, which is a financial capital, partly fulfils Hartwick rule if the 
government has good effective means to capture almost all of the resource rents.  
Therefore, avoiding resource curse is nearly the same as attempting to attain sustainable 
development.  
8.4 Summary 
8.4.1 Main Messages 
 The main messages of this thesis are as follows:  
 a) Economic tools involving Hotelling‘s concept, consumer surplus and 
producer surplus can be applied to justify a policy of a specific mineral. 
 b) The Hotelling‘s concept of maximizing Net Present Value (NPV) of resource 
rents accrued to a society is rational, but it is debatable whether the Hotelling‘s rule 
works in the real world.  Among the culprits that cause the Hotelling‘s rule to fail may 
be the apparent price inelasticity of demand for minerals and the non-increasing cost of 
extracting deeper and poorer minerals due to the fast progress of mining technology.   
 c) The effects of a country boundary make export of a mineral of finite reserves 
less important than domestic consumption.  If the Hotelling‘s concept is accepted, near 
the time of exhaustion of that mineral stock, it is economically favourable to stop 
export of such mineral.   
 d) Thailand is in a unique position as the only major supplier of mineral gypsum 
in the region of Far East Asia.  To gain a better net social benefit in according to the 
Hotelling‘s concept, the government of Thailand should not allow Thai gypsum 
exporters to freely compete for limited foreign demand and should prepare to enforce a 
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measure to stop the export of gypsum some time before all its gypsum reserves are 
exhausted.    
8.4.2 Further Studies 
 Some further studies suggested by this author are as follows:  
a) Academically, the price elasticity of demand for a mineral should be further 
studied to prove or disprove that it is really highly inelastic. 
b) The government of Thailand should sponsor a complete study about the 
demand for gypsum that takes into account the whole relevant variables including 
synthetic gypsum production and prices. 
c) A full research determining GS, augmented GS, GNNP, and augmented 
GNNP of Thailand that cover all natural resources and pollution as much as possible 
should be done. 
d) Academically, the linkage between Genuine Saving and Green Net National 
Product as proposed by Pezzey and Toman (2002) that the time derivative of 
augmented GNNP is always the interest rate times augmented GS should be further 
analysed.  This suggestion stems from fact that there was a very significant mismatch 
between the hypothesis and the empirical study done on Scotland by Pezzey et al. 
(2006) and on Thailand in this thesis.   
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Appendix A The Estimation of User Cost 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) stated that (i) asset values should be measured as 
the present value of economic profits over the life of the resource; and (ii) asset 
depreciation should be measured as the user cost.  The user cost is defined as the 
change in asset value associated with mineral extraction over the accounting period.  
 For extraction, extraction costs c(qi) and constant discount rate r, the value of 
subsoil assets, in the form of minerals and mineral fuels, that will be exploited to 
exhaustion over N + 1 years should be the present value of the sequence of profits, 

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The user cost, UCt, is measured by 
UCt = Vt − Vt−1       (A2) 
Observing from the equations A1 and A2, to calculate user cost requires the 
forecast of both prices and quantities.  A number of solutions to this problem are shown 
in Table A.1. 
Table A.1 Alternative Measures of Resource Depletion (User Cost) 
Method Formula Assumptions 
Total rent 
tt qcpq   Constant unit extraction cost c , Hotelling rule: 
rcpp 

)/(  
Marginal rent 
ttt qqcpq )(  Constant price, increasing marginal extraction 
cost, Hotelling rule 
Exhaustion 
N
t
r
pq
)1( 
 
Constant price, increasing marginal extraction 
cost, Hotelling rule 
Simple PV 
Nr
cpq
)1( 

 
Constant total rent 
Quasi-optimal 
Nr
cpq
)1)(1(1
)(


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
 
Constant price, isoelastic cost function with 
increasing marginal costs, ‗near-optimal‘ path for 
extraction and marginal rents 
Source: Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) 
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  The first three approaches, total rent, marginal rent and exhaustion, need the 
assumptions of optimality.  In other words, these approaches provide correct 
measurement when the extraction path is optimal.  
For the total rent approach, the assumptions are that marginal extraction costs 
are fixed atc and a rising resource price satisfying the equation:
 
rcpp tt 

)/( , in 
accordance to the Hotelling rule.  In this case, the user costs are equal to total rents.  
Therefore,
 
 
    ttt qcpqUC        (A3) 
The marginal rent approach is under the assumptions that resource prices are 
constant, while marginal extraction costs are increasing.  According to the Hotelling 
rule, the user costs are equal to the scarcity (or marginal) rent, as expressed by the 
following equation: 
tttt qqcpqUC )(      (A4) 
For the exhaustion approach, the assumptions of constant resource prices, 
increasing marginal extraction cost, and the effectiveness of the Hotelling rule are also 
applied.  In addition, it has to conform to the exhaustion condition for the optimal 
extraction path, which states that: 
prqcp Nt  )1)](([    
where N is the number of years until resource is exhausted.  Then the user cost can be 
calculated as follows: 
N
t
t
r
pq
UC
)1( 
       (A5) 
The fourth method in Table A.1, the simple present value approach, as proposed 
by El Serafy (1989) requires no optimization of the extraction path.  The approach 
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assumes that the total rents in each period are constant at level pq – c.  In this case, 
therefore, the user costs can be calculated as:    
Nt r
cpq
UC
)1( 

       (A6) 
The fifth method in Table A.1, quasi-optimal approach, as proposed by Vincent 
(1997) offering a compromise valuation by additionally assuming that the extraction 
cost function is isoelastic with increasing marginal cost defined by: 

q
a
qc )(  for a > 
0 and elasticity > 1.  Therefore, the marginal extraction cost is qcqc /)(  , where 
c/q is the average extraction cost.  The approach is termed ‗quasi-optimal‘ because it 
combines the constant price assumption, the Hotelling rule and the exhaustion condition 
together. It follows that  
prqcp N  )1)(/(     
Then the user cost is measured as  
Nt r
cpq
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)1)(1(1
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
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
     (A7) 
Since Vincent defined N to be the reserves-to-production ratio, the approach understates 
the reserve lifetime and, hence, overstates the user cost.  
 The estimated user costs for oils of the 21 oil-producing countries by the five 
above-mentioned methods are shown in Table A.2.  To compare the user cost figures 
resulting from these five methods, one should be reminded of their drawbacks.  The 
total rent approach, which requires a rising resource price path, runs counter to the fact 
that real prices of resources are flat or slightly declining.  The marginal rent and 
exhaustion approaches, which requires the optimal extraction path or, in other words, 
quantity extracted must fall over time, is not supported by the fact that quantity 
extracted fluctuates all the time.  The simple present value approach, which is based on 
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the assumption of no optimization, means that resource owners are implicitly holding 
assets with a zero rate of return, suggesting that it would be rational to liquidate as 
much as possible in the current period.  
The ranking of user costs of the approaches in Table A.2, for 15 of the 21 
countries, is the same: total rent > marginal rent > quasi-optimal > exhaustion > simple 
present value.  The total rent and marginal rent approaches provide very similar results 
at least for the assumed value of .  The exhaustion approach is the most erratic. The 
user cost estimated by the exhaustion approach provides values extremely in excess of 
any other approach for countries with high extraction cost and small reserve life.  
However, the exhaustion approach provides the same results as those derived by the 
simple value approach for countries with low extraction cost and large reserve life.  
 The quasi-optimal approach provides the most interesting result, giving some 
middle ground between the total rent and simple present value approaches.  This quasi-
optimal approach is inconsistent with optimal depletion regarding the assumed terminal 
time and the interdependence of parameters (price, cost, terminal time and elasticity).  
Moreover, it offers the depletion values being a decreasing function of the deposit size, 
which seems correct for a ‗real world‘ estimate that does not assume full optimality 
(Atkinson and Hamilton, 2007).  
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Table A.2 Depletion Estimates for Oil in 2000 
 Reserve 
life (N) 
in years 
Total rent as 
proportion of 
total revenues 
Total 
rent 
Marginal 
rent 
Exhaustion Simple 
present 
value 
Quasi- 
optimal 
Percentage of gross national income (GNI) 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Canada 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Gabon 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Kuwait 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Peru 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Ukraine 
UK 
USA 
Venezuela 
11 
35 
7 
14 
12 
25 
11 
67 
131 
17 
25 
27 
8 
9 
21 
87 
15 
21 
6 
10 
65 
0.46 
0.45 
0.44 
0.85 
0.57 
0.52 
0.74 
0.97 
0.94 
0.84 
0.85 
0.84 
0.30 
0.62 
0.79 
0.97 
0.72 
0.89 
0.35 
0.62 
0.85 
1.4 
1.8 
1.2 
30.3 
4.0 
35.0 
7.0 
36.5 
46.4 
7.0 
4.9 
53.2 
6.0 
1.2 
21.2 
43.9 
12.4 
1.6 
0.6 
0.4 
23.7 
1.1 
1.5 
1.0 
29.5 
3.6 
30.1 
6.6 
36.3 
45.9 
6.8 
4.8 
51.6 
3.9 
1.1 
20.4 
43.7 
11.7 
1.6 
0.4 
0.3 
23.1 
1.8 
0.7 
1.9 
18.2 
4.0 
20.3 
5.6 
1.5 
0.1 
3.7 
1.7 
16.6 
13.7 
1.3 
9.8 
0.7 
8.2 
0.7 
1.3 
0.4 
1.2 
0.8 
0.3 
0.8 
     15.4 
2.3 
     10.5 
4.1 
1.4 
0.1 
3.1 
1.5 
     14.0 
4.1 
0.8 
7.8 
0.6 
5.9 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
1.0 
1.2 
1.1 
1.1 
     26.9 
3.7 
     26.8 
6.4 
       8.6 
 0.6 
6.0 
3.7 
     38.9 
5.7 
1.1 
     17.3 
4.5 
     10.9 
1.3 
0.6 
0.3 
       6.0 
Note: Assumes r = 0.05, ε = 1.15 
Source: Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) 
 
398 
 
Appendix B National Product, People's Welfare and 
Convex Economy 
A convex economy is an economy with convex production possibilities and 
preferences, as demonstrated in Figure B.1, for a simplified economy of two consumer 
goods (X and Y) and a single consumer.  The convex production possibilities and 
preferences mean that the production possibility frontier curve (TT in Figure B.1) is 
concave to the origin, while the consumer‘s indifference curves (I1 I1 and I2 I2 in 
Figure B.1) are convex to the origin.  A convex economy of the Figure B.1 will attain 
an equilibrium at the optimal point A, at which the production possibility frontier curve 
touches the highest-possible consumer‘s indifference curve I1 I1 and the common 
tangent of the two curves, pp, defines the optimal prices of the two consumer goods.  
Figure B.1 An Equilibrium for a Simplified Economy with Convex Production 
Possibilities and Preferences 
Let px and py be the prices (whether optimal or not) of the two consumer goods.  
Then, the national product of such an economy, NP, shall be defined as: 
    NP   =   pxX + pyY 
Y 
X 
T 
T 
0 
I1 
p 
A 
I2 
p 
I1 
I2 
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 For a change in the economy that does not affect the real prices of the two 
consumer goods; therefore, the price ratio, px/py, or the slope of a price ratio line is 
unchanged.  The change in the national product, 
   NP  =  pxX + pyY 
             =  py (px/ py·X + Y) 
Hence, the change in the national product, NP, will be positive only when: 
       px/ py·X + Y   >   0 
That is:    Y   >  - px/ py·X 
For X > 0, then       Y/X >  - px/ py    (B1) 
For X < 0, then       Y/X <  - px/ py    (B2) 
 The conditions set forth by the inequalities B1 and B2 dictate that the changes in 
economy that increase the national product have to go in the directions pointing above 
the price ratio line as shown in Figure B.2. 
 
Figure B.2 The Directions of the Changes in Economy from Point C to Points B1, B2 
and B3, within the Production Possibility Frontier Curve, that Increase the 
National Product. 
Y 
X 
0 
C 
B1 
B2 
B3 
p 
p 
T 
T 
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Theorem: Under the condition that the real prices are not affected, the national 
product shall increase only when changes in the economy are in the directions 
pointing above the price ratio line that passes through the beginning point of the 
changes. 
In proving that an economy has to be convex for the GNNP (Green Net National 
Product) or the NP to be a good welfare indicator, two possibilities of non-convex 
economies will be analyzed here: i) an economy with both the production possibility 
frontier curve and the consumer‘s indifference curves being convex to the origin, as 
shown in Figure B.3; and ii) an economy with both the production possibility frontier 
curve and the consumer‘s indifference curves being concave to the origin, as shown in 
Figure B.4;  
 
Figure B.3 A Non Convex Economy with both the Production Possibility Frontier 
Curve and the Consumer‘s Indifference Curves being Convex to the Origin 
A 
B 
T 
Y 
T 
X 
I1 
 
I1 
 
I2 
 
I2 
 
0 
p 
p 
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Figure B.4 A Non Convex Economy with both the Production Possibility Frontier 
Curve and the Consumer‘s Indifference Curves being Concave to the Origin 
It is shown in Figure B.3 that, with both the production possibility frontier curve 
and the consumer‘s indifference curves being convex to the origin, a change in 
economy from an optimal point A to point B makes the consumer worse off.  But the 
economic movement from A to B improves the national product because it moves in the 
direction pointing above the price ratio line, pp, satisfying the above-proven Theorem.  
In the case that the consumer‘s preferences are concave as in Figure B.4, an economic 
movement, within the production possibility frontier curve, from point B to C also 
satisfies the Theorem; therefore, the movement improves the national product.  But at 
point C, the consumer attains a lower indifference curve. Therefore, it may be 
concluded that in both cases of non convex economy the change in the national product 
is not an indicator of people‘s welfare. 
 
B 
T 
Y 
T 
X 
I1 
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I2 
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Appendix C The t-statistics and Values of All Coefficients in 
All Equation Forms of All Eight Countries 
 
 
Table C.1 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.1 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta4 beta5 beta6 
Indonesia -233709 2.678 116.053 -0.093 8.855 -25.375 0.031 
Japan -825029 -1.339 408.735 1804.460 887.366 1.172 0.139 
Korea -5464211 4.215 2739.649 981.889 -1245.998 -25.810 0.001 
Malaysia -384587 5.525 192.657 -71.043 -284.641 -1.862 0.011 
Philippines -380466 2.021 190.820 38.818 60.982 -8.700 -0.004 
Taiwan -39911 0.471 5.036 637.421 -147.620 4.473 0.041 
Vietnam -3131599 -5.659 1576.829 -27.287 -61.413 198.923 -0.020 
 
Table C.2 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.1 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.812) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta4 beta5 beta6 
Indonesia -1.473 1.441 1.449 -0.001 0.150 -1.319 2.280 
Japan -0.983 -2.661 0.984 2.999 1.720 0.308 3.564 
Korea -2.760 1.592 2.769 0.972 -1.326 -1.490 0.052 
Malaysia -0.733 2.539 0.729 -0.227 -0.852 -0.133 0.814 
Philippines -7.456 2.405 7.462 1.061 1.702 -0.958 -1.140 
Taiwan -0.032 0.289 0.008 1.711 -0.386 0.257 3.888 
Vietnam -3.300 -0.333 3.303 -0.164 -0.444 1.237 -1.945 
 
Table C.3 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.2 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta4 beta5 
Indonesia -573549 5.844 287.911 -53.409 -18.612 -55.232 
Japan 790792 -1.274 -358.714 363.933 841.146 8.513 
Korea -5426101 4.264 2720.951 989.180 -1266.044 -25.981 
Malaysia -686716 6.562 345.438 -60.545 -417.243 -3.489 
Philippines -335816 1.649 168.387 36.282 78.909 -12.475 
Taiwan -613978 -0.453 307.477 1092.211 36.843 28.283 
Vietnam -1644199 10.462 828.646 -139.182 22.108 124.478 
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Table C.4 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.2 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.796) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta4 beta5 
Indonesia -8.945 4.025 9.054 -0.638 -0.273 -3.332 
Japan 0.779 -1.763 -0.703 0.568 1.135 1.848 
Korea -3.098 1.814 3.099 1.037 -1.553 -1.602 
Malaysia -1.881 3.777 1.886 -0.197 -1.453 -0.255 
Philippines -10.134 2.101 10.175 0.980 2.418 -1.456 
Taiwan -0.331 -0.186 0.328 2.043 0.064 1.149 
Vietnam -2.613 0.630 2.619 -0.798 0.150 0.712 
 
Table C.5 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.3 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta4 beta6 
Indonesia -89163 0.334 43.207 15.731 13.927 0.043 
Japan -743652 -1.226 365.347 1863.514 875.920 0.146 
Korea -7813565 0.659 3916.572 1053.924 -787.128 0.006 
Malaysia -412762 5.307 206.861 -58.734 -276.964 0.012 
Philippines -414255 1.570 207.785 56.230 48.120 -0.006 
Taiwan 259996 0.857 -147.242 621.847 -146.315 0.041 
Vietnam -2684950 12.022 1351.187 10.554 2.861 -0.017 
 
Table C.6 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.3 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.796) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta4 beta6 
Indonesia -0.752 0.596 0.722 0.206 0.228 4.197 
Japan -0.974 -3.710 0.976 3.412 1.777 4.629 
Korea -6.192 0.546 6.238 0.991 -0.842 0.326 
Malaysia -0.902 3.912 0.897 -0.206 -0.882 0.882 
Philippines -11.276 2.264 11.304 1.777 1.454 -1.605 
Taiwan 0.671 1.439 -0.760 1.768 -0.400 4.443 
Vietnam -2.988 1.278 2.992 0.063 0.022 -1.660 
 
Table C.7 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.4 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta5 beta6 
Indonesia -237438 2.724 117.978 0.768 -25.562 0.030 
Japan -915311 -1.017 453.960 1897.428 0.699 0.137 
Korea -6653114 2.535 3329.437 675.832 -18.275 0.010 
Malaysia -290828 4.573 144.683 -123.598 0.215 0.017 
Philippines -416604 2.252 209.035 62.549 -2.910 -0.007 
Taiwan -41712 0.394 6.217 580.153 4.384 0.040 
Vietnam -3078272 -4.094 1549.839 -55.291 172.144 -0.018 
Thailand -2797371 -2.221 1403.745 303.425 79.241 0.027 
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Table C.8 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.4 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.796) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta5 beta6 
Indonesia -1.587 1.557 1.564 0.011 -1.395 2.407 
Japan -1.006 -2.006 1.009 2.918 0.169 3.245 
Korea -3.645 1.055 3.643 0.665 -1.080 0.638 
Malaysia -0.574 2.480 0.567 -0.408 0.016 1.426 
Philippines -8.293 2.509 8.312 1.707 -0.319 -1.939 
Taiwan -0.035 0.254 0.010 1.767 0.262 4.029 
Vietnam -3.396 -0.256 3.400 -0.374 1.200 -1.975 
Thailand -2.821 -0.352 2.807 0.791 1.414 1.993 
 
Table C.9 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.5 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta4 beta5 beta6 
Indonesia -233687 2.677 116.041 8.849 -25.371 0.031 
Japan 333730 -1.090 -145.104 1026.362 4.820 0.060 
Korea -4749573 4.750 2383.524 -1037.441 -26.616 0.003 
Malaysia -436452 5.370 218.486 -299.582 -0.915 0.011 
Philippines -356529 2.421 178.923 75.463 -13.484 -0.004 
Taiwan 316449 0.653 -173.074 113.446 -0.369 0.046 
Vietnam -3187048 -5.724 1604.560 -70.048 194.062 -0.020 
 
Table C.10 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.5 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.796) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta4 beta5 beta6 
Indonesia -1.555 1.605 1.531 0.157 -1.401 2.518 
Japan 0.341 -1.671 -0.297 1.520 1.016 1.591 
Korea -2.590 1.839 2.600 -1.137 -1.542 0.190 
Malaysia -0.967 2.719 0.958 -0.957 -0.071 0.843 
Philippines -7.747 3.208 7.741 2.265 -1.701 -1.071 
Taiwan 0.240 0.371 -0.259 0.298 -0.020 4.299 
Vietnam -3.764 -0.353 3.764 -0.573 1.286 -2.235 
 
Table C.11 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.6 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta4 
Indonesia -529654 1.394 266.734 -74.303 -41.856 
Japan 2399554 -0.087 -1171.434 280.475 701.529 
Korea -7660747 0.836 3842.682 1106.599 -902.423 
Malaysia -753961 6.190 379.358 -36.542 -408.430 
Philippines -369062 0.714 185.072 63.789 66.725 
Taiwan 1454110 2.180 -740.757 1056.165 77.226 
Vietnam -1497257 20.572 754.087 -102.847 56.358 
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Table C.12 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.6 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.782) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta4 
Indonesia -6.219 1.804 6.308 -0.656 -0.455 
Japan 4.189 -0.239 -4.132 0.401 0.868 
Korea -6.798 0.808 6.823 1.094 -1.084 
Malaysia -3.115 6.830 3.140 -0.130 -1.492 
Philippines -14.703 1.514 14.831 1.916 2.023 
Taiwan 3.251 2.640 -3.296 1.953 0.133 
Vietnam -2.572 2.440 2.579 -0.629 0.413 
 
Table C.13 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.7 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta5 
Indonesia -575334 5.836 288.727 -56.859 -55.697 
Japan 686562 -0.969 -306.986 468.693 7.980 
Korea -6386384 2.855 3200.029 709.099 -18.975 
Malaysia -802899 5.749 403.108 -151.305 -1.091 
Philippines -346838 1.629 174.017 71.650 -7.159 
Taiwan -615310 -0.436 308.120 1108.144 28.380 
Vietnam -1623524 10.293 818.312 -131.181 133.046 
Thailand -3536238 0.369 1776.514 253.766 78.815 
 
Table C.14 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.7 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.782) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta5 
Indonesia -9.389 4.185 9.493 -0.716 -3.516 
Japan 0.671 -1.428 -0.597 0.731 1.721 
Korea -3.686 1.246 3.683 0.716 -1.152 
Malaysia -2.157 3.344 2.156 -0.480 -0.077 
Philippines -8.918 1.752 8.964 1.778 -0.729 
Taiwan -0.347 -0.188 0.343 2.444 1.206 
Vietnam -2.759 0.648 2.764 -0.824 0.840 
Thailand -3.442 0.053 3.430 0.593 1.259 
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Table C.15 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.8 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta6 
Indonesia -93367 0.379 45.398 17.275 0.042 
Japan -865829 -0.952 427.599 1932.111 0.141 
Korea -8169595 0.205 4090.822 822.401 0.012 
Malaysia -287172 4.596 142.838 -125.232 0.017 
Philippines -426785 2.058 214.141 67.376 -0.007 
Taiwan 252297 0.773 -143.069 565.382 0.041 
Vietnam -2684581 12.066 1351.003 12.348 -0.017 
Thailand -1552307 6.242 775.247 203.413 0.027 
 
Table C.16 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.8 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.782) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta6 
Indonesia -0.831 0.754 0.800 0.237 4.428 
Japan -1.049 -2.999 1.057 3.265 4.148 
Korea -6.956 0.192 6.987 0.810 0.705 
Malaysia -0.666 4.250 0.659 -0.460 1.492 
Philippines -11.432 3.246 11.474 2.099 -2.159 
Taiwan 0.676 1.438 -0.767 1.820 4.594 
Vietnam -3.121 1.372 3.125 0.089 -1.794 
Thailand -3.267 2.970 3.250 0.518 1.910 
 
Table C.17 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.9 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta4 beta5 
Indonesia -595986 5.691 298.909 -25.166 -56.025 
Japan 880936 -1.196 -402.807 901.846 8.328 
Korea -4588445 4.950 2304.316 -1106.088 -27.273 
Malaysia -728029 6.419 365.989 -428.698 -2.665 
Philippines -315731 2.044 158.417 91.542 -16.762 
Taiwan -87333 -0.349 48.333 581.515 25.332 
Vietnam -1713623 12.813 862.635 -13.784 83.699 
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Table C.18 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.9 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.782) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta4 beta5 
Indonesia -11.399 4.076 11.471 -0.384 -3.476 
Japan 0.904 -1.736 -0.822 1.266 1.866 
Korea -2.943 2.187 2.943 -1.377 -1.682 
Malaysia -2.543 4.239 2.536 -1.590 -0.213 
Philippines -12.146 3.043 12.158 3.059 -2.278 
Taiwan -0.042 -0.128 0.046 1.017 0.917 
Vietnam -2.793 0.796 2.794 -0.100 0.508 
 
Table C.19 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.10 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta4 beta6 
Indonesia -89280 0.408 43.368 15.038 0.042 
Japan 880120 -0.537 -426.835 994.769 0.078 
Korea -7123677 1.115 3572.987 -547.337 0.009 
Malaysia -446795 5.267 223.730 -294.048 0.011 
Philippines -403949 1.863 202.844 62.366 -0.007 
Taiwan 291775 0.620 -160.540 113.876 0.046 
Vietnam -2658383 12.221 1337.878 6.946 -0.017 
 
Table C.20 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.10 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.782) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta4 beta6 
Indonesia -0.785 0.986 0.755 0.258 4.496 
Japan 1.074 -1.494 -1.059 1.473 2.327 
Korea -6.773 1.002 6.831 -0.606 0.482 
Malaysia -1.091 4.089 1.082 -1.012 0.904 
Philippines -10.252 2.547 10.279 1.788 -1.741 
Taiwan 0.694 0.985 -0.764 0.313 4.735 
Vietnam -3.497 1.440 3.498 0.063 -1.870 
 
Table C.21 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.11 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta5 beta6 
Indonesia -237644 2.731 118.087 -25.595 0.030 
Japan 298070 -0.700 -125.643 4.488 0.054 
Korea -5989642 3.128 2999.134 -19.776 0.011 
Malaysia -375796 4.202 186.875 2.126 0.018 
Philippines -387660 3.111 194.762 -9.334 -0.008 
Taiwan 347348 0.738 -188.773 -0.685 0.047 
Vietnam -3191815 -3.728 1606.516 151.719 -0.019 
Thailand -2589500 -0.562 1300.422 71.074 0.026 
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Table C.22 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.11 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.782) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta5 beta6 
Indonesia -1.673 1.744 1.650 -1.479 2.665 
Japan 0.289 -1.108 -0.244 0.899 1.353 
Korea -4.013 1.435 4.005 -1.208 0.689 
Malaysia -0.844 2.716 0.831 0.172 1.509 
Philippines -7.613 3.886 7.626 -1.044 -2.021 
Taiwan 0.275 0.442 -0.294 -0.038 4.760 
Vietnam -3.880 -0.242 3.879 1.187 -2.227 
Thailand -2.751 -0.096 2.737 1.311 1.977 
 
Table C.23 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.12 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 
Indonesia -532873 1.291 268.184 -82.542 
Japan 2226805 0.108 -1084.946 373.169 
Korea -7937089 0.461 3979.113 865.735 
Malaysia -823455 5.636 413.483 -143.082 
Philippines -366215 1.056 183.732 85.192 
Taiwan 1466188 2.234 -746.946 1089.427 
Vietnam -1409401 22.075 709.957 -72.879 
Thailand -2295862 8.780 1150.383 154.424 
 
Table C.24 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.12 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.771) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 
Indonesia -6.479 1.803 6.564 -0.762 
Japan 4.185 0.381 -4.126 0.545 
Korea -7.183 0.470 7.201 0.872 
Malaysia -3.314 6.517 3.332 -0.502 
Philippines -13.133 2.159 13.252 2.426 
Taiwan 3.482 3.231 -3.534 2.363 
Vietnam -2.688 3.000 2.695 -0.514 
Thailand -7.683 4.914 7.750 0.359 
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Table C.25 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.13 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta4 
Indonesia -560163 1.090 281.695 -51.492 
Japan 2442347 -0.046 -1191.932 750.889 
Korea -6843159 1.416 3436.603 -702.066 
Malaysia -770893 6.154 387.707 -417.444 
Philippines -348471 0.890 175.000 86.806 
Taiwan 1755722 2.014 -886.072 601.653 
Vietnam -1592252 19.795 801.289 18.289 
 
Table C.26 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.13 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.771) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta4 
Indonesia -8.029 1.800 8.090 -0.580 
Japan 4.487 -0.137 -4.419 0.972 
Korea -8.049 1.580 8.051 -0.858 
Malaysia -3.932 7.427 3.943 -1.640 
Philippines -13.991 1.755 14.083 2.528 
Taiwan 3.792 2.223 -3.789 1.060 
Vietnam -2.901 2.431 2.903 0.153 
 
Table C.27 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.14 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta5 
Indonesia -600461 5.667 301.021 -56.739 
Japan 795225 -0.838 -360.066 7.686 
Korea -5673428 3.496 2845.281 -20.594 
Malaysia -918887 5.319 460.797 1.229 
Philippines -303968 2.547 152.797 -15.199 
Taiwan 40466 0.016 -14.802 26.412 
Vietnam -1730584 13.022 871.084 76.195 
Thailand -3345666 1.706 1681.671 71.965 
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Table C.28 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.14 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.771) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta5 
Indonesia -12.188 4.203 12.227 -3.666 
Japan 0.800 -1.303 -0.720 1.695 
Korea -4.078 1.690 4.063 -1.287 
Malaysia -3.345 3.735 3.317 0.095 
Philippines -9.225 3.051 9.242 -1.616 
Taiwan 0.020 0.006 -0.014 0.955 
Vietnam -3.054 0.849 3.052 0.541 
Thailand -3.517 0.268 3.501 1.200 
 
Table C.29 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.15 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta6 
Indonesia -93867 0.465 45.770 0.042 
Japan 808891 -0.195 -389.064 0.071 
Korea -7501943 0.702 3759.092 0.012 
Malaysia -347426 4.404 172.454 0.017 
Philippines -418388 2.615 210.246 -0.009 
Taiwan 301599 0.678 -165.533 0.047 
Vietnam -2642713 12.472 1330.032 -0.017 
Thailand -1497103 6.788 748.497 0.026 
 
Table C.30 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 1.15 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.771) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta6 
Indonesia -0.867 1.380 0.838 4.755 
Japan 0.947 -0.680 -0.927 2.034 
Korea -9.083 0.817 9.100 0.765 
Malaysia -0.873 4.556 0.860 1.562 
Philippines -10.034 4.044 10.078 -2.486 
Taiwan 0.746 1.168 -0.819 5.213 
Vietnam -3.825 1.727 3.824 -1.952 
Thailand -3.328 3.842 3.309 1.935 
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Table C.31 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 2.1 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta7 beta5 beta6 
Indonesia -228887 3.120 113.672 -0.280 -26.435 0.031 
Japan 201479 -0.721 -78.961 0.046 4.211 0.059 
Korea -5526941 2.893 2770.236 1.112 -25.762 0.001 
Malaysia -502884 3.962 250.733 0.416 2.479 0.015 
Philippines -373978 3.345 187.917 -0.180 -11.609 -0.007 
Taiwan 192481 0.426 -111.453 0.305 1.803 0.046 
Vietnam -3260174 -6.396 1640.866 2.131 155.940 -0.021 
 
Table C.32 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 2.1 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.796) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta7 beta5 beta6 
Indonesia -1.550 1.745 1.528 -0.510 -1.473 2.605 
Japan 0.177 -1.088 -0.140 0.256 0.793 1.290 
Korea -3.760 1.378 3.758 1.418 -1.582 0.078 
Malaysia -0.991 2.409 0.980 0.583 0.194 1.108 
Philippines -6.124 3.406 6.139 -0.444 -1.097 -1.685 
Taiwan 0.153 0.254 -0.174 1.113 0.101 4.623 
Vietnam -3.795 -0.383 3.794 0.518 1.180 -2.211 
 
Table C.33 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 2.2 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta7 beta5 
Indonesia -596821 5.974 299.185 -0.204 -57.590 
Japan 851032 -0.802 -387.591 -0.049 7.678 
Korea -5485338 2.924 2749.910 1.137 -25.977 
Malaysia -975639 4.549 488.993 0.735 2.129 
Philippines -288372 3.188 145.011 -0.411 -19.302 
Taiwan -183260 -0.431 95.936 0.468 28.980 
Vietnam -1746726 13.475 879.227 -0.721 76.796 
 
Table C.34 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 2.2 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.782) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta7 beta5 
Indonesia -11.381 3.474 11.411 -0.307 -3.537 
Japan 0.812 -1.182 -0.736 -0.292 1.632 
Korea -4.184 1.482 4.166 1.657 -1.690 
Malaysia -3.523 2.895 3.494 1.114 0.165 
Philippines -7.921 3.036 7.946 -1.006 -1.883 
Taiwan -0.089 -0.157 0.092 1.050 1.048 
Vietnam -2.922 0.832 2.921 -0.161 0.525 
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Table C.35 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 2.3 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta7 beta6 
Indonesia -83968 0.696 40.783 -0.205 0.042 
Japan 600479 -0.281 -286.682 0.075 0.077 
Korea -7498461 0.013 3759.912 0.791 0.006 
Malaysia -467873 4.200 232.946 0.410 0.014 
Philippines -419608 2.593 210.851 0.035 -0.009 
Taiwan 312733 0.584 -172.524 0.301 0.046 
Vietnam -2688353 10.565 1352.952 1.832 -0.018 
 
Table C.36 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 2.3 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.782) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta7 beta6 
Indonesia -0.728 0.950 0.701 -0.359 4.593 
Japan 0.597 -0.788 -0.580 0.433 1.992 
Korea -9.067 0.012 9.091 0.984 0.331 
Malaysia -1.028 4.006 1.016 0.598 1.150 
Philippines -9.305 3.655 9.351 0.099 -2.373 
Taiwan 0.783 1.008 -0.864 1.158 5.149 
Vietnam -3.729 1.225 3.729 0.440 -1.934 
 
Table C.37 Coefficients of Equation Form no. 2.4 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta7 
Indonesia -572482 0.690 287.619 0.198 
Japan 2324595 0.217 -1132.205 -0.051 
Korea -7383030 0.046 3704.525 0.892 
Malaysia -943788 4.752 472.819 0.729 
Philippines -332471 1.562 167.245 -0.105 
Taiwan 1936570 2.309 -978.487 0.427 
Vietnam -1559028 20.963 784.690 -0.661 
 
Table C.38 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 2.4 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.771) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta7 
Indonesia -8.020 0.590 8.052 0.219 
Japan 4.104 0.775 -4.043 -0.284 
Korea -10.202 0.043 10.149 1.244 
Malaysia -4.930 5.035 4.910 1.149 
Philippines -10.908 2.392 10.992 -0.255 
Taiwan 4.598 2.841 -4.590 0.957 
Vietnam -3.351 2.823 3.349 -0.152 
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Table C.39 t-statistics and Values of Coefficients of Equation Form no. 2.5 
Country Coefficient 
0 1 2 R
2 F-statistic 
Indonesia -568497.9 (-8.53) 0.918154 (1.78) 285.6207 (8.57) 0.87 45.60 
Japan 2268538 (4.42) 0.181293 (0.75) -1104.577 (-4.35) 0.74 19.71 
Korea -7214542 (-9.96) 1.005988 (1.34) 3620.388 (9.90) 0.90 63.60 
Malaysia -900731.2 (-4.74) 5.432618 (7.31) 451.5747 (4.72) 0.63 11.84 
Philippines -334353.6 (-11.70) 1.472246 (2.77) 168.1712 (11.78) 0.91 75.00 
Taiwan 1969560 (4.71) 2.496265 (3.17) -992.7673 (-4.68) 0.62 11.44 
Vietnam -1545571 (-3.51) 20.49411 (3.15) 777.9013 (3.51) 0.54 8.33 
Thailand -2243722 (-8.87) 9.162343 (6.59) 1124.918 (8.91) 0.86 42.73 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and critical t-value is 1.761.  
 
Table C.40 Coefficients of Equation 5.16 
Country Coefficient 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta4 beta5 beta6 
Indonesia -108.227 0.540 0.052 -0.148 0.190 -0.320 0.866 
Japan -10.174 -0.789 0.006 0.336 0.154 0.131 1.117 
Korea -339.720 -0.752 0.176 0.017 0.255 0.483 0.132 
Malaysia -13.669 0.786 0.006 -0.036 -0.102 0.036 0.345 
Philippines -118.510 0.570 0.062 0.186 0.328 0.014 -0.147 
Taiwan 9.390 0.701 -0.012 0.421 -0.130 -0.021 1.321 
Vietnam 138.053 1.058 -0.070 -0.151 0.093 -0.019 0.492 
 
Table C.41 t-statistics of Coefficients of Equation 5.16 
 
 
Country t-statistic of coefficient (critical t-value = 1.812) 
  beta0 beta1 beta2 beta3 beta4 beta5 beta6 
Indonesia -2.368 0.841 2.046 -0.388 0.640 -0.698 1.585 
Japan -0.673 -2.280 0.879 2.570 1.481 0.541 2.857 
Korea -7.717 -0.960 7.824 0.059 0.853 1.022 0.297 
Malaysia -0.686 2.246 0.573 -0.211 -0.618 0.305 1.187 
Philippines -3.920 1.103 3.794 0.618 1.257 0.042 -0.464 
Taiwan 0.161 0.664 -0.389 1.552 -0.585 -0.060 3.174 
Vietnam 1.400 2.662 -1.364 -0.733 0.455 -0.061 1.577 
